- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Re: Raving on...
by Paco Xander Nathan 29 Apr '93

29 Apr '93

"Sent from the cyberdeck of: Geoff White" > > >Hmm... the problem is I don't think a majority of the people at raves are > > >focused enough to concentrate on something as technical as that (I KNOW it > > >isn't technical to you and me, but the average raver doesn't even > > >know what the word encryption means). HOWEVER, raves ARE the ideal place > > >to hand out info about what's going on, something the raver can cling onto Our company, FringeWare, has been out doing brain machine demos at raves for a while.. I'm still trying to catch up on sleep from last weekend's rave construction & show :-) The raves started as socio/politial but in many places have become yet-another-club-hop-for-kids-with-time-to-kill. Even so, sentiments are in the right place, guaranteed. Especially among the *RAVE PROMOTERS* .. The promoters are already sensitive to issues in common with cypherpunks since they tend to be underground operations in the cash economy, etc. Plus, they're HEAVILY networked. As a techno/gonzo journalist, I've found it EASIER to get in with hacker cliques than with rave promoter cliques; granted the real stakes are higher so they take security more seriously :-) Also, I'm intrigued to see the overlap (at least in this area) between ravers and people at EFF-Austin mtgs.. Some of the main u/g promoters even showed up to EFF-A's CopCon a couple weeks back, so the overlap in our agendas is valid. I'd tend to go with the argument that actually signing keys or passing out pamphlets during a rave would be weird and blow the mood. Maybe you'd say "So what?" but to an entertainment promoter, mood means everything and only a few cypherphuckups would spread a terrible image for us. I'm generally the most hi-tech part of these raves, what with the sound/light brain gizmos and even that's too left-brained some ravers.. Most want to experience, not engage in discourse. With pheromones and alkaloids being some of the dominant attractions for people attending, I could agree more :-) Which is why I'd suggest we tag along with the VRrave project, based on IRC connex between concurrent raves. That'd present a hi-tech set & setting and allow for some demo/experience of secure comm. Do what you can to introduce/instruct the local promoters -- but generally they're busy people with better things to worry about, like liability and overhead not somebody else's political agenda. pxn. pacoid(a)wixer.bga.com

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RE: Rave on...
by simonm＠mindvox.phantom.com 29 Apr '93

29 Apr '93

crunch(a)netcom.com (John Draper) writes: > My proposal is to set up a room with a bunch of donated PC's Macs or > whatever, and have a booth set up where people can purchase PGP diskettes While this sounds like a great idea, I'm not sure you'll find many ravers who eill actually use PGP. How many ravers exchange email, but haven't heard of PGP? It seems like only a couple, based on my talking to people about computers at raves. > [...] handout literature can be made available for anyone attending that > describes the "Clipper" proposals, and suggestions on what people can do > to resist further government control over private cryptography. This seems like a more practical tactic. Even just handing out a single or half-page flier about PGP, Clipper, and a couple of other topics would probably get a lot of people to read it. And people at raves are used to others going around handing out interesting things to read. The hard part is coming up with 300 well written words that cover everything that needs to be said, a task I leave in more capable hands. On the other hand, I wouldn't mind lugging my PowerBook 170 down to a rave... If anyone organizes such an event, drop me a line... -- Simon (simonm(a)mindvox.phantom.com)

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Orig. Press Release.
by J. Michael Diehl 29 Apr '93

29 Apr '93

I'm looking for the press release for the wire-tap chip which says that communications manufactures will be "encouraged" to incorporate the "we're-tapped" chip in their products. Any hints would be appreciated. Thanx in advance. +-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+ | J. Michael Diehl ;-) | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY | | | But, I was mistaken. |available| | +-----------------------------+---------+ | mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity | | mike.diehl(a)fido.org | to be Politically Incorrect! <Me> | | (505) 299-2282 | | +-----------------------+---------------------------------------+

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pgp
by jim＠RSA.COM 29 Apr '93

