- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

cyberspace & cybercycles donations!
by L. Detweiler 16 Aug '93

16 Aug '93

From: an12070(a)anon.penet.fi >* it is extremely difficult find sites willing to donate computer >cycles, space, and management despite that it is rather abundant in the >world. virtually every cypherpunk idea requires some cycles & space >somewhere. [...] > ideally a list of volunteering sites could be created and >individual cypherpunks could contact the sites independently. Hey, I think this is a great idea. The only problem is that the list would probably be empty =) I personally have many pet projects that might see the light of day if they could find the inside of a computer on the internet. I volunteer to maintain this list. If anyone would like to donate cycles or space for pet cypherpunk projects such as digital cash, anonymity servers, archives, etc. please send me your name and availability and I'll stick it in the list. Unfortunately, the people most likely to be in charge of these resources are coincidentally the most paranoid about restricting them and least likely to hear this--and once they hear the word `cypherpunk' their mind will slam shut in a nanosecond. We may be able to get more `outside support' if such a list was posted into Usenet. In fact, if the list kept track of all the current projects and the status, it might really encourage volunteers out there in the world. Maybe the problem is that the list is just too high noise for important people to pay attention, but that a summary like this might get results. ltr.

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Re: encrypting virus (KOH)
by Karl Barrus 16 Aug '93

16 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, perhaps any discussion of viruses tends to cause feelings to run high, so perhaps the author of potassium hydroxide shouldn't have termed his program a virus. I don't see any difference between Stacker 3.0 and its stacked disk option that compresses files on a floppy and inserts a small decompression routine there as well, and the encrypting "program" I posted information on. Well, besides the fact the Stacker compresses and potassium hydroxide encrypts. > Anything a virus could beneficially do, a legitimate, > non-replicating program can do better. Well, if I were more proficient in assembly I might code an encrypting Stacker program. Perhaps you will take the public domain code, disassemble it and improve it, elevating it from "virus" status. > Also, every virus harbors the potential for damage. No programmer > (read: virus author) can possibly know each and every environment > where the code will be introduced. Yes, this may be true, and applied to every program ever written, not just "viruses". Not to insult anybody, but if memory serves PGP had a bug which destroyed files on hard drives.... why, even Microsoft's CHKDSK program had a bug which could destroy a hard drive. Modern software is complex and configurations uncountable. Now I do not advocate spreading viruses and damaging computer systems, but to imply the only viruses harbor potential for damage is surely ridiculous. I posted this because the purpose of the "virus" is to automatically encrypt files, a goal that I understand some people on this list are working on. If anybody is interested in a copy, I can send it. A disassembly would be instructive, and would allow people to fine tune the program, improve it, incorporate it into other projects, etc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLG67HYOA7OpLWtYzAQF5IAP/VFEqemlG8ntyyqikQie1eFR+61D2JX8k 3k5oc5pU2LdYqFPKDFyNQ/Rn/Sw9LAB2+NFfc4X1J1+nWcGTPxZ1Njb5n9tYrC8D WQUMD6O8NxgKQhfJMsBJQqmbrXKcCnLOfAYyzDlrEszmKzg3xp0uqRqvsh2rHyIb YDK6HYk3B08= =f6WE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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`Stalled' Progress
by an12070＠anon.penet.fi 16 Aug '93

16 Aug '93

we've accomplished a great deal as cypherpunks so far, but major obstacles are in place of our ambitious goals. here are some critical factors: * it is extremely difficult find sites willing to donate computer cycles, space, and management despite that it is rather abundant in the world. virtually every cypherpunk idea requires some cycles & space somewhere. building up all these things on student accounts is commendable but a foundation of quicksand in the long run. rumor has it even soda.berkeley.edu ftp site (perhaps the most critical cypherpunk element other than the mailing list) is being run off a student account. ideally a list of volunteering sites could be created and individual cypherpunks could contact the sites independently. * the internet itself is very hostile in general to most cypherpunk ideas, including digital cash, anonymous remailing, etc. because of nonuniform policies and general resentment and taboos on anything commercial. to some degree only prototypes can be created in this atmosphere, but even prototypes of our most critical ideas are lacking. great attention should be placed on identifying and cultivating emerging networks where commercialism is officially sanctioned and encouraged. * the `i thought you were doing that' factor. with no organization and coordination, the effort and energy of the group is needlessly dissipated and tragically wasted. in fact, many cypherpunks have philosophies that are exceedingly antagonistic toward and distrustful of any oversight or coordination, and frequently assume that others are making progress in some area when in fact no one is. * to a large degree, despite the commandment `cypherpunks write code', the `cypherpunks' have always gained their cohesion more from political ideology than implementing tangible systems. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Back on track(s)...
by Seth Morris 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

