- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Cancellation
by morrison＠tantalus.scl.ameslab.gov 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

Please remove me from the list. I have limited access to my e-mail, and can't keep up. Thank you, Andrew Morrison

1 0

Re:PGP again.
by Robert Luscombe 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

I apologize for this, but... If anyone sent me a response re:pgp help, i just lost my incoming mailbox before i read my mail. I did see a few responses listed in my new mail, but they were gone when i tried to read them. Sorry for the hassle, but could anyone who did send me something re-send it? I am not too happy about all my lost mail. --Robert Luscombe Internet: ral(a)telerama.pgh.pa.us Voice:412/488-0941 robert(a)well.sf.ca.us (Finger for PGP Pub Key)

1 0

Intergraph employee claims trademark violation
by szabo＠techbook.com 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

Forwarded from Libernet: Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:30:47 PDT From: ald(a)clipper.clipper.ingr.com (Al Date) Subject: "Clipper Chip" --NOT! To: libernet(a)Dartmouth.EDU Clipper TM chip is a registered trademark of Intergraph Corp. The so-called Clipper chip which was recently mentioned here and in other media with respect to encryption is being used in violation of that trademark. The Intergraph Clipper chip is a Unix microprocessor, originally developed by Fairchild Semiconductors, and has no relationship to the encryption chip whatsoever. I mention this here with the hope that someone reading this will intercede before the group alt.privacy."clipper" is established. --Al Date

1 0

Re: Meets 'n Greets
by uni＠acs.bu.edu 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

de_armor_file: infile = AppDisk:fm ?, outfile = AppDisk:fm ?.$00, curline = 0 ERROR: Badly formed ASCII armor checksum, line 28. Error: Transport armor stripping failed for file AppDisk:fm ? Please resend

1 0

Meets 'n Greets (IRC Meetings Maybe?)
by pat＠tstc.edu 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

> You're right, Eric -- we are mad as hell, too. But I'm not about to > jump on a flight to the west coast to simply share strategies. The > fact that I would even consider it negates the functions which we are > working towards, no? I propose that us east coasters organize and > meet as well. Pat and I are DC bourne, for those interested, I'd like > to propose a DC local meeting. Suggestions? Yeah. Does anybody have the resources to setup an IRC at a known cypherpunk site? -- Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL Texas State Technical College at Waco {pat,postmaster}(a)tstc.edu Instructional Network Services PGP Key available by finger. 3801 Campus Dr. Waco, Tx 76705 V:(817) 867-4830 F:(817) 799-2843

2 1

Re: DC Cypherpunks
by Bob Stratton 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

> Subject: DC Cypherpunks > From: fergp(a)sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) > Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 12:16:22 EDT > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > On Wed, 21 Apr 93 09:15:25 EST, > Pat Farrell <uunet!cs.gmu.edu!pfarrell> writes - > > PF> Craig, there is no problem having a meeting, you just have to have > PF> more sense than the kids who think Pentagon City Mall is public > PF> space. A small meeting can be in my house, or at Maggie's bar over > PF> beer and pizza. > > You've got my vote for beer and pizza. ;-) > > Pat, let's plan accordingly. I'd like to be there for the first > meeting, so I'll give you a call and we can discuss this at length. In > the meantime, I'm keeping a list and building a kering of > interested parties. Hear, hear. I think I can also swing permission to have it at my office in Herndon, if having a T1 to the Net is at all helpful. I'll ask, if anyone's interested. --Strat, whose company actually took a position on the Clipper chip! (It's the right one, BTW) Help stop the wiretap chip! (a.k.a "Clipper") RIPEM and PGP keys available on request.

1 0

DC Cypherpunks
by fergp＠sytex.com 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

On Wed, 21 Apr 93 2:07:49 EDT, Craig Nottingham <uunet!cosmos.gmu.edu!cnotting> wrote - CN> There is plenty of DC area support fr such a group. The only CN> problem that presents it self is where to hold a meeting where CN> here will be no hassles. I'm putting together of interested parties who would like to get together for physical meetings on a "psuedo-random" basis. As Pat mentioned earlier, my free time is non-existant at least until mid-May (getting re-married May 1), but I'm eager to meet, unite and build a DC chapter. Solidarity and determination, my brothers and sisters! Also, send your pubkey. Little things mean alot. Paul Ferguson | Uncle Sam wants to read Network Integration Consultant | your e-mail... Centreville, Virginia USA | Just say "NO" to the Clipper fergp(a)sytex.com | Chip...

