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Re: [Pgi-wg] Documenting the security agreement/info progress
by m.riedel＠fz-juelich.de 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

Yes, I got the best experience of it as well combining it with the factsheets makes sense - what do you think Weizhong? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Morris Riedel SW - Engineer Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division Central Institute of Applied Mathematics Research Centre Juelich Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 D - 52425 Juelich Germany Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/zam/ZAMPeople/riedel Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 Skype: MorrisRiedel 'We work to improve ourselves and the rest of mankind.' ----- Original Message ----- From: Duane Merrill <dgm4d(a)virginia.edu> Date: Thursday, March 19, 2009 2:45 pm Subject: Re: [Pgi-wg] Documenting the security agreement/info progress > The "track-changes" and "insert comments" feature for MS Word > documents has > come in very handy in other OGF working groups. The "insert comments" > feature is particularly useful for allowing discussions on particular > aspects to flow on with perfect contextual reference. > > 2009/3/19 Morris Riedel <m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de> > > > Hi PGI security folks, > > > > I'm thinking how we can document progress in agreements in > terms of > > security. Just let the flow of e-mails run us out of time is not > a good > > idea... > > > > > > Also, the strawmen document is nice but it is a Formula 1 > racecar (or US: > > Indy500 car) compared to a bicycle, which is more needed by PGI > in the > > moment to agree on important 'forward-bringing elements' before > profiling> it > > precisely to realize a common view on a racecar. > > > > > > As I said earlier - our common agreement (not only in security) > is crucial > > - > > rushing a profile out is not collaborative enough and had nearly > crushed> the > > group instead of getting us out of the security hole mentioned > by Steven > > earlier. In slightly other words - it's the process - not the > documentation> alone, especially in collaborative efforts. > > > > > > So - I hesitate to again come up with a big document during the > agreement> process and rather prefer a condensed WIKI page. > > > > > > But also this page implies changes by numerous folks making again > > unreviewable without having any 'place constraints' especially > having not > > really a good track changes option! > > > > > > My current idea is around so-called factsheets that are only two- > page word > > documents for each security topic making it condensed and > allowing the > > valuable track changes functionality including one picture per > topic that > > represents our common agreement aligned with some text that > later lays the > > foundation for our 'one' document mentioned in the charter. > > > > > > I just want to hear your opinions on this before I start working > on them - > > it makes no sense if you disagree. > > > > I'm also happy to hear better suggestions. > > > > > > Thanks for sharing your views on this, > > Morris > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Morris Riedel > > SW - Engineer > > Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division > > Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) > > Forschungszentrum Juelich > > Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 > > D - 52425 Juelich > > Germany > > > > Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de > > Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel > > Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 > > Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 > > > > Skype: MorrisRiedel > > > > "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" > > > > Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich > > Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 > > Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe > > Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), > > Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender) > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Pgi-wg mailing list > > Pgi-wg(a)ogf.org > > http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/pgi-wg > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------- Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH 52425 Jülich Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDir'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe Geschäftsführung: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender), Prof. Dr. Harald Bolt, Dr. Sebastian M. Schmidt ------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: [Pgi-wg] Sec: Agreement on supported Attribute Authority Interfaces
by weizhong qiang 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