Hi... I haven't posted much here, but I've been lurking for quite some time. On the issue of "lost focus" and a return to projects, I'd like to ask about some of the projects that were/are underway from a while ago. Some months back, there was a push to get kits together for different non-technical persons needing access to privacy, anonymity, digital signatures, crypto, etc... such as journalists, political activists, religious groups, terro^H^H^H^H^Hetc. This is an idea I am very interested in, and I'm wondering if it's still ongoing. It seems to gel well with the proposed cd-rom collection (I think some shareware/PD distributors might be talked into a multi-disk privacy distribution set, perhaps with some basic utils like antiviruses/text-editors/defraggers as a "must have" basic start-up kit). Could one of the major FTP sites be persuaded to maintain a privacy/anonymity section that didn't put them in a legally tenuous position? No PGP, perhaps but articles (with sample code?), steganographic utils, etc. Maybe some front ends for popular remailers/encryption utils. What about digital cash? I thought some ongoing experiments testing ease- of-use/speed etc. started up (or were announced) about six months ago? (I lost net access for about three months a while back, so I may have missed preliminary results.) I think that this is a fertile area for trial balloons based on games. Set up a server with several games being managed (possibly as either lists or CC-groups or with human moderators) and use secure digital cash protocals(sp?) both within a game and between games... sounds like the FBI (Flying Buffalo, Inc) Illuminati PBM and other PBM's with requirements to progress from one game to another would serve as a useful model.... Gnomic or Elusius(sp? the research-based cardgame from one of the Penrose books, I believe) would serve as an excellent test for popular secure anonymous voting by non-programmers. All in all, gamers are excellent sources of guinea pigs, and usually quite willing (hmmm... how about handing out disk packs at SF/Gamer cons?... MANY gamers are computer users and they can be counted on the use the programs in their PBEM games, spreading them on to other BBSing Gamers while they're at it... maybe I can test this here in Tucson). I think that just getting dialog generated will spark most of us to get work done. I feel, personally, that the cypherpunks remailers need some spec-work done and the specs published more openly, and similar work done with steganographic tools, etc. We need more active, reputation-building anonymous Usenetters, people who want to create such identities need to feel that THEY can control the tools they will be using. Are the pools still active? Can a set of games be developed that model crypto/anonymity/steg? rec.games.abstract is a wonderful source of ideas and shows what can be done with an abstract idea (play both gnomic and elesius sometime!). What we need is a list of projects that people are interested in/working on, with some communication about how they're going. We have no dearth of ideas, or people, or interest. It's the assumption that either, someone else is already doing it (a bad attitude among the hacker-types that abound here, reminds me of a SF story where a bunch of ship captians are put in a simulator to see who gets a big promotion. The simulator is wretched, has too many little (useless) lights, the AC blows in your eyes, the sound is WAY too loud, etc. Everyone fails, all making the same complaints and telling them how to redesign the simulator. The promotion goes to the guy who tapes up the redundant lights, puts cardboard over the AC and turns the speakers to face outward... the wanted a commander who would actually FIX things, not make orders) Cypherpunks aren't bery organised, nor should we be, but having some lists of what some of us want to do, who's doing what, and what some of us are thinking/worried about might be very helpful. Hmmm. maybe someone should see if a regular digest of what's ACTUALLY being said/done on the list, for reference, would go over well... This week we discussed: a) pagers and ping... most think it's a myth b) T-Shirts (list of popular ideas for shirts) c) Digital democracy debates d) meetings e) focus F) Someone is installing and will probably be reporting on an encryption virus in the PD... there's some talk of a commented dis-assembly being made. g) the Phantom mailer when down (am I remembering this right? This is off-the-cuff) h) California law being decided NOW about online access to current legislative agenda. Get your viewpoint in before the 18th. i) NSA asked for one year on the FOIA request about MYK78/80 (again, pardonany misinformation, take NONE of this as gospel... check the archives). j) <more> with any reports on ongoing games/projects/running gags,etc. Hmmm... some comments on this idea. a) We've done a lot more this week than I'd noticed. b) it may be more bandwidth than many want (but a CC list is easy to maintain for those that want it, or it could be dropped in to archives and left to rot until someone cares enough to retieve it). c) it's pretty easy to make. d) it will be, to some extent, subjective. e) I make too many lists... probably a sign of something about my poddy training, I suppose. f) I'm rambling. When the kits idea was first kicked around, I expressed support (I think... the message may have been lost by my mailer before it reached the list... that happens here at launchpad), but offered no other help or support, a I was just starting a new job. Well, now I'm about to be fired, so I have a bit of free time (oh well, never set out to write Nintendo games, anyway.... sigh). I suspect that we're not actually being stagnant at all. Maybe not even taking a breather. Seth Morris (Seth.Morris(a)launchpad.unc.edu) PS. T-shirt ideas: "We watch the Watchmen" and "Wiretapping is Privacy; Censorship is Freedom; Publicity is Anonymity: 1994 -- the eight was a typo." "We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert." -- J. Robert Oppenheimer

