- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

INSLAW
by DIC1241＠cup.edu 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Ahhh, I was looking around on ftp.eff.org and I found something(a paper) on the INSLAW thingie... So if you want it, ftp ftp.eff.org and get pub/cud/papers/inslw*...

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InfoWorld Letter
by Paul Goggin 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Brought to without permission of anyone in authority. InfoWorld August 2,1993 Section: To the Editor (pg.54) _Big Brother's encryption_ In his Peer to Peer essay on the Clipper data encryption chip (see "Clipper chip won't clip your wings, it will just protect the unprotected," June 21, page 55), A. Padgett Peterson contends that "the government has more to lose by being exposed to world ridicule from a trapdoor or backdoor than it can hope to gain." My direct experience with the National Security Agency indicates otherwise. At the 1981 fall Comdex, Epic computer Corp. unveiled Kryptyk, the only commerical E-mail crypto package for CP/M computers. My software team and I had implemented the first RSA public key cryptosystem for microprocessors. Our booth was swamped with managers from the Fortune 500 and many international firms. Our ecstasy was still strong when a week later we were visited by the NSA. I proudly explained that we could not inject a trapdoor function -- that cracking the algorithm was computationally infeasible, even with the then- recent advances of prime number theory in France. Within a month we received a letter from the Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms the proclaimed our product was "strategic munition" and could not be sold either to multinational companies nor outside the continental United States -- a heavy penalty for not allowing a trapdoor. And we should believe that NIST and NSA did not boobytrap the Clipper chip? I agree with Mr. Peterson that "security by obscurity just does not work." Remember Watergate? Teh Warren Commission's magic-bullet findings? But as long as governments are the only people who can depend on having secrets, they will always view their citizenry as fools to be manipulated. And when governments sanction data security, rest assured they can freely "E-avesdrop" Steven Fisher, CDP Controlled Information Environments Compuserve: 71750,3203 All spelling mistakes my own. Paul -- R O All Comments Copyright by | Technofetisht A N Paul S. Goggin (1993) | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos V Information Broker | Ergoflux, Interzone E chaos(a)aql.gatech.edu | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744(a)charcoal.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden

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Nice summary of NIST/PKP Deal in sci.crypt
by tcmay＠netcom.com 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Ross Williams has distributed a nice summary of the current NIST/PKP/DSA situation in sci.crypt, entitled "NIST/PKP scandal: All you need to act." It's 2000 lines, so I'm not sending it out to the entire List (and, no, I was not the one Lance said chastised him, at least not so far as I know). Anyone without Usenet access to sci.crypt can mail me and I'll forward to you the Williams article. If enough folks are sci-crypt-deprived, perhaps I'll post the whole thing. Cheers, -Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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things that have been on my mind
by bwp＠mindvox.phantom.com 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Reading Denning's latest remarks about the key generation process of Clipper being classified, and reading the latest tired redundant flame war with David Sternlight in Usenet, I have to wonder why so much energy is being spent trying to discredit these people who are obviously working towards Clipper and against pgp. Denning has her own agenda, Lord knows where it all comes from, and she's apparently listened to in the government. Sternlight, well, I can't get a handle on him, but it seems like his motives are somewhat similar to Denning's except that he hides his statements behind a veil of claiming to want what is "legal." The thing is, why spend any energy on these two at all? CP's write code. If CP's want to exert any political pressure at all, they should be working with CPSR and EFF to mount a public information drive similar to that which was put up against the FBI Wiretap-PBX deal. Making congressmen uncomfortable with Clipper and facilitating the efforts of reporters like those behind more the recent spate of news articles is where CP's can excel. Just my thought for the day. Preserving privacy is a cause worth fighting for, but keep your eyes on the prize. On the other hand, maybe there's nothing here to get upset over; after all, this is the same government that nominated Kimba Woods. ;-) -bwp

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Mulivor's new address
by pmulivor＠eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

To the sizeable group of cypherpunks who have been in contact with me during the last couple weeks concerning my current magazine article: I've just been given a new e-mail address -- pmulivor(a)eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu. Please direct all e-mail there from now on. Thanks for the valuable assistance you've provided. I've enjoyed working with you all. Phil Mulivor 716 256-2222 716 244-7212 716 271-4052 (fax)

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"Big Brother Inside" tshirts
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

I regret to inform the group that I cannot make the T-shirts. I have no money to fund them, and even less time. I do, however, encourage anyone else who want to make the shirts to do so. I uploaded the logos to soda this morning, so they should be available soon (if not already). I printed on of the images out (the large one) and it looked great...... I am sorry for this, but I am absolutely financially strapped now. BTW, the images names started with "BigBro" -= and if you want, you can strip off the "Image Edited by Nate Sammons" line I dropped in the lower right corner of the large images (it was in, I think, 12-pixel high letters). Well, for anyone whe makes the T-shirts, put something cool on the back, and sign me up for one, size XL. -nate sammons nate(a)vis.colostate.edu

