- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Clipper: International implications
by Tom Keenan 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

It will be fascinating to see how non-US governments react to Clipper. Anybody have any info on this? I will contact the office of the Canadian minister responsible for Communictions (Hon. Perrin Beatty) and see if there has been a statement or reaction. Canada might prosper as a "phone haven" much as some Caribbean countries are "data havens." Somewhat related item in April 19/93 Communictions Week International (page 4) reports (in part): "Europe's mobile telephone industry is developing less-secure GSM digital cellular equipment to mollify government law-enforcement agencies and adjust to restrictions on high technology exports. New base station software and modified handset chips would make it easier for GSM calls to be tapped, a requirement of some governments, but would likely cost millions of dollars to install in existing networks and terminals." The export status of Clipper technology will also be an interesting thing to sort out. White House Statement just says "case by case." Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P. Associate Dean, R&D, U of Calgary & Technology Correspondent, CBC Television "Midday"

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How to protect your electronic privacy -- consumer pamphlet
by szabo＠techbook.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Here is a handout I've written for our next Portland-area libertarian meeting. Comments welcome. Feel free to distribute freely (you can edit out Portland-specific stuff) with attributions. ---------------------------------------------------------------- How to Protect Your Electronic Privacy Nick Szabo, April 30 1993 Distribute Freely We conduct more and more of our legal, political, and private business over the wires. Every decade, the number of phone calls that the government can record for later playback increases by a factor of ten. Commercial organizations gather and sell our transactions; marketers and governments cross-reference them, forming our vast electronic reputation. The number of e-mail messages doubles every year, and many political organizations are coming to rely on networks like Internet and LiberNet. Most e-mail users are unaware that it is the most public medium ever invented, and use it to write love letters, letters to their lawyer, discussion of illegal activities, etc. Vast volumes of e-mail can be stored on small magnetic tapes and searched in bulk for keywords, eg "mari[jh]uana". The good news is, the computer brings an even greater weapon to fight these threats to our privacy and political freedoms: widely available, automatic cryptography. Instead of developing phones allowing truly private conversations, which are now feasible, AT&T recently put a phone on the market that contains the NSA-designed "Clipper" wiretap chip. All users' encryption keys are registered with the U.S. government, giving it exclusive access to wiretapping this system's phones. The use of an unpublished algorithm and other features also make the system insecure. "Clipper" would also make traffic analysis (finding out who is calling whom, when, etc.) much easier. The goal of this government/Ma Bell collusion is to subsidize the creation of a standard that forces truly private phone systems off the market. By purposefully allowing a government backdoor in its "secure" phones, AT&T has demonstrated its contempt for its customers' privacy. Here are some other long-distance providers that may have more respect. All U.S. line providers are required to surrender to telephone taps under government "authorization", but some require more "authorization" than others, or otherwise make a greater fuss about it. Local wiretaps are beyond the control of long-distance companies, but long-distance eavesdropping is much more difficult if the company uses fiber optic instead of microwave links. Ask company representatives for details. Allnet Long Distance Services 1-800-783-2020 MCI, commercial 1-800-888-0800 MCI, residential 1-800-950-5555 Metromedia Communications Corp. 1-800-275-2273 One-2-One Communications 1-800-293-4121 Sprint, residential 1-800-877-7746 Sprint, business 1-800-733-5566 Real phone privacy can be obtained with a veil of encryption, by using pairs of phones containing privacy chips, which scramble the signals *and* keep the keys private. Contact your local business telephone dealers for privacy phones from Ericson, Cylink and other companies. Keep your eye out for portable-computer-based software with voice input that can be used to encrypt voice mail and send it over the networks like e-mail; these may be appearing on the market or as freeware within six months. Data privacy can be obtained with public-key encryption features which have been added to some of the newer e-mail packages from Microsoft, Apple, Novell, etc. Beware: most software encryption has been restricted by the U.S. government to very weak algorithms. "Cypherpunks" enjoy writing programs to crack the weakened file encryption in Word Perfect, Lotus, etc. Be sure the software contains the new "RSA" public-key algorithm, which probably cannot be cracked by anybody, even the NSA with their buildings full of supercomputers. A strong freeware RSA package is also available called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP); this is the international standard on the Internet. PGP can also be used for protecting the files on your PC. On an Internet machine type "archie pgp" to find out where PGP is available for download. Several BBS systems also have PGP available. In public key encryption, there are two keys, one used to lock (really scramble) the data, the other to unlock (unscramble) the data. To join the fun, publish or send your freinds your public key, and they can then send you messages only you can unlock with your private key. You collect other's public keys and do the same. PGP key distribution is based on an informal, voluntary web of trust instead of the government's rigid heirarchy which is vulnerable to failure at the top. Just as today's businessmen trade business cards, tommorrow's businessmen will trade public keys -- if the government doesn't ban them first. For more detailed information on electronic privacy, see: * Your local phone dealer. If he does not know about privacy issues and phone privacy products, ask him to find out! * The May/June issue of "Wired" magazine featuring "crypto-rebels" on the cover. A history computer cryptography and the "cypherpunk" movement, whose goal is to break the government monopoly on cryptography and to restore our right to privacy in the electronic age. * "Mondo 2000" #9 (most recent) features two good articles on PGP, and a third article on protecting our financial privacy from governments. * The Winter/Spring issue of "Extropy" features and article on digital cash. Unlike current electronic funds transfer, digital cash increases financial privacy. * On the Internet, the cypherpunks mailing list (cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com) and the newsgroups sci.crypt. In the Portland area two Internet providers are agora (293-1772 data) and techbook (220-0636 data). * Organizations helping lobby for electronic privacy: Electronic Frontier Foundation (eff.org) Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (cpsr.org) Privacy International. These are not entirely libertarian (eg EFF tends to support Gore's socialist "Data Highway".) * James Bamford, _The Puzzle Palace_, 1983: A classic expose of the National Security Agency. Nick Szabo szabo(a)techbook.com