1 0

DC Cypherpunks
by fergp＠sytex.com 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Wed, 21 Apr 93 09:15:25 EST, Pat Farrell <uunet!cs.gmu.edu!pfarrell> writes - PF> Craig, there is no problem having a meeting, you just have to have PF> more sense than the kids who think Pentagon City Mall is public PF> space. A small meeting can be in my house, or at Maggie's bar over PF> beer and pizza. You've got my vote for beer and pizza. ;-) Pat, let's plan accordingly. I'd like to be there for the first meeting, so I'll give you a call and we can discuss this at length. In the meantime, I'm keeping a list and building a kering of interested parties. Cheers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBK9VurZRLcZSdHMBNAQG6GQP/aWlhwgaBwLU2QFUsjdoauIuPYrVRiu5f 87z4s8YhRj/dNX/alIO6LTGIT0Q4V5UW7w9gu2EChok618KJly3zgqg1slDBhg0x F6ZIJjbdiPmkeNGjlswfm/x/yGF2NWLu+F2YsMfbXEjnmdOaZaooiOQFA1tiMN2x AysEJYTBnJs= =q/Pf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Paul Ferguson | Uncle Sam wants to read Network Integration Consultant | your e-mail... Centreville, Virginia USA | Just say "NO" to the Clipper fergp(a)sytex.com | Chip...

1 0

Making Clippers More Secure
by Communism is like MS-DOS: It doesn't work, and you wouldn't want to use it even if it did. 21-Apr-1993 1120 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

Agreeing with all the previous problems and issues put forth; key-escrow, secret algorithms that can't be formally tested, etc... So, let's *assume* that the US Gummint makes all other encryption illegal, except those that use this chip, and they intend to check all messages that look encrypted to verify that they have the correct system key: Well, we can use more than one chip, or use it in ways that were "unanticipated". F'rinstance: Use PGP (or SROT, or some other p.d. crypto package) to encrypt once, and then use a Clipper to put a legal-looking wrapper on the message. The problem with this is that *if* there is a law making all other cryptosystems illegal, then you still do time. Then the gummint says "You can use chips, but ONLY chips. No other encryptation.". Well, how 'bout this: Use three chips. The first two are BOTH fed the message, and the resulting bitstreams are XORed together and then fed to the third chip (to provide a legal-looking "wrapper") The XORing should obscure the serial numbers of the first two chips, meaning that the NSA can not go to a key-escrow authority with a blanket court order and obtain the keys. Rather, assuming the "secret algorithm" is good, the worst-case scenario is either a full search of the keyspace (if the secret algorithm forms a mathematical "group", or an exhaustive search of [issued-keyspace]^2. Yes, the above does not address the issue of decoding (as stated above, you can't recover the plaintext.) But that's soluble, by inserting a known (but secret) string into the start of the bitstream for both the encoding and decoding second chips; the result is that by the time the second decoding chip needs to start knowing what was XORed into the incoming stream, the first decoding chip has already decoded that part of the message, which can be re-encoded using the first encoding chip's keys to provide the continuing bitstream needed for the XOR. Now, the BIG issue is this: is it possible to obtain the serial numbers of a pair of Clipper chips from the XOR of two output streams? How about three? How about N, where N is large? Without knowing the algorithm, this will be difficult to answer... -Bill % ====== Internet headers and postmarks (see DECWRL::GATEWAY.DOC) ====== % Received: by enet-gw.pa.dec.com; id AA02474; Wed, 21 Apr 93 05:13:14 -0700 % Received: from mc by mc.lcs.mit.edu id ak02907; 20 Apr 93 11:15 EDT % Received: from enet-gw.pa.dec.com by mc.lcs.mit.edu id aa02377; 20 Apr 93 10:20 ED % Received: by enet-gw.pa.dec.com; id AA27388; Tue, 20 Apr 93 07:19:42 -0700 % Message-Id: <9304201419.AA27388(a)enet-gw.pa.dec.com> % Received: from aidev.enet; by decwrl.enet; Tue, 20 Apr 93 07:19:43 PDT % Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 07:19:43 PDT % From: "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. 20-Apr-1993 0950" <aidev::yerazunis> % To: elbows(a)mc.lcs.mit.edu % Cc: aidev::yerazunis % Apparently-To: elbows(a)mc.lcs.mit.edu % Subject: Clipper Chip

1 0

alt.encrypted
by grady＠netcom.com 21 Apr '93

21 Apr '93

I guess the cryptowranglers read this group too. But of course I knew that because it is so easy to do. There is not a single doubt in my mind that every byte that passes every significant gateway or 'bone is captured for the colligation of data about __________? (Maybe your name is here). Maybe we should start a newsgroup for the distribution of encrypted posts intended of members of affinity groups with a shared private key. For example at the coming up Cypherpunks meeting, a private key corresponding to that particular meeting could be passed out by a moderator. Minutes, followup comments to other participants, and so on could be posted to the alt.encrypted group for the use of the people who attended. Communiques intended by the group for non-attendees could of course just be signed using the private key but otherwises not encrypted. Starting a alt.encrypted newsgroup rather than just maintaining mailing lists is better for several reasons. First, it would be easier to archive for people who might join a group "late" and who might like to easily read earlier posts; second, traffic analysis to know exactly to whom an affinity message is directed would be foiled; three, a newsgroup is much more public and would serve to publicize available privacy measures on the internet. And it would be fun to accumulate a secret keyring full of such keys -- it beats giving out t-shirts as a door prize. We could send a copy of alt.encrypted directly to Judge William Sessions or Admiral Studeman to save them the time of having it collected for them. -- grady(a)netcom.com 2EF221 / 15 E2 AD D3 D1 C6 F3 FC 58 AC F7 3D 4F 01 1E 2F

1 0