- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Digital Money
by guy＠theporch.raider.net 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

I'm new to the list and this may be a dumb question, but what is currently being done in the area of digital money? Anything? -- Jonathan R. Guy | The opinions expressed above are not E-Mail: guy(a)theporch.raider.net | those of my employer. Nor are Snail: P.O. Box 158325 | they my own. Actually, I copied them Nashville, TN 37215 | from the encyclopedia.

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CP T's
by fergp＠sytex.com 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

On Sun, 25 Jul 93 19:22:20 PDT, Timothy C. May <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> wrote - > P.S. Speaking of t-shirts...maybe we ought to think about some > Cypherpunks shirts? Now that's an idea. Something along the lines of the "Pretty Good Revolution" and/or "Crypto Rebels" would be interesting... The more I think about it, the more I like the idea. I'd surely opt to get one. ;-) Cheers, Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense I love my country, but I fear its government.

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Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
by covin＠cs.uchicago.edu 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

"George A. Gleason" <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> writes: >And did you read Hugh's posting about the 7pm to 8am coin >curfew in Czechago? ... >Wake up, how much evidence do you need that it's a simple matter of bigotry >and classism? Hm. Perhaps it is. On the other hand, it could also be a combination of a little bit of greed for power with a bit of genuine fear and despair. You see, if the Chicago Tribune can be believed, there are actual citizens' groups lobbying for the removal of pay phones from certain areas of the city. Groups of citizens who *live* in those same areas. These folk claim that public pay phones attract drug dealers, presumably because of the semi-anonymity they provide. I don't know personally how true this claim is, but I can understand the advantages that a pay phone might offer to a drug dealer. Sure, the "big time" dealers might not use anything as plebian as a public pay phone, but drugs are a big booming business, and clearly there are far more small-time dealers than big-time ones. They further claim that drug dealers attract violence. I don't know myself if this is true, but I do know from reading the paper that an absurdly large number of people are killed in Chicago by stray bullets shot by drug dealers in conflicts with each other. And, of course, still more folks who *are* drug dealers are killed directly, each year. Finally, they claim that merchants in certain areas are pandering to the drug-dealer market for pay phones by installing far more than one would otherwise think necessary. I haven't seen this myself, but the article I read did mention what seemed like unusually large clusters (street corners with 7-10 pay phones). That's the fear and despair bit. It could be bigotry, it could be classism-- but stray bullets are damn good motivators too, and here in Chicago we have a lot of them. As for greed: this could be a factor, it might not. At least one alderman has made it illegal to install new pay phones in his ward without his explicit permission. Clearly this adds to his power. The same fellow has made much of his public name in recent campaigning against these public pay phones, and threatening to take an axe to them himself if some of them weren't removed. Make of this what you will. How much more evidence do I need that it's a simple matter of bigotry and classism? Well, a bit more than I've seen so far. Cypherpunk content? This is a damn good illustration of the problems that can crop up with an anonymous service. Though services on the net have the advantage of not being tied to a physical location, like pay phones are; so they probably won't serve to attract a "bad element" to any particular place. On the other hand, any sort of public terminal service offering encrypted email, might very well. -David

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Re: Secured E-mail standard?
by smb＠research.att.com 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

Has a proposal been made to officially adopt a header field in standard Internet mail messages that would essentially include security signature information? Something like: X-Security-Type: PGP 1.0 X-Security-Code: asdui&Dh1daOFajsFNOA...etc. These generic field names would allow for various types of security methods. Most important, would make it a lot easier for smart e-mail systems to recognize secured e-mail, with the option of allowing the user to filter out such fields when reading text. The current scheme of having to "frame" the content (plain text) and add the PGP signature is distracting. This won't fly for several reasons. First, X- implies a non-standard header. Second, in the Internet world PEM is on the standards track, and it uses a PGP-like encapsulation. (More precisely, many facets of the PGP appearance were taken from PEM.) PEM does provide for various security mechanisms, I should note, not just the current RSA+DES. Finally, the scheme which you label ``distracting'' (and I agree) was adopted because there's simply too much information to put into headers in any comprehensible fashion, and to really do the job properly requires an encoded (and hence unreadable) plaintext of the message, independent of the encryption or signature algorithms. (These folks worried, and rightly so, about character sets, gateways that would add or drop trailing blanks or tabs, etc.)