29 Apr '93

I don't think you're aware of our position on pgp. Unfortunately, you may leave us no choice but to take legal action, which we will unless you cease promotion adn distribution of pgp. The next message will state our position. End forwarded msg---------------------------------------------------------- -- Testes saxi solidi! ********************** Podex opacus gravedinosus est! Stanton McCandlish, SysOp: Noise in the Void Data Center BBS IndraNet: 369:1/1 FidoNet: 1:301/2 Internet: anton(a)hydra.unm.edu Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1) Vox phone: +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)

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Help find this shareware!
by William Oldacre 29 Apr '93

29 Apr '93

To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com PLEASE HELP ME LOCATE THE FOLLOWING SHAREWARE AND IT'S AUTHORS. The following shareware was removed from Compuserve Information Service because a sysop feared it might be downloaded by someone outside of the United States and get him in trouble. 1 DES Documentation for DESJWW.ZIP IBMPRO/C and C++ [P] DESJWW.DOC 2 Data Encryption Standard (in MSC v5.0) IBMPRO/C and C++ [P] DESJWW.ZIP 3 Knapsack Public-Key Encryption System IBMPRO/C and C++ [P] KNAPSA.ZIP 4 Confide - encryption/decryption program (DES) IBMSYS/File Utilities [S] CONFID.ARC 5 The Private Line (tm) IBMSYS/File Utilities [S] TPL.ARC 6 The Private Line Documentation IBMSYS/File Utilities [S] TPLDOC.ARC I am trying to do a survey of ALL data encryption shareware, especially that based on the DES or RSA algorithm (I have PGP). Can you help? Please contact William Oldacre at: 76114.2307(a)Compuserve.com or William H. Oldacre 6208 N.W. 132nd St. Gainesville, FL 32606 904-332-3010

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No FTP? You can still get PGP!
by Stanton McCandlish 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

