- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Re: PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

> Unfortunately, wide distribution in the USA of PGP, the most popular > product, is inhibited because it violate's RSA's patents. PGP has > already been chased off some USA FTP Sites. But this problem has a > solution! I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was > present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be > constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code > from RSAREF. Since source for both PGP and RSAREF are available, this > sounds like an easy job. Since no-one's actually done it yet, perhaps > it's not, but I will try. I hope I haven't bitten off more than I can > chew. At best, I can compile and test only the MSDOS version of PGP. I > will certainly need help if USA-Legal MAC, AMIGA, UNIX, etc. versions > are to be available. You should be able to do it. But, you will first have to get permission from RSADSI to access RSAREF in ways other than by the published interface. I trust they'll grant it, given what you say above. Also, be sure to get the RSAREF version included with RIPEM (wait for version 1.07 if you can). It has several significant performance enhancements (generic and some platform specific asm versions of time critical code). You won't be able to export this 'legal' version of PGP. Tracking and updating to new PGP releases will be a pain as much of the development is done outside of North America. Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433

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ANON: Cryptographic MIX
by /home/kelly/.sig 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

#<text/x-pgp -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi All, At the first cypherpunks meeting I cam to, A speaker was giving a presentation on cryptographic MIX protocols. My memory fails me as to who that was... so thats the question and what is the progress on an implementation??? cheers kelly - -- Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May. Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also. .......................................................................... Kelly Goen | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, kelly(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Intelligence Systems | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Specialists Inc. | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark | tech, covert channels, shared secrets, | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments. Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2. | .......................................................................... PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet. pub 1024/1BA573 1992/09/09 kelly <kelly(a)netcom.com> Key fingerprint = EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B 90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBK93QvfgXinP2G6VzAQHAzQP/aaSiiBlKIrZUP+xe4xuC6pzyeS/xM0Hd FdDOJ4ttsOiBPkSm+C6WxLZQvsdhSpe9e947YZmM2afQWgDFBynkcaUG3RS6eh7P Q35Fqaof6WEAqZO+IRg2KYarRA60CB1hUu082B3/9DSSCnr2CsPPMgtQGo8ULg/x WnHX6cN/9Xo= =AtWx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- #

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Liddy; There's a Chip in the Middle of the Phone
by fnerd＠smds.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

> In <9304231457.AA22562(a)gmuvax2.gmu.edu>, 7025aj(a)gmuvax2.gmu.edu writes: > |> > |> send him [Limbaug] some convincing words, please? > |> > |> G. Gordon Liddy would be another good target, but I don't know his address. cp(a)jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba) [!Is that real rot13!?] replies: > My guess would be that Liddy and Limbaugh would both be very > happy about the Tapper chip proposal... Isn't Liddy the guy who wanted to be able to get at someone's private information later, and so he... he... wait, I hear a melody... There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel, There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel, There's some Dems, There's some Dems, There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel. There's a suite for the the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a door on the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a lock on the door on the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a tape on the lock on the door of the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a finger on the tape on the lock on the door of the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a chip in the middle of the phone, There's a chip in the middle of the phone, There's a chip, There's a chip, There's a chip in the middle of the phone. There's a lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a tap on the crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a speaker on the tap on the crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's an ear at the speaker on the tap on the crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... -fnerd keep your oxides dry --fnerd(a)smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham) quote me

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(fwd) Capstone & Preliminary Message Security Protocol
by tcmay＠netcom.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Cypherfolks, Some info on Capstone and another program called "Tessera." -Tim From: mrr(a)scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Capstone & Preliminary Message Security Protocol Date: 28 Apr 1993 01:35:50 GMT Organization: Michigan State University Summary: Defense Message System to use Capstone chip Keywords: Clipper, Capstone, PMSP, Mykotronx, NSA An article in the 26 April 93 issue of Network World mentions encryption technology to be used in a proposed Department of Defence email network: Next year, the DOD will issue an RFP for a one million-user Defense Message System (DMS). DMS will not be completely compatible with X.400 messaging. Therefore, to make it easier for vendors to bid on what will be a non-standard email system, the DOS plan to release prototype source code for its version of X.400. The article contains the interesting sentence: "Along with source code, it will release the nonclassified encryption algorithm application called Preliminary Message Security Protocol (PMSP)." DMS places security features in the Mail User Agent, rather than the Message Transfer Agent, as is done with stock X.400. Furthermore, PMSP will use the NSA's Capstone public key algorithm, rather than RSA, which is used in X.400. Therefore, gateways will be required to translate between encryption systems when DMS is exchanging messages with other networks. As its data encryption algorithm, Capstone uses the same unpublished private-key algorithm as the Clipper chip. [In a Usenet posting, Dorothy Denning says that Capstone uses the Skipjack algorithm, the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).] Capstone chips will be provided by Mykotronx, Inc., the Torrance, Calif firm that also designed Clipper. Military DMS users will be issued PCMCIA-compliant cryptocards containing the Capstone chip. (PCMCIA is an add-on interface card standard oriented toward subnotebook PC compatibles.) This interface card is dubbed "Tessera". Mykotronx claims to have already shipped 10,000 Capstone and 20,000 Clipper chipsets. Does anyone know anything else about PMSP? Mark R. mrr(a)ripem.msu.edu --

