- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Re: Ayn Rand and Crypto-Anarchy
by James Still 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

>So, I would agree that Rand was one of the prime motivators of crypto >anarchy. What she wanted to do with material technology (mirrors over >Galt's Gulch) is _much_ more easily done with mathematical technology. > >Someday I'll repost my essay "Libertaria in Cyberspace" to this List. I've never seen it, how about humoring me and making "someday" today? +----------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | Life is a PGP-encryted riddle, | <still(a)kailua.colorado.edu> | | and the secret key is hidden | Hieroglyphic Voodoo Machine | | on board a UFO with Elvis. | 1.303.443.2457 N-8-1 | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------+

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NIST System's Address
by DIC1241＠cup.edu 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

I seemed to miss it the first time, so could someone please post NIST's system address again. Thanks

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Secure voice software issues
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As soon as I get the famous Intergraph Overtime Boot off my neck, I plan to start writing some crypto-phone software for the Mac. Pursuant to that, there are some issues and questions that I'd like to raise here for your perusal. There have been several calls here in the past for Sound-Blaster based cryptophones, but none have yet appeared, so I'm going ahead with this. Comments and questions, even flames, are welcome. Just don't ask me to include support for Skipjack/Capstone hardware, or I'll sic David Sternlight on you. (note: no smiley) 1. Why the Mac? Well, because I have one :) Also because all Macs for the last three years or so have integrated sound I/O, and OS support for same. This support includes choice of sampling rate, compression (none, ~2:1, ~6:1), and even a choice of input device (the built-in mike, or some more-exotic external device, like the Mac version of the PAS-16 soundcard.) 2. Some fundamental principles: a) encryption routines will be provided as drop-in "plugins", much like Photoshop or BBEdit. Easy to customize, easy to roll-your-own. Easy for non-US residents to use. Easy to separate details of encryption from messy details of Mac Sound Manager and Toolbox. b) reuse. The initial version will leverage as much existing code (cf. Outerbridge's fast 68k DES, parts of PGP, and so on.) The eventual product will be released in complete source form to encourage adaptation to other platforms. (note that if I use AppMaker for my basic design, as I am wont to do, that I won't be able to distribute their source code.) c) STU-III metaphor. Basic mechanism: caller dials callee. The phones establish a connection and negotiate speed and security- for example, the crypto ignition key you put into a STU-III may be able to handle TOP SECRET or below, but your callee may only be able to handle SECRET. I expect the s/w version to also negotiate sampling fidelity (5.5, 11, or 22 kHz) based on DCE connect speed and compression based on DCE connect speed and CPU power. (neat idea: each side can compress and encrypt one of the standard system beeps to determine a relative "power index" for negotiation) 4. The initial version will probably support single and triple DES and IDEA for encryption, with key exchange a la vat- none! Later versions may include DH key exchange and other encryption algorithms. Eventually (probably not until I get a PowerPC-based machine) I'd like to be able to use PGP keyrings as phonebooks. 5. In a few months I'll need some beta testers. In the meantime I need helpful suggestions for names, features, and designed-in expansion capabilities. - -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | "Crypto-anarchy means never having to say perobich(a)ingr.com | you're sorry." - Tim May (tcmay(a)netcom.com) Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLGZaUiA78To+806NAQFzbwP/QcmDnDIqIxyzKyXdbWteVMDd6DUeHwQ0 is/C6yQgRNSNgf0fPTPBU8u3D8R8CWua7YM8oSwzPsR0MNYDbuMQqEKNLQNDHkGo Sq1duWBKcjy1XmGXJ0QxlC3EqB85IQMnp2tI7JxmotsAv5YLFJ3+vvfRZZkmdpUS c0Aea7baaec= =kZWx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Key-Escrow (black) Humor
by Anonymous 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