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COMP.RISKS is where the action seems to be
by tcmay＠netcom.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Comp.risks is carrying extensive coverage of the Clipper Chip issue, including Dorothy Denning attempting to defend the Clipper. Sci.crypt and alt.security.clipper still have more messages, but comp.risks seems to be the place I check first. Being a digest, though, a new one only appears a few times a week. -Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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Markey hearings on Thursday will be on the Internet MBone
by gnu 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

John Gage tells me that audio from the Congressional hearings on telephone privacy and Clipper will be multicast on the Internet `MBone' (multicast backbone). We don't yet know the multicast address. If someone who knows about the mbone could hook in and record a copy of the hearings (as an online sound file, or on tape), that would be great. I'll be at a conference on Thursday. John

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Re: a quick non-technical writeup on the Clipper chip -- corrections
by composer＠Beyond.Dreams.ORG 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Here are some minor corrections to the the non-technical writeup I posted earlier this evening. Note, that I also already corrected the typo regarding how the keys were constructed. Ignore the line numbers.. they'll be incorrect, as this is part of a larger article. FYI... -jeff Jeff Kellem Internet: composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG ===CUT HERE=== *** /tmp/RCSA002047 Tue Apr 27 01:29:46 1993 --- whats-out-there-1.03.text Tue Apr 27 01:29:08 1993 *************** *** 188,203 **** important to the privacy of that same public. o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to ! Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology. It's unclear whether each ! company makes the entire chip or just parts thereof. o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to be decrypted, is embedded in the chip [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be ! replaced to maintain private communications. In other words, a new ! encryption device, if the key is ever divulged, which could just ! mean a wire-tap. ] o the 80-bit key is made from the xor of two (2) 80-bit keys, which are kept in databases at two different escrow agencies --- 188,206 ---- important to the privacy of that same public. o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to ! Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology. As far as I know, VLSI ! fabricates the chip and Mykotronx programs the keys into it. o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to be decrypted, is embedded in the chip [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be ! replaced to maintain private communications. This would usually ! mean replacing the entire device (e.g. telephone), anytime that ! the key was divulged, whether legally or not. The key is also ! transmitted along with your encrypted data, so that law enforcement ! can obtain it, which would allow them to decrypt your data without ! your knowledge. ] o the 80-bit key is made from the xor of two (2) 80-bit keys, which are kept in databases at two different escrow agencies *************** *** 223,235 **** for international distribution. On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which ! are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly. Some of these items ! have been mentioned above. I recommend talking with your local ! congressman, writing letters, and discussing this with friends. Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements ! against the announcement. The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding the plan. Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the --- 226,243 ---- for international distribution. On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which ! are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly. Some of these items have ! been mentioned above. The Clipper Chip basically seems like it might ! provide privacy from some people, but not from the government. I recommend ! talking with your local congressman, writing letters, and discussing this ! with friends. Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements ! against the announcement. The EFF supports the idea of reviewing ! cryptographic and privacy policies, but believes that the Clipper Chip ! announcement was premature and should be delayed until after the overall ! review and discussion. The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding the plan. Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the