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Markey Hearing Thursday 930AM
by gnu 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

------- Forwarded Message Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 13:04:20 -0400 From: jberman(a)eff.org (Jerry Berman) Subject: Markey Hearing DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 29, 1993 at 9:30am ROOM: 2123 Rayburn House Office Building SUBJECT: Oversight hearing on issues relating to the integrity of telecommunications networks and transmissions including consumer privacy, encryption, computer hacking, toll fraud and data security. WITNESS LIST Technical Presentation Mr. John B. Gage Director, Science Office Sun Microsystems, Inc. 2550 Garcia Avenue, MS PAL01-505 Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 [I think Tsutomu Shimomura and Ron Rivest will also appear as part of this presentation. --gnu] Panel Mr. Raymond Kammer Acting Director National Institute of Standards and Technology Building 101, Room A1111 Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Mr. John P. Lucich State Investigator Organized Crime and Racketeering Bureau New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625 Mr. Bruce Sterling 4525 Speedway Austin, TX 78751 Author: The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Mr. Joel Reidenberg Associate Professor of Law Fordham University School of Law 140 West 62nd Street New York, NY 10023-7485 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Navajo Hypothetical
by Mike Godwin 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

I recently heard an even better hypothetical that illustrates the issues raised by encryption: Suppose the only two navajo speakers left in the world were talking on the phone to plot the overthrow of the United States. If the FBI could not obtain a translator, would that mean the plotters could be compelled to hold their phone conversations in English? --Mike

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MYK-78
by Arthur Abraham 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

