- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

repost from sci.crypt
by Marc Horowitz 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

I just posted this to sci.crypt. You conspiracy theorists out there are probably going to start getting ulcers soon. Marc From: marc(a)mit.edu (Marc Horowitz N1NZU) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: The source of that announcement Date: 18 Apr 1993 01:19:38 GMT Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lines: 38 Distribution: world Message-ID: <MARC.93Apr17211937(a)oliver.mit.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: oliver.mit.edu The message from the NIST about the clipper chip comes from the following address: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) Just who is that, I asked myself, or rather, I asked the computer. % telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov 25 Trying... Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov. Escape character is '^]'. 220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:42:56 EDT expn clipper 250-<csspab(a)mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov> 250-<denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu> 250-<hoffman(a)seas.gwu.edu> 250-<mkapor(a)eff.org> 250-<rotenberg(a)cpsr.org> 250-<rivest(a)mit.edu> 250-<mhellman(a)stanford.edu> 250-<alanrp(a)aol.com> 250-<dparker(a)sri.com> 250-<jim(a)rsa.com> 250-<branstad(a)tis.com> 250 <mgrsplus(a)csmes.ncsl.nist.gov> quit 221 first.org closing connection Connection closed. Well, isn't that interesting. Dorothy Denning, Mitch Kapor, Marc Rotenberg, Ron Rivest, Jim Bidzos, and others. The Government, RSA, TIS, CPSR, and the EFF are all represented. I don't suppose anybody within any of these organizations would care to comment? Or is this just the White House's idea of a cruel joke on these peoples' inboxes? Marc -- Marc Horowitz N1NZU <marc(a)mit.edu> 617-253-7788

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How to Block the Big Brother Proposal--Petition, fax, mail?
by Clark Reynard 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

I've looked into the issue a little more. I think it's probably the most important cypherpunk issue. Perhaps it _is_ time to write the White House. But I think individual emailed letters to the White House ought to be combined with some sort of petition, carefully drafted, and sent by (telegram/fax/snailmail) and signed by everyone we can get, copied as one of those mailer files like shareware uses for registration, so that anyone can print it out, sign it and stamp it. Though individually-written letters would have a greater impact, the sheer volume of mail achievable by a large crosspost (I don't like massive crossposts, but one is necessary.) of the mailer, even if only .1% of the readership considers it worth doing. In addition, individual letters to government officials of note, in particular Representative Rohrbacker (anyone have an email/ snailmail address?), Lloyd Bentsen and anyone else who potentially could have an interest. Does anyone have any specific input about what ONE person could do to fulfill his part of the obligation to block this lame Nazi bullshit? Again, I think a petition would be a good idea, but getting it signed by everyone would be difficult, and signing it electronically via PGP might be considered just a _mite_ provocative, like making a peace offering to William Bennett by offering him a toke off a J. Any input? ---- Robert W. Clark rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu PGP signature available by mail or finger