hi, I have some questions as following. 2009/3/19 Morris Riedel <m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de> > Hi PGI security folks, > > another issue I see is the supported attribute authorities and (more > notably) their interfaces. > > Taking our experience from GIN into account and addressing the message of > Steven (EGEE) there are still two interfaces to consider in terms of VOMS. > Also, as an alternative AA there is Shibboleth quite much used in the > space. > > ### goal > > (a) > We are discussing which AA can be used in PGI to retrieve attributes... > > (b) > ...because we want to find out which interfaces have to be supported to get > attributes... > > > (c) > ... in order to know more precisely which types of attribute transport > mechanisms we have to support in PGI. > > ### Possible scenarios > > A. A user contacts a non-WS-based classic VOMS with a proprietary > interface, > but gets a standardized RFC AC Do you proposed to use the stadardized RFC AC, instead of the VOMS AC which is known as a simplified RFC while de-facto AC. If so, I think it is not needed. We can use VOMS AC, because we already have a few production Grid systems which have supported it. > back with the attributes signed by the VOMS. > (later on these are used within extensions of RFC proxies for attr-authZ) > > B. A user contacts a WS-based VOMS with SAML-REQUEST-interface standard and > gets a standardized SAML Assertion back signed by the VOMS service. (later > on these are used within WS-SecExt within SOAP Headers) > > C. A user contacts a Shibboleth system (possibly w/o WAYF) using SLCs with > SAML assertions inside its extensions. Shibboleth itself does not support SLCs, and you need to develope some system to issuing SLCs by using Shibboleth as ONE part of this system. You can also get SLCs credential through otherway except Shibboleth-based. IF we use "push" model, I think how does the client get the credential doesn't matter, what does matter is the content of the credential. Futhermore, I can see two different problems here about interoperability in PGI in terms of credential/attributes: a.The interoperability of getting a credential (with attributes inside); The points you mentioned above are all about this problem. b.the interoperability of using a credential (with attribute inside). One user or client (on behalf of user) get the credential, it needs to use it and interoperate with services. I guess PGI is supposed to solve both of them? > > > D. A user contacts MyProxy with a stored proxy using ACs in its extension > (implies no new attribute transport mechanism), but possibly a new > interface > of getting (indirectly) attributes. > > > > I see the agreement on the elements of this e-mail thread as a prerequisite > to agree on the mechanisms of which attribute formats we support and how we > convey attributes precisely (separate email thread). > > ### Possible conclusion: > > A. We only reference in our profile possible ways of retrieving either ACs > or SAML assertions (e.g. by pointing to the SAML-request document that is > in > public comment currently as mentioned earlier). We do not intend to profile > how exactly a user gets its attributes. > > B. If we agree on A - we indirectly agree on attribute push since in the > attribute pull mode - for interoperability reasons - the interface of > getting attributes must be known so that the middleware can contact it on > behalf of the user! So we are only going to solve the second sub-problem I concluded above? > > > C. We deal with RFC ACs Not VOMS AC? > > > D. We deal with SAML assertions > > E. We only consider C+D in the first iteration of the profile > > > > ### open Questions > > Q: Can we agree on these conclusions? Are there any comments - something I > missed? Changing VOMS AC to RFC AC? Plus Supporting SAML Assertion? > > > Q: Is there any production infrastructure that largely supports Shibboleth > w/o supporting VOMS either in classic or WS style? In terms of ARC, The production ARC supports VOMS classic The development ARC supports VOMS classic and WS style, and has it own SLCs service which is based on Shibboleth IdP. Cheers Weizhong > > > > > > Please consider the attribute - and its transport mechanisms out of scope > in > this e-mail thread. > > > Take care, > Morris > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Morris Riedel > SW - Engineer > Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division > Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) > Forschungszentrum Juelich > Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 > D - 52425 Juelich > Germany > > Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de > Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel > Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 > Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 > > Skype: MorrisRiedel > > "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" > > Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich > Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 > Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe > Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), > Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender) > > > > _______________________________________________ > Pgi-wg mailing list > Pgi-wg(a)ogf.org > http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/pgi-wg > >

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Re: [Pgi-wg] Sec: Agreement on SOAP and authentication
by weizhong qiang 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

