- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Amiga Crypto
by Haywood J. Blowme 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Return-Path: <newsham(a)wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu> >> The basic idea I think would need the following: >> >> - A sound digitizer >> - High speed modem >> - 68020 or above processor (for speed purposes) >> - Good encryption algorithm (IDEA for example) >> >> Implementing the system would involve using the digitizer to digitize the >> voice. Then processing the sample (in real time) through the encryption >> algorithm and sending the output to the modem for transmission. The process >> would be repeated on the other end. >> >> The problems I see occurring are the following >> >> - Speed of the computer affecting real time encryption >> - Synchronizing the data packets for accurate decryption on the other side. >> - simultaneous I/O on the serial and parallel ports(for modem and digitizer) >> - outputing to speakers on receiving end. >> - having the whole process operate in a full duplex mode (ie. both people >> can talk at the same time). >> >> >> I think the majority of functions can be handled by the system libraries and >> outside sources (such as xpkidea.library for encryption). >> >> Does this sound feasible?? newsham(a)wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu Writes: >From what I gather CELP takes about 10 to 15 MIPS and LPC takes >somewhere under 5 MIPS on DSP chips. Instructions including >fixed point multiplies and accumulations (not counting divisions). >Thats quite a load for a 68020 to bear and still do encryption >and communications isnt it? [Stuff deleted] This is true. But if a sampling rate of about 9000-10,000 samples per second are used this will allow for good voice quality and the encryption algorithm should be able to handle it. The IDEA implementations I have seen for the Amiga run about 30-50K per second on my Amiga 1200 with 68020. This should be fast enough. If you then can send that data directly to the serial port with a fast modem 14.4K it should work. But it might sound choppy (haven't done the figures yet on how much data would be going to the modem while the person speaks, but it may be substantial enough to make the use of a high speed modem not feasible. Also I have to consider that data compression in the form of LAP/M or MNP will be ineffective against the encrypted data as it will appear as white noise and will be largely uncompressable.. ============================================================================= /// | psionic(a)wam.umd.edu | Q: How did the govt. decide to use an 80 __ /// C= | Craig H. Rowland | bit key for the new clipper chip? \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available | A: They combined Bill and Hillary \/// 1200 | by finger. | Clintons' IQ's. =============================================================================

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subscribe
by Kaya Bekiroglu 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

subscribe me.

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Request
by Lestat 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Please add me to your mailing list; as a passionate support of freedom of speech and expression of all kinds in all mediums, I'm concerned about the ClipperChip and interested in what you have to offer. Thanks, Lestat, aka Howard S. Jones 72(a)arms.uucp

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Re: Fighting the Wiretap Chip Plan
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

When this "Clipper chip" story broke, I was off on an extropian (if not cypherpunk) activity--helping freeze Alcor's 27 patient (another HIV+ case.) I doubt I am the strongest hardware person on these groups, but nobody else has commented on this aspect. You just *can't* make chips entirely resistant to reverse engineering. I know, I have spent close to 10% of my engineering career reverse engineering things. Given time and a few samples, *any* chip can be reverse engineered. This is especially true with tools such as SEM stimulator/state readers and Focused Ion Beam chip slicers and dicers widely available. *Somebody* will dig out every gate in their spare time. Thus the following statement looks very odd: >Q: How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure > how strong the security is? > >A: This system is more secure than many other voice encryption > systems readily available today. While the algorithm will > remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow > system, Say what? Does this mean that if somebody slices up a chip and publishes the algorithm the "security of the key escrow system" is broken? Can a representative of the government say why, or if, this is the case? If it is not the case, why not publish the algorithm and be done with it? Because, soon as the chip can be bought over the counter or stolen, the algorithm will be deduced. > we are willing to invite an independent panel of > cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all > potential users that there are no unrecognized > vulnerabilities. Well, unless the "independent panel" includes people who can follow the algorithm all the way through to silicon, I would not trust their report even if I trusted the experts, and that goes double for the next set of masks. Keith Henson

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My comments on the Clipper or Tapper chip,
by crunch＠netcom.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

