- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 03 May '93

03 May '93

re paying a reasonable license fee, I wonder if RSA would cash my check for (say) $10 if I wrote on the check that it was for a license for whatever they might claim on PGP. One wonders what they would do with several hundred checks. :) Keith

2 1

Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 03 May '93

03 May '93

(I sent a copy of this message this morning from my Compuserve account, but it never appeared. Fighting to control my surging paranoia, I am re-sending it from this account. I apologize if a duplicate eventually shows up.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May writes: > I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for > PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related > to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto. I see several problems with this proposal. 1. It's not clear what it means to "reconsider our basic support for PGP." What exactly is Tim proposing? That people stop using PGP? That they phase out their use of it as legal products become available? I'd like to see some clarification. 2. More generally, what about the issue of our advocating and supporting other possibly infringing actions? Which ones do we stop? Just those that upset Jim Bidzos? He claims to have patents that cover many more activities than RSA, including patents which cover the very idea of public key encryption, and patents on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and virtually any conceivable variation. Should we respect all of these now? 3. David Chaum apparently has U.S. patents on many key features of digital cash. It looks like we would have to stop working on that, too, by this reasoning. 4. What reasonable alternatives to PGP exist? Is RSAREF really usable on a PC? I tried an early version and it was terribly, terribly slow. PGP is just barely fast enough. A "legal" version of PGP which uses RSAREF will presumably be considerably slower. 5. I am not as convinced as Tim that RSADSI is truly, positively, certainly on our side. Why is it that RSAREF has such a weak conventional encryption algorithm (DES, with 56-bit keys)? RIPEM has been out for many months, and people have been asking for IDEA or triple DES all that time. Bidzos has supposedly said he'll give permission for improvements. Yet as far as I know RIPEM still only has this small key size, a key size which persistent rumors say can be broken by government computers. When Bidzos permits RSAREF to run a conventional encryption algorithm with a secure key size I will give more credence to the view that he wants people to have strong encryption. 6. How is it that one company has collected virtually all of the patents on cryptographic technology in this country? Jim Bidzos controls patents on public-key encryption in general, RSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, ElGamal signatures and encryption, and several others. I can't help noticing that it would be an extraordinarily convenient arrangement for the government if such a company existed and were secretly working against public use of cryptography while publically pretending to be doing all they can to bring this technology to a reluctant market. I still have not seen any specific public action by Bidzos which would invalidate this possibility. Yes, he has engaged in this widely publicized tiff with NIST over the Digital Signature Standard, and he's made some statements against Clipper. But where are the lawsuits? Is AT&T receiving the same threatening letters that Stanton McCandlish received when he said he was distributing PGP from his BBS? 7. Extrapolating from the widespread acceptance of PGP, which is free, to conclude that there is a market for a commercial encryption product which costs money is pointless. Granted, some of us may spend a lot of time talking about PGP and thinking about these issues, but most PGP users just downloaded it from a BBS or the net. There are a lot of things they'd spend $100 on before they would buy an encryption program. One of the things that attracted me to Cypherpunks is that they take steps to make these tools available without worrying about upsetting the power structure. David Chaum may object to our implementing digital cash. Jim Bidzos may object to our using RSA, or Diffie-Hellman, or almost anything else having to do with cryptography. If we're going to start looking over our shoulder and not doing anything which powerful people object to then we might as well pack up and go home. Almost everything we have talked about over the last six months infringes somebody's patents in this country. I really don't see what role a group like ours has if we have to tiptoe through the minefield of intellectual property protection which permeates the field of cryptography. Are we to become a bunch of unpaid consultants for RSADSI, writing code which they will then make profits on? Phil Zimmermann has done more to put strong cryptography into the hands of people all over the world in two years than Bidzos has managed in ten. He has faced lawsuits by Bidzos and has undergone considerable personal sacrifice in getting this software out. People talk about this "feud" as though the two are equally guilty, and ask (like Rodney King) "can't we all just get along?" But this is a cop-out. To me there is clear asymmetry in their dispute in terms of who asserts their power and who is trying to empower individuals. Look at what Tim is suggesting. We abandon PGP, not because it is a bad program; not because its author has behaved unethically; not because it has failed in its goals; but because Jim Bidzos is throwing his weight around and we don't want Jim to be unhappy. If Jim were to accept that PGP was no more threatening to his patents than RSAREF then the problem would be solved. I presume that Tim has decided that this won't happen, so now he suggests Plan B, that we abandon PGP. I have to suggest that the real obstacle to the wide deployment of strong cryptography remains Jim Bidzos. He has the power, by a single stroke of a pen, to do more to encourage the spread of cryptography in this country than any other single person (including Bill Clinton). All he has to do is to issue a policy statement that since PGP is freeware it falls under the PKP policy allowing use of the patents for noncommercial use. Presto - PGP is legal, and one of the main obstacles to its spread is eliminated. I agree with Tim that we need to look closely to see who our real enemies are. Perhaps Bidzos is a charming person. I've never met him. Certainly the bay area Cypherpunks seem to be falling under his influence. From my perspective I find this cozying up to the PKP/RSADSI power structure to be rather alarming. I don't think it is a good direction for the group. Hal Finney 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBK9/UvKgTA69YIUw3AQGCrgQAi2980bgg4eHAoIbRUtEtT05V7+50UH16 erkzERI8ot+uk0soXPsM53YlVVAvSYVmLY5Ine862RWG0TUldq1O99CbnCet6Da9 /NWVUQCAoKrUuwj7Cetyf84wE4Fof6tbugOtXhke26WXZXhEIIsSdgKBzaDdc/LD y0zU/abZ9Es= =IKKf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: RISKS DIGEST 14.54
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 03 May '93