Thanks to <ld231782(a)LANCE.ColoState.Edu> - Q. How many endangered bureacrats does it take to screw in a light bulb? A1. We're not sure, they prefer to hide in the shadows. A2. We don't know, we can't find any. Have you seen any? A3. You only need one, but each only works once because they invariably manage to electrocute themselves in the process. A4. You must fill out form KT-398930-0-3893-1z(321.31x*) in sextuplicate, "Requisition for Light Amplification and Enhancement Device Facilities and Staff Resources and Efficacy Data Measures Projections and Speculations." Invisible ink only. Reply will be shipped on punch cards by carrier pigeon after brief administrative period. Offer void where prohibited. Prohibited in this universe. Q. How many FBI agents does it take to wiretap? A1. All of them. One to hold the alligator clips and the rest to convince the Congress and American public "he's just doing his job." A2. FBI doesn't actually `wiretap,' a groundless popular myth. They only participate in wholesome law-enforcement activities at all times. A3. Two. One to do the job and one to botch it. Public relations is automatically handled by a new AI program that endlessly constructs almost-coherent sentences from keywords like `dead bodies', `airplane explosion', `innocent children', `drug dealers', `terrorists', `criminals', `law-abiding public,' `American businesses'. A4. B.C. (Before cryptography), several. After, none. (See also `endangered bureacrats.') Q. How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens? A. Sorry, that's classified information. Q. Why does D. Sternlight favor Clipper technology? A1. It's the kind of idea he could have come up with himself. A2. Doesn't like to be bothered by details. That's what the NSA is for. A3. No unsound idea has ever emanated from the U.S. Government. A4. Having been to many subversive foreign countries, he recognizes the necessity of spying on them. Q. Why is D. Denning promoting Clipper? A1. Peer pressure (all her friends are doing it). A2. Wanted to beat the rush. A3. Looks good on her resume. A4. Everyone needs a hobby. A5. Coincidentally got an NSA employee after signing up for the Adopt an Endangered Bureacrat program. Q. Why is D. Denning's cryptography book so successful? A1. It's cornered the lucrative NSA textbook market. A2. The NSA bureacrats love to shred their reading material, and order new copies each time they need to look something up (which is frequent). A3. People marvel at the writing by an expert endorsed by the NSA. A4. NSA afraid someone will read it so they buy all the copies. Q. Why is the Clinton administration wholeheartedly promoting Clipper? A1. The neato secret decoder rings handed out at the briefing won everyone over immediately. A2. Opportunity for another authoritative and stunning nose-tweaking at `the previous administration'. A3. First installment of the fabulous new and comprehensive `Orwell Plan'. A4. Anything to get those creepy NSA guys to go away. Q. Why did the NSA come up with the Clipper chip? A1. Job security. A2. Entertainment. A3. Scared silly of `economic espionage' monsters hiding in the closet. A4. Got bored that day. A5. Great joke on those Mykotronx bozos. - -- This is a carbon copy of a message that was sent to 4 different e-mail to USENET gatewys: 1. to alt.privacy.clipper via cs.utexas.edu via nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2. to alt.privacy via demon.co.uk via ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 3. to sci.crypt via decwrl.dec.com via elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 4. to misc.legal.computing via news.cs.indiana.edu via phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu Let's see how they fare.... Ye olde Spooge Meister spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code <spooge(a)dev.null.net> or random and probably incorrect output from a computer program.

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CFP '94 announcement
by L. Detweiler 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