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Mykotronx and VLSI data sheets
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

The data sheets arrived today! (Steve - I gave Matt a copy; I can fax it to you if yours hasn't shown) (Cypherpunks - Mykotronx 310-533-8100 fax-0527, VLSI 408-434-3100 fax-263-2511) The VLSI material didn't have anything Clipper-specific - lots of stuff on their ASIC libraries and chips, and some information on their tamper-proof technology. Their DES chip does 192 Mb/s, and they've got a vocoder chip for 13 kb/s GSM as well as 32 kb/s ADPCM G.721, ARM RISC, Z80 cores, high-speed comms stuff, PC support ASICs, etc. The Mykotronx material was interesting. It was about 18 pages long, and there are functional diagrams, pinouts, timing diags, command sets. It looks like there may be two versions, one commercial, one industrial-hard. The chip is 28-pin PLCC, with 4 bits control input, 8 leads for input/ output/config/status/test/alarm depending on command, the usual power, clock, strobe, busy, reset, and alarm leads, and two leads for higher-voltage write-once PROM. The internal clock is 15 MHz, and I'm not sure how fast it goes if you clock it externally (it uses the internal clock when it's doing the fun stuff, but can use externals for I/O, etc.) It looks like the encryption phase takes 64 clock cycles, but I'm not an electrician so I can't guarantee that that's what the timing diags mean; if that's the case it would seem to be slower than 16 mb/s throughput given I/O time? There are 5 functional blocks: controller, algorithm, Data Bus Buffer, self-test, and clock. There's an internal data bus (how wide? 8 bits?) with the controller, data buffer, and external clock accessible from outside, the self-test generating two output leads only, and the algorithm block isolated (only connected to the bus and self-test.) The basic sequence of operations, once the chip has booted and tested, is that you feed commands to initialize cryptographic variables (key, IV), tell it to encrypt or decrypt, strobe in data, let it crunch, and strobe out results. It's picky about getting commands in the right order, and rejects anything it isn't willing to do for security reasons. It can operate in 7 different modes: ECB-64, CBC-64, OFB-64, CFB-64/32/16/8. The number of bytes read or written depends on the mode, but I was interested to find that I couldn't tell from the data sheets how many bytes that is, which either means they deliberately aren't telling us where the wiretap block is or else they assume that the Output Buffer Full and Input Buf Empty leads are all you care about; I'll try to find a tasteful way to ask them. Commands: - Reset - Write Random Seed - must be done at startup; there's a pseudo-random generator for IVs. If you give it a zero, it asks for a better seed. - Write Config Register - done second, picks operating mode. If you're in IDLE mode, you need to do this before writing the CV or IV. - Write Crypto-Variable (CV) (loads 10 bytes key, 3 bytes checksum, automagically checks key when loaded.) - Write Initialization Vector (IV) - you can load it or generate. - Generate IV - using the pseudo-random. Outputs to data bus when done. - Start Encrypt Block - read data off bus, crunch, wait for Read Output, IDLE - Read Output - strobes out output - Start Decrypt Block - read data, crunch, wait for Read Output, repeat until you get a Terminate or other command - Terminate Encrypt/Decrypt - stop doing encryption (IDLE?) - Save Current State - output 8 bytes of state to data bus - Restore Current State - input 8 bytes of state from data bus - Read Status Register - outputs to bus - Read Test/Alarm Register - outputs to bus - Write Test/Alarm Register - read from bus, do tests If you want to order a copy, they were pretty quick about delivering it. The person I talked to was John Droge, VP, Program Development. Approximate prices are $30 (qty. 10,000), no mention of engineering samples, quotations on a case-by-case basis for now. Bill Stewart # Bill Stewart wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876 # AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ 07733-3030