hi, I think the issue you proposed can be divided into branches (since HTTPS is actually http + tls/ssl): 1. If all of the PGI services use SOAP (i.e. Web Service interface)? 2. If all of the PGI services use TLS? For the first one, at least GridFTP service is excluded, while it is widely used by production grid. For the second, maybe most of the services are based on secure transport communication, but some of them are using GSI (SRM service: SOAP + GSI?) In terms of ARC, the A-REX service (for job management, supporting BES, JSDL) is using SOAP plus TLS, while it is also configurable to support SOAP plus GSI. Regards, Weizhong 2009/3/19 Morris Riedel <m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de> > Hi security folks, > > > reading certain elements of the IIRM, strawman, and following discussions > on the list - I see there is still no common agreement on SOAP / HTTP(S) in > some areas. > > ### Goal: > > (a) > We are discussing if SOAP / HTTPS can be used in PGI to contact a > functional > interface (like BES)... > > (b) > ...because we want to find out if there is any important service in the PGI > context that is not capable of using SOAP (over SSL layer)... > > > (c) > ... in order to find out if we can agree on SOAP/HTTPS or to understand > requirements from other non WS-based interfaces in PGI. > > > Therefore the aim of this thread is to get to an agreement in this context, > while considering Attribute authorities like VOMS as a supportive service > and not an functional interface (also separate thread). > > ### Contacting functional implementations with SOAP > > If we consider the case that we communicate with an functional interface > like OGSA-BES - we agree on SOAP. > > ### TLS/SSL Layer: > > # <strawman> > Foundational: Conveying identity for authentication. > SOAP over HTTPS (PGI_HTTPS). SOAP-over-HTTP communication using a SSL/TLS > transport protocol in which endpoints are mutually authenticated by X.509 > end-entity public key certificates (PKCs). > # </strawman> > > > # <simple plumbings: authentication> > We use authentication either based on identities inside X.509 end-entity > public key certificates or X.509 proxies (including restrictions, encoding > handled separately in another thread). > > This refers of using either one or the other of these certificate types on > the SSL/TLS level. > > For simplification of the profile - there should be no direct dependencies > with attribute-transport used for authorization. > # </plumbings> > > > ### Possible scenarios: > > # A. TLS with end-entity certificate, SOAP in message -> authN check with > CA > > # B. TLS with (restricted) proxy certificates, SOAP in message -> authN > check with proxy signer chain > > ### Possible Conclusion: > > # We use SOAP inside a message to contact functional interfaces. > > # We use either full X.509 end-entity certificates OR X.509 proxies (with > restrictions) > > ### Open Questions: > > > Q: There are WS interfaces for functional specifications that matter to PGI > (BES, WS-DAIS and SRM) - so in the context of PGI - can we agree on SOAP > based on HTTPS as mentioned above? > > Q: If not - are there any important functional interfaces (except support > interfaces from AAs like classic VOMS) that do not support SOAP in the PGI > ecosystem? > > > Please feel free to comment but let the question of attributes+restrictions > outside - I propose to deal with it in separate threads because of their > complexity. > > > Take care, > Morris > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Morris Riedel > SW - Engineer > Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division > Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) > Forschungszentrum Juelich > Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 > D - 52425 Juelich > Germany > > Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de > Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel > Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 > Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 > > Skype: MorrisRiedel > > "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" > > Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich > Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 > Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe > Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), > Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender) > > > > _______________________________________________ > Pgi-wg mailing list > Pgi-wg(a)ogf.org > http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/pgi-wg > >

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Re: [Pgi-wg] Sec: Agreement on supported Attribute Authority Interfaces
by Duane Merrill 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

> > > ### Possible scenarios ... E. A user (or agent service) is in possession of statically-assigned credentials (an identity + zero-or-more attributes). > > ### Possible conclusion: > > A. We only reference in our profile possible ways of retrieving either ACs > or SAML assertions (e.g. by pointing to the SAML-request document that is > in > public comment currently as mentioned earlier). We do not intend to profile > how exactly a user gets its attributes. > > B. If we agree on A - we indirectly agree on attribute push since in the > attribute pull mode - for interoperability reasons - the interface of > getting attributes must be known so that the middleware can contact it on > behalf of the user! > > C. We deal with RFC ACs > > D. We deal with SAML assertions > > E. We only consider C+D in the first iteration of the profile > > We would prefer to begin with A (which implies B). We can always layer an agreement for attribute/token aquisition at a later date if the world demands a pull-style mode. -Duane

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Re: [Pgi-wg] Sec: Agreement on SOAP and authentication
by Duane Merrill 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