03 May '93

This issue of comp.risks has a rather lengthy posting by DD. The moderator commented (re the wiretap chip) "there has been essentially no other topic of concern for the past week . . . ." Considering the wide range of topics covered here, that is quite a statement! Keith

1 0

Add to list
by wtap＠mindvox.phantom.com 03 May '93

03 May '93

I was wondering if I might be added to your mailing list, or be sent an application or something similar. Thanx you.

1 0

Import OK by the look of this...
by Sy Verpunc 03 May '93

03 May '93

: which otherwise would have been illegal. FBI special agent was standing by to : make sure no other laws were broken, as could have happened in technology : demonstration. Event was practical demonstration of what Subcommittee Chmn. : Markey (D-Mass.) called "the 'sinister side' to cyberspace." ... : Gage said export laws prohibit selling abroad of particular encryption : computer programs. Yet he showed panel text of computer program pulled off : Internet, from Finland, of prohibited source code for Data Encryption Standard : (DES) used by U.S. govt. In that case, law wasn't broken because program was : imported, not exported. Adding comma to code would route program to Moscow, Gage : said, so he didn't add it because there was no immunity. Also set up in room was : satellite hookup to Moscow using small earth station made by KGB, which was in : contact with Russian satellite. My inference from this is that if they went to the bother of checking to make sure they knew about the laws and explicitly arranged immunity for the scanner demonstration, we can take it as read that *import* of crypto wares is *not* illegal, as some have tried to suggest. Graham PS I'm xposting this to sci.crypt

1 0

Shimomura's testimony
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 03 May '93

03 May '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This sounds like the tricks he and Mark Lottor showed off at Hackers last year, according to the first issue of Wired. Of course he was anonymous there; I guess Wired didn't offer him immunity. I'd like to know more about Shimomura's testimony -- was he just showing off, or is he selling us out? Sounds like both. DEADBEAT <an5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQBFAgUBK+UZ6PFZTpBW/B35AQGroQGAprtpUtJi5l9EzQsjmdyhniWtea0kRRg4 KZloWA2ScVtaEQP0/e/q2yGXYCILuKV5 =wmIO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: government free reign on RSA -- from whence?
by smb＠research.att.com 03 May '93

03 May '93

This is driving me crazy. I have asked many people that refer to the U.S. government's free reign on the use of patents in general and RSA technology in particular. There are a lot of very respectable and reputable specialists on this list and I hope they can answer my quest ion. What *specifically* gives the government the *right* to use patents developed `with public money' without licensing, or the RSA patent in particular (if the two are not the same)? My understanding -- and I've never seen the original document, so I can be wrong -- is that the statutes providing for grants to professors have such provisions. That is, barring all patents developed under such grants could be seen as stifling private initiative. But permitting the inventor to retain all rights is unfair, since the government funded the work. Hence the compromise: patents are permitted in such cases, but the government gets free use. As for the ``personal use'' question -- I've never heard of such a thing. The law gives gives the patent holder the right to bar others from selling, making, or *using* the protected invention. There is a court ruling permitting use of patented materials for experimental purposes; some people may be extending that. One more word on patents. The claim that 50% of patents are thrown out when challenged may or may not be accurate; however, it is very time-dependent. Such things go in cycles, depending on the makeup of the Supreme Court. During, say, the 1970's, there was a substantial component on the court that opposed the concept of patents, so many more challenges were upheld. I need not point out that the makeup of the court has changed substantially in recent years; during the 1980's, many more patents were upheld. I've seen one or two articles indicating that the pendulum is starting to swing back, but it's harder to say now; most patent cases these days only go as high as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. --Steve Bellovin