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There's an echo here! There's an echo, hear?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

I know the site "cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com" was supposedly removed from the Cypherpunks list, as per a message from Eric Hughes, but I am getting several bounces per day. I assume you folks are, too. What's apparent is that each of these long bounces (400-500 lines) is *getting longer* each cycle through the process. I noticed this when I was deleting them. I suppose the extra lines--roughly 20 extra lines each cycle--are more error messages being added by cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com and then sent back to the List. This is *not* a complaint, though I hope it stops soon. Instead, it's a comment that e-mail systems and lists may need (soon!) more sophisticated positive reputation filters, to screen out such pathological behaviors, mail bombs, and the like. I feel sorry for the List members who are on more restrictive mail systems, including those who may have to (gulp!) pay for incoming mail by the byte. -Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
by George A. Gleason 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

Citizens lobbying for removal of payphones in their neighborhoods sounds like more of the same old "fix a cut toe by chopping off the foot" syndrome. People have to be pretty desperate to go that far. Next step: remove indoor plumbing because some dope dealers flush their stuff when the cops come to the door. Gee, how about tatooed ID on the wrists, eh? Drug dealers and violence: now there's a decent issue. And of course the idea of removing the *guns* won't go anywhere, but since there isn't a National Payphone Association, taking away the phones is easier politically. On the other hand, a lot of parents have themselves to blame for letting their little kiddies play with toy guns and watch violent BS on TV. Training, as it were. Alderman Payphone Permit: is probably also violating FCC rules there; a decent Federal case could be made. Too many phones? Hey, what about the number of places where one can purchase alcohol? Here in the Bay Area, they're starting to crack down on liquor stores, since these seem to attract a lot of nastiness also. That seems more reasonable, given that 50% of homicides and suicides involve alcohol. Baddies in Cyberspace: oh, as soon as they get Cellular Modems, you can bet they will. Back to race & class. Take a look at what has happened to the urban ghettoes over the last 10 years. If you look at drug abuse as self-medication (which has been well demonstrated), what we see is an incredible number of people in intolerable pain in their daily lives. Reduce the pain with jobs, decent places to live, and some sense of opportunity, and drugs will have far less attraction. I'll never forget the woman who was interviewed locally on the radio; saying, essentially, "we have nothing at all, no hope of anything better, and every day is a desperate scramble to survive; when I do a hit of dope it's like I've eaten a meal, had a bowel movement, made love, and taken a nap all at once." Sounds like hyperbole until you see the numbers, that something like half of black children don't get three meals a day, and over half of black families can't afford rent *and* food every month. When you're dying slowly anyway, shaving off a few more years with a dope habit is a bargain if those remaining years hurt a little bit less. *We are developing a serious underclass in this country,* have been for ten years now. Take a look at any 3d world city; look back at the slums here, it all looks the same. Punishing these people even more by taking away one after another of the amenities of civilisation can only make it worse over the long run. People are very obliging; if they're treated like animals, they respond accordingly. -gg

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DARE T-shirts
by Dan M. Shaw 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

Timothy C. May writes: >Anyway, I have long wanted to get a t-shirt or sweatshirt >silk-screened with "D.A.R.E." on it, as so many phony >parents are nowwearing (I think the kiddies get gold >stars if they sell one of these shirts to their parents). >But *my* shirt would go something like this: >"D. rugs > A. re > R. eality > E. nhancers" A friend of mine is in the T-shirt business... he can take a GIF or other graphics file, print it on a color printer, and heat-transfer it to a T-shirt. Not quite as nice as silk-screen, but the set-up cost is much lower, especially for onesies. Consider taking a paint program and, um, "rolling your own" custom T-shirt design. Perhaps run an official DARE poster through a color scanner and make suitable modifications. If you're interested, I will ask him for details.

