Denning, April 19
>I'd like to add that I was not in
>any way involved. I found out about it when the FBI briefed me on
>Thursday evening, April 15.
Mr. May calls Mrs. Denning's claims that she was ``not in any way
involved'' with this project ``curious''. I'm a bit amazed at
everyone's tiptoeing around Mrs. Denning and reluctance to challenge
her outright given overwhelming evidence as to her two-facedness. Maybe
it is her established reputation in the field, maybe it is her
cryptography book, maybe it is her participation at conferences like CFP.
Nevertheless, I cannot let lies stand. Mrs. Denning wants to have her
cake and eat it too. She wants to be perceived as an unbiased academic
and taken seriously for her participation in scientific forums. She
also wants to mask her involvement in this proposal, which for me,
appears unequivocal, and only the *degree* and *extent* is unclear. I
cannot comprehend how she cannot be involved. It would not be so
outrageous if she stated that ``I cannot comment on my involvement for
obvious reasons''. But her denial to me has all the signs of a
desperate fabrication. Lets look at what she's done:
1. She was the *first*, if I'm not mistaken, to bring up the idea of
splitting keys among impartial agencies many months ago on sci.crypt
after the firestorm and barrage of protests on the initial balloon on
key registration.
2. She has shown ``prescient insight'' (as another tiptoer noted on
sci.crypt) into anticipating major aspects of the proposal. Key
registration itself was largely unheard-of until she began advocating
the idea. She posts a massive technical description to sci.crypt less
than a week after her initial ``briefing''.
3. The rhetoric (more aptly called propaganda) of the public
announcement closely mirrors words and arguments she used in the
initial debate on sci.crypt, esp. the ``need to balance legitimate law
enforcement goals with privacy.''
4. Since she persists in her sheer, ugly chutzpuh, and people here and
on sci.crypt are still pussyfooting around her, I must offer my new evidence.
In early April I became extremely concerned about her continuing
advocation of key registration in the recent further CACM articles in
the face of such vocal opposition and defiance on sci.crypt. I was
astonished with the claims in her latest posting to sci.crypt when I
read it on 28 March, and replied to it.
I expressed my appreciation for her postings, because ``you're
definitely one of the most highly regard personalities in this area
posting publicly,'' (I was disenchanted enough then not to say
`authority') and I wrote of my extreme concern with her seeming evasion
of addressing critical aspects of the key-registration idea from a
scientific standpoint. I advised her to ``abandon the idea to salvage
the remainder of your reputation''. I will be quoting only some
critical parts of her letter now (there is only one, but it speaks
volumes), and I ask that I not be assaulted for this, because in my
opinion the extreme circumstances merit it, and her hypocrisies cannot
go unchallenged! Her comments follow her pattern of revealing a few
more details of the overall plan after being violently assaulted on the
revealed ones. (I remind the reader that this all transpired before any
knowledge on my part whatsoever of the Clipper proposal, but apparently
not before her own...)
- - -
L.D.: (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>The issue is not that "the government is corrupt QED" but that such a
>system would be such a tremendous temptation to a government only bordering
>on moral rectitude, as ours generally is... Part of the idea of
>democracy is not even INTRODUCING mechanisms that have a potential for
>extremely insideous and treacherous abuse.
D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>I am convinced that with the new technologies and crypto, we can make it
>extremely difficult -- much more difficult than now -- for the government
>to perform illegal taps.
L.D.: (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>I like those new technologies for the same revolutionary reasons.
>hehe, we can make it IMPOSSIBLE right now for the government to tap AT
>ALL. I guess you can imagine how appealing your proposal is in the face
>of this. We're doing just fine, thank you very much. The best thing
>the government can do on this issue is STAY OUT OF IT. Given it's
>unweildy and intrusive history, this is quite an optimistic expectation.
- - -
L.D.: (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>There are just no good assurances that these kind of systems won't
>be radically abused, and until you describe precisely how to do this
>most reasonable people will not touch your proposals with a 20ft
>pole, even in cyberspace...
D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>Obviously a much more detailed proposal would be needed in
>order to answer all the questions people have asked.
L.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04 -0700)
>We eagerly await such a proposal from you or others, to show how none
>of the specifics can possibly be implemented without a totalitarian
>state, bizarre and unrealistic assumptions, unbearable and
>anti-competitive commercial restrictions, or new grotesque government
>bureacracies.
- - -
L.D.: (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>The issue is not that "criminals won't comply QED"
>but that "enforcement is impossible except in a totalitarian state".
D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>Not necessarily if you don't try to demand 100% compliance. Everyone is
>required to register their car, and this has not required a totalitarian state.
>Compliance might be enforced only when there is already probably cause and
>a warrant issued. Compliance might be promoted by putting requirements on
>products that are sold.
L.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04 -0700)
>I object to this vehemently. I consider this somewhat of a subterfuge.
>The public then may not be aware how much they are spending to promote
>an agenda of the anointed government officials' plans detrimental to
>privacy. It would weaken technological competiveness, for companies to
>be burdened by these artificial and warped restrictions.
>
>Unfortunately, I find it one of your most dangerously insidious ideas,
>because it has the most likelihood of influencing some naive,
>uninformed, and misguided policymaker...
>
>These policies you have in mind are exactly the kind that sound good on
>paper and intent, but when implemented come nothing close to the
>intentions of the purveyors, who on hint of failure would then
>disassociate themselves, saying that ``it wasn't implemented according
>to my suggestions.'' That's the problem, its an inherently flawed idea
>to begin with, and NO implementation would have the desired effect...
- - -
D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>I do not find
>sci.crypt a constructive environment to explore the issues or try to develop
>a more concrete proposal, so I will use other forums for this.
L.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04 -0700)
>definitely, Usenet has all the delicacy, subtlety and finesse of a
>melee. On the other hand, it also has a low tolerance for pretentious
>and impractical ideas ...
>
>I'm serious. I think you ought to stop promoting the idea. Otherwise,
>the label "Denning Proposal" will have all the valiant credibility that
>the label "Chamberlain Treaty" had after WWII.... Don't say I didn't warn
>you!
>
>Do you know how much trouble the NSA has caused for the development and
>proliferation of cryptography? Do you think they have harmed American
>interests in the international market? Weakened their ability to
>compete? I guarantee that all this would PALE TOTALLY in comparison to
>any kind of key-registration scheme, and would earn its advocates, in
>historical hindsight, the utmost black discredit imaginable.
- - -
Mrs. Denning did not respond to my letter of Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04
-0700, for obvious reasons... Let me add that of all the things she
wrote about, the `commercial compliance by requirements on products
sold' alarmed me the most, and I thought she might be hinting at
Telephony-style bill. I considered sending a warning to the cypherpunk
list, but decided that it would be premature and I intended to watch
and wait for more signs first...
Perhaps I am condemning aspects of my own future in academic circles
for attacking Denning. Perhaps I am the subject of zealous blacklisting
at this moment for my public comments on the Clipper chip. But I cannot
be silent in the face of repulsive and outrageous hypocrisy.
Because of her denial, I have no alternative but to recognize Mrs.
Denning as the intellectual and moral equivalent of a double-agent.
She is a traitor to at least *one* cause. I hope her friends involved
in the Clipper proposal appreciate her work in that area, because, for
me, she no longer has any credibility whatsoever as an unbiased
cryptographic authority or an honest and ethical scientist. Like a
compromised code, the integrity has been lost...
NOTE! this letter is a *warning* for the private cypherpunks list only!
I do not grant, and specifically prohibit, redistribution. If Mrs.
Denning publicly addresses the points I have raised in this letter, I
will consider my sincere trust misguided and violated.
