- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

"Big Brother Inside" tshirts
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

I regret to inform the group that I cannot make the T-shirts. I have no money to fund them, and even less time. I do, however, encourage anyone else who want to make the shirts to do so. I uploaded the logos to soda this morning, so they should be available soon (if not already). I printed on of the images out (the large one) and it looked great...... I am sorry for this, but I am absolutely financially strapped now. BTW, the images names started with "BigBro" -= and if you want, you can strip off the "Image Edited by Nate Sammons" line I dropped in the lower right corner of the large images (it was in, I think, 12-pixel high letters). Well, for anyone whe makes the T-shirts, put something cool on the back, and sign me up for one, size XL. -nate sammons nate(a)vis.colostate.edu

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...
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

I think the T-shirt thing is a nice idea, and I think that the "Big Brother Inside" thing is also a nice idea, but I liked them better when they were separate. Wearing a shirt that suggests "big brother inside" seems like it might send the wrong message. Dunno if there are enough of us in the world for it to be worth worrying about, but some of us Cypherpunks just laugh at L and XL T-shirt sizes; best fit for me is a XXXL-Tall. I might order an XL shirt to hang on my wall, but it's unlikely it'll ever hang on me. :) The "celebrating 400 years .." thing sounds wonderful. Would make a neat poster/flyer, too. -- Greg Broiles greg(a)goldenbear.com Golden Bear Computer Consulting +1 503 465 0325 Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440 BBS: +1 503 687 7764

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cross-post
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Path: transfer.stratus.com!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme From: cme(a)ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Skipjack review as a side-track Date: 2 Aug 1993 21:25:11 GMT Organization: Stratus Computer, Marlboro MA Lines: 28 Message-ID: <23k0nn$8gk(a)transfer.stratus.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com It amuses the gallows-humor bone in me to see people busily debating the quality of Skipjack as an algorithm and the quality of the review of its strength. Someone proposes to dangle you over the Grand Canyon using sewing thread tied to steel chain tied to knitting yarn and you're debating whether the steel chain has been X-rayed properly to see if there are flaws in the metal. Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders, distribution of keys once acquired from escrow agencies and safety of keys within escrow agencies are some of the real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as my use of 1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in keeping keys on the two sides of a conversation with no one in the middle able to get the key, then we need to look at the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack itself. -- - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>> - Carl Ellison cme(a)sw.stratus.com - Stratus Computer Inc. M3-2-BKW TEL: (508)460-2783 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298 FAX: (508)624-7488

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Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

>Message-Id: <199308021828.AA12198(a)flubber.cc.utexas.edu> >Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts >Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:28:36 -0500 (CDT) >From: Jim McCoy <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> I wrote: >> "celebrating 4000 years of strong cryptography in the >> hands of private citizens" Jim replied: >A nice thought, but it is not quite true now, is it? Cryptography has been >a tool for specialists, scholars, and governments for those 4000 years, but >to claim that "the masses" have had access to it is clearly untrue. In >fact, it seems that the current friction between groups such as this one >and the U.S. governement is caused mostly because private citizens are >beginning to get access to this strong cryptography and this is something >"those who watch" do not like... Jim, I meant precisely this. It is quite true. I didn't say "the masses". In the old days, first you had to be literate to use crypto. That excluded the masses immediately. However, it was private citizens -- not military folks or diplomats -- who had access to and who often invented the crypto. I am concerned that you would continue to state the popular misconception. This is, in fact, my one complaint with Julian's article in the Village Voice. Check out the first several chapters of David Kahn's "The Codebreakers". Cryptography originated with private individuals. Private individuals have *always* had access to and used cryptography at least as strong as that used by the military of the time. The few exceptions have been very short-lived and rare. My 4 examples for the T-shirt show a steady progression of strong cryptography in the hands of private citizens. I stopped at 4 to keep from making the T-shirt too busy. I *really* recommend reading Kahn about this. The notion that strong crypto in private hands is somehow new is totally bogus -- flattering to those of us who like to think we're better off than our parents or that we're exploring new ground -- but it's wrong and, even worse, it plays into the hands of the NSA and FBI. Once you start saying that citizens have "first time ever" access to strong crypto, the FBI is free to turn around and say "OK - now the gov't will have first time ever power to take strong crypto away from the people". Read Kahn. - Carl