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No Subject
by UCX_SMTP＠crc.monroecc.edu 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA04722; Sun, 25 Jul 93 23:37:39 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA28964; Sun, 25 Jul 93 20:28:48 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA28911; Sun, 25 Jul 93 20:27:26 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA28907; Sun, 25 Jul 93 20:27:24 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA19458; Sun, 25 Jul 93 20:11:40 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA15685 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sun, 25 Jul 1993 22:51:09 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA15370 ; Sun, 25 Jul 93 22:42:00 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307260242.AA15370(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sun, 25 Jul 93 22:20:05 EDT Resent-Date: Sun, 25 Jul 1993 22:17:59 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sun, 25 Jul 1993 22:17:46 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA03179 ; Sun, 25 Jul 93 18:43:19 -0400 Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 18:43:19 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307252243.AA03179(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA20451; Sun, 25 Jul 93 18:31:35 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA24577; Sun, 25 Jul 93 09:53:11 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA24546; Sun, 25 Jul 93 09:51:42 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA24542; Sun, 25 Jul 93 09:51:40 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA02645; Sun, 25 Jul 93 01:45:08 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA06800 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sun, 25 Jul 1993 04:11:07 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA26062 ; Sun, 25 Jul 93 04:01:24 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307250801.AA26062(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sun, 25 Jul 93 02:55:32 EDT Resent-Date: Sun, 25 Jul 1993 02:54:09 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sun, 25 Jul 1993 02:53:55 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA11977 ; Sun, 25 Jul 93 02:02:48 -0400 Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 02:02:48 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307250602.AA11977(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA21882; Sun, 25 Jul 93 05:57:17 GMT Received: by toad.com id AA18227; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:13:56 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA18185; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:09:45 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA18181; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:09:44 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA17070; Sat, 24 Jul 93 19:49:34 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA03528 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sat, 24 Jul 1993 22:28:50 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA29610 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:20:31 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307250220.AA29610(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:14:16 EDT Resent-Date: Sat, 24 Jul 1993 22:13:52 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sat, 24 Jul 1993 22:13:47 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA18696 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 18:19:19 -0400 Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 18:19:19 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307242219.AA18696(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA17170; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:13:19 GMT Received: by toad.com id AA13070; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:20 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA13067; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:03 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA13063; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:02 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA15103; Sat, 24 Jul 93 07:52:21 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA27657 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sat, 24 Jul 1993 10:35:54 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA28817 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 10:26:15 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307241426.AA28817(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sat, 24 Jul 93 09:20:26 EDT Resent-Date: Sat, 24 Jul 1993 08:42:46 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sat, 24 Jul 1993 08:42:36 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA09179 ; Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:48:31 -0400 Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:48:31 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307230148.AA09179(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA00909; Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:41:38 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA14078; Thu, 22 Jul 93 18:01:32 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA13842; Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:53:04 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA13837; Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:53:03 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA12960; Thu, 22 Jul 93 12:50:15 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA20089 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Thu, 22 Jul 1993 15:25:50 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA07594 ; Thu, 22 Jul 93 15:15:19 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307221915.AA07594(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Thu, 22 Jul 93 14:38:30 EDT Resent-Date: Thu, 22 Jul 1993 14:27:57 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Thu, 22 Jul 1993 14:27:48 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA23297 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:26:36 -0400 Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:26:36 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307220326.AA23297(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA06943; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:22:44 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA21927; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:16:03 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA21680; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:20 PDT Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA21676; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:19 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA18750; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:00:31 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA03218 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:36:21 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA16552 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:27:59 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307220127.AA16552(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:25:09 EDT Resent-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:26 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:18 EDT Received: from relay2.UU.NET by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA12591 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:34:47 -0400 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA14330; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:31:29 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA18642; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:09:44 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA18609; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:26 PDT Return-Path: <lock60!snark!boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Received: from gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM ([128.126.220.104]) by toad.com id AA18605; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:15 PDT Received: from lock60.UUCP by gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (4.1/mls/4.0) id AA04653; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:07:13 EDT X-Info: VFL.Paramax.COM is the new name for GVL.Unisys.COM Please change any mailing lists or aliases. Both the old and the new addresses will work for a short time. Received: by lock60.Canal.Org (smail2.5) id AA16551; 21 Jul 93 18:50:24 EDT (Wed) Received: by snark.thyrsus.com (/\==/\ Smail3.1.21.1 #21.19) id <m0oIjLP-00020KC(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:56 