************************************************************************* DEFEAT THE BIG BROTHER PROPOSAL! JUST SAY F!CK NO TO THE PRIVACY CLIPPER! ************************************************************************* ************************************************************ The security of PGP encryption for those without FTP access! ************************************************************ This is not an ad, but a public service announcement. NitV-BBS is FREE. This info (and my system!) has been updated to make it easier for you to obtain Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): Secure RSA pubkey encrytion for all! Due to the overwhelming response, I have sought out as many ports as possible. After a week of exhaustive FPT/Archie searches it appears to me that NitV-BBS is the world's singlemost comprehensive PGP site, with executables and/or source code for the following platforms: Platform exec source patch extras MS-DOS (PC-DOS, etc.) X X X Macintosh X X Archimedes X ? OS/2 X X Amiga X X Unix X X NeXT X In one case I do not have the means to open the archive to see if it comes with the source code, thus "?". WARNING: My DallasFax 14.4k v32bis modem does not always cooperate too well with USR/Miracom Dual Standards. BY MODEM TO BBS: Call NitV-BBS (see .sig at end of message for details) Here you will find: File area file name description LOGIN PGP22.ZIP DOS version of PGP LOGIN PGPSHEL1.ZIP menu/shell for PGP (DOS only) NONIBM PGP22B-A.LHA PGP for Amiga (w/source) NONIBM ARCPGP22 PGP for Archimedes (format unknown; w/src??) NONIBM MACPGP22.CPT PGP for Mac (.cpt archive) NONIBM PGP22.TAZ PGP for Unix (compressed .tar; w/source) WIN PGP22OS2.ZIP PGP for OS/2 (w/source patch) LOGIN PGP22SRC.ZIP PGP source code & utils for DOS NONIBM MPGP22SC.S_H PGP source code for Mac (BinHex .hqx encode of a .sea self-extracting archive) MONIBM MPGP22SC.SIG PGP signature for validation of Mac source NONIBM NXTPGP22.ASC PGP source code diff (patch) for NeXT. ASCII A quick <T>ext search for "pgp" will yield the files for flagging quickly. Note: original name of Mac version is: MacPGP_2.2.cpt original name of Unix version is: pgp22.tar.Z original name of Mac source is: MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx original name of Mac signature is: MacPGP2.2src.SIGNATURE NeXT patch is a concatenation of: PGP.random.c.diff and PGP.random.c.diff.README These names were changed because of the 12 char limit of MesSDOS filenames. All files are direct from these FTP sites: nic.funet.fi, sony.com, garbo.uwasa.fi, and ftp.uni-erlangen.de. They are NOT uploaded by BBS users, nor gotten from other BBSs. You can rest assured that they are "clean" (the superparanoid^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^Hcautious may wish to obtain additional copies and compare them for further validation.) You may login anonymously as ANONYMOUS, password GUEST. If you want the whole lot you won't have time, as that acct. is limited. In that case, login normally, but if you never intend to call again, please be courteous, and leave a <C>omment to sysop to delete your account. Disk space is limited! All user accounts are free. There is no charge (other than your phone expenses of course) for obtaining PGP from NitV-BBS. BY FIDO-PROTOCOL FREQ Anyone in FidoNet or any other FTN/FTSC network (such as RBBSNet, etc.), or anyone with a working Fido-type mailer, can get PGP from the same source, via File REQuest, as long as they can send mail to Fido address 1:301/2 (you will need a Fido nodelist to pull that off). You do not have to be nodelisted to do this. You can even be a point system. Just send a DIRECT not routed netmail To: Sysop, NitV (1:301/2) From: <your info here> Re: <filename>,<filename>,<etc> St: Crash, Direct, FilReq, <etc> <filename> can be a full file name, or a "magic name". Status is not that important, as long as the message is set for at least these 2: Direct and FilReq. You can use the following magic names (which will still hold for future releases of PGP): Magic Name files description PGPDOS PGP22.ZIP, PGPSHEL1.ZIP DOS PGP and menu/shell PGPAMI PGP22B-A.LHA Amiga PGP & source PGPARC ARCPGP22 Archimedes PGP PGPMAC MACPGP22.C_H Mac PGP PGPNXT NXTPGP22.ASC NeXT PGP source code diff (requires a full src package) PGPOS2 PGP22O2.ZIP OS/2 PGP & patch PGPUNX PGP22TAR.Z Unix PGP & source PGPSDOS PGP22SRC.ZIP PGP source & utils (DOS fmt.) PGPSMAC MPGP22SC.S_H, MPGP22SC.SIG PGP source & sig (Mac fmt.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please upload, file-attach via netmail, uuencode and email, or just tell me where to find, any interesting utils, FAQs, etc for PGP that you come across, so that I can make them available to the needy but FTPless hordes. Please do NOT further distribute this copy of PGP, especially to BBSs. Part of the Good Thing about getting it from NitV is that you know it came right from one of the original FTP sites for it, not from some cheezy BBS via the hands of 27 other people and systems, any of which might harbour a baddie. This is not to say that BBSs are bad (hell, I run one!) but rather that too much is left to chance (and ill-will!) in it's distribution methods. PGP is a security program, and needs to be guaranteed to be secure. Thank you. This offer, due to IDIOTIC export restrictions, must of course be limited to the USA. <snort> Authors are stongly encouraged to upload, mail, etc. their ports of PGP, their PGP utilities, etc. directly to me or the system listed below so that non-FTP-using PGP afficionados can be certain that they are getting a "pris- tine" copy. Thanks! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Distribute ENTIRE contents of this message freely. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Testes saxi solidi! ********************** Podex opacus gravedinosus est! Stanton McCandlish, SysOp: Noise in the Void Data Center BBS IndraNet: 369:1/1 FidoNet: 1:301/2 Internet: anton(a)hydra.unm.edu Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1) Vox phone: +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)

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PGP: pgp -ke
by Chuck Lever 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

so, like, what's to stop me from writing a program (based on pgp source code) which can delete user IDs from my own keys after other folks have signed them? in fact, how *can* i change the user ID on a key after it has been signed? the pgp docs are unclear on how this works. can someone help me to understand what it means exactly when a key is signed? what parts of the key are certified by the signature?

