- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

UNSUBSCRIBE !
by ab357＠freenet.carleton.ca 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

Please unsubscribe me. Thanks. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- | HELENA DANG | hdang(a)math.carleton.ca | | =)8-> | ab357(a)freenet.carleton.ca | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Peter shipley 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I suppose this should be added to the the ftp site on soda. -Pete -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLDyRNHynuL1gkffFAQGWigH6A6/aLAoAtJElN++r0qyMyD+aWQTVr7FH gGb8C+4wNozzPAmr+wIpN0oBW7Cti7U1+G4oOW+FMQKdOljAyLJxQA== =cinp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ;; ;; ;; From: mpf(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Michael P. Frank) ;; A quick summary: ;; ;; Key Command name Notes ;; ------- ------------------ ---------------- ;; C-c p e pgp-encrypt-region Prompts for recipient's ID. ;; C-c p d pgp-decrypt-region The first time, prompts for your pass phrase. ;; C-c p s pgp-sign-region Ditto. Uses CLEARSIG. ;; C-c p S pgp-sign-and-encrypt-region Doesn't use CLEARSIG. Encrypts also. ;; C-c p v pgp-verify-region Checks signature (in a new window). ;; C-c p p pgp-set-passphrase Sets or changes PGP pass phrase. ;; C-c p c pgp-clear-passphrase Erases pass phrase. ;; ;; Thanks are due to Bob Anderson <bs891(a)cleveland.Freenet.Edu> for ;; writing a very helpful explanation of how to do the guts of these ;; commands. However, any bugs are my own. ;; ;; Enjoy! ;; ;; -Mike ;; ;;; ;;; Emacs Support for PGP ;;; ;;; People can see your PGP passphrase if: ;;; * They watch over your shoulder as you type it. (It's not invisible.) ;;; * They do "ps auxww" (SunOS) on your machine while you're ;;; decrypting/signing. ;;; * They type C-h v *pgp-passphrase* in your emacs after you've ;;; entered your passphrase. ;;; ;;; Plus the system suffers from all the normal Unix and X-windows ;;; security holes. ;;; (defun pgp-set-passphrase (arg) "Prompts for PGP pass phrase." (interactive "sPGP pass phrase: ") (setq *pgp-passphrase* arg)) (defun pgp-clear-passphrase () "Clears the PGP pass phrase." (interactive) (makunbound '*pgp-passphrase*)) (defun pgp-encrypt-region (start end pgp-user-id &optional flag) "Encrypt the region using PGP. Prompts for a PGP user ID. With prefix arg, puts result in serparate window. Noninteractive args are START, END, PGP-USER-ID, and optional FLAG." (interactive "r\nsUser ID to encrypt to: \nP") (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -fea " pgp-user-id) (not flag))) (defun pgp-decrypt-region (start end &optional flag) "Decrypt the region using PGP. Prompts for the user's pass phrase, if not already known. With prefix arg, puts result in separate window. Noninteractive args are START and END and optional FLAG." (interactive "r\nP") (if (not (boundp '*pgp-passphrase*)) (call-interactively 'pgp-set-passphrase)) (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -f -z \"" *pgp-passphrase* "\"") (not flag))) (defun pgp-sign-and-encrypt-region (start end pgp-user-id &optional flag) "Sign and encrypt the region using PGP. Prompts for a user to encrypt to and a pass phrase, if not already known. With prefix arg puts result in separate window. Noninteractive args are START, END, and PGP-USER-ID, and optional FLAG." (interactive "r\nsUser ID to encrypt to: \nP") (if (not (boundp '*pgp-passphrase*)) (call-interactively 'pgp-set-passphrase)) (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -safe " pgp-user-id " -z \"" *pgp-passphrase* "\"") (not flag))) (defun pgp-sign-region (start end &optional flag) "Sign the region using PGP. Prompts for a pass phrase, if not already Known. With prefix arg puts result in separate window. Noninteractive args are START and END and optional FLAG." (interactive "r\nP") (if (not (boundp '*pgp-passphrase*)) (call-interactively 'pgp-set-passphrase)) (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -saft +clearsig=on" " -z \"" *pgp-passphrase* "\"") (not flag))) (defun pgp-verify-region (start end) "Verify the signature on the text in the given region using PGP." (interactive "r") (shell-command-on-region start end "pgp -f")) (global-set-key "\C-cpp" 'pgp-set-passphrase) (global-set-key "\C-cpc" 'pgp-clear-passphrase) (global-set-key "\C-cpe" 'pgp-encrypt-region) (global-set-key "\C-cpd" 'pgp-decrypt-region) (global-set-key "\C-cps" 'pgp-sign-region) (global-set-key "\C-cpS" 'pgp-sign-and-encrypt-region) (global-set-key "\C-cpv" 'pgp-verify-region)