EDT Received: by boojum.uucp (Smail3.1.28.1 #2) id m0oIiVK-000BQZC; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03 EDT Message-Id: <m0oIiVK-000BQZC(a)boojum.uucp> From: <boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Subject: FAQ, round 2 To: boojum!cypherpunks(a)uunet.uu.net Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11] I've written some more material for it. Criticisms and additions welcome. --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- From: esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond) Newsgroups: news.answers Followup-To: poster This is the Cypherpunks FAQ. It explains the projects and purposes of the Cypherpunks mailing list. It is also intended to serve as a general introduction to privacy and encryption issues. For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography, see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt. The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including the most up-to-date version of this FAQ. This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; send additions and corrections to that address. Sections contributed by others are credited to individual authors. We gratefully acknowledge, in addition, feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl(a)lehman.com> and Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu>. Here is a table of contents for this FAQ: 1. Why cypherpunks? 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. b. Digital cash. c. Electronic voting. d. Electronic contracts. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. f. <more?> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA b. DES c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS d. PGP e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. b. Expansion of the counter-economy. c. Disempowerment of government. d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. c. Promote the use of encrypted communication. To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to: cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother. So if you have skills to contribute, act now. The freedom you save could be your own. 1. Why cypherpunks? Because privacy is essential to freedom. If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them. And it will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more control. The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights. Nor can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that want to know all about you so they can sell you things. Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*. Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools. The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software. Our aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap. 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and a single key. Two users who share a key can exchange private messages. A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public. Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other. For privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private key from the public one. Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among them. The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came from you by decoding with your public key. In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public Key Cryptosystem'. The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES standard, and the government's Clipper proposal. We'll discuss these, and others, in more detail below. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public clear-text message for tampering. To do this, the message must contain a `digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver. For security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash. PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect. Unfortunately, known PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing. Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'. The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS. Snefru, invented by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been broken. MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference implementation in C. As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but has not been *proved* to be secure. DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper proposal. <more needed here> c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. <more needed here> 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key. If you encode it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you. This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public channels. Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it. b. Digital cash. Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash. You could use a PKC to send to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money from your bank account. The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's public keys, can verify that the order is genuine. This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial risk. c. Electronic voting. Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting. If you encode your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it with your public key. d. Electronic contracts. If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it. This is an unforgeable contract. Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. <more needed here> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer scientists who developed the technique. RSA has withstood determined attacks for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure. It has been proposed as an Internet standard. The RSA technique is patented. The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact information should go here>. An implemenation in C called RSAREF is available for research and certain noncommercial uses. b. DES <more needed here> c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS <more needed here> d. PGP <more needed here> e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. <more needed here> 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. <more needed here> b. Expansion of the counter-economy. <more needed here> c. Disempowerment of government. <more needed here> d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. <more needed here> 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? <more needed here> a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. <more needed here> b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. <more needed here> c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. <more needed here> 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. <list of current projects should go here> b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. <more needed here> c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication. <more needed here> You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide (both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as envelopes). --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- -- >>eric>>

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Secured E-mail standard?
by mdavis＠pro-sol.cts.com 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

Has a proposal been made to officially adopt a header field in standard Internet mail messages that would essentially include security signature information? Something like: X-Security-Type: PGP 1.0 X-Security-Code: asdui&Dh1daOFajsFNOA...etc. These generic field names would allow for various types of security methods. Most important, would make it a lot easier for smart e-mail systems to recognize secured e-mail, with the option of allowing the user to filter out such fields when reading text. The current scheme of having to "frame" the content (plain text) and add the PGP signature is distracting. /\/\ Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563) / /__\ Internet: mdavis(a)pro-sol.cts.com

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Secret service 'C.A.T.'
by Steve Greenberg 26 Jul '93

26 Jul '93

>... I sat across from a guy wearing a >Secret Service logo'd polo shirt with the acronym 'C.A.T.' on it. I can't say for the secret service, but in the Army C.A.T stands for "Crisis Action Team". Steve +-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------+ |VOTE Steve Greenberg for President (2004)| steve(a)oc3s-emh1.army.mil | | He's "Too Big To Fail!" (tm) | CMR 420, Box 2569 APO, AE 09063 | +-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------+

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