- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Sign my Key?
by J. Michael Diehl 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

Hi all! Well, I'm getting married Aug. 7. for our Honeymoon, we are taking a driving trip through Pheonix, Az., Las Angeles, Ca., Sacramento, Ca., and Denver Co. I MIGHT be able get away from my wife in order to have my pub key signed. Are there any Cypherpunks in these cities who might be willing to sign my key? Thanx in advance. Laters. ========================+==========================================+ J. Michael Diehl ;^) | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately? | mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to | mike.diehl(a)fido.org help| be Politically Incorrect!" +=========+ al945(a)cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone? | PGP KEY | (505) 299-2282 (voice) | If you don't know, ask me. |Available| ========================+================================+=========+ PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1 12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law

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BOOK: Differential Cryptanalysis
by Karl Barrus 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

Just yesterday I saw _Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard_ by Biham and Shamir at a local bookstore and immediately purchased it. It is published by Springer-Verlag (who also publish Salomaa's _Public Key Cryptography_); ISBN 0-387-97930-1 and 3-540-97930-1. The book describes the differential cryptanalysis attack, which is also applicable to "bounded-round versions" of certain other cryptosystems [what is a "bounded-round version" anyway?]. Phil Zimmerman is acknowledged in the Preface [could this be the same prz of PGP?] I haven't had a chance to read the book - I've just been flipping around so far, but here are the chapters: 1 Introduction 2 Results 3 Introduction to Differential Cryptanalysis 4 Differential Cryptanalysis of DES Variants four rounds six rounds eight rounds arbitrary number of rounds modified variants of DES DES with independent keys generalized DES 5 Differential Cryptanalysis of the Full 16-Round DES 6 Differential Cryptanalysis of FEAL FEAL-8 FEAL-N and FEAL-NX other properties 7 Differential Cryptanalysis of Other Cryptosystems Khafre REDOC-II LOKI Lucifer 8 Differential Cryptanalysis of Hash Functions Snefru N-Hash 9 Non-Differential Cryptanalysis of DES with a Small Number of Rounds Ciphertext Only Known Plaintext Statistical Known Plaintext Appendix A: Description of DES Appendix B: Difference Distribution Tables of DES I doesn't look like IDEA, MD4, or MD5 are mentioned. /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus | | elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu | <- preferred address | barrus(a)tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | \-----------------------------------/

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Re: Sterilized medflies of crypto
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

Detweiler says: We should fight the only thing which matters: key registration. I think that he has a point here. The SkipJack *may* be secure, it may not (my feeling is that it is not), but the whole bit about key registration is absolutely absurd (at best). -nate sammons nate(a)vis.colostate.edu

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Other shoe drop confirmation
by bart＠netcom.com 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

Well, somebody else heard the story as I did. Bart

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Remailer configuration
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

Hal Finney writes and asks what folks think about his remailers - if two are better than one, etc. My two cents' worth is that two is better; already we're starting to see applications (like the UT mail-to-news gateway) where people are filtering known remailers out. The bigger the list of remailers which might be sending mail, the harder it'll be to do that sort of thing. I wonder how big the list would need to get before sysadmins would consider it more economical to abandon filtering entirely? Let a thousand flowers bloom. -- Greg Broiles greg(a)goldenbear.com Golden Bear Computer Consulting +1 503 465 0325 Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440 BBS: +1 503 687 7764

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REMAIL: Anonymous posts
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Several people have asked about anonymous posting given that the utexas gateway is blocking (some?) cypherpunks remailers. Another possibility is to use Julf's anonymous remailer in Finland. I'm not sure what groups it posts to but I'm pretty sure it includes sci.crypt and most of the alt groups. For more security, you can mail to it from my remailer at hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, and probably other cypherpunks remailers as well. I'm pretty sure my other remailer, hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu, will work too. Send mail of the form: ========================= cut ==================== :: Request-Remailing-To: alt.privacy(a)anon.penet.fi This is a post to alt.privacy. ========================= cut ==================== This should work. You can also use PGP encryption; encrypt that message above with the PGP public key of my remailer, add the header: :: Encrypted: PGP and a blank line before the -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- line, and send it to the remailer. You can chain through a bunch of cpunks remailers using Karl's scripts for higher security. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQCVAgUBLF28O6gTA69YIUw3AQFj8QQAvaATrxKVYbKR4Jvj/Oj54DYJT7NdSs+z lozanaG70YJRnJNI5EAzRK8mT9egjxHzd41aa/XqEeuC9qjLCA5qDYQEhsFFr6tw LclgvXJ9I8xFvzHmIa7sVEytlWhDZJHXImHcyoFxAsmNFbLBJ5/h1szNgCx6NpzV UnmXw3ftshQ= -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ...
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