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IETF
by Marc Horowitz 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

Is anyone else on this list going to be there? Marc

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Re: If the cypherpunks list gets this, the loop is at pro-sol.cts.com
by mdavis＠pro-sol.cts.com 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

gnu(a)toad.com writes: >There's been a message loop running in cypherpunks today. Did you guys >add cypherpunks(a)toad.com to your local list or something? Please remove >it, if so! > > John Gilmore > postmaster(a)toad.com No. Our local list alias is "cypherpunks-list" and the only recipient is an incoming news processor that posts messages in a local newsgroup (pro.cypherpunks). The only transmissions to the cypherpunks(a)toad.com address are when posts are made in our local newsgroup. I will double-check everything though. /\/\ Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563) / /__\ Internet: mdavis(a)pro-sol.cts.com

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USENET newsreaders and cryptography: features/suggestions/questions
by Clifford A Adams 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

Hello out there! The current version of strn (see below) contains a signature verification command (control-V). It looks for either a RIPEM or PGP signature line and passes the article to the appropriate command for verification. (Strn leaves it up to the user to interpret the output of the command.) I have a few questions/requests that I hope the cypherpunks list can help me with: 1. Does anyone know if including code like system("pgp -m foobar") might cause legal problems? Strn doesn't implement any cryptographic techniques. 2. What's the status on a USA-legal PGP (using RSAREF)? I would like to greatly expand strn's cryptographic features, but I'd rather not implement features that many of strn's users can't use. (That includes me--I won't use PGP until/unless the legal issues are cleared up.) 3. It would be greatly convenient if someone would implement a "verify signature only" switch for PGP. Most of the applications I would like to use don't involve data hiding--just signature verification. I'm also lobbying the RIPEM author to include a similar feature. Also, if anyone has any comments or suggestions about newsreader cryptographic features feel free to send mail. I hope to do some work later with things like remote reconfiguration, trusted ratings, suggested reading lists, and the like. --Cliff P.S. Strn is about 10K lines of C code added to trn. It is (probably) just a few weeks away from a public beta test. If anyone really wants to test strn, let me know and I'll consider it. More information is also available via finger or mail. -- Clifford A. Adams caadams(a)polaris.unm.edu | USENET Interface Project: 457 Ash St. NE Albuquerque, NM 87106 | Tools for advanced newsreading STRN (Scan TRN) now in testing: trn 3.0 plus flexible newsgroup menus, fast article scoring with score ordered display, and merged/virtual newsgroups.

