- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

RE: FAQ, round 2 (posting because of bounce)
by collins＠newton.apple.com 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

I tried to mail these comments directly to Eric Raymond, who posted his in progress FAQ. My mail bounced, so I am posting it in hopes that he will get it. I missed a lot of the FAQ commentary, so I apologize if this is all known. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024/669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com ..........bounced comments follow.......... Hi, Good work on the FAQ. I'ts not a rewarding job, I'm sure; I just wanted to personally express gratitude. Sorry I took so long to get these comments to you. > The best-known PKCs are [...] DES DES is a symmetric cypher, i.e. *not* a public key crypto-system. >`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' A message digest or hash is distinct from a digital signature. In particular, for a given input, everyone will derive the same digest or hash but a different signature. >The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS. Again, MD5 is not a signature algorigthm. It is only a (supposedly) cryptographically secure, i.e. one way, hash. Everyone who runs MD5 on the same input, will get the same output. If you meant that MD5 is used as a component of some signature algorithms (which is true), then I apologize, it wasn't clear to me. > DSS is [...] associated with the Clipper proposal. They both come from the government. They were both influenced by the NSA. They are not associated in any formal way. More cousins than brothers. >c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. DC-nets are anonymous voting mechanisms (at their heart). I don't see the direct relation to 'thwart spoofing'. > If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in >succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it. This is >an unforgeable contract. Yes, although more often digital signatures are what people want and mean when they discuss digital contracts. With individual digital signatures, i.e. a hash of the contract signed with your private key, each signature can be individually verified. > RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', Adleman Keep up the good work, Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024/669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Key Signing Policy.
by J. Michael Diehl 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, I got a lot of good discussion about when to sign someone's key. I have since come up with my own policy on when I will sign a key. Actually, I plagarized much of it from the many good responses I received. If anyone looks at my policy, recognizes their words and objects, please tell me. Otherwise, after about 10 days, I will make my statement a matter of public domain. Also, If you have any comments/questions/additions to my statement, please tell me I hope this will help clear up some of the confusion reguarding when to sign someone's key. Laters. BTW, what do you think of my new sig? ========================+==========================================+ J. Michael Diehl ;^) | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately? | mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to | mike.diehl(a)fido.org help| be Politically Incorrect!" +=========+ al945(a)cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone? | PGP KEY | (505) 299-2282 (voice) | If you don't know, ask me. |Available| ========================+================================+=========+ PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1 12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLFDMSlWjzUwifAbxAQG3ngP/QXhforNMRIcDp8/alFhz5jMfXYH5+UTd xIs+hi6ocrSK2ZEtqfndto1agHaTdlNjAaJRgD8twmGrMUi+iEfRfsVtLwjBOTLV Ly0sJbnLbxR9K+2DweC6YsqDNEMvCxS3QHR3q5/sq8jLcPMEdC0wHuZ8lhMp8yCC VhFpls1Lv9Q= =Lgii -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FAQ corrections
by Matt Schroth 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

[I tried mailing this directly to Eric Raymond, but I got a bounce message a day later.] Eric, I have read some things I think are incorrect in the FAQ you're working on. I could be wrong, of course, but I wanted to point them out to you anyway: In the introduction to PKC, you say that "the Federal Government's DES standard" is a PKC. Is there some way to view DES as a public key system that I'm not aware of? I have only seen it used as a symmetric key system. In 3a, you state that "If you encode with *your* public key...". I think you meant "with your private key...", as anyone can encode something with a public key. In 4a, "RSA stands for 'Rivest-Shamir-Adelson'"...his name is Adleman. I saw a few "more needed here's". Are you soliciting help for these, or are you just not finished with those sections yourself? Good luck, Matt

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Credit Reports and NS
by Dave Banisar 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