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An Alliance with RSA?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Fellow Cypherpunks, In this message I am urging we all consider an alliance with RSA Data Security, the only company or group able to actually provide an alternative to the "weak crypto" of the Clinton Clipper. I have no idea if RSA is interested, or if in fact they're already in league with the NSA and other privacy clippers. I chose a public forum because I'm in no position to negotiate for anybody in private. I also mailed a copy to Jim Bidzos, in case he's not reading sci.cryt right now. -Tim Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm,comp.org.ieee From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Don't fight Clipper Chip, subvert or replace it ! Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 21:09:13 GMT Robert Lewis Glendenning (rlglende(a)netcom.com) wrote: : Clipper Chip is a response to the fact that there is no business : or professional body in a position to establish a standard and : provide chipsets to implement it for analog or digial transmission : systems. : : RSA might be in position to do it, if they had active cooperation of : a couple of manufacturers of cellular phones or desktop phones. ....... : Is RSA independt of the gov enough to spearhead this? I, for one, : would *gladly* pay royalties via purchasing secure phones. Hear hear! I completely agree that we need to work quickly to establish alternatives to the government's Clinton Clipper. As Brad Templeton and others have noted, once the Clipper becomes ensconced in enough phones there will be enormous pressure to make it the *legal* standard, and it will become the "market* standard as well. (There is a lot of confusion in the proposal about whether the use of Clipper is mandated, about whether non-escrow alternatives will be allowed, etc.) (There are also unclear issues about how hard, or how illegal, it will be to make "workalikes" which meet the standard but which generate phony or untappable keys...I'm sure the next several weeks will see these issues thrashed out in this and other groups.) Meanwhile, I'd be interested to hear RSA Data Security's reaction. Often criticized in this group for their licensing policies (the usual complaints about MailSafe costing too much, at $125 or so, and the general issue of software patents...), we may find that *allying* ourselves with RSA is the best thing we can do. What's a mere licensing fee when our liberty may be at stake? (If everyone who wanted true security paid, say, $100 for a lifetime use of all of RSA's patents--which expire in the period 1998-2002, or so--then RSA would make tons of money and be happy, I'm sure. A small price to pay. For those to whom $100 sounds like too much, I'm sure the actual terms could be different, spread out over several years, whatever. To me, it's a small price to pay.) Strong crypto means strong privacy. Escrowing keys, sending copies of keys to large databases, and splitting keys into two 40-bit pieces, all done with secret and non-analyzable protocols and algorithms, is *NOT* strong crypto! Whatever some of us may think about the abstract principles of patenting number theory applications, this minor issue pales in comparison with the potential dangers of the Clipper proposal (note that I said "potential"...we'll presumably learn more in the coming months). The RSA algorithms are at least public, have been analyzed and attacked for years, and source code is available (to better ensure no deliberate weakenesses or trapdoors). I know of a number of groups putting together voice encryption systems using off-the-shelf hardware (like Soundblaster boards for the PC) and CELP-type software. The new generations of PCs, using fast 486s and Pentiums are fast enough to do real-time voice encryption. Combined with Diffie-Hellman key exchange, this should provide an alternative to the Clipper system. Of course, we don't really know if the Administration proposes to outlaw competing systems. (It seems to me that their goal of tapping terrorists, child pornographers, and Hilary bashers would be thwarted if low-cost alternatives to Clipper proliferated. Not to defend child pornographers or terrorists, but limiting basic freedoms to catch a few criminals is not the American way of doing things. End of soapbox mode.) I suggest we in these groups set aside any differences we may have had with RSA (and don't look at me....I have both MacPGP *and* a fully legal copy of "MailSafe"!) and instead work with them as quickly as we can. RSA?, Jim?, are you listening? -Tim May P.S. I reserve the right to retract these opinions if it should turn out that RSA Data Security was involved in the Clipper proposal. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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History of Gov. Telecom Interception
by Harry Shapiro 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Last year Oxford press published a book called The Invisible Weapon - it details, from 1851 - 1945, how governments, esp. the British have used "backdoors" into coded messages to watch/listen/read messages. At one time the British has a strangle hold on world wide telegram service. They made very strong claims that they would never read their clients (often other governments) mail, but instead went to detailed and expensive measures to insure that in fact they could/did. The IBSN # is :0-19-506273-6 We should read this book (I have) so in the up coming debate on the Clipper, we can frame the Clipper in the rich historical context it deserves to be placed in. -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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Phil Zimmerman on the Radio
by dmandl＠shearson.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

FYI, for those of you in the NYC area, I'm going to be conducting a brief interview with Phil Zimmerman (author of PGP) on my radio show tomorrow to discuss the recent NSA/Big Brother crypto developments (see the front page of today's New York Times). WFMU, East Orange, NJ, 91.1 FM. My show airs from noon-3:00 local time, and the interview will start at around 1:00. N.B.: I will NOT be taping the show, so I can't make tapes for anyone. Anyone else listening is free to make copies and do whatever they want with them, of course. --Dave.

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Boston Globe article 4/17/93
by Bill Sommerfeld 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

[I've called the Globe to complain about their swallowing the government's story, hook, line, and sinker; I suggest others do likewise...] US reveals computer chip for scrambling telephones By John Mintz Washington Post WASHINGTON -- The White House yesterday announced its new plan to prevent criminals, terrorists, and industrial spies from decoding communications over telephones, fax machines, and computers while ensuring the government's ability to eavesdrop. The plan features a $1200 government-developed computer chip embedded in a scrambling device the size of a small notebook, which the government hopes will be adopted as the universal means of encryption. The Clinton administration said the technology will balance the interests of civil libertarians, corporations, and individuals on the one hand against law enforcement and intelligence agencies on the other. The official White House announcement yesterday was the endorsement of the Clipper Chip, developed by NSA, as the government standard for encryption devices. Industry and US officials said that means the Clipper Chip also will become widely accepted in corporate America, because companies and individuals desiring to do business with federal agencies that encode their information would have to use the government's standard. The success of the government's initiative depends on the willingness of companies to accept encryption that the government can crack. AT&T announced yesterday it would use the new chip in all its secure nongovernment telephones. The NSA has licensed two California firms to manufacture and market the Clipper Chip, officials said. The price is expected to drop to about $25 each, they said.

