- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Trapdoors
by ssandfort＠attmail.com 18 Feb '93

18 Feb '93

_________________________________________________________________ FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I'm relatively new to the list, so this may be an idea that's already been dealt with. If so, please let me know off-line. PGP was created as an end-run to legislation that would have mandated trapdoors in all encryption hardware/software sold in the U.S. Fortunately, such legislation has been defeated to date. How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke screen? Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised Intel or MicroSoft? Is there some way to be sure that the new 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA private key you generate? S a n d y ssandfort(a)attmail.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Trapdoors (Not Very Likely)
by root＠rmsdell.ftl.fl.us 18 Feb '93

18 Feb '93

> Intel or MicroSoft? Is there some way to be sure that the new > 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA > private key you generate? This is not very likely. There would be several problems for anyone attempting this. First, where do you store it? On-chip non-volatile memory? Second, how would the chip know that it was generating a private key? This would almost require artificial intelligence. You can't just scan for a sequence of instructions currently used by PGP, for they change with each version released. Or would it store ALL data that passes through it? Third, how useful would that be? What if you generate your keys on a sub-notebook computer which you carry with you or store in a secure place at all times. So, no, this is not something you need to worry about. -- Yanek Martinson yanek(a)novavax.nova.edu

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Re: Trapdoors
by tcmay＠netcom.com 18 Feb '93

18 Feb '93

>How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke >screen? Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised >Intel or MicroSoft? Is there some way to be sure that the new >486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA >private key you generate? > S a n d y ssandfort(a)attmail.com Sandy has discovered the deep dark secret of crypto! I worked for Intel from 1974 to 1986 and can confirm this to be the case. Every crypto key is secretly recorded by Intel microprocessors. Motorola processors do not yet record keys, which I why use a Macintosh. The specific instruction is the so-called "NSA instruction" which John Gilmore identified some time ago. Sun Microsystems was ordered by the NSA to redesign their chips to capture keys, which is why the SPARC processor was introduced. SPARC stands for "Sun Processor Allowing Remote Capture." Once the keys have been captured and stored on the user's hard disk (notice how the drives occasionally turn on a night?), they are forwarded to the NSA and National Surveillance Organization by "screen saver" programs, like "After Dark," which were actually written by the Berkeley Microsystems cut-out operation of the NSO. Real hackers don't use cutesy screen saver programs. This new automated system is much more convenient than the previous system, where the FBI and NSO had to break into homes and offices in order to retrieve the keys the Intel processors had recorded. -Klaus! von Future Prime, Cypherpunk and Extropian

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Re: Trapdoors
by lefty＠apple.com 18 Feb '93

18 Feb '93

Sandy Sandfort wonders: >How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke >screen? Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised >Intel or MicroSoft? Is there some way to be sure that the new >486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA >private key you generate? No, nor do we having any particular way of knowing that Packard-Bell doesn't install an extremely tiny person into each keyboard they sell, studiously copying down each one of your key strokes. How in the world would the computer's CPU be able to distinguish the generation of a PGP or RSA private key from any other computation? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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MEETING: 4th Cypherpunks U.K.
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 18 Feb '93

18 Feb '93

4th Cypherpunks meeting, London ------------------------------- Will be held Saturday, 20 February 1993, at 1400 in the office of: FOREST 4th Floor 2 Grosvenor Gardens London SW1W 0DH 071-823-6550 This location is 2 blocks from Victoria Station, at the corner of Hobart Place, near Buckingham Palace. The entrance is the very last at the end of the office block, and is diagonally across the street from a cabbie shelter and a bank of BT payphones. If you have trouble finding us, call the above number or page me on 081-812-2661. Attendees, as always, are encouraged to bring their laptop and portable computers, for on-site PGP public key exchange and certification. Those who have already generated PGP 2.n public keys, but who aren't bringing their own machines, should bring diskettes with their public keys. As is usually the rule in this crowd, please don't copy your secret key on these diskettes... Amongst the usual topics of discussion will be: * An introduction to data privacy for novices * Further developments in U.K. anonymous remailers * Further developments in U.K. PGP key servers (telnet, ftp, email) .. and some interesting developments in re attempted anti-privacy legislation in the U.K. and elsewhere. Our special guest Saturday will be Dr. Whitfield Diffie, who will join us informally for the meeting, before his return to the U.S. It looks to be a good meeting. All are welcome. In liberty, Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor AMiX: RWhitaker EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) ================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================