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Phiber Optik pleads guilty
by L. Detweiler 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

From: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Subject: Two messages that may interest you re: "Phiber Optik," Date: Tue, 6 Jul 1993 17:31:39 -0500 The following appears on Newsbytes today. Newsbytes is a copyrighted commercial service which appears on GEnie, Compuserve, America OnLine, Newsnet, DIALOG, Clarinet and other networks. This story is posted here with the permission of the authors. ========================================================================== Phiber Optik Pleads Guilty 07/06/93 NEW YORK, NEW YORK, U.S.A., 1993 JUL 6 (NB) -- Mark Abene, better known throughout the computer world by the hacker handle "Phiber Optik," plead guilty on July 2 in Federal Court to felony charges of conspiracy and unauthorized access to computers. Abene had been due to go to trial on these counts today. The plea by Abene, entered before Judge Louis Stanton in the Southern District of New York, admitted intrusion into computers owned by NYNEX, BellSouth, and Southwestern Bell. In his statement, Abene said that he had, in his actions, "never tried to damage any computer systems and, to my knowledge, I never have." In the course of the proceedings, Judge Stanton asked Abene a series of questions including: whether he understood the charges; whether he realized that, by pleading guilty to felony charges, he was exposing himself to possible loss of civil liberties such as the right to vote, sit on jury or hold public office; whether he realized that he could face a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $500,000; whether he understood that he could be required to make restitution for damages; and whether he was satisfied that he had received adequate legal counsel. He replied yes to all the above, but no to the question of whether he had been threatened or coerced by the United States Attorney's office to change his plea. Following the questioning, the judge asked Abene to say what he did. Abene responded by admitting that he had conspired with others to gain access to various computer systems, including those belonging NYNEX, BellSouth and Southwestern Bell; he had intercepted data on networks belonging to British Telcom and Tymnet; and that he had misrepresented himself to employees of phone companies to gain access to their systems. It was during these admissions that Abene said that he had never, to his knowledge, damaged any systems. At the end of Abene's statement, Assistant US Attorney Fishbein stated that Abene had fraudulently used computer accounts at New York University to access the remote computer systems. When asked by the judge to confirm Fishbein's assertion, Abene did. Judge Stanton then stated, "Mr. Abene is fully competent to make an informed plea in this case. He is knowledgeable of the charges against him and is aware of the possible consequences. I accept his guilty pleas." Judge Stanton then set sentencing for 9:30AM Wednesday, November 3rd. He asked Abene's attorney, Paul Ruskin, to insure that he do everything possible to cooperate with the probation staff in its development of a background of Abene for the sentencing procedure. Abene was then released on his own recognizance. Abene, together with Elias Ladopoulpos, a/k/a "Acid Phreak;" Paul Stira, "Scorpion;" John Lee, "Corrupt;" and Julio Fernandez, "Outlaw," were indicted on July 8, 1992. Ladopulous, Stira, Lee, and Fernandez previously plead guilty to charges relating to the indictment. Lee, the only one sentenced to date, has received a year and a day. Stira and Ladopoulos are scheduled for sentencing on July 23. In a prepared statement after court adjournment, United States Attorney Mary Jo White said that the investigation leading to the indictment was performed jointly by the United Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She praised both the Secret Service and FBI and thanked the Department of Justice Computer Crime Unit for "their important assistance in the investigation." Ruskin, Abene's attorney, told Newsbytes, "My personal opinion is that Mark has outgrown the phase in his life in which he performed the activities to which he confessed. He wants to use his considerable computer talents in manners that will be productive to society." Fishbein told Newsbytes, "The government is satisfied with the successful end to an important case. We hope that other people involved in illegal computer activities recognize that the Federal Government takes these cases very seriously." (Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen/19930706) John F. McMullen mcmullen(a)mindvox.phantom.com Consultant, knxd(a)maristb.bitnet mcmullen(a)well.sf.ca.us Writer, 70210.172(a)compuserve.com mcmullen(a)panix.com Student, GEnie - nb.nyc mcmullen(a)eff.org Teacher Subject: Perhaps you could help From: mcmullen (John F. McMullen) Comments: Message-ID: <N3006B7w165w(a)mindvox.phantom.com> Date: Tue, 06 Jul 93 16:43:10 EDT Organization: [Phantom Access] / the MindVox system I received this from Mark and, with his permission, am sending it to you in the hope that you might write something. John ========================================================================== >From panix.com!mark Tue Jul 6 15:31:07 1993 Return-Path: <mark(a)panix.com> Received: from panix.com by mindvox.phantom.com with smtp (Smail3.1.28.1 #5) id m0oDIjD-0009STC; Tue, 6 Jul 93 15:30 EDT Received: by panix.com id AA14749 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for mcmullen); Tue, 6 Jul 1993 15:25:42 -0400 From: Phiber Optik <mark(a)panix.com> Subject: Personal request... Friends and fellow netters: I regret to inform you all that after much stress and anxiety, I decided the risk of loss to be too great, and have accepted a guilty plea in my case. All things considered, it seemed the only thing to do in order to avoid the possibility of a much harsher sentence in the event things did not go well during trial. I entered my plea on Friday, July 2nd, and am to be sentenced this November. I'm sending this letter to those who were under consideration for testifying in my favor as character/expert witnesses, and I would greatly appreciate if you could put together letters of recommendation attesting to my character. These letters would be considered by the judge and the probation department and would help me in my review for sentencing. If there are any questions, feel free to reply, or you can contact my lawyers, Paul Ruskin and Carl Hartmann, at 212/223-3330. Thank you, - -Mark. ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Clipper committee: open meetings required by law?
by L. Detweiler 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