I don't understand the strict "either-or" wording below with regards to PCs versus PKCs in a *proxy-plus-embedded-AC* conformance target. You make it sound like their use would be unilaterally mutually exclusive. Both types of certificates can embed attribute certificates, and there is an "is-a"/polymorphic relationship here: a PKC is a PC of delegation depth zero (and therefore does not have the extension OID set). A *proxy-plus-embedded-AC* conformance target should describe implementations that allow both. In the strawman document, the goal of layering the *pgi-tls-proxy* conformance target on top of the *pgi-https*target was to add functionality (not take it away): *pgi-tls-proxy* describes SOAP implementations that perform mutual SSL/TLS authentication with certificates, and these certificates MAY have proxy extensions (making them PCs) and MAY have AC extensions (embedding attribute certificates). Perhaps I am just misinterpreting your language. -Duane 2009/3/19 Morris Riedel <m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de> > Hi security folks, > > > reading certain elements of the IIRM, strawman, and following discussions > on the list - I see there is still no common agreement on SOAP / HTTP(S) in > some areas. > > ### Goal: > > (a) > We are discussing if SOAP / HTTPS can be used in PGI to contact a > functional > interface (like BES)... > > (b) > ...because we want to find out if there is any important service in the PGI > context that is not capable of using SOAP (over SSL layer)... > > > (c) > ... in order to find out if we can agree on SOAP/HTTPS or to understand > requirements from other non WS-based interfaces in PGI. > > > Therefore the aim of this thread is to get to an agreement in this context, > while considering Attribute authorities like VOMS as a supportive service > and not an functional interface (also separate thread). > > ### Contacting functional implementations with SOAP > > If we consider the case that we communicate with an functional interface > like OGSA-BES - we agree on SOAP. > > ### TLS/SSL Layer: > > # <strawman> > Foundational: Conveying identity for authentication. > SOAP over HTTPS (PGI_HTTPS). SOAP-over-HTTP communication using a SSL/TLS > transport protocol in which endpoints are mutually authenticated by X.509 > end-entity public key certificates (PKCs). > # </strawman> > > > # <simple plumbings: authentication> > We use authentication either based on identities inside X.509 end-entity > public key certificates or X.509 proxies (including restrictions, encoding > handled separately in another thread). > > This refers of using either one or the other of these certificate types on > the SSL/TLS level. > > For simplification of the profile - there should be no direct dependencies > with attribute-transport used for authorization. > # </plumbings> > > > ### Possible scenarios: > > # A. TLS with end-entity certificate, SOAP in message -> authN check with > CA > > # B. TLS with (restricted) proxy certificates, SOAP in message -> authN > check with proxy signer chain > > ### Possible Conclusion: > > # We use SOAP inside a message to contact functional interfaces. > > # We use either full X.509 end-entity certificates OR X.509 proxies (with > restrictions) > > ### Open Questions: > > > Q: There are WS interfaces for functional specifications that matter to PGI > (BES, WS-DAIS and SRM) - so in the context of PGI - can we agree on SOAP > based on HTTPS as mentioned above? > > Q: If not - are there any important functional interfaces (except support > interfaces from AAs like classic VOMS) that do not support SOAP in the PGI > ecosystem? > > > Please feel free to comment but let the question of attributes+restrictions > outside - I propose to deal with it in separate threads because of their > complexity. > > > Take care, > Morris > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Morris Riedel > SW - Engineer > Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division > Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) > Forschungszentrum Juelich > Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 > D - 52425 Juelich > Germany > > Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de > Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel > Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 > Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 > > Skype: MorrisRiedel > > "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" > > Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich > Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 > Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe > Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), > Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender) > > > > _______________________________________________ > Pgi-wg mailing list > Pgi-wg(a)ogf.org > http://www.ogf.org/mailman/listinfo/pgi-wg > >

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Sec: Agreement on supported Attribute Authority Interfaces
by Morris Riedel 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