1 0

No Subject
by Timothy Newsham 03 May '93

03 May '93

I am using the d3des package. So far I have been using the normal DES routines. I have recently decided to use the tripple-DES routines but the documentation ( == *.c and *.h ) didnt seem too clear on the point. From what I understand so far it seems that Ddes() is used for both double and triple encryption (???) for 64bits in 64bits out. this is the test code I did, it works, I'd just like to know for sure if it is using triple des (3*56 bit keys). thanx. #include "d3des.h" unsigned long enkey[96],dekey[96]; main() { char *a,b[100],*k; strcpy(b,"this is a test"); k="testing123423456789212345678"; des3key(k,0); cp3key(enkey); /* set up long keys , encrypt */ des3key(k,1); cp3key(dekey); /* decrypt */ use3key(enkey); Ddes(b,b); /* encrypt b */ write(1,b,8); use3key(dekey); Ddes(b,b); /* decrypt b */ write(1,b,8); }

1 0

A LEGAL way---maybe!
by William Oldacre 03 May '93

03 May '93

To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com;>Internet:huges@soda.berkeley.edu; To: >Internet:prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu One of the first attornys I ever had used to build steam engines as a hobby. He would purchase a kit of basic castings somewhere and then machine them into beautiful working models. Some of the designs were covered by modern patents. That's where I first heard of the "if for private use" principal. It was reaffirmed, some years later, by an attorney working for one of the large law firms next to the U.S. Patent Office. I'd designed several electronic circuits, one of which (the simplest and clearly unpatentable) had appeared on the front cover of Popular Electronics magazine. I was concerned about another which might be patentable. I came away from our discussion with the impression that there was nothing to stop someone who wanted to build a single copy of a patented design for themselves. (I came away from my first attempt at a patent search with a headache.) Yesterday, I was delighted when this small bit of knowledge seemed to have some practical application, i.e. legally bypassing a frivolous patent and putting a good encryption program in the hands of an exposed public. So today I decided to spend some time at the Univ. of Fla. law library to get the actual statute numbers and case law background. (Sigh) I didn't have much luck. Three hours wasn't nearly enough time to research roughly 80 feet of shelf space filled with patent law. But I couldn't confirm what I said yesterday and I'm hoping that I haven't miscontrued something called the "public use doctrine." Tomorrow I'll try to get a legal opinion on the matter. If what I said yesterday turns out to be wrong, there remains an important point to consider. Finding legal ways to sidestep patents is the name of the game. It may even encourage further innovation. What makes patent law such a lucrative field is not the four inches of shelf space devoted to the actual law itself, but weight of the seventy nine feet eight inches of case law next to it. There was a lot of encouraging background there. Something like fifty percent of all patents in litigation are overturned. And misuse is an excellent way to overturn one. Interference is another. CypherPunks has something that Public Key Partners doesn't. An organization of motivated people who can devote hundreds of person hours to putting the RSA patent under a microscope. To pay someone to do that amount of research would cost a fortune. If you put all of the skills each of us has down on paper it would take a sizable corporation to equal it. And, the high speed communications network is already in place. I think it's time the organization was less a shrill chorus of skeptics and more of a cavalry charge. By now, Phil Zimmermann and some others would find us a welcome sight coming over the hill top. If we break the PGP/RSA problem into managable pieces and divide ourselves into working groups something is bound to turn up. And then there is the press. Magazine articles and news releases will get the public and legislators involved. Don't think this won't work. Remember the guy in Colorado three years ago with a perfectly worthless generator that produced more energy than it used? He got the legislature to force the N.B.S. to examine it over their ongoing objection. The arguments I've heard on this newsgroup are sound. You don't like the chill that has come over public cryptography, I don't like it, and the public won't like it either. Forget how the law is written, patent laws have been in a constant state of flux since their inception. Allowing patents on ordinary mathematics was mistake that has to be rectified. To start with, I need something. Does anyone out there have the actual patent numbers for the RSA and DHM (Diffie-Helman-Merkle?) patents so I can order copies?