Subject: Clipper review committee must hold open meetings, etc! Date: Tue, 06 Jul 93 15:48:18 -0700 From: gnu(a)cygnus.com According to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 USC app. 2), the panel of cryptographers who are reviewing the Skipjack algorithm qualify as an advisory committee, and must hold open meetings, announce the location and duration of meetings, make transcripts available under FOIA, etc. 5 U.S.C app. 2 (sec. 3) (2) The term "advisory committee" means any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as "committee"), which is: (A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or (B) established or utilized by the President, or (C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that such term excludes (i) the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii) the Commission on Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government. (3) The term "agency" has the same meaning as in section 551(1) of Title 5. ... (sec 10) (a) (1) Each advisory committee meeting shall be open to the public. (2) Except when the President tdetermines otherwise for reasons of national security, timely notice of each such meeting shall be published in the Federal Registers, and the Administrator shall proescribe regulations to provide for other types of public notice to insure that all interested persons are notified of such meeting prior thereto. [Administrator = Administrator of General Services] (3) Interested persons shall be permitted to attend, appear before, or file statements with any advisory committee, subject to such reasonable rules or regulations as the Administrator may prescribe. (b) Subject to section 552 of Title 5, United States Code [the FOIA], the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory committee shall be available for public inspection and copying at a single location in the offices of the advisory committee or the agency to which the advisory committee reports until the advisory committee ceases to exist. (c) Detailed minutes of each meeting...shall be kept... (d) Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) of this section shall not apply to any portion of an advisory committee meeting where the President, or the head of the agency to which the advisory committee reports, determines that such portion of such meeting may be closed to the public in accordance with subsection (c) of section 552b of Title 5, United States Code [the Government in the Sunshine Act]. Any such determination shall be in writing and shall contain the reasons for such determination... [This lets them close portions of the meeting that are classified. But they must hold an open meeting anytime their discussion is not classified. And they must vote publicly about what portions of the meeting to close.] ... (sec 11) (a) Except where prohibited by contractural agreements entered into prior to the effective date of this Act, agencies and advisory committees shall make available to any person, at actual cost of duplication, copies of transcripts of agency proceedings or advisory committee meetings. Read over the whole act (it's in the annual Justice Dept. "FOIA Case List" publication) and then let's find out whether NIST is following the rules here... The Sept 91 case list has about 40 FACA cases listed. The recent controversy over Hilary's health care advisory task force is also an FACA case. Thanks to Whit Diffie for thinking of this. John ------- End of Forwarded Message

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`ad hominem' ad nauseam
by L. Detweiler 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