Hi PGI security folks, another issue I see is the supported attribute authorities and (more notably) their interfaces. Taking our experience from GIN into account and addressing the message of Steven (EGEE) there are still two interfaces to consider in terms of VOMS. Also, as an alternative AA there is Shibboleth quite much used in the space. ### goal (a) We are discussing which AA can be used in PGI to retrieve attributes... (b) ...because we want to find out which interfaces have to be supported to get attributes... (c) ... in order to know more precisely which types of attribute transport mechanisms we have to support in PGI. ### Possible scenarios A. A user contacts a non-WS-based classic VOMS with a proprietary interface, but gets a standardized RFC AC back with the attributes signed by the VOMS. (later on these are used within extensions of RFC proxies for attr-authZ) B. A user contacts a WS-based VOMS with SAML-REQUEST-interface standard and gets a standardized SAML Assertion back signed by the VOMS service. (later on these are used within WS-SecExt within SOAP Headers) C. A user contacts a Shibboleth system (possibly w/o WAYF) using SLCs with SAML assertions inside its extensions. D. A user contacts MyProxy with a stored proxy using ACs in its extension (implies no new attribute transport mechanism), but possibly a new interface of getting (indirectly) attributes. I see the agreement on the elements of this e-mail thread as a prerequisite to agree on the mechanisms of which attribute formats we support and how we convey attributes precisely (separate email thread). ### Possible conclusion: A. We only reference in our profile possible ways of retrieving either ACs or SAML assertions (e.g. by pointing to the SAML-request document that is in public comment currently as mentioned earlier). We do not intend to profile how exactly a user gets its attributes. B. If we agree on A - we indirectly agree on attribute push since in the attribute pull mode - for interoperability reasons - the interface of getting attributes must be known so that the middleware can contact it on behalf of the user! C. We deal with RFC ACs D. We deal with SAML assertions E. We only consider C+D in the first iteration of the profile ### open Questions Q: Can we agree on these conclusions? Are there any comments - something I missed? Q: Is there any production infrastructure that largely supports Shibboleth w/o supporting VOMS either in classic or WS style? Please consider the attribute - and its transport mechanisms out of scope in this e-mail thread. Take care, Morris ------------------------------------------------------------ Morris Riedel SW - Engineer Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) Forschungszentrum Juelich Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 D - 52425 Juelich Germany Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 Skype: MorrisRiedel "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender)

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Sec: Agreement on SOAP and authentication
by Morris Riedel 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

Hi security folks, reading certain elements of the IIRM, strawman, and following discussions on the list - I see there is still no common agreement on SOAP / HTTP(S) in some areas. ### Goal: (a) We are discussing if SOAP / HTTPS can be used in PGI to contact a functional interface (like BES)... (b) ...because we want to find out if there is any important service in the PGI context that is not capable of using SOAP (over SSL layer)... (c) ... in order to find out if we can agree on SOAP/HTTPS or to understand requirements from other non WS-based interfaces in PGI. Therefore the aim of this thread is to get to an agreement in this context, while considering Attribute authorities like VOMS as a supportive service and not an functional interface (also separate thread). ### Contacting functional implementations with SOAP If we consider the case that we communicate with an functional interface like OGSA-BES - we agree on SOAP. ### TLS/SSL Layer: # <strawman> Foundational: Conveying identity for authentication. SOAP over HTTPS (PGI_HTTPS). SOAP-over-HTTP communication using a SSL/TLS transport protocol in which endpoints are mutually authenticated by X.509 end-entity public key certificates (PKCs). # </strawman> # <simple plumbings: authentication> We use authentication either based on identities inside X.509 end-entity public key certificates or X.509 proxies (including restrictions, encoding handled separately in another thread). This refers of using either one or the other of these certificate types on the SSL/TLS level. For simplification of the profile - there should be no direct dependencies with attribute-transport used for authorization. # </plumbings> ### Possible scenarios: # A. TLS with end-entity certificate, SOAP in message -> authN check with CA # B. TLS with (restricted) proxy certificates, SOAP in message -> authN check with proxy signer chain ### Possible Conclusion: # We use SOAP inside a message to contact functional interfaces. # We use either full X.509 end-entity certificates OR X.509 proxies (with restrictions) ### Open Questions: Q: There are WS interfaces for functional specifications that matter to PGI (BES, WS-DAIS and SRM) - so in the context of PGI - can we agree on SOAP based on HTTPS as mentioned above? Q: If not - are there any important functional interfaces (except support interfaces from AAs like classic VOMS) that do not support SOAP in the PGI ecosystem? Please feel free to comment but let the question of attributes+restrictions outside - I propose to deal with it in separate threads because of their complexity. Take care, Morris ------------------------------------------------------------ Morris Riedel SW - Engineer Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) Forschungszentrum Juelich Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 D - 52425 Juelich Germany Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 Skype: MorrisRiedel "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender)