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Key Generation Scheme...
by Peter Wayner 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

According to my latest communication with Dorothy Denning: "The key generation process is not as described in my earlier Clipper paper and is classifed. We did look at it and will come back to it in our Final Report." So don't even bother spending your time thinking about what she wrote before. -Peter

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Clipper Key generation
by L. Detweiler 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

The Clipper key generation is almost too bizarre to contemplate. In the recent Denning article we still have the fantastically implausible (or at least unimaginable) indication that it is all done on a `laptop computer'. She left out the indication that it is destroyed. Only one implausibility at a time. Anyway, there are various aspects that don't entirely make sense, or seem to indicate some kind of ulterior design constraints. I would like to hear speculation on what the design constraints were. In particular, they could just let the key generator site create random keys. But then there would be accusations that they are encoding secret information or something, and the appearance is too much like `we will know all the keys' irrespective of key escrow agencies. So we have this picture of the two escrow agencies entering in information into the initial system that determines the final unit key, two 80 bit values. This means the escrow agencies could theoretically combine keys and reproduce the entire process to recompute the unit key and prove that the key generation as described is actually taking place. It also makes it look like the key originates completely from outside sources. But wait! The generation site (read: NSA in capital letters) supplies the `starting serial number'. That is, it is completely at the discretion of the NSA to determine the serial number. Now, given that this should be random and contain no extra information, wouldn't we all feel a bit more comfortable if the key escrow agencies also supplied it, or that it was based on their input? What could be put in the serial number that is useful? There are 64 bits to play with here and the two keys are 160. Denning says that it is `padded' -- almost a Freudian slip. The key generation process is rather interesting. It clearly is not `cryptographically secure' in the sense that it relies on the security of an algorithm for protection against abuse. This makes me think of the following problem, which I wonder how has been explored in the literature: consider it the Clean Key Generation problem. How can a chip be programmed such that no one ever has the complete key all at once? I would like to see the chip go through two stages: in the first stage the first agency plugs in their half of the secret key, in the second stage the second key agency does so, and the ability for either to read the other is impossible. This would guarantee there is no illicit archival. In fact, the centralized key generation in the scheme seems so absolutely preposterous, because it is not `cryptographically secure', it is only `NSA-assured-secure' (hey, a new category of communications security!) What is the assurance that the facility is `safe'? Alternatively, it would be very useful to devise some cryptographic or technological scheme whereby a chip could be programmed at a centralized location based on the input from multiple escrow agencies, but the complete key is never available to the programmers. Seems like a real catch-22, but then again so is public key cryptography (need to ruminate on this one some more). of course, these are all just theoretical ramblings and not to be taken in any way of endorsement of key escrow...