I'd like to respond to a few introspective cypherpunkesque notes by P. Farrell and T.C. May. I've considered the general attitudes toward e.g. Denning and Sternlight seriously, particularly my own. I freely admit to banging out scathing verbiage on behalf of both here and elsewhere and critical reactions both publicly and privately. First, a general observation. It strikes me that many have not recognized the true meaning of `ad hominem' in their casual and careless use of it (perhaps even it is the only Latin term known to some tossing it about because of its frequent appearance in cyberspatial flame wars). I think it has taken a new meaning on the net to be something like `making someone look like a fool'. By my view, it means *calling* someone a fool completely without justification (e.g. attacking irrelevent aspects of their reputation). However, devastating their flimsy arguments and false beliefs to the point they *look* like a fool is not an ad hominem attack. Perhaps I will be accused of splitting fibers but I think the distinction is transparent. P.F.: >I'm more than a little concerned about the vicious personal attacks that >this list makes on folks that have strongly held beliefs that disagree with >some (or all) of the beliefs of hot headed posters to cypherpunks. >I thought this was a technical mailing list, that dabbled in politics only >as necessary. I see no justification for the personal attacks, especially on >3rd parties that do not read this list. These uncalled for attacks will not >convince anyone on the list, and do not become the poster. First, I will not argue that ad hominem or vicious attacks are warranted. However, they are there because they are *motivated* by tangible reasons that you fail to address. Let's look at each case: [D. Denning] >She just happens to support a view that she >strongly believes in. The fact that I think her side is dead wrong does not >make her an idiot. Name calling accomplishes nothing but does hurt the >signal to noise ratio of this list. First, it is not clear why Denning doggedly pursues the key escrow scheme and advocation of Clipper, and she has never expressed any conceivable reason. Your invention of `strong belief' is nothing but pure speculation and in the glaring lack of any statements on the subject by her, not any superior in plausibility than attributions of black machinations by others. Yet, on the other hand, virtually everyone who is (admittedly) equally dogmatically opposed to Clipper supplies a continuous torrent of personal motivations, anecdotes, and background for their characteristic position and drive. D. Denning once volunteered some weak statistics on wiretapping a long time ago but has long since abandoned them. Others suggested they showed to the contrary that wiretapping did not have a socially significant effect despite severe compromises and sacrifices to institute it. >Even more annoying are the attacks on Jim Bidzos. He is trying to make a >buck, which was legal last time I looked. And on many issues, he is far more >in our camp than against us. He at least likes strong cryptography, and his >disputable patents expire in a relatively short time. He has agreed to allow >a PGP-compatible program to use RSA without cost, providing the legal >version that many U.S. users would like to see. Again, you are postulating hypothetical motivations. You supply no direct evidence for your claims whatsoever, despite very disturbing evidence to the contrary (PGP hassling, DSA scheming, patent-mongering, laywer-breeding, etc.). As for the PGP case you cite, why has it taken years for him to reverse the companies well-known belligerence despite overtures by PRZ? Probably because of strong public pressure and PR opportunism, IMHO. I don't claim my opinion is correct, but I do claim that it is most plausible in light of all the data. [T.M.] >What really bothers me is the type of criticism, which I also tend to call >"ad hominem" (but which rhetoriticians may have a special name for), in >which people impute _motives_ to others. Thus, we see seemingly endless >comments about the motives of Denning, of Bidzos, of Sternlight, and of >others. >[...] >While I think Dorothy Denning is, for various reasons, hopelessly in the >camp of the NSA and FBI, I see nothing to be gained by demonizing her. This was a bit confusing to me to hear Mr. May first criticize imputing motives, and then to say that `Denning is for various reasons hopelessly in the camp of the NSA and FBI'. What are her various reasons for her bizarre lone intransigence? The whole *point* is that these reasons are unclear, and most of the `endless comments about the motives' by others are actually encouraging bait for those parties to publicly `come clean' with their associations and affiliations. These people's actions are completely baffling from our own point of view and troubling in light of other hazy but discernable ulterior trend-patterns. What is their version of reality? Particularly with Denning and Bidzos their public comments on their motivations, despite the sheer strangeness of it all, are essentially nonexistent. I must admit a bit of frustration and annoyance (to say the least) with T.C. May's habitual tendency to don rosy glasses in viewing the actions of Denning and Bidzos and others (speaking in spineless psychoanalytic babble like `cognitive dissonance'), seemingly reflecting a continual forebearance and willingness to grant them `the benefit of the doubt' despite increasingly sinister evidence of motives to the contrary. Denning, in particular, has explicitly claimed no knowledge of Clipper despite her uncannily prescient proposals (she was the *first* to propose the `split key' idea on sci.crypt in an infamous `Copper Balloon' message). Bidzos appears to me to be playing different cyberpunks against each other and making lame statements such as that the DSS arrangement is completely sensible and rational despite the historical convolutions preceding it. We are dealing with people who are failing to level with us at best and tricking and deceiving us at worst, and the `demonizing' represents our desperation. To the contrary, it is attribution of their motives to `socializing' and `support' from their `peer group' that dangerously trivializes, underestimates, misjudges them. [`demonizing'] >... weakens our cause, for two reasons. First, it >cuts off dialog with those we disagree with. Second, we tend to >underestimate people we have written off as stooges or dunces. As the sci.crypt melee you valiantly instigated dramatically proves, dialogue has so far been completely useless. Despite the most critical reception possible to the idea of key escrow about 6 months before the release of Clipper, no modification of the plan was apparent. D. Denning may as well be a brick wall when it comes to rational consideration of opposing viewpoints on the subject (which she conveniently delegates to others to explore). She simply will not budge from her basic premise that key-escrow is wholly desirable and necessary. In short, at present we have an impasse, not `dialogue'. Furthermore, it is precisely in scathingly criticizing opponents that we encourage others *not* to underestimate these people and their dangerous ideas. That is the point: all of Denning, Bidzos, and Sternlight are too intelligent to write of as `stooges or dunces' and something more `intentional' and `systematic' is more likely. That is what is so alarming. >... we ought not to use cheap shots and cheap rhetorical tricks >(one I hate especially is the "sound effect" jab, the "<snicker, snicker>" >sort of comment inserted into postings ... While I've never done this, it is futile for you to request otherwise. This is one of the most colorful aspects of Usenet. Nothing is sacred in cyberspace. Professional academicians will get ruthlessly ridiculed or humiliated like anyone else if they doggedly advocate feeble ideas through deluded arguments. They are just another email address and bursting bit pattern in the ultimate egaltarianocracy. Who can escape or transcend the glare of multitudinous eyes glued on a computer screen?