I don't know wheter or not I should post this in alt.security.pgp, or other newsgroups, but here's my official comments on what I think of the Clinton Adm "Clipper" or "Tapper" chip. Any press people are welcome to use it, and feel free to send it out wherever it will help. My official statement and comments on the "Tapper chip" ======================================================= I believe that the Clintom Admin is trying to push this idea through without giving much thought on the ramifications of this rather intreguing idea of "registering" your keys with some government agency. This overwhelming urge to "tap into" our private conversations is just going to promote private encryption and voice scrambling. It is not going to make law enforcement's job any easier to catch criminals, because they will also encrypt their voice and data. It reminds me of that popular bumper sticker "If guns are outlawed, then only outlaws will have guns". It is clear that the government considers encryption as a "weapon", used by the enemy to keep nosey people away. Look at the current export laws to convince yourself of that. I guess I can think of it as a weapon to preserve my privacy. This is not only going to get a bad reception in the industry, but it will cost the government more money by adding huge administration costs. Talk about government "FAT"? I thought our goals are to cut government spending, not add to it. Lets see!! You need two agencys (Hopefully ones that people can trust). Gee!! I cannot even think of just ONE agency that I can trust!! can you? Then, these agencys have to keep track of one half of an 80 bit key. I guess there is one key for each "clipper" chip, so there has to be the capability of millions of keys, each one has to perfectly match the other half. Then there will be people needed to "register" these "tapper" phones. Lets not even think about what happens when one decides to sell it!! MORE government FAT!!. I guess thats why they're called FAT CATS. Now, if I were a criminal, do you think I would be dumb enough to "register" my phone with the government. Of course not. I would probably get mine on the black market, or though some other illicit means!! If I were a law abiding citizen, would I trust some government agency with my encryption key? Would you?? Then, there is this classified algorithm used in the clipper chip itself. I'm sure its pretty good, and it is probably hard to attack and crack. But can you really be absolutely sure that there isn't some sort of "back door" in it?? It is clear that the industry hasn't been consulted, or ideas were not put forth in some public forum. So, where is this democratic process?? We ARE still a democracy, aren't we? How was this company that sells the "Clipper chip" selected?? Was RSA data security people contacted?? It is clear that a lot of questions have to be answered before something like this can be accepted. I just hope the right people make the right decision, and that PRIVATE encryption be the responsibility of the user, and NOT the carriers. It is important that more and more private encryption programs, equipment, etc, can be made available on the market. If RSA is two tight with their licensing fees and policys, then there should be more math whiz types making better algorithms than RSA's. The field is wide open, so lets exploit them!! John D.

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subscribe
by James A. Donald 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

subscribe James A. Donald In case a human is reading this, I wish to subscribe to the cypherpunks mailing list. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | James A. Donald | Joseph Stalin said: "Ideas are more powerful | than guns. We would not let our enemies have jamesdon(a)infoserv.com | guns, why should we let them have ideas."

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gentlemen
by D Anton Sherwood 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Who was the statesman who said, two generations ago, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"? By the way, the San Francisco Chronicle's business section's Saturday headline was Secret Phone Plan Under Fire or maybe it was Secure Phone Scheme Draws Fire *\\* Anton Ubi scriptum?