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Program to measure entropy
by Peter Meyer 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Cypherpunks write code, so here's some (at the end, anyway). Someone asked awhile back (just before the deluge of postings on the Wiretap Chip swamped my announcement of the release of new versions of our Dolphin Encrypt encryption software) about (something like) how to tell whether a file consists of something like English text or just (apparent) garbage. Here's one way, a program to calculate the entropy (and the relative entropy) of the set of bytes in a file. First the documentation (extracted from Appendix III in the manual for the Dolphin Encryption Library): Information theorists have attempted to formalize and to quantify the notion of randomness, also called entropy. The usual definition of entropy in a string of letters from some alphabet is due to Claude Shannon (who formulated this concept in the 1950s). Let S be a string of letters from some alphabet A = { a(0), a(1), ..., a(k-1) } of k letters, and let p(i) be the probability (that is, the relative frequency) of occurrence of a(i) in the string S, then the entropy E of the string S may be defined as: k-1 E = - Sigma ( p(i) * ln ( p(i) ) ) i = 0 where ln is the natural logarithm. It can be shown that this value is maximized when all letters occur in S with equal frequency (in this case E = ln(k)), and is minimized when one letter occurs all the time (in this case E = 0). Since E ranges between 0 and ln(k), we may obtain a modified entropy value E', which we call relative entropy, which ranges between 0 and 1 by dividing E by ln(k) thus: E' = E / ln(k). The program ENTROPY1.EXE calculates the relative entropy of the bytes in a given file. For a DOS text file consisting of English text the relative entropy value is typically in the range 0.48 - .68. The relative entropy values for most non-random files, including .OBJ, .COM and .EXE files, usually fall in the range 0.50 through 0.95. Files consisting of bytes generated by pseudo-random-number generators typically have relative entropy values in the range 0.970 - 0.999. Thus a file with a relative entropy value of at least .98 looks (at least according to this test) very much like a file consisting of random bytes. ENTROPY.EXE can thus be used to test whether a file appears to consist of random bytes or something like natural language. The ENTROPY1.EXE program takes two parameters on the command line, a file specification (wildcard characters are not allowed in this version) and (optionally) a byte space size, e.g. ENTROPY1 FILE.TXT 150. The program produces results such as: File Size Entropy Rel. entropy Diff. bytes HAMLET.TXT 1459 3.037405 0.547756 42 PTRS.TXT 3683 3.415741 0.615984 108 CHAP04.TXT 51162 3.339292 0.602198 100 FILE1.RND 1762 5.473655 0.987102 255 FILE2.RND 3400 5.503647 0.992511 256 FILE3.RND 29225 5.541324 0.999305 256 HAMLET.ENC 1762 5.478605 0.987995 256 PTRS.ENC 3400 5.501231 0.992075 256 CHAP04.ENC 29225 5.540785 0.999208 256 NULLFILE 20000 0.000000 0.000000 1 The file called NULLFILE consists of 20,000 null (zero) bytes, and has a relative entropy value of zero (as do all files which contain only a single byte value). Note that the relative entropy values for the .ENC files (encrypted using Dolphin Encrypt) are about .99, as are those for the .RND files (created by using a pseudo-random-number generator similar to Microsoft's rand() function) of the same size. The last column gives the number of different bytes found in the file. This may be less than the size of the byte space