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Release: July 5, 1993
by ccat＠netcom.com 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

Content: First Announcement/On-Line Congressional Hearing On July 26 at 9:30AM EDT, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the U.S. House of Representatives will hold the first Congressional Hearing ever held over a computer network. The oversight hearing on "The Role of Government in Cyberspace" will take place in the Grand Ballroom of the National Press Club at 14th and F Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. The hearing is open to the public. An open house will be held from 3-5PM on the same day in the same location and is also open to the public. Chairman Markey has asked that this historic occasion demonstrate the potential and diversity of the global Internet. Thirty Sparcstations will be in the hearing room, allowing members of Congress, staff, and their guests to read e-mail, use Gopher menus, read testimony in WAIS databases, browse the World Wide Web, and otherwise use the resources of the global Internet as part of the hearing. Some witnesses for the hearing will testify remotely, sending audio and video over the Internet. Audio and video of the hearing will also be multicast over the Multicast Backbone (MBONE). We are hoping that C-SPAN and other traditional media will also carry the event. *MORE DETAILS ON MBONE AND OTHER WAYS TO WATCH THE HEARINGS REMOTELY WILL BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.* One of the primary points that we are hoping to demonstrate is the diversity and size of the Internet. We have therefore established an electronic mail address by which people on the Internet can communicate with the Subcommittee before and during the hearing: congress(a)town.hall.org We encourage you to send your comments on what the role of government should be in the information age to this address. Your comments to this address will be made part of the public record of the hearing. Feel free to carry on a dialogue with others on a mailing list, cc'ing the e-mail address. Your cards and letters to congress(a)town.hall.org will help demonstrate that there are people who use the Internet as part of their personal and professional lives. We encourage you to send comments on the role of government in cyberspace, on what role cyberspace should play in government (e.g., whether government data be made available on the Internet), on how the Internet should be built and financed, on how you use the Internet, and on any other topic you feel is appropriate. This is your chance to show the U.S. Congress that there is a constituency that cares about this global infrastructure. If you would like to communicate with a human being about the hearing, you may send your comments and questions to: hearing-info(a)town.hall.org Support for the Internet Town Hall is provided by Sun Microsystems and O'Reilly & Associates. Additional support for the July 26 on-line congressional hearing is being provided by ARPA, BBN Communications, the National Press Club, Xerox PARC, and many other organizations. Network connectivity for the Internet Town Hall is provided by UUNET Technologies.