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Re: LEEF->LEAF etc.
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

>Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:46:24 -0400 >From: technopagan priest <tedwards(a)wam.umd.edu> >Message-Id: <199308021746.AA17259(a)rac2.wam.umd.edu> >Subject: LEEF->LEAF etc. >I am very concerned about the key-exchange system. As far as I can >see, we still don't know exactly what it is, and whether that is safe. Safe? You are joking, yes? As long as *anyone* has skeleton keys, the system is worthless. Even if *I* am the one holding the skeleton keys, you shouldn't trust it, and I'm a great deal more trustworthy than the FBI and NSA and CIA, according to our respective histories of abuses of privacy. - Carl - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>> - Carl Ellison cme(a)sw.stratus.com - Stratus Computer Inc. M3-2-BKW TEL: (508)460-2783 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298 FAX: (508)624-7488

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Re: SKIPJACK PANEL
by Peter Wayner 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Tom Knight is correct that the key generation process is a good place to hide a weakness. If I remember correctly, the chip's key is generated directly from it's ID number by padding it with 160 random bits and encrypting the whole mess. 80 bits of the result becomes the key. Obviously, if you can keep a copy of the 160 bits of padding, then you can regenerate the chip's local key without calling up the key-escrow fascility. Apparently, an early document said that each collection of padding would be used for a batch of 300 chips. So if you can keep a list of these padding bits, then you're set... (Disclosure: This data came from the hip, not from documents.) -Peter

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Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

>From: csvcjld(a)nomvst.lsumc.edu >Message-Id: <19930802100425065(a)nomvst.lsumc.edu> >Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts >Date: 02 Aug 93 10:04:25 -0700 >"When privacy is outlawed, only governments will have privacy." How about, "celebrating 4000 years of strong cryptography in the hands of private citizens" ?? - Carl

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SKIPJACK PANEL
by Sandy 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA* CRAY COMPUTER? Since many of the objections to the whole plan arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests? How difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer? Next big news items: United Nations hires Serbian troops to report on human rights violations in Bosnia. Farmer Brown puts fox in charge of henhouse. Film at eleven. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: money tracing
by baumbach＠atmel.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Thug writes: > The black ink that is used to print the front side of U.S. cash contains a > very finely ground black iron oxide powder. The ink is magnetic. This > magnetism is used mostly by vending & change machines to distinguish real > bills from forgeries/photocopies. >[...] > 3. Magnetic ink detection. Real bills are printed with magnetic > ink, forgeries/photocopies are not. Magnetic toner for laser printers does exist. Its purpose is to allow people to print their own checks. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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LEEF->LEAF etc.
by technopagan priest 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

I think it is interesting how the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field has been renamed LEAF. Good P.R. move NIST! I'm personally not motivated to believe that Skipjack is a flawed algorithm, but at the same time I do not consider it tested until it has stood up to peer-reviewed public analysis. I am very concerned about the key-exchange system. As far as I can see, we still don't know exactly what it is, and whether that is safe. Public key systems are much more difficult to design securely than private key systems. The key exchange has to be secure from eavesdroppers and also proof against "man-in-the-middle" attacks. Furthermore, there is the traffic-analysis problem. Everything I have read so far has indicated there will be a single system key which will encrypt Clipper serial numbers. A trivial phone tap with someone armed with the system key could result in massive traffic-analysis, and the government could do this simply because they have the system key, the Mafia will follow soon. I think a good avenue of attack right now is to politically attack the key-escrow parts of Clipper, and get Skipjack as a published private-key standard. Write your congresscritters. -Thomas

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