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Cracking security by small agreement pieces
by Morris Riedel 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

PGI Security folks, in my opinion we crack the security better if we try to come to agreements on smaller pieces first before going to the full-blown profile. Therefore, our next e-mails partially address items from the reference model input (i.e plumbings), the strawman document (provided by Virginia) and other elements that arise from the security discussions via the e-mails. Here, the goal would be to agree on the elements of each e-mail thread. Clearly, tomorrow will be not 'the one and only sec telcon in PGI' therefore we need this mechanism (in my opinion) to give the infrastructures time to comment even if they can't join the telcons or feel being overwhelmed by strawman documents. The agreements on these little pieces will be in turn noted down on the factsheets/wikis/etc one after another creating the whole ecosystem in terms of security. Again, here I would like to remind ourselves that we are the <Production> Infrastructure Working Group - so the security elements should be reasonably stable and adopted and not huge frameworks that MAY arise in future if - and only if - funding is provided. So let's get started... Take care, Morris ------------------------------------------------------------ Morris Riedel SW - Engineer Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) Forschungszentrum Juelich Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 D - 52425 Juelich Germany Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 Skype: MorrisRiedel "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender)

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Use Case Document on Gridforge (in odt and doc)
by Morris Riedel 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

Hi PGI folks, as promised earlier, I just created a doc version and uploaded it on GridForge. Both are located at: http://forge.gridforum.org/sf/go/projects.pgi-wg/docman.root.input_documents .use_cases Please feel free to comment on this use case. Take care, Morris ------------------------------------------------------------ Morris Riedel SW - Engineer Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) Forschungszentrum Juelich Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 D - 52425 Juelich Germany Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 Skype: MorrisRiedel "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender)

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Documenting the security agreement/info progress
by Morris Riedel 19 Mar '09

19 Mar '09

Hi PGI security folks, I'm thinking how we can document progress in agreements in terms of security. Just let the flow of e-mails run us out of time is not a good idea... Also, the strawmen document is nice but it is a Formula 1 racecar (or US: Indy500 car) compared to a bicycle, which is more needed by PGI in the moment to agree on important 'forward-bringing elements' before profiling it precisely to realize a common view on a racecar. As I said earlier - our common agreement (not only in security) is crucial - rushing a profile out is not collaborative enough and had nearly crushed the group instead of getting us out of the security hole mentioned by Steven earlier. In slightly other words - it's the process - not the documentation alone, especially in collaborative efforts. So - I hesitate to again come up with a big document during the agreement process and rather prefer a condensed WIKI page. But also this page implies changes by numerous folks making again unreviewable without having any 'place constraints' especially having not really a good track changes option! My current idea is around so-called factsheets that are only two-page word documents for each security topic making it condensed and allowing the valuable track changes functionality including one picture per topic that represents our common agreement aligned with some text that later lays the foundation for our 'one' document mentioned in the charter. I just want to hear your opinions on this before I start working on them - it makes no sense if you disagree. I'm also happy to hear better suggestions. Thanks for sharing your views on this, Morris ------------------------------------------------------------ Morris Riedel SW - Engineer Distributed Systems and Grid Computing Division Jülich Supercomputing Centre (JSC) Forschungszentrum Juelich Wilhelm-Johnen-Str. 1 D - 52425 Juelich Germany Email: m.riedel(a)fz-juelich.de Info: http://www.fz-juelich.de/jsc/JSCPeople/riedel Phone: +49 2461 61 - 3651 Fax: +49 2461 61 - 6656 Skype: MorrisRiedel "We work to better ourselves, and the rest of humanity" Sitz der Gesellschaft: Jülich Eingetragen im Handelsregister des Amtsgerichts Düren Nr. HR B 3498 Vorsitzende des Aufsichtsrats: MinDirig'in Bärbel Brumme-Bothe Vorstand: Prof. Dr. Achim Bachem (Vorsitzender), Dr. Ulrich Krafft (stellv. Vorsitzender)

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