for the file. If the size of the byte space is less than 256, as is the case with text files, then the space size parameter may be included in the command line, as in ENTROPY1 HAMLET.TXT 108. In this case the program produces results such as: File Size Entropy Rel. entropy Diff.bytes HAMLET.TXT 1459 3.037405 0.648723 42 PTRS.TXT 3683 3.415741 0.729527 108 CHAP04.TXT 51162 3.339292 0.713199 100 Thus decreasing the value for the byte space increases the entropy measure. Relative entropy tends to be larger for larger files. Now the C source code: /* ENTROPY1.C * Written by Peter Meyer, last revised 1993-04-27. * Calculates the relative entropy of the bytes in a file * defined as the negative of the sum for each byte of the product of * the relative probability of that byte times the natural log * of that byte, divided by the natural log of the number of * different bytes occurring in the file; values can range from 0 to 1. */ #include <STDIO.H> /* Microsoft header files */ #include <STDLIB.H> #include <MEMORY.H> #include <MATH.H> unsigned long n[256]; double p[256]; unsigned char *usage = "\nUse: ENTROPY1 filespec [space_size]" "\nspace_size = number of possible bytes (default = 256)\n"; void measure_entropy(unsigned char *filename, unsigned long *total, double *entropy, double *relative_entropy, unsigned int*num_diff_bytes, unsigned int *space_size, int *err_flag); /*-----------------------------*/ void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int err_flag; unsigned int num_diff_bytes, space_size; unsigned long total; double entropy, relative_entropy; if ( argc == 1 ) { printf(usage); exit(0); } if ( argc == 2 ) space_size = 256; else { space_size = (unsigned int)atoi(argv[2]); if ( space_size == 0 || space_size > 256 ) { printf("\nInvalid space size.\n"); exit(1); } } measure_entropy(argv[1],&total,&entropy,&relative_entropy,&num_diff_bytes, &space_size,&err_flag); switch ( err_flag ) { case 0: /* no error */ printf("Space size = %u\n",space_size); printf("\n%15s%15s%15s%15s%15s", "File","Size","Entropy","Rel. entropy","Diff. bytes"); printf("\n%15s%15lu",argv[1],total); printf("%15.6f%15.6f%15d\n",entropy,relative_entropy,num_diff_bytes); exit(0); case -1: printf("\nCannot open file %s.\n",argv[1]); exit(2); case -2: printf("\n%15s is inconsistent with space size %d.\n", argv[1],space_size); exit(3); } } /*-----------------------------------------*/ void measure_entropy(unsigned char *filename, unsigned long *total, double *entropy, double *relative_entropy, unsigned int *num_diff_bytes, unsigned int *space_size, int *err_flag) { int j; FILE *file; *err_flag = 0; file = fopen(filename,"rb"); if ( file == NULL ) { *err_flag = -1; return; } /* zero the frequency array */ memset(n,0,256*sizeof(unsigned long)); /* count the byte values */ while ( !feof(file) ) n[fgetc(file)]++; /* get the number of bytes and the number of different byte values */ *num_diff_bytes = 0; *total = 0L; for ( j=0; j<256; j++ ) { *num_diff_bytes += ( n[j] != 0 ); *total += n[j]; } if ( *num_diff_bytes > *space_size ) { *err_flag = -2; fclose(file); return; } /* calculate the probabilities */ for ( j=0; j<256; j++ ) p[j] = ((double)n[j])/(*total); /* calculate the entropy */ *entropy = 0.0; for ( j=0; j<256; j++ ) { if ( p[j] ) *entropy += p[j]*log(p[j]); } *entropy = -1.0*(*entropy); /* calculate the relative entropy */ *relative_entropy = *entropy/log(*space_size); fclose(file); } If anyone wants the MS-DOS executable version of this program then send me (meyer(a)mcc.com) a snailmail address and I'll send it to you on the Dolphin Encrypt demonstration disk. -- Peter Meyer