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Gambling...
by wayner＠cs.cornell.edu 17 Feb '93

17 Feb '93

If there is no "real" money involved then you might want to consider running a betting operation on sports games or some other popular betting activity. Of course, many of us would probably rather bet on the release date of the 586 then some random ball game because that is where our expertise lies... :-) -Peter

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digital store?
by Karl Barrus 17 Feb '93

17 Feb '93

Cypherpunks, I've received mail from a bank user who wonders what to do with the "money". I responded that there really isn't too much reason to spend your money now, given that there isn't too much to buy :-) I've been trying to think of something the bank customers can do to trade bills, sort of a fixed monetary economic experiment. Anybody have ideas? Right now, bank customers can contact each other anonymously by using remailing headers set up for the remailer elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu - use the get command to receive a list of headers (for more info see the new help file). The only thing I can think of right now that people can do is play "mental poker" and use digital bills. Of course, messages back and forth need to be encrypted because such activity can be seen as gambling, although of course there is no real money involved. I'm working on a help file/FAQ for the bank, but I want to finish writing hop.mail for MSDOS first, and that isn't going as fast as I would like since I find the DOS scripting language to be, well... inadequate. /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus | | elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu | <- preferred address | barrus(a)tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | \-----------------------------------/

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Re: Timed-Release Crypto
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Feb '93

17 Feb '93

Dave Deltorto writes (about my idea for timed-release crypto): >Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other >storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the >disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to >for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places Loss of hardware over the years due to unreliability is unlikely to be the main issue, for several reasons: 1. Modern MTBFs for large disk drives are approaching 100,000 hours, or well over 10 years. The drives are likelier to be voluntarily retired first. And newer drives, including archival optical drives, are even more reliable (the drives may crash, but optical media survive). For the drives that _do_ fail, backup strategies exist, as with all storage of critical files. To wit, if your point is correct, then the failures of some disk drives at banks, insurance companies, etc., should be producing some fraction of "unrecoverable losses" each year. That they are not, because of robust backup and redundant storage methods, is evidence that crypto time vaults will also be reasonably secure. (Granted, you wouldn't want to trust your $100,000 deposit for 20 years on Joe Random's aging Amiga 1000.) 2. A relatively large file by today's standards, e.g., 10 megabytes, will be a very small file by the standards of 10 years from now. The upshot is that new and more reliable storage methods (and transmission methods) will make storage of such small files quite trivial. (And remember that since the pieces are encrypted, physical duplication for backups, redundant storage, etc., is not a compromise of security.) 3. The most reputatable crypto time vaults will of course be careful not to lose client files, especially not for such mundane reasons as disk drive failures. 4. M-out-of-n voting strategies are likely in any case, to deal with collusion of some of the nodes. That is, a file will be split into pieces such that any 8 out of 12 pieces, for example, are sufficient to recover the original file. (Encryption is a separate issue, though obviously related.) 5. The files are likely to be moved around a lot, anyway, making hardware failures manageable on an instantaneous basis (that is, bad nodes, etc., can be compensated for when the time comes to reroute the files). Thus, a critical file does not just get "parked" at one site for 30 years. >where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where >they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each >such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to >guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to >sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years >might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion. "Persistent institutions" is what I call these systems or trusts that last for many decades. If such systems can be built, using some of the ideas discussed here in this group, then interesting new financial and political structures are possible. Imagine an anonymous, distributed trust that has $10 billion in crypto-assets and a "goal" of funding nanotech or cryonics research. (Lots of complicated stuff yet to be considered in enough detail on how such "goals" might be stored, acted on, etc. For the sake of simplicity, think of it as a kind of Howard Hughes Medical Foundation, which once owned the Hughes Corporation, but which is not located in any one single country....) >Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit. Thanks. Lots more work is needed. -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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Re: Timed-Release Crypto
by deltorto＠aol.com 17 Feb '93

17 Feb '93

Tim May contributed a fascinating bit of thinking on timed-release messages, including this: >>"Aha!," I hear you exclaim, "Tim's scheme depends solely on the trust of >>these escrow agents, and that's no different from depositing a sealed >>envelope with your friendly lawyer and asking him to promise not to peek." Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion. Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit. dave

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re:subscription
by gkennedy＠ccs.carleton.ca 16 Feb '93

16 Feb '93

Subscribe. Gary Kennedy gkennedy(a)ccs.carleton.ca

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