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Cellular tracing (Done all the time.)
by fergp＠sytex.com 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A bit off-topic, but: Authorities in Fayetteville, North Carolina arrested two juveniles yesterday, in the death of James Jordan, father of basketball superstar Michael Jordan. Charles Kuralt, on CBS's "Sunday Morning," reported that authorities believe that Jordan was a victim of random violence. Authorities were able to locate the suspects because they allegedly used the cellular phone in Jordan's car before they dumped it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLG5MEpRLcZSdHMBNAQGCWwP/SZOkRSDjmFopxngHzcREsqY68PTQHC4N Y5oxmbK7V+MK88MjRdzTizq2298qndu50a170J8NT/KFrNbVUkiOTNhxtu6V3+SU mH2nyTUWs4oapQyYjPGGYyRqQbkbR/Z+aDGc0zWwZ5cfHztbesEpgoUot19pLsxu /TzNJL/PWVI= =1etK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15 Paul Ferguson <fergp(a)sytex.com> Key fingerprint = EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05 AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58 ser's knowledge. In doing this, it violates the integrity of the system and furthermore, it does it surreptitiously. Personally, I like to be intamately aware of every byte on each of my systems (I am) and know _exactly_ what every executable which resides on my system does (again, I do). For users who cannot know this, then a virus is a breech of their privacy, in a matter of speaking. Finally, distributed computing need not be accomplished by something as brain-damaged as a virus. Anything a virus could beneficially do, a legitimate, non-replicating program can do better. In fact, there have been viruses designed and coded which were supposed to perform beneficial activities (see historical notes about the Denzuko, Ohio, etc. viruses). Also, every virus harbors the potential for damage. No programmer (read: virus author) can possibly know each and every environment where the code will be introduced. An example which I frequently use to illustrate this point is the Stoned virus; it is mostly an innocuous virus, however with several spoofing disk partitioning schemes (such as Disk Mangler), it can devastating. And with the advent of the Microsoft Doublspace shit, alot of other potholes in the road are introduced into the possible scenarios. A final note: There is a virus called "Cruncher" which compresses executables in much the same way as PKLite or LZEXE. Is this a "good" virus? This ia an exercise left to the reader... Cheers from Washington, DC -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLG57NZRLcZSdHMBNAQEHygQAhER6mpzGIctOx6sHpndNsv9EdoO++DBq x32h5Q4b5ylGDJWEcbC3RMqpkbDrzzYJOaBtRiqW+XTfpTagAKI0CbBWknxJcF3T W8hdDxu0kN2K0TVPbinkUUM+bvXLAdhYdv9GqixoWJx+Y/mkW2XtQLKbxRSFt/Uv ZC/YC+YVb18= =Mq8P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15 Paul Ferguson <fergp(a)sytex.com> Key fingerprint = EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05 AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58

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elisp for PGP encryption and remailing
by Jin S Choi 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