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ANON: nntp, apology
by nobody＠mead.u.washington.edu 09 Jul '93

09 Jul '93

I feel silly. It just occurred to me that the remailers operate by piping to sendmail directly; thus a lone period is interpreted as "the end". So I have cunningly arranged for my message to be indented by one space (emacs has lots of functions!). I apologize for posting this essentially three times. I'm sure by now nobody cares how to forge a usenet post :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, we can all forge mail with smtp, use the cypherpunk remailers, use "anonymous" servers like penet and charcoal, email-to-usenet gateways, etc. I've never seen instructions on how to forge a usenet post, so here goes: 1) Telnet to an NNTP server (see Yanoff's internet services list) 2) Type 'post'. After a bit, you'll get an OK message. 3) Type in what you want to appear. Have in mind before you start what fields you want in the header, or check other posts to see what they have. 4) End with a period on a line all by itself. After a bit, you'll get a "Post OK" message. 5) Type 'quit' For example, I was experimenting and telnetted to news.fu-berlin.de 119: ====================================================================== menudo> telnet news.fu-berlin.de 119 Trying 130.133.4.250... Connected to gibb.math.fu-berlin.de. Escape character is '^]'. 200 gibb NNTP server version 1.5.11 (10 February 1991) ready at Thu Jul 8 16:19:05 1993 (posting ok). post 340 Ok Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d Path: one!two!three From: mr.smiley(a)other.plane Subject: A test II Content-Type: text Sender: the MailMan Nntp-Posting-Host: castle Organization: other plane hackers Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 07:45:00 GMT Lines: 1 This is another test. . 340 Post successful quit ====================================================================== and this is what appeared: ====================================================================== Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d Path: menudo.uh.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!uunet!math.fu-berlin.de!one!two!three From: mr.smiley(a)other.plane Subject: A test II Content-Type: text Message-ID: <706EBA2L(a)math.fu-berlin.de> Sender: the MailMan Nntp-Posting-Host: castle Organization: other plane hackers Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 07:45:00 GMT Lines: 1 This is another test. ====================================================================== Although Path: contains the one!two!three I typed at the end, it reveals math.fu-berlin.de as the origin of the post. Also, the Message-ID field reveals math.fu-berlin.de. More works needs to be done on how to suppress or further disguise these fields, if possible. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLDyDDoOA7OpLWtYzAQHwvAP/bb8B+tMtZomonKfYfVEyzy4qVsRDcsy6 jekqxWf2F5xi/aA4EVoXvg6sBbYuO/H0o63xNnDXeA1GzYpAdDp7Ouhztvj0bhn3 TdT5nQHFU/8E5WxhttF6NHs8GNFRDb2QXAxTd5idScMyAEU0RD10VmkwryQXuPez GC93HrcCKyo= =NJA2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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