Credit Reports and NS Here is the letter opposing the provision to allow for easier access to credit reports. As you can guess, the Senate Intelligence Committee (which generally acts as the biggest supporter of the agencies on the Hill) did not address our concerns at all and approved the provision. I was unable to easily find the actualy text but will get it after I come back from vacation. Dave July 12, 1993 The Honorable Dennis Deconcini Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate SH-211 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510-6475 Dear Chairman DeConcini; We are writing to voice our strong opposition to the Administration's legislative proposal to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to obtain consumer credit reports in foreign counterintelligence cases. The FBI seeks a national security letter exemption to the FCRA to obtain personal information from consumer reporting agencies without a subpoena or court order. A national security letter gives the FBI the authority to obtain records without judicial approval and without providing notice to the individual that his or her records have been obtained by the Bureau. Similar FBT proposals were rejected in previous years after Congressional leaders expressed concern over the civil liberties issues raised. Although the current draft proposal is more comprehensive than those circulated in previous years, the changes and additions do not alter significantly the central character of the proposal. The Administration's 1993 proposal includes explicit limits to'dissemination of obtained information within the goverrment, penalties for violations including punitive damages, and reporting requirements. These provisions are positive changes from the legislation put forward in previous years, but they do not save the proposal from its intrinsic flaws. Therefore, the reasons for our fundamental opposition to the current proposal remain the same: 1) the FBI has not demonstrated a compelling need for access to consumer credit reports; and 2) legislation that implicates civil liberties should be addressed separately and not as part of the authorization process. There are only two instances in which Congress has authorized the FBI, in counterintelligence investigations, to obtain information about individuals pursuant to a national security letter but without a subpoena, search warrant or court order. First, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 included a provision requiring common carriers to disclose subscriber information and long distance toll records to the FBI in response to a national security letter. Second, congress included in the 1987 Intelligence Authorization Act an amendment to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) that requires banks to provide customer records to the FBI in response to a similar letter. In that case, the FBI presented to Congress its case for obtaining financial records in foreign counter- intelligence cases and the difficulty of obtaining those records without a court order. in both instances when congress has previously authorized the national security letter, Congress recognized that the procedure departs dramatically from the procedure necessary to obtain a court order. The FBI's current proposal seeks similar access to individuals' credit records held by consumer reporting companies. The FBI has yet to adequately justify its need to add such highly personal, sensitive information to the narrow category of records subject to the national security letter exemption. The Bureau claims obtaining credit reports will allow it to more easily determine where a subject of an investigation banks -- information the FBI claims will help them effectuate their ability to access bank records under the RFPA. We opposed the national security letter exemption in the RFPA and do not endorse the FBI's slippery slope approach to ensuring that they can more easily obtain financial information in foreign counterintelligence cases. This information can be and is routinely gained without credit reports. We do not believe convenience is a sufficient justification for this significant exception to the law. The FBI further argues that obtaining banking information through a credit report is preferred because it is actually leas intrusive than those investigative methods that would otherwise be used. While we too are frustrated that other information- gathering techniques are frequently too intrusive, our objections to the other techniques do not lead us to endorse yet another technique that is also intrusive and that weakens existing privacy law. Finally, we object to using the authorization process as the vehicle for pursuing this change. The national security latter exemption, because it diminishes the due process and privacy protections for individuals, must be given the most careful consideration. The FBI's proposal should be introduced as separate legislation on which public hearings can be held. only in this way can the Committee test thoroughly the FBI's case for the exemption and hear from witnesses who object to the change. We urge you to reject the FBI's proposal in its current form. We are available to work with you on this issue. Sincerely, Janiori Goldman Michelle Meier Privacy and Technology Project Consumers Union American civil Liberties Union Marc Rotenberg Evan Hendricks Computer Professionals for U.S. Privacy Council Social Responsibility cc: Members, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence The Honorable George J. Mitchell Senate Majority Leader The Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman Subcommittee on Technology and the Law

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Encrypted communications with phone and PC
by nowhere＠bsu-cs.bsu.edu 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

I am about 300 messages behind on the list because I'm dialing in long- distance right now, but I just happened to think of something because it is related directly to my work... I install and debug voice mail systems all the time that run on 286's, 386's or 486's and can run up to 24 telephone lines on a single computer *at full speed*. The analog signal gets digitized by the voice board, compressed, and stored on disk whenever a person leaves a message. What if an extra step were added where the information were encrypted before being written to disk and it took the receiver entering his PGP key on the PC before it would play the messages to him? Then, if this works, the user on each end could use a computer with a voice board in it and dial into one port while an encrypted/scrambled session is being transmitted on another port. Who knows how real-time it would be and I don't have the technical expertise to pull it off, but I see these things go out of our office every day with little security other than that of obscurity on them. One note, though, the voice boards that we use (high quality) cost anywhere from $800 for a repaired one to $1000 for the one I like the best to $1200 for a different brand that we also sell. Neither voice mail software vendor is willing to give us the super-secret security code that unlocks full system access, so I seriously doubt if I could scare any source out of them. Anyway, it is a thought and now that I have my own voice board to play with I might just try to piece together some interesting software. Chael -- Chael Hall nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL(a)BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall(a)bsu.edu (317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST

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Macpgp 2.3
by deboni＠diego.llnl.gov 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

I just fetched macpgp 2.3 from soda, and wound up with a file ending in the suffix "gz". This is a new one on me, and I don't know how to decode it. Can anybody inform me? Inside whatever it is is a binhexed compactor file, and I can deal with those formats, but the outside wrapper defies every decompressing utility I've got. Tom DeBoni deboni(a)llnl.gov

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Re: Macpgp 2.2
by fnerd＠smds.com 24 Jul '93

24 Jul '93

> However, I have the prog > available here at aql.gatech.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/binaries in cpt.hqx > format. The source code for gzip is also available in /pub. > > Hope this helps. > > A N Paul S. Goggin (1993) | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos > E chaos(a)aql.gatech.edu | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip Thanks, but a) BINARIES? b) who are these binaries PGP-signed by? c) what program do I use to verify the signature(s)? I do mean the thanks. Just wondering. -fnerd quote me

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forged mail
by baumbach＠atmel.com 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

I only have access to an email connection to the internet, so I cannot test a method of forging mail that I learned. Is this a taboo topic? It seems it would be useful for anonomous mailers. Give me the go ahead, and I'll continue...tomorrow. I'm done for the day. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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local network only?
by any＠uu4.psi.com 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

Derek, >mail to me, most likely I can track you down to at LEAST the machine >you forged it from! I don't have an account on this machine. The machine doesn't seem to care. Does the machine keep a record of this letter, I don't know? I'm using the command mconnect on a sun system. It asks me who I am, and then trusts me when I tell it! I have even told it I was ROOT, and it filled in "Operator" from the local passwd file! Is this security so lax because I am on a local area network unconnected to the Internet? Does anyone know? mconnect even gives me help if I ask it! I didn't mail this, not me

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Re: INTERNATIONAL ENCRYPTION
by lefty＠apple.com 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

Sandy Sandfort writes: >Geoff Dale asks about statutes prohibiting the transmission of >encrypted data across international boundaries. To the best of >my knowledge, there's no such animal. If such exists, it is >widely violated, with impunity, by me and folks I know, on a >regular basis. Au contraire, I am certain that France has restrictions on the transmission of encrypted data within its borders. I believe Brazil does as well. >Where do these urban legends come from? Umm, many of them are based on fact? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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