I've been stalking Mykotronx with phone and smail since right after the announcement, and finally got through the guy who kept telling me that I'd undertand if I just knew a little more crypto, to the guy who really know what was going on and wanted to tell me. This is what I found out: Mykotronx MYK-78 has been identified as the Privacy "Clipper" chip. The "Clipper" name comes from Washington, and the guys at Mykotronx know about the Intergraph chip. The data sheets, as those of you who have read them know, are confusing, incomplete and internally inconsistent. This is evident even if you do not consider that they are to implement the social protocol described by Dorothy Denning (her 19-Apr-93 paper, as published in Cypherpunks). After some discussions with Mykotronx, I was able to convince them of the truth of the last paragraph and to have them explain just what the chip was designed to do. I would also like to emphasize that these discussions revealed that the poor quality of the documentation does not result from any attempt to obscure the operation of the chip, they were very forth coming and eager to discuss its operation. The deficiencies result more from the nature of a military contractor's relationship to its one customer: the customer understands how to use the chip so there's no pressure to get it described carefully. Going public was a bit of a surprise to them, in fact the announcement was made during their application engineer's vacation. I am sure there is an interesting story in this timing, but the people I was talking to didn't seem to know it. On to the chip: You don't just hook up a clear-text bit stream to one end and get a Denning-stream out the other. It needs a bit of care and feeding. At startup it requires a Random Seed (8 bytes/64-bits) and a crypto-variable CV (10 bytes/80-bits) for its DES-type algorithm. This is Denning's "skipjack" algorithm and, like DES, is a symmetric key block cypher, which performs in all the DES modes: 64-Bit Electronic Code Book (ECB) 64-Bit Cypher Block Chaining (CBC) 8/16/32/64 Bit Cypher Feedback 64-Bit Output Feedback (OFB) In the last three modes the encryption of each block is dependent on the previous blocks. (If you care to know more about DES modes, see FIPS-PUB 81 which is cited in the data sheets.) One other thing about Skipjack: Denning describes it as having "32 rounds of scrambling" and this is supported by the data sheet's timing charts, which note 64 clocks cycles to complete an encryption. Since this would operate on an 8-byte/64-bit block, with the 15MHz internal clock we appear to have roughly a 10M-bit/1.3MB transfer rate in encryption/decryption. This is fast enough for the average telephone, or several telephones, or maybe a stereo CD. It's probably just average performance for 1 micron technology and some units clock up to 30MHz (they expect 0.8 micron eventually, with improved performance). Back to the Crypto-Variable, CV. The CV is the session key, is selected off-chip, and must always be accompanied by a 3 byte/24-bit checkword. Where do you get the check word?... you ask the chip! If you load a CV with a bad checkword, the chip sets its ERROR line -- oh, sadness. But then you can read out a good checkword, and subsiquently reload the same CV with the good checkword (happy now?). The checkword is actually just the first three bytes from an application of Skipjack to the CV. Do all this and the chip is loaded and ready for plaintext. You could just give it an Encryption command, and start pulling cyphertext out the other side, but who would understand it? First you have to get the key information out of the chip and send it to the chip on the other side of the link. Skipjack is DES-like so to run a decryption mode on the other chip we're going to have to send it the session key, CV, and the Initial Vector, IV, which is the starting state of the stream for the non-ECB modes of operation. We selected CV ourselves, and learned its checkword during the startup experience, but where's IV? Well, we generate it using "a feature not found in current DES chips" (data sheet, 1-3). And quite a feature it is, too. We use this command, Generate IV, and it makes all 8 bytes/64-bits of the IV, based on the Random Seed... But That's Not ALL! You issue the Generate IV command three (3) times to get the full 24 byte/192-bit LEEF block. LEEF = Law Enforcement Exploitation Field. (I wrote this down very carefully to be sure I had it right.) ...Actually, you issue a Read Data command after each Generate IV command, but I won't bore you with details. The first 8 bytes/64-bits are called L1 or LEEF-1, the second 8 bytes/64-bits are L2 or LEEF-2, and then here is the IV we've all been waiting for, in its full 8 byte/64-bit glory. You probably noticed that LEEF is 24 bytes/192-bits long, and has the structure [L1,L2,IV]. Mykotronx is not supposed to tell us the structure of L1,L2. The interesting thing is that [CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV] is a self-checking unit. The receiving chip checks it as it is loaded. If something is wrong, the chip sets its ERROR line. If CV is fermished, you have to get all the way to IV before you're rasberried. In transmitting this we are advised to encrypt CV because it is, after all, the session key. OK, so we are encrypting and the other chip is decrypting. Suppose something happens and the other chip wants to talk to us, so that it encrypts and we decrypt. It has all it needs to encrypt and we have all we need to decrypt, but one more thing has to be done. We need to save the state of the chaining cypher so we can resume it at the same place in the chain when we return to encrypting. Use the Save State command, which pops out 8 bytes/64-bits of Saved State, SS, or the current contents of the Skipjack encryption register. To make this a bit clearer, if we pulled the Saved State right after Generate IV, we'd find SS = IV. The chip's serial number is 4-bytes/32-bits long, not the 3.75 bytes/30-bits Denning reported, but don't worry, _you'll_ never see it. It and the family key are written in over pins Vpp1 and Vpp2, which are then burned out. All chips are currently planned to have the same family key, but if you happen to meet a chip with a different family key and it sends you [CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV], you could understand it. That's the main part of what's missing from the data sheets. The rest works pretty much as described, and is at a level of detail too fine to interest anyone except a compulsive hardware wonk. Oh, one more thing, on page 1-4 where the Configuration Register is shown with two "Arm CV" bits, the one at position D5 should be "Arm IV". -a2. ps: I will be at a meeting the rest of the week, so please don't expect me to respond to requests for clarification until I return. Sorry. -a2.

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CLIPPER SOUND BITES
by Sandy 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

_________________________________________________________________ FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ No matter what you think of our current and former presidents, associating the Clipper chip with them might work in our favor. Asking the following question might cause their supporters to have second thoughts: "Why haven't Clinton and Gore had a "town meeting" about the Reagan-Bush Wiretap Chip? Didn't they run on a platform of change? This sounds like business-as-usual to me." Presumably, Reagan-Bush supporters will smell a rat--Clinton--and oppose Clipper to thwart the new administration. Clinton fans will oppose Clipper because it is a leftover symbol of the hated Reagan-Bush era. S a n d y _________________________________________________________________ PLEASE RESPOND TO: ssandfort(a)attmail.com (except from CompuServe) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses
by fergp＠sytex.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