I submitted my mailcrypt package to the elisp archive a few days ago, but it doesn't seem to have been put up yet, and people have been asking me for it, so I'll put it up here. As a bonus, I've hacked up a little function which lets you easily set up a mail message for encrypted, chained remailing through any number of cypherpunk remailers. I hope someone finds this useful. Comments and suggestions appreciated. -----------------------cut here---------------------------------- #! /bin/sh # This is a shell archive, meaning: # 1. Remove everything above the #! /bin/sh line. # 2. Save the resulting text in a file. # 3. Execute the file with /bin/sh (not csh) to create the files: # mailcrypt.el # remail.el # This archive created: Sun Aug 15 17:02:07 1993 export PATH; PATH=/bin:$PATH if test -f 'mailcrypt.el' then echo shar: will not over-write existing file "'mailcrypt.el'" else cat << \SHAR_EOF > 'mailcrypt.el' ;; mailcrypt.el v1.2, mail encryption with RIPEM and PGP ;; Copyright (C) 1993 Jin Choi <jsc(a)mit.edu> ;; Any comments or suggestions welcome. ;; Inspired by pgp.el, by Gray Watson <gray(a)antaire.com>. ;; LCD Archive Entry: ;; mailcrypt|Jin S Choi|jsc(a)mit.edu| ;; Encryption/decryption for mail using RIPEM or PGP. Supports RMAIL and VM.| ;; 15-Aug-93|Version 1.2| *archive path* | ;;{{{ Licensing ;; This file is intended to be used with GNU Emacs. ;; This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify ;; it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ;; the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) ;; any later version. ;; This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ;; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ;; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ;; GNU General Public License for more details. ;; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ;; along with GNU Emacs; see the file COPYING. If not, write to ;; the Free Software Foundation, 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. ;;}}} ;;{{{ Change Log ;;{{{ Changes from 1.1: ;; * Added recipients field to mc-encrypt-message. ;;}}} ;;{{{ Changes from 1.0: ;; * Fixed batchmode bug in decryption, where unsigned messages would return ;; with exit code of 1. ;;}}} ;;{{{ Changes from 0.3b: ;; * Only set PGPPASSFD when needed, so PGP won't break when used ;; in shell mode. ;; * Use call-process-region instead of shell-command-on-region in order ;; to detect exit codes. ;; * Changed mc-temp-display to not use the kill ring. ;; * Bug fixes. ;;}}} ;;{{{ Changes from 0.2b: ;; * Prompts for replacement in mc-rmail-decrypt-message. ;; * Bug fixes. ;;}}} ;;{{{ Changes from 0.1b: ;; * Several bug fixes. ;; Contributed by Jason Merrill <jason(a)cygnus.com>: ;; * VM mailreader support ;; * Support for addresses with spaces and <>'s in them ;; * Support for using an explicit path for the pgp executable ;; * Key management functions ;; * The ability to avoid some of the prompts when encrypting ;; * Assumes mc-default-scheme unless prefixed ;;}}} ;;}}} ;;{{{ Usage: ;;{{{ Installation: ;; To use, put the following elisp into your .emacs file. ;; You may want to set some of the user variables there as well, ;; particularly mc-default-scheme. ;;(autoload 'mc-encrypt-message "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(autoload 'mc-sign-message "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(autoload 'mc-insert-public-key "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(add-hook 'mail-mode-hook ;; '(lambda () ;; (require 'mailcrypt) ;; (define-key mail-mode-map "\C-ce" 'mc-encrypt-message) ;; (define-key mail-mode-map "\C-cs" 'mc-sign-message) ;; (define-key mail-mode-map "\C-ca" 'mc-insert-public-key))) ;;(autoload 'mc-rmail-decrypt-message "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(autoload 'mc-rmail-verify-signature "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(autoload 'mc-snarf-keys "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(add-hook 'rmail-mode-hook ;; '(lambda () ;; (require 'mailcrypt) ;; (define-key rmail-mode-map "\C-cd" 'mc-rmail-decrypt-message) ;; (define-key rmail-mode-map "\C-cv" 'mc-rmail-verify-signature) ;; (define-key rmail-mode-map "\C-cs" 'mc-snarf-keys))) ;;(autoload 'mc-vm-decrypt-message "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(autoload 'mc-vm-verify-signature "mailcrypt" nil t) ;;(add-hook 'vm-mode-hooks ;; '(lambda () ;; (require 'mailcrypt) ;; (define-key vm-mode-map "\C-cd" 'mc-vm-decrypt-message) ;; (define-key vm-mode-map "\C-cv" 'mc-vm-verify-signature) ;; (define-key vm-mode-map "\C-cs" 'mc-snarf-keys))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ Security Considerations ;; I've tried to write this with security in mind, especially in ;; regard to the passphrase used to encrypt the private key. ;; No passphrase is ever passed by command line or environment ;; variable. The passphrase may be temporarily stored into an elisp ;; variable to allow multiple encryptions/decryptions within a short ;; period of time without having to type it in each time. It will ;; deactivate automatically some time after its last use (default one ;; minute; see `mc-passwd-timeout') if you are running emacs 19. This ;; is to prevent someone from walking up to your computer while you're ;; gone and looking up your passphrase. If you are using an older ;; version of emacs, you can either set mc-passwd-timeout to nil, ;; which disables passphrase cacheing, or manually deactivate your ;; passphrase when you are done with it by typing `M-x mc-deactivate-passwd'. ;; The passphrase may still be visible shortly after entry as lossage ;; (the last 100 characters entered can be displayed by typing ;; `C-h l'). I've taken no steps to deal with this, as I don't think ;; anything *can* be done. If you are the paranoid type, make sure you ;; type at least a hundred keys after entering your passphrase before ;; you leave your emacs unattended. ;; If you are truly security conscious, you should, of course, never ;; leave your computer unattended while you're logged in.... ;;}}} ;;{{{ CAVEAT: ;; This code breaks if you have "Verbose=0" in your config.txt for PGP. ;; Thanks to Ciamac Moallemi (ciamac(a)hplms2.hpl.hp.com) for pointing this out. ;; This was written under emacs v19. Its behavior under older versions ;; of emacs is untested. If something breaks under emacs 18, please ;; feel free to fix it and send me patches. ;;}}} ;;{{{ Note: ;; The funny triple braces you see are used by `folding-mode', a minor ;; mode by Jamie Lokier, available from the elisp archive. ;;}}} ;;}}} (require 'comint) (require 'mail-utils) ;;{{{ User variables. (defvar mc-default-scheme 'pgp "*Default encryption scheme to use.") (defvar mc-passwd-timeout "1 min" "*Time to deactivate password in after a use, or nil for immediately.") (defvar mc-pgp-user-id (user-login-name) "*Your PGP user ID.") (defvar mc-ripem-user-id (or (getenv "RIPEM_USER_NAME") (user-full-name) "*Your RIPEM user ID.")) (defvar mc-pgp-always-sign nil "*Always sign encrypted PGP messages.") (defvar mc-always-replace nil "*Decrypt messages in place without prompting.") (defvar mc-use-default-recipients nil "*Assume that the message should be encoded for everyone listed in the To: and Cc: fields.") (defvar mc-encrypt-for-me nil "*Encrypt all outgoing messages with user's public key.") ;;}}} ;;{{{ Program variables and constants. (defvar mc-timer nil "Timer object for password deactivation.") (defvar mc-pgp-passwd nil "Your PGP passphrase.") (defvar mc-ripem-passwd nil "Your RIPEM passphrase.") (defvar mc-pgp-path "pgp" "*The PGP executable.") (defvar mc-ripem-path "ripem" "*The RIPEM executable.") (defvar mc-ripem-pubkeyfile (getenv "RIPEM_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE") "*Location of RIPEM public key file.") (defconst mc-pgp-msg-begin-line "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----" "Text for start of PGP message delimiter.") (defconst mc-pgp-msg-end-line "-----END PGP MESSAGE-----" "Text for end of PGP message delimiter.") (defconst mc-pgp-signed-begin-line "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" "Text for start of PGP signed messages.") (defconst mc-pgp-signed-end-line "-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----" "Text for end of PGP signed messages.") (defconst mc-pgp-key-begin-line "-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----" "Text for start of PGP public key.") (defconst mc-pgp-key-end-line "-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----" "Text for end of PGP public key.") (defconst mc-ripem-key-begin-line "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----" "Text for start of RIPEM public key.") (defconst mc-ripem-key-end-line "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----" "Text for end of RIPEM public key.") (defconst mc-ripem-msg-begin-line "-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----" "Text for start of RIPEM message delimiter.") (defconst mc-ripem-msg-end-line "-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----" "Text for end of RIPEM message delimiter.") ;;}}} ;;{{{ Utility functions. (defun mc-split (regexp str) "Splits STR into a list of elements which were separated by REGEXP, stripping initial and trailing whitespace." (let ((data (match-data)) beg end retval) (string-match "[ \t\n]*" str) ; Will always match at 0 (setq beg (match-end 0)) ;; This will break if there are newlines in str XXX (setq end (string-match "[ \t\n]*$" str)) (while (string-match regexp str beg) (setq retval (append retval (list (substring str beg (match-beginning 0))))) (setq beg (match-end 0))) (if (not (= (length str) beg)) ; Not end (setq retval (append retval (list (substring str beg end))))) (store-match-data data) retval)) (defun mc-temp-display (beg end &optional name) (let (tmp) (if (not name) (setq name "*Mailcrypt Temp*")) (setq tmp (buffer-substring beg end)) (delete-region beg end) (save-excursion (set-buffer (generate-new-buffer name)) (insert tmp) (goto-char (point-min)) (save-window-excursion (shrink-window-if-larger-than-buffer (display-buffer (current-buffer))) (message "Press any key to remove the %s window." name) (read-char) (kill-buffer (current-buffer)))))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ Passphrase management (defun mc-activate-passwd (scheme) (if (fboundp 'run-at-time) (progn (if mc-timer (cancel-timer mc-timer)) (setq mc-timer (if mc-passwd-timeout (run-at-time mc-passwd-timeout nil 'mc-deactivate-passwd) nil)))) (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp) (if (not mc-pgp-passwd) (setq mc-pgp-passwd (comint-read-noecho "PGP Password: ")))) ((eq scheme 'ripem) (if (not mc-ripem-passwd) (setq mc-ripem-passwd (comint-read-noecho "RIPEM Password: ")))) (t (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme)))) (defun mc-deactivate-passwd () "*Deactivates both PGP and RIPEM passwords." (interactive) (and mc-timer (fboundp 'cancel-timer) (cancel-timer mc-timer)) (setq mc-pgp-passwd nil mc-ripem-passwd nil) (message "password deactivated")) ;;}}} ;;{{{ Encryption (defun mc-encrypt-message (&optional recipients scheme) "*Encrypt the message to RECIPIENTS using the given encryption SCHEME. If SCHEME is nil, use the value of `mc-default-scheme'." (interactive (if current-prefix-arg (list nil (read-from-minibuffer "Encryption Scheme: " nil nil t)))) (let (args start signed-p retval) (or scheme (setq scheme mc-default-scheme)) (setq recipients (cond (recipients ; given as function argument recipients) (mc-use-default-recipients (concat (mail-fetch-field "to" nil t) ", " (mail-fetch-field "cc" nil t))) (t ; prompt for it (read-from-minibuffer "Recipients: " (concat (mail-fetch-field "to" nil t) ", " (mail-fetch-field "cc" nil t)))))) (setq recipients (mc-split "\$[ \t\n]*,[ \t\n]*\$+" recipients)) (or recipients (error "No recipients!")) (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp) (and mc-encrypt-for-me (setq recipients (cons mc-pgp-user-id recipients))) (setq args (list "+batchmode" "-feat")) (if (or mc-pgp-always-sign (y-or-n-p "Sign the message? ")) (setq signed-p t args (append args (list "-su" mc-pgp-user-id)))) (setq args (append args recipients)) (goto-char (point-min)) (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n")) (setq start (point)) (let ((process-environment process-environment)) ;; Don't need to ask for the passphrase if not signing. (if signed-p (progn (mc-activate-passwd 'pgp) (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n") (setq process-environment (cons "PGPPASSFD=0" process-environment)))) (message "Encrypting...") ;; Use call-process-region rather than shell-command-on-region ;; to get the exit code. (setq retval (apply 'call-process-region (append (list start (point-max) mc-pgp-path t t nil) args))) (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd)) (if (= retval 0) (progn (goto-char start) (search-forward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line) (search-backward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line) (mc-temp-display start (point) "*Encryption*")) (error "Error while encrypting. Hit C-x u to undo.")))) ((eq scheme 'ripem) (and mc-encrypt-for-me (setq recipients (cons mc-ripem-user-id recipients))) ;; Anyone know any better way to do the following? (setq args (append (list "-e" "-m" "encrypted" "-T" "a" "-k" "-") (apply 'append (mapcar (lambda (x) (list "-r" x)) recipients)))) (goto-char (point-min)) (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n")) (setq start (point)) (mc-activate-passwd 'ripem) (insert mc-ripem-passwd "\n") (message "Encrypting...") (setq retval (apply 'call-process-region (append (list start (point-max) mc-ripem-path t t nil) args))) (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd)) (if (/= retval 0) (error "Error while encrypting. Hit C-x u to undo."))) (t (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme))))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ Decryption (defun mc-decrypt-message () "*Decrypt whatever message is in the current buffer. Return t on success." (interactive) (let (start msg retval) (goto-char (point-min)) (cond ((search-forward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line nil t) (search-backward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line) (setq start (point)) (mc-activate-passwd 'pgp) (or buffer-read-only (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n")) (re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-pgp-msg-end-line)) (cond (buffer-read-only (setq msg (buffer-substring start (point))) (pop-to-buffer (get-buffer-create "*Decrypted Message*")) (erase-buffer) (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n" msg) (setq start (point-min)))) (let ((process-environment (cons "PGPPASSFD=0" process-environment))) (message "Decrypting...") (setq retval (call-process-region start (point) mc-pgp-path t t nil "-f")) (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd)) (if (= retval 0) (prog1 t (goto-char start) (or (re-search-forward "^Signature made.*\n" nil t) (search-forward "Just a moment......")) (mc-temp-display start (point) "*Decryption*")) (mc-temp-display start (point) "*ERROR*") nil))) ((search-forward mc-ripem-msg-begin-line nil t) (search-backward mc-ripem-msg-begin-line) (setq start (point)) (mc-activate-passwd 'ripem) (insert mc-ripem-passwd "\n") (re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-ripem-msg-end-line)) (message "Decrypting...") (setq retval (call-process-region start (point) mc-ripem-path t t nil "-d" "-k" "-")) (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd)) (if (= retval 0) t (mc-temp-display start (point) "*ERROR*") nil)) (t (message "Found no encrypted message in this buffer.") nil)))) (defun mc-rmail-decrypt-message () "*Decrypt the contents of this message" (interactive) (if (not (equal mode-name "RMAIL")) (error "mc-rmail-decrypt-message called in a non-RMAIL buffer")) (rmail-edit-current-message) (cond ((not (mc-decrypt-message)) (rmail-abort-edit)) ((or mc-always-replace (y-or-n-p "Replace encrypted message with decrypted? ")) (rmail-cease-edit) (rmail-kill-label "edited") (rmail-add-label "decrypted")) (t (rmail-abort-edit)))) (defun mc-vm-decrypt-message () "*Decrypt the contents of the current VM message" (interactive) (if (interactive-p) (vm-follow-summary-cursor)) (vm-select-folder-buffer) (vm-check-for-killed-summary) (vm-error-if-folder-read-only) (vm-error-if-folder-empty) (vm-edit-message) (cond ((not (mc-decrypt-message)) (progn (message "Decryption failed.") (vm-edit-message-abort))) ((or mc-always-replace (y-or-n-p "Replace encrypted message with decrypted? ")) (vm-edit-message-end)) (t (vm-edit-message-abort)))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ Signing (defun mc-sign-message (&optional scheme) "*Clear sign the message using the given encryption SCHEME." (interactive (if current-prefix-arg (list (read-from-minibuffer "Encryption Scheme: " nil nil t)))) (or scheme (setq scheme mc-default-scheme)) (let (start retval) (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp) (goto-char (point-min)) (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n")) (setq start (point)) (mc-activate-passwd 'pgp) (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n") (let ((process-environment (cons "PGPPASSFD=0" process-environment))) (setq retval (call-process-region start (point-max) mc-pgp-path t t nil "-fast" "+clearsig=on" "+batchmode" "-u" mc-pgp-user-id))) (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd)) (cond ((= 0 retval) (goto-char start) (search-forward "\nJust a moment....") (mc-temp-display start (point))) (t (error "PGP signing failed. Use C-x u to undo.")))) ((eq scheme 'ripem) (setq command (concat mc-ripem-path " -e -m mic-clear -k -")) (goto-char (point-min)) (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n")) (setq start (point)) (mc-activate-passwd 'ripem) (insert mc-ripem-passwd "\n") (setq retval (call-process-region start (point-max) mc-ripem-path t t nil "-e" "-m" "mic-clear" "-k" "-")) (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd)) (if (/= 0 retval) (error "RIPEM signing failed. Use C-x u to undo."))) (t (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme))))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ Signature verification ;;{{{ mc-verify-signature (defun mc-verify-signature () "*Verify the signature of whatever signed message is in the current buffer, and give the result as a message in the minibuffer. Returns t if the signature is verified." (interactive) (let (start buf msg retval) (goto-char (point-min)) (cond ((re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-pgp-signed-begin-line) nil t) (beginning-of-line) (setq start (point)) (search-forward mc-pgp-signed-end-line) (setq msg (buffer-substring start (point))) (save-excursion (set-buffer (generate-new-buffer "*Verification*")) (insert msg) (setq retval (call-process-region (point-min) (point-max) mc-pgp-path t t nil "+batchmode" "-f")) (if (/= retval 0) (progn (mc-temp-display (point-min) (point-max) "*ERROR*") (kill-buffer (current-buffer)) nil) (goto-char (point-min)) (search-forward "Good signature") (beginning-of-line) (setq start (point)) (end-of-line) (message (buffer-substring start (point))) (kill-buffer (current-buffer)) t))) ((re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-ripem-msg-begin-line) nil t) (beginning-of-line) (setq start (point)) (search-forward mc-ripem-msg-end-line) (setq msg (buffer-substring start (point))) (save-excursion (set-buffer (generate-new-buffer "*Verification*")) (insert msg) (setq retval (call-process-region (point-min) (point-max) mc-ripem-path t t nil "-d")) ;; Theoretically, at this point retval should hold a 0 if ;; the signature was correct, and a 1 if it wasn't. In ;; practice, it holds whatever it feels like holding. I ;; believe this is a bug in call-process-region, but have ;; not been able to figure out why it works everywhere ;; else but not here. For now, I'm just going to display ;; the output. (mc-temp-display (point-min) (point-max)) (kill-buffer (current-buffer)))) ; (if (/= 0 retval) ; (progn (goto-char (point-min)) ; (message (buffer-substring (point) (progn ; (end-of-line) ; (point)))) ; (kill-buffer (current-buffer)) ; nil) ; (message "RIPEM signature verified") ; (kill-buffer (current-buffer)) ; t))) (t (error "No signed message found."))))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ mc-rmail-verify-signature (defun mc-rmail-verify-signature () "*Verify the signature in the current message." (interactive) (if (not (equal mode-name "RMAIL")) (error "mc-rmail-verify-signature called in a non-RMAIL buffer")) (if (mc-verify-signature) (rmail-add-label "verified"))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ mc-vm-verify-signature (defun mc-vm-verify-signature () "*Verify the signature in the current VM message" (interactive) (if (interactive-p) (vm-follow-summary-cursor)) (vm-select-folder-buffer) (vm-check-for-killed-summary) (vm-error-if-folder-empty) (mc-verify-signature)) ;;}}} ;;}}} ;;{{{ Key management ;;{{{ mc-insert-public-key (defun mc-insert-public-key (&optional scheme) "*Insert your public key at the end of the current buffer." (interactive (if current-prefix-arg (list (read-from-minibuffer "Encryption Scheme: " nil nil t)))) (or scheme (setq scheme mc-default-scheme)) (let (command start pubkey) (goto-char (point-max)) (if (not (bolp)) (insert "\n")) (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp) (setq command (concat mc-pgp-path " +batchmode -kxaf '" mc-pgp-user-id "'")) (setq start (point)) (shell-command command t) (goto-char start) (search-forward mc-pgp-key-begin-line) (beginning-of-line) (mc-temp-display start (point))) ((eq scheme 'ripem) (if (file-readable-p mc-ripem-pubkeyfile) (save-excursion (set-buffer (find-file-noselect mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)) (goto-char (point-min)) (if (search-forward mc-ripem-user-id nil t) (progn (search-backward mc-ripem-key-begin-line) (setq start (point)) (search-forward mc-ripem-key-end-line) (setq pubkey (buffer-substring start (point)))) (message "Couldn't find key for `%s' in file %s" mc-ripem-user-id mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)) (kill-buffer (current-buffer))) (error "Cannot read file %s for public key" mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)) (if pubkey (insert pubkey))) (t (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme))))) ;;}}} ;;{{{ mc-snarf-keys (defun mc-snarf-keys () "*Add any public keys in the buffer to your keyring." (interactive) (let (start buf user exists) (goto-char (point-min)) (cond ((search-forward mc-pgp-key-begin-line nil t) (setq buf (generate-new-buffer " *Key Temp*")) (goto-char (match-beginning 0)) (call-process-region (point) (point-max) mc-pgp-path nil buf nil "+batchmode" "-kaf") (save-excursion (set-buffer buf) (mc-temp-display (point-min) (point-max) "*Key Management*")) (kill-buffer buf)) ((search-forward mc-ripem-key-begin-line nil t) (goto-char (match-beginning 0)) (setq start (point)) ;; Get the user ID of the key being added. (re-search-forward "^User:\s-*.*$" nil t) (setq user (buffer-substring (match-beginning 0) (match-end 0))) (search-forward mc-ripem-key-end-line) (if (file-writable-p mc-ripem-pubkeyfile) (progn (save-excursion (set-buffer (find-file-noselect mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)) (goto-char (point-min)) (if (search-forward user nil t) (setq exists t)) (kill-buffer (current-buffer))) (if (not exists) (append-to-file start (point) mc-ripem-pubkeyfile) (message "RIPEM public key for this user already exists."))) (error "Can't write to file %s" mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)))))) ;;}}} ;;}}} (provide 'mailcrypt) ;; Local Variables: ;; folded-file: t ;; End: SHAR_EOF fi # end of overwriting check if test -f 'remail.el' then echo shar: will not over-write existing file "'remail.el'" else cat << \SHAR_EOF > 'remail.el' ;; remail.el, by Jin S. Choi <jsc(a)mit.edu> ;; Quick hack to allow easy use of cypherpunk remailers. ;; Requires mailcrypt v1.2 or higher. ;; Always encrypts. If you don't want to use encryption, it's simple ;; enough to set up by hand.... ;; Assumes that you have the public keys of the remailers you want to ;; use in your keyring already. (require 'mailcrypt) (defvar remailer-list (list "hfinney(a)shell.portal.com" "hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu") "*A list of remailers to mail through.") (defun remail-message () "*Munge the current message to go through the remailers listed in remailer-list and end up at the address listed in the To: field." (interactive) (goto-char (point-min)) (re-search-forward (concat "^" mail-header-separator)) (beginning-of-line) (narrow-to-region (point-min) (point)) (let ((recipients (mail-fetch-field "to" nil t)) (remailer-list remailer-list) from to) (delete-region (point-min) (point-max)) (goto-char (point-min)) (insert "To: " (car remailer-list) "\n") (setq remailer-list (reverse remailer-list)) (widen) (forward-line) (setq to recipients) (setq from (car remailer-list)) (while remailer-list (if to (insert "::\nRequest-Remailing-To: " to "\n\n")) (mc-encrypt-message from 'pgp) (save-excursion (insert "::\nEncrypted: PGP\n\n")) (setq remailer-list (cdr remailer-list)) (setq to from) (setq from (car remailer-list))))) SHAR_EOF fi # end of overwriting check # End of shell archive exit 0