>Subject: ... >From: greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) >Message-Id: <eyio8B1w164w(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> >Date: Mon, 02 Aug 93 16:55:01 PDT > >The "celebrating 400 years .." thing sounds wonderful. Would make a neat >poster/flyer, too. Thanks. It's 4000 years, BTW. I assume your 400 was a typo. - Carl

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Re: Skipjack Panel
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

I'll disagree with Mr. Thug. It probably *is* in the interests of the National Spook Agency to have the SkipJack algorithm secure; they've taken too much heat in the past for DES, and if they can't convince enough of us that we can trust them, we'll all use real encryption products from independent vendors, or at least triple-DES. The Key Escrow business strikes me as major sleight of hand, but even if they don't steal the keys somewhere in that process, they can change to rules so they can get them from the experts. Obviously they could hide weaknesses anywhere in the system, but the SkipJack part is pretty clean, and trapdoors in the chip itself are a lot of trouble to use compared to the escrow process. Right now they're trying to draw everybody's attention to the foot-thick concrete walls and roof, and the final release of the report will emphasize the heavy steel door with the big bulletproof neon sign saying "COPS ONLY" and the elaborate ceremony for opening the two case-hardened real-estate-agent locks on the doors, so you forget to notice that they've already made a spare copy of the key, and maybe you can pop the unbreakable titanium pins out of the hinges as well. Bill # Bill Stewart wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876 # AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ 07733-3030

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FBI wants to ban Crypto
by gast＠cs.ucla.edu 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

I just heard a little of the report on NPR on Saturday, but it seems that the FBI went public last week at a security conference with its desires to ban cryptography, at least crypto that it cannot break. The FBI said that in four different wiretap cases, it got encrypted messages instead of talk. I know that the FBI has previously announced similar plans including at CFP-2, but this seems to be a new salvo. David

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Re: Encrypted BBS?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 03 Aug '93

03 Aug '93

> > Would it be at all possible, given today's present state of > >cryptography, to run a bbs in a totally encrypted form? If so, are there > >any software packages out there that accomplish this at some level? You've got to think about what threats you're trying to protect against. - Confiscated Machine - this can be done today with commercial products, a no-brainer. You keep the disk in encrypted form, either using software or a hardware-assist DES board, and it's automatically handled by your disk drivers using a boot-time secret-key password. Neither your users nor your BBS sofware knows any difference. (Obviously you also want to decrypt your backup floppies.) - Wiretapping - there are tons of possible solutions, at varying amounts of work. you can either do this with public or secret-key approaches, and you can use a shared secret key, separate secret keys, session keys set up using secret or public keys, etc. Most of these methods affect the BBS sofware itself, though you could use an encrypted telnet or other comm program instead, presumably in conjunction with the encrypted disk. A solution that requires a little more integration is to have the users upload the files encrypted (using random keys), and upload the keys (encrypted) and have the host recrypt them with the readers public or private keys, either at upload or download time, or perhaps on a batch basis during idle time. You could probably adapt PGP to retain the initial key for each file, and only re-encrypt the key when a user wants to download it, instead of re-encrypting the whole file. - Untrusted users - if there may be narcs on your box, you've got to give the users control over who can access what messages they create. If the users trust *you*, you can use some sort of password-based system; some existing BBSs presumably provide this, and you can even hack Usenet to do it (for non-NNTP use, anyway) using Unix groups; this allows groups of users who trust each other but not other users. - Untrusted Sysadm - if *you* may be a narc :-), your users can include PGP-encrypted messages in their postings, and there's not much you can do about it :-) This somewhat solves the untrusted-user problem as well, though it makes the closed user group bit more annoying. Bill Stewart

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