2 1

No Subject
by nobody＠mead.u.washington.edu 03 May '93

03 May '93

Hey guys, I think someone has been listening: --------------------------------------------------- Communications Daily April 30, 1993, Friday Immunity Needed; MARKEY PANEL SEES DARK SIDE OF ELECTRONIC FRONTIER Legislative intent met reality of technology Thurs. one-on-one before House Telecom Subcommittee. It was no contest: Technology won in seconds, on a knockout. Last year, Congress, concerned about cellular phone users' privacy, passed legislation outlawing scanners that pick up cellular channels, and last week FCC issued rules banning those scanners (CD April 23 p2). At hearing on privacy, computer cracking and related topics, it took San Diego Supercenter Center scientist Tsutomu Shimomura about 2 min. to take new cellular phone out of its box, turn it on and set device to test mode -- thus turning it into scanner that enabled those in House hearing room to hear snatches of live cellular conversations. Shimomura needed congressional immunity to conduct demonstration, which otherwise would have been illegal. FBI special agent was standing by to make sure no other laws were broken, as could have happened in technology demonstration. Event was practical demonstration of what Subcommittee Chmn. Markey (D-Mass.) called "the 'sinister side' to cyberspace." John Gage, dir. of science office of Sun Microsystems, who orchestrated that and other demonstrations that turned Rayburn Bldg. hearing room into media lab with HDTV setup, computers and other devices, held up phone and said that, in effect, legislation passed by Congress "has banned all cellular telephones in the United States." Gage said: "It's not safe to talk on a cellular phone." With right screwdriver and little adaptation, scanning capabilities of cellular phones can be made more impressive, he said. He said that cellular phones are little more than "good radios and terrible computers" that are designed to be scanners, because that's how cellular radios keep users in touch with switches. In moving products quickly to market, cellular manufacturers didn't want to spend money or take time to worry about privacy concerns or consider encryption technology, Gage said. Gage's general theme was that move to digital world posed challenges for policy-makers and for industry. He said KPIX San Francisco planned to store newscasts in computer in digital form for sound and pictures, to be made available over high-speed network in Bay area and over Internet, to be played back via computers whenever anyone called it up. What will that development do to concept of TV stations or networks? "There's no way to stop digital technology." Even as he spoke, Gage's equipment was transmitting images and sound from hearing room to Internet. Gage said export laws prohibit selling abroad of particular encryption computer programs. Yet he showed panel text of computer program pulled off Internet, from Finland, of prohibited source code for Data Encryption Standard (DES) used by U.S. govt. In that case, law wasn't broken because program was imported, not exported. Adding comma to code would route program to Moscow, Gage said, so he didn't add it because there was no immunity. Also set up in room was satellite hookup to Moscow using small earth station made by KGB, which was in contact with Russian satellite. Subcommittee members were impressed and dismayed. Rep. Tauzin (D-La.) asked what Congress could do to keep up with technology. Gage said it should stick to general principles and forget about legislating against specific technologies. He said that one solution for Digital Age was encryption, and that federal govt. should take lead, not by endorsing specific technology such as Clipper Chip (CD April 19 p2) that fits into telephones, fax machines, other devices. In reply to question from Rep. Boucher (D-Va.), Gage said federal govt. should support research on encryption. Following Gage's demonstration, Raymond Kammer, acting dir. of National Institute for Standards & Technology (NIST), defended govt. support for Clipper Chip and for DES standard. He said it would take powerful Cray supercomputer more than 200 years to solve DES key, and more than billion years to crack one Clipper Chip encryption key. Under Administration plan, users would have one key to chip and federal govt. would have other. Kammer endorsed plan as balance between law enforcement needs and privacy concerns. In April 28 letter to Markey in response to April 19 letter from chmn., Kammer said Clipper Chip technology has no "trap door" that could allow govt. to crack encyption code and said code would be offered to experts for evaluation. He wasn't asked for comment on Gage's demonstration. Fordham U. law Prof. Joel Reidenberg called for federal board that would set series of "fair information practices," as well as Data Protection Board for specific information standards. N.J. state investigator John Lucich warned of harm that comes from cracking of private business telephone and voice mail services and said sophistication of law enforcement is increasing. Science fiction author Bruce Sterling, who also wrote nonfiction book on govt. crackdown on computer hackers, testified about future issues. Hearing was first in series on privacy, computer and telecommunications issues. Others will examine automatic number identification, selling of marketing information, related topics. -------------------------------------------------------- CommunicationsWeek April 26, 1993 Encryption Policy Spurs Concern SHARON FISHER WASHINGTON Members of the networking and security community have expressed concern that a