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Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

There is one way to track someone with a beeper - you call them, leave your number, and trace the call if they call back. It doesn't work for people who only accept calls from certain numbers (mid-level drug dealers, for instance) or use other authentication (voice pagers, or codes you dial along with the number), and it's worth calling them from a pay phone in case they recognize the usual pay-phone numbers (if you live in an area where you can still call back to a pay-phone.) It's not generally possible to locate specific beepers from the miniscule amount of IF that they generate, especially since many of them work by listening to a standard frequency and only beeping if there's a specific message sent to alert that user; at most you could find someone using that beeper company. As an extreme case, consider Skypage, which is satellite-based :-) On the other hand, if you're trying to figure out which of the <politically targeted ethnic group members> hanging around on the street corner is the drug dealer, and you know the popular local beeper companies' frequencies and addressing, you _could_ set up a transmitter that loops through the addresses and see who pulls out a beeper and heads for the pay phone.... It may take a while if the beepers support 10,000 or 4 billion addresses, but you can limit your search a bit if the beeper company or stool pigeons have provided you the numbers of the usual suspects... Sounds like a good reason to design a paging system with a large sparse address space to prevent brute-force searches, and not to key the address directly off your home phone number or anything obvious like that. Bill, who doesn't carry a beeper and whose sales of dangerous addictive drugs are normally limited to caffeine...