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He's all yours...
by gnu 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

I'll send him the master list of cypherpunks questions. You-all can do the rest. John ------- Forwarded Message From: schneier(a)chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: Comments on Clipper for Publication To: gnu(a)toad.com Date: Mon, 26 Apr 1993 20:27:26 -0500 (CDT) I am writing an article on Clipper for Network World. I am looking for comments and opinions (that I can quote) on the scheme, its implications for security and privacy, its acceptance here and overseas, etc. I am on very tight deadline (I need to finish this Wednesday night). Please call or E-Mail responses. If there is someone else at EFF I should be talking to, please send me his address and telephione number. Thanks, Bruce (708) 524-9461 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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A correction, and another motive for Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Jim Bidzos of RSA informs me that Capstone does in fact use public key methods, and that his company will presumably receive royalty payments. (I remember this being discussd, now. The government itself has royalty-free access to the various public key patents, so I understand, but corporations selling equipement using the patents would presumably have to negotiate their own deals.) On another matter, I saw in the April 19th issue of "Network World," the headline on the front page: "Clinton security plan hints of Big Brother," with the subtitle: "Clipper Chip would let government eavesdrop on encrypted voice and data communications." The article is by Ellen Messmer. Along with the usual quotes from the White House announcement came this curious admission from an AT&T manager when asked why anyone, especially a criminal or terrorist, would use a tappable phone when alternatives exist. ---begin quote--- "A criminal probably wouldn't use it," said Mike Agee, marketing manager for secure products at AT&T, adding that the Clipper Chip is for the rest of the world. ---end quote--- Now I've heard several explanations for Clipper, ranging from buying market share to the stupidity of criminals (i.e., criminals _could_ buy non-Clipper alternatives under the current plan, but in practice they're too stupid to). Assuming non-Clipper encryption remains legal, why Clipper? It just occurred to me that perhaps the government is primarily interested in tapping its *own* phones! Not necessarily as part of a paranoid conspiracy plan, but because of the graft and bribery cases that keep coming up, such as the Defense Department scandals uncovered by Operatin Ill Wind a few years back. Ditto for "leaks" from offices. The Powers That Be may have looked at the coming age of untappable phones and concluded that at least they make sure they could tap the phones of those in government and defense contractors and suppliers, who will be the only ones actually _required_ to buy the Clipperphones. (Under the precise wording of the White House announcement; we can all still worry that this move is preparatory to wider restrictions.) Lest you think I'm becoming like David Sternlight and looking for the silver lining in every government move, I'm only floating this as a minor wrinkle on why the Clipperphones may be being deployed so quickly. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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a quick non-technical writeup on the Clipper chip...
by composer＠Beyond.Dreams.ORG 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