I've been following the discussions on several newsgroups and mailing lists (RISKS, PRIVACY and Cypherpunks) concerning the Wiretap Chip (Clipper/Capstone) and the proposed key escrow system. Here's my $.02, as well. In RISK 14.55, <jim(a)RSA.COM> Jim Bidzos wrote - JB> Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in JB> software, what options are available to those who can benefit JB> from cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on JB> these vendors or of the potential cost to the software industry JB> conducted? (Much of the use of cryptography by software JB> companies, particularly those in the entertainment industry, is JB> for the protection of their intellectual property. Using hardware JB> is not economically feasible for most of them.) Jim raises a valid concern. Although a hardware based system is ideal for voice encryption, the idea of registered key systems, where government and/or LE agencies have involvement, is not a popular one. The key escrow scheme in this proposal reeks of Big Brother. (As in, "Trust me. I'm from the government and I'm your friend.") In some circles, it is not even a consideration. Software encryption systems employed to protect intellectual and commercial data and electronic mail are much more flexible and desirable, especially when they are not governmentally proposed, imposed, designed and sanctioned by spook organizations such as the NSA. The real sore spot with the Clipper proposal is that private industry and citizenry were blind-sided by this entire process. The possibility that Uncle Sam will try to make this a de-facto standard and subsequently place restrictions on other forms of crypto (eg. software based) is real. Also in RISKS 14.55, <billc(a)glacier.sierra.com> Bill Campbell wrotes - BC> There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of commercial, criminal and BC> governmental entities with access to government resources who BC> would not hesitate for a moment to violate my rights if they BC> found it expedient to do so. These individuals and organizations BC> have demonstrated beyond question that they are not constrained BC> by legal or ethical considerations, and as has been suggested BC> in a number of other postings, the technology employed by Clipper BC> (including the dual escrow sham) will probably not even pose so BC> much as an inconvenience to a determined adversary. To suggest BC> otherwise is, at best, profoundly naive. I have a tendency to agree with Bill. In fact, California is currently embroiled in a scandal involving the release of confidential data (DMV addresses), by employees of the Anaheim Police Department, to third party interests. This is clearly in violation of their employer's policies, their own terms of employment, state criminal law, and civil law. What's to stop the same blatant, unethical breech of confidentiality with regards to the Clipper key escrow implementation? Nothing, that's what. In the future, information will be the most powerful possession and in the spirit of SNEAKERS, s/he who has control of and access to the information is the most powerful. Power corrupts, but absolute power corrupts absolutely. I think that Clipper offers maximum abuse in this scenario. Also in RISK 14.55, <firth(a)SEI.CMU.EDU> Robert Firth wrote - RF> You see, friends, if the Clipper becomes the normal, standard, or RF> accepted means of encryption, then *the use of any other encryption RF> scheme can of itself be considered "probable cause" for search and RF> seizure*. And thereby could be lost in the courts what was won at RF> such great cost. This is perhaps my greatest concern in all of the Clipper/Capstone hoopla. Personally, I don't have much faith in the law enforcment agencies to act responsibly. The Secret Service and FBI have, in the past, clearly demonstrated that do not grasp the scope of the problems technically challenging modern society. The Steve Jackson Games case is one instance that immediately springs to mind. Some parts of the country are demographically more at risk than others. For example, the criteria which may be deemed as "probable cause" for search and seizure in Jackson, Mississippi could very well be reason for the ACLU to file a suit against the LEA in New York City. Also in RISKS 14.55, <padgett(a)tccslr.dnet.mmc.com> A. PADGETT PETERSON writes - PP> Like I said, both the government and corporate America *need* PP> Clipper, the designers are some of the best in the world, and PP> the administration has more to lose than we do. Given that, PP> Clipper will work as advertised. The only way that I can imagine the government actually *needing* Clipper is where Clipper is forced upon the country as the de-facto standard and other forms of cryptography are restricted. Uncle Sam tends to forget that what is desirable for the government, is not always acceptable to the public at large. Cynically, Paul Ferguson | Uncle Sam wants to read Network Integrator | your e-mail... Centreville, Virginia USA | Just say "NO" to the Clipper fergp(a)sytex.com | Chip... -------------------------------+------------------------------ I love my country, but I fear it's government.