new government policy on data encryption may restrict the use of the technology. The White House earlier this month called for the implementation of a special encryption chip that offers a "back door" for decryption by federal law enforcement agencies. The chip uses a secret algorithm called "Skipjack" that prevents users from encoding data in such a way that it cannot be read by law enforcement officials. Under the new policy, electronic keys will be stored in two "escrow" locations for release to law enforcement organizations that have been warranted to wiretap and decrypt voice transmissions. The escrow locations have not been named. The encryption chip was initially called the Clipper chip, but the government has received complaints from Intergraph Corp., which holds a registered trademark on a product called Clipper chip, according to John Droge, vice president of program development for Mykotronx Inc., Torrance, Calif., which developed the chip. "We call it the MYK-78," he said. AT&T has already announced a device based on the chip that attaches to a telephone to let users encrypt telephone calls. The AT&T Telephone Security Device will cost around $1,195 and will be available at the end of the second quarter. In addition, Mykotronx is working on a more complex chip, called the Capstone or MYK-80, that adds a key exchange algorithm, digital signature standard and other technologies to the MYK-78, Droge said. Key exchange lets two devices agree on a common encryption key; digital signature is a way to guarantee the identity of the originator of the message. Industry members expressed concern that the federal government's policy review on encryption, privacy protection and law enforcement could result in further changes or restrictions to communications technology. The review is taking place under a classified Presidential directive that does not publicly state its exact scope or procedure. The review, which will be managed and directed by the National Security Council, calls for an interim report by the end of June and a final report in late August or early September, said Lynn McNulty, associate director for computer security for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Md. Many members of the encryption community are concerned that a policy review might result in restrictions on encryption technology already in use. There are currently no restrictions in the United States on the use of encryption technology. "Why (else) would the government go through all this time and trouble and expense to do this?" said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security Inc., a Redwood City, Calif., company that licenses encryption and key technology to vendors such as Apple Computer Inc., Lotus Development Corp. and Novell Inc. "I'm not sure anybody has a complaint with the FBI wanting to wiretap with a legitimate court order, but when the FBI says it's so important that we need to force a new communications system on the country, I have a problem with that," Bidzos said. "I am afraid, from the FBI's viewpoint, if this is the solution, how can it work unless you eliminate the other kinds of use?" But McNulty said such an expanded policy was not likely. "Those concerns are not well-founded," he said, though he said the issue probably will be addressed in the policy review. "I don't think in our society that people would accept that restriction on their technology and freedoms. It's absolutely the last recommendation that would be made." ----------------------------------------------------- CommunicationsWeek April 26, 1993 Editor's View; WHAT GOOD IS SECURITY IF IT MAKES US INSECURE? The federal government, under the guise of President Clinton's new Public Encryption Management directive, promises to improve the security and privacy of communications systems. The directive is likely, however, to result in the eventual disappearance of private encryption and the erosion of personal freedom. The directive was announced two weeks ago by the White House and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. It requests suppliers of communications equipment to base encryption on the " Clipper Chip, " a microcircuit developed by the National Security Agency. The Clipper Chip will be manufactured by Mykotronx Inc., a military contractor in Torrance, Calif. An 80-bit, split-key escrowed encryption scheme used to lock and unlock data transmissions will be built into each chip. The encryption scheme will also be kept in a "key-escrow" database monitored by two independent government agencies. Unlike effective public encryption techniques, such as RSA Data Security's triple-Data Encryption Standard (DES), which are available for analysis and testing, the Clipper Chip's key algorithm will not be released to the public. Based on explanations provided in official documents, it seems that the government doesn't care about improving secure communications. Reliable encryption already exists. Indeed, in the view of agencies like the NSA, standards such as DES are too good because they are hard to crack. Clinton's directive has only one real agenda-to make it easier for government agencies to snoop on private communications. Keys will be made available to government agencies who request access in the same manner that Federal judges grant telephone taps. The initiative hides behind the excuse of creating means to monitor "terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals." This isn't the first time that the government has proposed an authoritarian scheme that goes after a few peoples' crimes while stomping on the majority's civil liberties. Public scrutiny helps