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comments on Denning's American Scientist article on Clipper
by L. Detweiler 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Some notes on the D. Denning article on Clipper in Sigma Xi American Scientist, July-August, vol 81 p. 319-323. Essentially almost nothing new for people who have tracked the debate on the Internet. Some tiny scraps at the end. This is a sort of `Scientific American' article on the Clipper chip. Apparently it was written before the switch to the Skipjack moniker, although under the photo caption of the chip it states `The name `Clipper Chip' should not be confused with Integraph Corperation's microprocessor.' The article begins by noting that cryptography is as ancient as Julius Caesar and the Gallic Wars. Clinton's Clipper and Capstone as a `new government standard for encryption.' Short blurb on public key cryptosystems a la Diffie & Hellman and RSA in mid 1970s, `a turning point in the development of modern cryptosystem.' (Madam, it is a revolution.) DES in 1977 by IBM `with advice from the National Security Agency.' Mentions PEM as example of `growing interest in strong cryptosystems that protect unclassified, private-sector telecommunications and computer data.' Next, the AT&T Model 3600 Telephone Security Device, which used the DES chip that `illustrates the basic issues--some technical and some societal--involved in securing voice communcations.' Denning says the key exchange algorithm in the phone is `proprietary' but gives the Diffie Hellman math as example. Then we hear of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that limits electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, to be `conducted lawfully only by law-enforcement agencies that are authorized with a court warrant, and then only for serious criminal activities in which other means of gathering evidence have failed, are likely to fail or are too dangerous.' `This act prohibits surveillance in other cases such as political discourse. The law provides a practical basis for safeguarding privacy rights while allowing legitimate criminal investigations. In applies only to federal investigations; two-thirds of the states have their own laws that govern local surveillance activities.' `Officials in the Dept. of Justice have become concerned that the increasing use of digital encoding and the success of public cryptography may make it impossible to intercept or understand criminal communications. The AT&T telephone device added urgency to that concern.' Hm, even the Clipper announcement didn't note any `concern'... Then, Clipper was `proposed' by Clinton administration to (1) secure telephone conversations, (2) preserve law-enforcement capability to `legally intercept the telephone conversations of suspected criminals' (wow, finally a word like `suspected' or `reputed' or `alleged' in conjunction with Clipper, a real milestone), and (3) split key escrow system that `balances' privacy. `The president declared that it is essential to establish these principles now, while the `national information infrastructure' is still young, so that privacy and effective law enforcement can guaranteed for everyone in years ahead.' I don't recall that proclamation. What were his exact words again? Next, description of Clipper and Capstone and the first user-friendly diagrams suitable for public consumption showing the key generation, communication session, and interception. Fairly detailed esp. with the key generation. Does not indicate at all how the key escrow agencies are assured that the chip IDs presented to them are actually of the people named in a warrant. `The details of the law-enforcement field are classified so that no one will be able to construct compatible chips that bypass this feature. Consequently, the structure of the law enforcement decoder is classified.' Then, Capstone as Clipper successor `will be relased this summer' with all the same elements plus DSA, key negotiation, exponentiation, and random number generator. `If the Capstone Chip become available on workstations and personal computers, it could also be used for Privacy Enhanced Mail.' (Boy, clearly someone at NSA is really concerned about this PEM thing.) Yeeks, here's the news: `The Clinton administration intends to [promote Clipper and] by developing and promulgating a standard for all sensitive, unclassified federal communications by the end of 1993.'' The ominous statement is that this seems to suggest something more than Clipper. `The Clinton administration believes that industry will follow the government's lead as it did in the 1970s with the DES system.' (we'll see.) `The administration does not propose to enforce the use of the Clipper Chip because it believes the technology will become widespread without coercion'. This is the tantalizingly familar NSAspeak into which people can read whatever they want, the same sounds-OK-except-to-here and what-are-they-really-saying sentence structure that permeated the Clipper announcment. Taken in the first half, it seems to be the most bold and unequivocal indication so far in the popular press that Clipper nor any other system will be `enforced'. On the other hand, it also has the ulterior suggestion that if the technology does *not* become widespread without coercion, some other attack will be formulated, and the `administration' cannot be considered liable for any seeming promises for unrestriction. Now, for the kicker: the National Security Council will finish their `comprehensive policy review' hinted in the Clipper announcement on `privacy, secure business communications, ... electronic surveillance, ... manufacture and export of advanced [cryptographic] products, use of advanced [cryptographic] technologies in digital networks and telecommunications, ... expected to be completed in September'. Can't wait for that one. `issues such as software encryption and private-sector standards are likely to be raised by industry during the process'. Don't you love that ubiquitous evasive passive voice? As the Clipper announcement stated `public debate is expected to intensify'...yelled at and echoing off the brick wall of the castle, soon to disgorge the concealed schemers with their Royal Proclamation for the Citizenry... At the end: `Note: the author obtained some of the information in this article during private briefings with the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' No kidding.

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Re: Sterilized Medflies of Crypto
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

uunet!PROCASE.COM!peb (Paul Baclace) writes: > The CIA has been accused of stealing a company's source code and > reselling said software modified with a trojan horse to specific targets > outside the U.S. I don't remember the name of the company, but read about > the lawsuit pending against the government. Anyone have more details? > This is nice evidence for people who think the spooks are fully accountable. This sounds like the Inslaw thing - a company called Inslaw sold some software for case management and person-tracking (intended for use by prosecuting attorneys for maintaining dossiers, etc.) to the Justice department. Then (the story goes) the Justice department deliberately failed to make agreed-upon payments and screwed around with Inslaw's cash flow to the point that they were forced into choosing between bankruptcy and selling out to another software company owned by cronies of Ed Meese. They chose bankruptcy and subsequently sued the Justice Department. The first judge who heard the case ruled in Inslaw's favor was not reappointed to his seat. I'm unable to remember the specifics of the following events - and the above summary probably leaves out important stuff. I've got a few text files on this - if folks are interested I can upload them to the soda archives. This is also related to the "suicide" of writer Danny Casolaro about 2 years ago in Washington, D.C. - he was working on a book on this mess, supposedly discovered something pretty important, then allegedly killed himself. Conspiracy stuff abounds with this. Supposedly the PROMIS software has also been given to Canadian intelligence/police forces, as well as the Israelis. It's a pretty sordid story and frankly I dunno how much of it to believe. I don't know if this is exactly relevant to Cypherpunk stuff (and it's long) so I'm not posting it to the list, but I can mail or ftp the stuff to interested folks. -- Greg Broiles greg(a)goldenbear.com Golden Bear Computer Consulting +1 503 465 0325 Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440 BBS: +1 503 687 7764

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