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musings from a madman
by ld231782＠longs.lance.colostate.edu 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Hellman's Hints --------------- [Hellman] >When a message is to be sent it will first be >encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, >and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part >message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK >producing > > E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} > >When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K Just a quibble, Mr. Hellman says earlier that K1 and K2 lead to unit key UK, not family code K. And given the above, how do they ever decrypt the message if they don't have K, unless the scheme is insecure under the `family code'? (>barf<, leave it for the Ministry of Truth to come up with some user-friendly term for something inherently nauseating like `friendly fire', I wonder if Dingaling is behind this one too...) Do you get it? -------------- This little formula is not obvious to me. It seems to me two basic questions have to be answered, could someone spell these out given what's known? 1. How the phones interact prior/during a call 2. How the sinister TLAs wiretap 3. How casual eavesdropping by other than billion-dollary agencies is prevented (if at all) The Flimsy Code --------------- The family code is clearly a propaganda wrench in the works. `They' now have some pretty powerful ammunition--it must be secure if you get to change your code whenever you want, right? It's so simple anyone can use it! I'm a bit surprised it wasn't mentioned in the announcement. I guess all the hoopla and slick and vapid AT&T ads about `wow, you get to *choose* your combination!' will come a bit later, it'll fit in quite nicely with their `I' plan, as in Illegal... (I hope Sprint and MCI sue the pants off AT&T and the government for this outrageous collusion, unless of course they are in the collusion too...) Conspiracy Theories ------------------- how is it that CPSR and EFF came out with responses to the initial announcement virtually instantaneously after its release? Are they just really swift? I want to know what >every< single person on those mailing lists has to say about how their name got there and how long they knew about this abomination (and before they have a chance to agree on stories!). I don't appreciate Mr. Banisar's little slash suggesting that the issue is already closed and that anyone who thinks something just a tad unusual is going on is a deranged conspiracy monger... I think its kind of cute how he says that `nothing significant' appeared in the traffic... Who Has the Keys? ----------------- The evasion of `who stores the keys' makes me wonder. It suggests that the proposal was poorly crafted (which is true in any case), but, more likely, IMHO, the scheme is weak enough for the NSA (but maybe not cops) to break regardless, and hence their casual disregard for this seemingly monumentally crucial point. Also, they can make it sound like they are `compromising' by giving the appearance of public debate on the agencies, because it won't really matter, while diverting attention from the *real* issues (look here! see your rights? now you see 'em, now you don't... pick a key, any key---was it this one? >wow< how'd you *do* that?). What IS Acceptable ------------------ We should be prepared to say what >is< acceptable for the government to do; don't get caught off guard with a question like ``well, what are you people proposing as an alternative?'' Here are a few ideas... 1) Get the hell out of the cryptography and hardware development business, and leave private industry alone to do what it does best when not harrassed by extortionists and terrorists who shall remain nameless but have the initials N.S.A. ... 2) Let the NIST pick a phone encryption scheme after totally open debates and total noninvolvement by the NSA, who is obviously biased. We can note that this has been attempted to be followed for other encryption schemes (e.g. digital signature, DES, etc.) why not here? what's so special? 3) Let communications companies loose on it, stay out of the way or get trampled by the stampede, and we'll all be happy. Ministry of Truth (1993-?) -------------------------- Finally, drive home the point: the government may have always had the `precedent' (don't ever use `right' here) to *listen*, there has never been any assurance that they must *understand* what is being said, and we are assured by our Noble Constitution that we can say what we please, and if by exercising this fundamental and inalienable right we upset the fragile status quo, then so be it, because the monument of freedom of speech will always overshadow the weak and tenuous `precedent to listen'. Cryptography simply alters their *understanding* of what is on a line from the meaningful to the meaningless, and only the Ministry of Truth is allowed to regulate *meaning* (hm, maybe that will be the next government agency created under the New Regime...) Mea Culpa --------- sorry for the rough editing on the last message, that's what happens in the heat of the moment from one of those impatient and extremely agitated cypherpunks... For those of you keeping score at home, the ``Notice how the proposal talks about'' non sequitur should read ``Notice how the proposal talks about criminals and terrorists without any qualifications such as `alleged' and `suspected' ''. as my penance you have this little beauty in front of you... How Does Cypherpunk Sound? -------------------------- `cypherpunk' actually has some pretty endearing qualities as a name, and I'd be a bit horrified to give it up, just when I was waiting for the T shirt ``Cypherpunks do it stealthily'' (secretly? sneakily?). The public seems to have a bit of fascination for `cyberpunk' right now and we are just riding on it (stealthily? secretly? sneakily?). OK, so we don't publicize that term, but it could actually increase the glamor and mystery of the cause; we shouldn't pretend that we're not seriously pissed off... Quote Corner ------------ ``the TURNCOATS ARE COMING!'' ``REMEMBER THE LIBERTY!'' ``They're HEEEERE...'' ``Keys? I thought YOU had the keys! Do you have a crypt hanger? We better call the cryptsmith...''

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Re: AT&T Press Release on Clipper
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

On Sun, 18 Apr 1993 09:49:35 -0500 Dave Banisar <banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org> posted: >Subject: AT&T Press Release on Clipper > >Here's AT&T's announcement on the Clipper. > > > AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS >PRODUCT LINE > >GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16 > > AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy >of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S. >government technology for voice encryption into its secure communications >product line. > > AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a [mucho deleted] > AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro. > For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600 >and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at >919-279-7680. > CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279- >7680,or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations, >202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162 Expecting to get a recording or something of the like, I called the last of these numbers, and got a considerably agitated Herb Lennen--at home--who had already been the recipient of a call or two. He was not happy, to put it mildly! I kindly informed him that his home phone number had been posted all over the computer nets by someone posting an official ATT press release, and that the government's universal wiretap chip, er Clipper chip, was fast becoming a controversial topic. He accused me of being with an "organized hacker group," and stated that he only talks to people from news organizations of the NYT and Wall Street Journal size. I offered to send him a sample of the comments, but he declined to give me his email address. (Though I suspect that Herb_Lennen(a)att.com might work.) Most interesting though, he told me that John Markoff had written the definitive (and he implied positive) story on the chip. Yo John! If you are not reading the cypherpunks list for the "other side" of this story, you might want to. Keith Henson

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MEDIA: Calm
by Matthew J Miszewski 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Everyone, Im glad to see so many insightful letters being sent/broadcast to media types. I think that our cause would be better served with a toning down of the rhetoric and techno-talk. I understand what your saying but Joe Byline may not. Keep it simple. On that note, I think one more effective strategy is for some cypherpunks to write thoughtful letters which appear (or do) come from strict lay people scared at the thought of the "Wiretap Chip". If it appears that only techno- types care about this issue, then no one else will. I know non-crypto experts read this list, so this is a call to you to express your opinions publically as john/jane doe on the street. You dont have to speak to the technical side of things at all. Simply let the world know your afraid and so should everyone else. Leave the cryptoanalysis to the experts (Tim, Eric, et al) Keep up the good work everyone. Matt

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