to pinpoint weaknesses and allow technical refinement. In this case, we're being asked to trust the government, a notion that rubs most rational people the wrong way. Congress passed the Computer Security Act in 1987 to open the development of non-military computer security standards to public scrutiny to limit-not expand-the NSA's role in their development. The directive makes no mention of a particular communication session's key-escrow. Once your keys have been released, all past and future traffic is open to examination. The administration said it would not prohibit private encryption, "nor is the U.S. saying that every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." If the program succeeds, it probably will drive private encryption vendors out of the marketplace. Commercial encryption products already provide excellent network security. Contact the White House and let policy-makers know that we appreciate their concern about crime control, but prefer that the government stay out of the security-control business. Send your reactions to DBUERGER on MCI Mail, DBUERGERCUP.PORTAL.COM on the Internet or by fax, 516-562-5055. ---------------------------------------------------- Network World April 26, 1993 NSA has public-key chip to complement Clipper Chip; Uses same controversial key escrow system. By Ellen Messmer, Senior Correspondent WASHINGTON, D.C. The algorithm developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for use with the government's newly proposed Clipper Chip private-key encryption system will also show up in Capstone, a chip for public-key encryption, Network World has learned. Like Clipper Chip, Capstone will use a key escrow system that will enable the government to eavesdrop on encrypted information. Vendors of Capstone-based encryption products will have to register decryption keys with a federal agency that other agencies can retrieve through legal means. Although Capstone has not been publicly announced, it is at the heart of the encryption system that is to be used in the upcoming Defense Message System (DMS) (see story, p.1). With the public-key Capstone system, one key is made public, while another is kept secret; the message recipient and sender do not have to exchange keys as they do in private-key systems such as the Data Encryption Standard and Clipper Chip. With Capstone, key management is much simpler. Clipper Chip, for example, enables users to encrypt electronic documents before sending them to the intended recipient, but the recipient must have received the sender's secret key beforehand in order to decrypt the document. In addition, Capstone will provide the electronic digital signature for "signing" documents electronically, something private-key systems cannot do. Mykotronx, Inc., the Torrance, Calif., firm that designed Clipper Chip, is also supplying the Capstone chipset. John Droge, vice president of marketing at Mykotronx, an authorized NSA Communications Security vendor, said the firm has already shipped 10,000 Capstone and 20,000 Clipper Chip chipsets. The NSA intends to equip military users of the DMS with cryptocards -- dubbed Tessera cards -- containing the Capstone chips so users can enter and activate the public-key encryption and signing features. The Tessera cards are based on the new industry standard PCMCIA, named after the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association, which created the standard. Mykotronx is currently the sole Tessera card supplier. Last week, the NSA acknowledged that the private-key algorithm to be used with Capstone in the DMS is the same as that used in Clipper Chip. "The [DMS] Type 2 algorithm is the same as the Clipper Chip announced by the Clinton administration," said John Nagengast, chief of strategic systems at the NSA, speaking last week at the Information Systems Security Association's trade show CardTech/SecureTech in Arlington, Va. "It will enable us to go across the government with a common algorithm." User reaction The key escrow concept behind both Clipper Chip and Capstone have left many users and vendors worried. Sandra Lambert, vice president of information security at Citibank, N.A., and Samuel Epstein, president of Racal-Guardata, Inc., said the key escrow system raises the issue of security vulnerability, which could result from a break-in at the site where the escrow keys will be stored. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a public advocacy group based here, has taken the position that the public should not have to rely on the government as the sole source for encryption chips. Last week, the EFF began pulling together a coalition of vendors and users under the banner of its Digital Privacy and Security Working Group to address the issues raised by Clipper Chip. AT&T, which announced that it would include Clipper Chip in its Secure Telephone Device, will participate in the EFF forum. Government sources last week said AT&T rushed out with its Clipper Chip announcement because the Department of Justice wants to purchase AT&T telephone security devices with Clipper Chip. Last week, AT&T said it based its decision to include the Clipper Chip chipset on faith rather than knowledge. "We've told the government there's a need to establish the credibility of the standard," said Mike Agee, marketing manager for secure products at AT&T. Although publication of the Clipper Chip specification would not compromise the effectiveness of the algorithm, the NSA said it intends to keep the algorithm secret. "The plan is we would share it with academia on a limited basis," Nagengast said. "I don't believe it's ever intended to be published."

1 0