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Re: Cypherpunk trends & visions
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

I have a shorter-term focus than Nick's proposals for digital coupons and cash. Here's what would be on my cypherpunks wish list: Improved remailers: The ability to handle reply messages; the ability to register pseudonyms of the user's choice, which get mapped to a user-supplied encrypted remailing block (this is Eric Hughes' model); true Chaumian "mix" functionality, with message batching so that in-to-out mapping is lost, including message padding so all messages are the same size. Remailer standards: An ad hoc assertion of standard remailer commands which all our different implementations will support. We could have a SIG just to discuss this. I don't think it would take long. Remailer proliferation: Build remailer software into some widely used mail packages like elm, metamail (which provides MIME support), emacs, etc. Digital cash: We badly need some implementation to start playing with; some net-based game which uses the digital cash. Digital postage stamps for the remailers. DH: I'd like to see more DH-based comm software so I can log in from home to my work or school computer and have an encrypted link. I know we have a version for the Amiga; I'd like to see it for PC. I'd also like to see an email program which used DH so that there would be no danger of coerced key exposure. Cryptophones: PC/Soundblaster or Mac based encrypted comm software using 14.4 Kbaud modems. This is a fairly daunting list, of course, but perhaps we should re-orient ourselves to be a working group more than a debating group. Split off sub-groups, get people to volunteer for each one, put one person in charge, have him make weekly or monthly reports to the main group. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: Which remailers are up & working?
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

I just updated the version of PGP on my remailers at Caltech and Portal to use version 2.3a. It turns out that, starting with version 2.3, PGP by default creates messages that are not readable by versions before 2.2. 2.2 can read the 2.3 messages, but 2.0 and 2.1 cannot. I was running 2.1 so I wasn't able to process messages created with 2.3. If anyone else is running PGP versions before 2.2 on their remailers they should upgrade them. I just did a non-encrypted ping test to a list of remailers, and heard back from the following remailers within 2 minutes:

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Re: Electronic Democracy
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 15 Aug '93

15 Aug '93

The one comment I'd make on the wolves vs sheep analogy is this. In the real world, there *are* wolves and sheep. Violence and coercion are part of life. Democracy, in a sense, recognizes the power implicit in large numbers of people. If they can't vote, they may revolt. No libertarian government will survive without the acceptance of the masses. A populace willing to countenance a Libertarian society would perhaps be wise enough to be entrusted with democracy, anyway. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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