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Proposal for anon chaining
by KINNEY WILLIAM H 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Recent traffic on anonymous remailers/servers: >From: Eli <ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu> >> From: Hal <74076.1041(a)CompuServe.COM> >> This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies. I have set >> "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear > >in the "From" line on the postings. Hopefully that will offer a clue that > >the normal reply mechanism doesn't work. Maybe the nickname should say so >> more explicitly? > > >The security provided by this technique could be provided without >the IMHO serious disadvantage of having no return address. Eric's >hybrid approach, where a pseudonym server hands mail to an remailer >chain, is secure (barring sophisticated traffic analysis) if you >trust the last remailer in the chain. Julf, have you thought about >whether you want to do something like this? > Hal Here's an idea I haven't seen suggested before, which would remove the need for a pseudonym server: The way things stand now, chaining Cypherpunk remailers works by nesting PGP encryptions of the form <remail header> *********** message text *********** If you want to chain remailers, you encrypt the above, make IT the new message text, and then add another header, and so on until you get bored. My proposal is for a modification of this protocol to allow for pseudonymous return mail addresses, like this: The trick would be to separate the message text from the remailer routing information, in a message of the form *********** ROUTING INFORMATION *********** *********** MESSAGE TEXT *********** where both blocks are encrypted with PGP. The message text would be encrypted with the PGP public key of the intended final recipient of the message, and would not be modified by the intermediate anon remailers. The routing information would be for the benefit of the remailers only. It would be created by the RECIPIENT and made publicly available as a pseudonymous mail address. It would work like this: Suppose user foo(a)bar.com wishes to establish a pseudonymous identity, and wants to route it through anon remailers "anon1" and "anon2". What he does is take a message of the form :: Request-Remailing-To: foo(a)bar.com and encrypts it with server anon1's PGP public key, to create <ANON1 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>. Then he adds another header to make :: Request-Remailing-To: anon1 <ANON1 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS> and encrypts THIS with anon2's public key to make <ANON2 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>, and adds a header to make :: Request-Remailing-To: anon2 <ANON2 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS> Obviously, this procedure can be nested to arbitrary depth, chaining through as many anon servers as you like. The trick is that this address block can be made PUBLIC, since the only way to unwind the routing is to have access to the secret keys of all the intermediate anon servers, and the identity of the recipient is protected. foo(a)bar.com then anonymously posts a PGP public key and a routing block to some public forum, and people can communicate with him without having any idea as to his actual identity. When I want to send a message to him, I encrypt the message with his provided public key, and then add the encrypted routing header, which he has also provided. I give him my own pseudonymous mail routing header to allow him to reply. This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing Cypherpunk remailer structure. It has the additional advantage of being decentralized and maintenance-free. It could be used for pseudonyms on net news, e-mail, wherever, and could presumably be integrated in some way into Julf's anon server. Comments? -- Will

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REAL ftp address of agrep tool
by grady＠netcom.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

The real address is: cs.arizona.edu in the directory "agrep". The incorrect ftp site I mentioned before, sunsite.unc.edu, has some interesting poly sci papers, but not much code. Too many archives. Too little time. Grady Ward

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fuzzy grep available
by grady＠netcom.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

"agrep" version 2.0.4 available via anonymous FTP from sunsite.unc.edu (including source) has a feature of cryptographic interest: fuzzy searches. For example, agrep -2 cypherpunks newsgroupspooldirectory would find all occurrence of"cypherpunks" or any such pattern with up to two errors of substitution, addition or deletion. cpyherpunks, cyphernks cipherapunks would all be found, fer instance. And the thing is Boyer-Moore sublinear FAST. Also has egrep features looking for up to 30,000 (yes, thirty thousand) patterns simultaneously with Boyer-Moore speed. For the NSA the applications are obvious: look for a bounch of keys words like revolution Timothy May NSA quickly. For us a good initial use might be to screen out "bad" passwords that are to simply a variant of a normal word. For example, if agrep -3 <prospective password/phrase> usr/dict/words or the lyric library, or the star trek location list or whatever, if anything were found then that password FAILS. This is a lot easier to use than other available tools. Like, MacPGP2.2 source, I will mail this on request IF you cannot do anonymous FTP from where you are. Grady Ward

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More info on Clipper Chip
by Dave Banisar 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Comments on White House Clipper Plan I attended the "interesting" NIST press conference yesterday on the "Clipper Chip" and may be able to clear up a few quaestions. According to NIST: The Chip has 4 functions, including Key Encryption Serial Number Escrow functionality Thus, it sounds like a key management system may have to be built into the devices that will be sold with the chip. However this means that they will also be able to determine which key to get becuase they will know the serial number. It also seems likely that once your key is compromised, its gone forever. This is a serious problem The Attorney General will determine next week who will be the escrow agents for this. I am willing to bet $ that NIST/Commerce will be one of them (not a lot, after all, I do work for a non-profit). Everything about this proposal is classified. The chip is classified but even more disturbing, the president directing ordering a review into crypto policy is also classified. CPSR has already filed 11 FOIA requests for all information, including the directive. You can expect that we will be filing suit shortly to get those documents and force this out into the open. When I questioned them about why the review was happening after the proposal, they did not answer me. This is not 1984 all over again-its '86. The NSA tried this exact same "black box" proposal (minus the escrow) in 1986. Industry laughed them out of the park. NIST also stated that the proposal has been implimented for 14 months and they (NSA actually) have been working on it for at least 4 years. AT&T announced yesterday that will will begin selling devices with these Clippers in them immediatly. We've been sold down the river by ma bell again. Dave Banisar CPSR Washington Office

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