The following is something I wrote for "What's Out There?", a column I write about what's available on the net. It's more for pointing out where to find out more information and such, but also includes a few of the concerns about the announcement. Feel free to send me comments. I'll be posting this to various USENET newsgroups in the near future, as the column won't be in hardcopy until about June, 1993. FYI... -jeff Jeff Kellem Internet: composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG p.s. This is excerpted with permission, of course, since I am the author. ;-) ===CUT HERE=== [ NOTE: Please see the COPYRIGHT/LICENSE notice at the end of this document before ANY redistribution. ] The following is a portion of Volume 1, Issue 03 of "What's Out There?" written by Jeff Kellem <composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG>. This is expected to appear in the May/June 1993 issue of the USENIX Association's hardcopy newsletter, ";login:". Excerpted from "What's Out There?", Volume 1, Issue 03... White House and NSA (Encryption) Clipper Chip Announcement ---------------------------------------------------------- On April 16, 1993, the White House announced the development of an encryption chip for voice communications developed in conjunction with the National Security Agency (NSA) called the Clipper Chip, along with an initiative regarding telecommunications and privacy which could literally affect almost every citizen in the United States. On the same day, AT&T announced a "secure" phone which incorporated this chip. Some important things to point out: o the encryption algorithm is remaining classified [ In the cryptography community, an encryption algorithm is only considered secure after it has been examined extensively and independently by a wide array of experts around the world. With an algorithm which is kept secret, there is no guarantee that it is secure and that the encryption method has no "back door" (allowing easy decryption for those, such as the NSA, that know the "back door"). ] o though the government has announced plans to use the chip in their own phones, they do NOT plan to use it for CLASSIFIED information, only for unclassified information. o this chip has been in the making for 4 years; it would seem that the Clinton Administration has already made plans to use the chip, without public comment or discussion on a matter which is so important to the privacy of that same public. o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology. It's unclear whether each company makes the entire chip or just parts thereof. o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to be decrypted, is embedded in the chip [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be replaced to maintain private communications. In other words, a new encryption device, if the key is ever divulged, which could just mean a wire-tap. ] o the 80-bit key is split into two (2) 40-bit pieces and kept in databases at two different escrow agencies [ It's not clear how the key databases will be kept secure. It is also unknown if the classified encryption algorithm is any less secure to brute-force attacks, once half the key is known. ] o a successor chip has already been announced, called the Capstone chip. The Capstone chip is supposed to be a "superset" of the Clipper chip and will include the "digital signature standard" (DSS), which many in the cyprotgraphy community seem to consider insecure, as I recall. The NSA also developed DSS, which wasn't disclosed until CPSR filed a FOIA request with NIST (the National Institute of Standards & Technology). This announcement, in one way, is a step in the right direction -- privacy and encryption technology are important to the general public and for international economic competitiveness. An inquiry on whether export restrictions on encryption technology is good or bad is also a good thing. Currently, companies that want to include encryption as part of their products need to make two versions -- one for domestic distribution and one for international distribution. On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly. Some of these items have been mentioned above. I recommend talking with your local congressman, writing letters, and discussing this with friends. Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements against the announcement. The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding the plan. Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the Net in various USENET newsgroups and mailing lists. Here's a sample of where you might find discussions of the Clipper Chip: USENET newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper sci.crypt alt.security alt.privacy comp.org.eff.talk comp.security.misc comp.society.cu-digest comp.risks Mailing lists: cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Also, check the archives for the various groups listed above, as things may have changed by the time this comes to print in hardcopy come June 1993. The official White House press release of the Clipper Chip can be found via anonymous ftp from: csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in the /pub/nistnews directory, or via the NIST Computer Security BBS at +1 301 948 5717. It should also be available with the rest of the White House press release archives mentioned above. The EFF comments were first published in the EFFector Online Issue 5.06, which is available via anonymous ftp from: ftp.eff.org in the /pub/EFF/newsletters directory. Information from CPSR is available online via anonymous ftp from: ftp.cpsr.org in the /cpsr directory. The cypherpunks mailing list also maintains an archive. Information on the Clipper Chip can be found via anonymous ftp from: soda.berkeley.edu in the /pub/cypherpunks/clipper directory. Please do read the announcement of the Clipper Chip encryption technology, think about and discuss the implications of this with your friends, congressmen, and anyone else. ...End of excerpt. COPYRIGHT/LICENSE: This document is Copyright (c) 1993 Jeff Kellem/Beyond Dreams, composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG. This copyright notice must be kept with each document. You have permission to freely redistribute this for non-commercial and non-profit purposes. It would be nice if you let the author know about any redistributions that are expected to reach more than a single person. :-) (This would include mirroring ftp sites, etc.) Please contact the author if you wish to use this document in ANY other fashion. Most likely, there won't be a problem. If you wish to redistribute this document for commercial purposes, you MUST contact the author for permission. Thank you. Jeff Kellem Composer of Dreams Beyond Dreams Internet: composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG

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Re: MEETING SUMMARY:
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Tim May closes his excellent summery with > May you live in interesting time, indeed! The rest of this curse is not as well known, but it goes "and attract the attention of important people." I suspect we are doing just that. Keith Henson

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