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PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Derek Zahn recently posted: Subject: "Cypherpunks Write Code" Hmm, I write code -- but so far no cyphercode. Since I'd like to be part of the cypherdelic revolution, what code needs writing? I agree that the PC/modem scrambled telephone is a good idea, but others are already bashing that out; there must be other neat projects that want doing. Any thoughts? Thank you, Derek!! Yes, I have such an idea and I'm beginning work on it myself. Your and other Cypherpunks participation is certainly welcome and probably essential. At the Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday (4/24), which was called to discuss plans to counter the "Clipper chip" announcement, we agreed that one prong of our attack should be to get strong crypto as widely distributed as possible. Unfortunately, wide distribution in the USA of PGP, the most popular product, is inhibited because it violate's RSA's patents. PGP has already been chased off some USA FTP Sites. But this problem has a solution! I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code from RSAREF. Since source for both PGP and RSAREF are available, this sounds like an easy job. Since no-one's actually done it yet, perhaps it's not, but I will try. I hope I haven't bitten off more than I can chew. At best, I can compile and test only the MSDOS version of PGP. I will certainly need help if USA-Legal MAC, AMIGA, UNIX, etc. versions are to be available. Note that since RSAREF cannot be exported, the USA Legal version(s) of PGP will not replace the current version(s) for use outside the USA. But the two versions -will- be able to exchange keys and messages and so the combination of the two will offer the -only- legal method of strong crypto for communication crossing USA borders. This is a job for USA programmers. We can't expect the foreign programmers currently maintaining/improving PGP to do the job for us. First, they have no incentive to do so; the current version of PGP is perfectly legal to use outside the USA. Second, they can't (legally) obtain a copy of RSAREF to work with. I plan to delimit all changes for USA legality with conditional compile statements (#ifdef USALEGAL), so I'm hopeful that Branko, Jean-Loup, et.al. will consent to merge those changes back into the master source, to reduce the pain of generating USA Legal versions of future releases of PGP. I invite you, Derek, and anyone interested in participating, and -especially- anyone who has -already- started a similar project to contact me immediately via e-mail edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) or by phone at (408)227-3471. Here is an (illegal) PGP key if you want to communicate encrypted: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAirfypkAAAEEAKe2jziPeFw6hY19clR2GtQ4gtGCSSVOTgPKEJzHfuC74Scf 9PEuu1kebLhHk43A9wo1vr52o4jpH/P/tnFmRtBQOMzLUzAt5rMucswtSVviMQS2 hBuc9yGJKWHVcyfA79EARKEYTdhx+2qKI+hFJcPE+rmD8wVoF94nNf3ah8DHAAUR tClFZGdhciBXLiBTd2FuayA8ZWRnYXJAc3BlY3RyeC5zYWlnb24uY29tPokAlAIF ECvWOdMYM6FlCLcHxQEBz6wD8wW3+pUMs8G1MHcWssyw6Idx8oJ7py6KIvss84hF UHIToErd7C3tiNdPAy8U4KftupSWEwGQfhoPBxsgfjc+tutw9F5VVF0Ivf+wkkcn fG4WBXrhT8Bcxz1mZciwwCLLmhHwbJqdgwS4H374VAqoolmJj/aGvqzgPuSB0vsT fLSJAFUCBRAruXWDs7y/yYd6pmEBAWAyAgCOSnWk4j69mNTrUQk4usTBuoZ0TWpb yvQuXf28ayp1GKrH0qSmsl/k7PabJqumunaDq19wALYHGbkwmFH0JHdtiQCVAgUQ K5cyE6HBOF9KrwDlAQGoXQP+K0aEladxviotML5HAL6Z8Le70hGKR10pMqAvC3QK rPW37eTQ0zspIMOR9ahRtQ6KpOqEdMsWNJPdXlaAVXJS1g2/eLDTtyYxySjv0HTg 4pOQ6ZlxJ0IQXy5bo7mJArSY6Ab9fkHSJp57/WjYnRriwJ3jb2flDTanxNyEUocz cNyJAJUCBRArY+YsNlaXxjLdmNkBAQxGA/9ojDJpeuXhWjVqzT+2m2IfEFt/jJ48 peQjaQIxpMXo5iJuJ2SqlBzeQ7hs6SQ57LUcG8+nWlyteV3KDNZvILobulMyMB7P foWyhOop0ws+AtJhOeT0prxf3o43sZxs7IhabhZ4zf7Ea0h3Oe35TiFFgQmQ/B4s 892mAcZr8CfOt4kAlQIFECsRFxzidd4O/2f3CwEBsmID/2qXL/VdjGxxYFNIZdA+ DC6howUXlHw66MUArILE2/9J69VvcpbQTKmD4A+04SwH9q8SDzWxsg+1VANuy08E E0up9pm7ZBzrxkFcOydhsEwOt9fRn9EJ3tDNYe1SVoxV9Fc47of55Om7cTNrky0h dp1LA13uf/TeV3nrBYa21zaz =kLEt -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Silicon Valley, Ca

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