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(fwd) Re: Clipper Chip Questions
by tcmay＠netcom.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Cypherpatriots, Here's a fairly long posting I made to sci.crypt and comp.lsi about reverse engineering the Clipper chip. Especially on the technical issues about tamper-resistant modules and electron-beam probing. -Tim Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.lsi From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Clipper Chip Questions Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 20:26:51 GMT (followup to comp.lsi added, as they may have something to say on this) allyn (allyn(a)netcom.com) wrote: : My question is what is to prevent someone who has one of these chips : (from a cellphone or computer or whatever) from taking the chip to : a microelectronic facility with a decent scanning electron microscope and : other equipment that is used to testing and analysis of microcircuits : and taking the darn thing abart and reverse engineer it? : : There must be plenty of microelectronic facilities that are under : relatively minimal security (such as universities) for someone to : try to reverse engineer one of these classified chips that the government : plans to put into the public's hands. I ran an electron microscope/chip testing lab for Intel, circa 1981-84. (We built a kind of "time machine" for imaging the internal states of complex chips--the 286 in those days--and displaying them on an image processing system which "subtracted out" the states of bad chips from known good chips and thus allowed us to analyze the nucleation and propagation of logic faults through the chip. Very useful for finding subtle speed and voltage problems, as well as gross faults, of course.) Analyzing the Clipper chip, or any "tamper-resistant module," will not be trivial, but neither will it be impossible. Some issues, questions, problems: 1. Getting through the package to the chip surface itself is problematic. Proprietray molding compounds may be used to make this tough. (For example, carborundum and sapphire particles are often mixed in, so that mechanical grinding and lapping also destroys the chip. And plasma ashing won't work.) 2. Sometimes the package itself has "traps" which wipe the chip (the data) if breached (fiber optic lines mixed in the epoxy, for example). This seems unlikely for a relatively low-cost solution like the Clipper. Papers presented at the "Crypto Conference" have dealt with this. (The main uses: nuclear weapons "Permissive Action Links" and credit card "smart cards," which use less intensive measures, obviously.) 3. Once at the chip surface, via grinding, chemical etch, plasma ashing, etc., the chip can be analyzed. 4. Carefully photographing the chip as layers are etched away (or even carefully lapped away) can reveal much about the internal operation, though not the data stored in internal ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash EPROM, etc. If the Clipper/Capstone algorithm is embedded in the microcode and not apparent from the visible circuitry, then it must be read by other means. 5. Voltage contrast electron microscopy allows internal chip voltages to be read with good reliability. Cf. any of the the many papers on this. Commercial e-beam probers are available. (How voltage contrast works is itself an interesting issue, and there are many good references on this.) 6. However, operating the chip is necessary to read the internal states and voltage levels, and opening the chip under "hostile conditions" (read: limited numbers of samples, no knowledge of the molding compound, no help from the manufacturer) often destroys the functionality. It can be done, but count on lots of trial and error. 7. Metal layers may be used to shield lower signal-carrying layers from scrutiny by electron beam probes. Intel, for example, builds the new Pentium on a 3-layer metal process in which the top layer almost completely covers the lower layers. (Extremely sophisticated measurements using lasers (Kerr effect) and magnetic field sensing may be possible. Count on a very expensive set-up to do this.) 8. Other "tricks" may route parts of the key circuitry through buried layers, polysilicon lines, several layers of metal, etc. 9. VLSI Technology, Inc., the company with the "tamper-resistant technology" used by Mykotronx (VTI will fab the chips), may also be storing bits in very small EEPROM cells, which are very hard to e-beam probe (especially without disrupting them!). Note also that Intel bought a partial stake in VLSI. (I'm not imputing anything and don't know if Intel is somehow involved in the Clipper/Capstone effort. In fact, I left Intel in 1986.) 10. The easiest way to get the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone details is probably the old-fashioned way: offer money for it. With anonymous remailers and digital cash, this may be much easier. Just some thoughts on this extremely interesting issue of reverse-engineering the Clipper. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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othercrypt
by Peter Honeyman 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

does anyone know how to get the a5 eurocrypt stuff? also there is rumored to be russian cryptosoftware on the street. clue? peter

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