There was a huge amount of interest in this last time around, so I'm posting this to the list for anyone who hasn't seen it. p.s. look who's running the `student paper competition'... ===cut=here=== From: faigin(a)aero.org (Daniel P. Faigin) Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm Subject: Computers Freedom and Privacy 1994 Date: 4 Aug 93 11:31:10 Message-ID: <FAIGIN.93Aug4113110(a)soldan.aero.org> Conference Announcement Computers, Freedom, and Privacy 1994 23-26 March 1994 The fourth annual conference, "Computers, Freedom, and Privacy," (CFP'94) will be held in Chicago, Il., March 23-26, 1994. The conference is hosted by The John Marshall Law School; George B. Trubow, professor of law and director of the Center for Informatics Law at John Marshall, is general chair of the conference. (E-Mail: 7trubow(a)jmls.edu) The program is sponsored jointly by these Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Groups: Communications (SIGCOMM); Computers and Society (SIGCAS); Security, Audit and Control (SIGSAC). The advance of computer and communications technologies holds great promise for individuals and society. From conveniences for consumers and efficiencies in commerce to improved public health and safety and increased participation in government and community, these technologies are fundamentally transforming our environment and our lives. At the same time, these technologies present challenges to the idea of a free and open society. Personal privacy is at risk from invasions by high-tech surveillance and monitoring; a myriad of personal information data bases expose private life to constant scrutiny; new forms of illegal activity may threaten the traditional barriers between citizen and state and present new tests of Constitutional protection; geographic boundaries of state and nation may be recast by information exchange that knows no boundaries in global data networks. CFP'94 will present an assemblage of experts, advocates and interest groups from diverse perspectives and disciplines to consider freedom and privacy in today's "information society." A series of pre-conference tutorials will be offered on March 23, 1994, with the conference program beginning on Thursday, March 24, and running through Saturday, March 26, 1994. The Palmer House, a Hilton hotel located in Chicago's "loop," and only about a block from The John Marshall Law School, is the conference headquarters. Room reservations should be made directly with the hotel after September 1, 1993, mentioning John Marshall or "CFP'94" to get the special conference rate of $99.00, plus tax. The Palmer House Hilton 17 E. Monroe., Chicago, Il., 60603 Tel: 312-726-7500; 1-800-HILTONS; Fax 312-263-2556 Communications regarding the conference should be sent to: CFP'94 The John Marshall Law School 315 S. Plymouth Ct. Chicago, IL 60604-3907 (Voice: 312-987-1419; Fax: 312-427-8307; E-mail: CFP94(a)jmls.edu) CALL FOR CFP'94 PARTICIPATION AND PROGRAM SUGGESTIONS It is intended that CFP'94 programs will examine the potential benefits and burdens of new information and communications technologies and consider ways in which society can enjoy the benefits while minimizing negative implications. Proposals are requested from those who desire to present an original paper in a relevant area of technology, policy analysis or law, or to suggest a program presentation. Any proposal (1) should not exceed three typewritten double-spaced pages; (2) must state the title of the paper or program; (3) briefly describe its theme and content; and (4) set out the name, address, credentials and experience of the author or suggested speakers. If a proposed paper has already been completed a copy should be attached to the proposal. STUDENT PAPER COMPETITION Full time college or graduate students are invited to enter the student paper competition. Papers must not exceed 2500 words and should address the impact of computer and telecommunications technologies on freedom and privacy in society. Winners will receive a scholarship to attend the conference and present their papers. All papers should be submitted by November 1, 1993 (either as straight text via e-mail or 6 printed copies) to: Prof. Eugene Spafford Department of Computer Science Purdue University West Lafeyette, IN 47907-2004 E-Mail: spaf(a)cs.purdue.edu; Voice: 317-494-7825 REGISTRATION Registration information and fee schedules will be announced by September 1, 1993. Inquiries regarding registration should be directed to RoseMarie Knight, Registration Chair, at the JMLS address above; her voice number is 312-987-1420. -- [W]: The Aerospace Corp. M1/055 * POB 92957 * LA, CA 90009-2957 * 310/336-8228 [Email]:faigin@aero.org, faigin(a)acm.org [Vmail]:310/336-5454 Box#68228 "I have a spelling checker/It came with my PC/It plainly marks four my revue/ Mistakes I cannot sea/I've run this poem threw it/I'm sure your pleased too no/ Its letter perfect in it's weigh/My checker tolled me sew." Pennye Harper

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EXE/COM encryptions
by IE63＠vaxb.acs.unt.edu 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

This is a message I received for an excellent idea on the run-time encryptions. Once I finish my current project(s), I may start on it, but in the mean time... any of you out there want to try this one? BTW - the program I mentioned in the post at the beginning of this thread has been uploaded to soda.berkeley.edu - when (if) it gets posted, anyone who's interested can FTP it... it contains full source code and is titled BWFPU21S.ZIP. As of yet, It has rather poor encryption techniques, but after all the suggestions I've been receiving, I hope to change that ASAP. Thanks Everyone! Michael Ellison ie63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu Forwarded Message: From: IN%"rarachel(a)ishara.poly.edu" "A1 ray arachelian" 8-AUG-1993 13:18:00.86 To: IN%"IE63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu" CC: Subj: RE: EXE/COM encryptions.... Return-path: <rarachel(a)ishara.poly.edu> Received: from ishara.poly.edu by vaxb.acs.unt.edu (PMDF #3644 ) id <01H1I5P1HL3K001KB3(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu>; Sun, 8 Aug 1993 13:17:49 CDT Received: by ishara.poly.edu (5.59a/25-eef) id AA05059; Sun, 8 Aug 93 10:16:57 EDT Date: 08 Aug 1993 10:16:55 -0400 (EDT) From: A1 ray arachelian <rarachel(a)ishara.poly.edu> (library) Subject: RE: EXE/COM encryptions.... In-reply-to: <01H1H4U3WNYQ001JGI(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu>; from "IE63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu" at Aug 7, 93 7:42 pm To: IE63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu Message-id: <9308081416.AA05059(a)ishara.poly.edu> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT > That sounds like an excellent idea - I may start experiment with > that soon if I get time, if not, you might want to send the idea to the > cypherpunks list as a whole as it would be really cool to see implemented. > The program I've written attaches to already compiled .EXE and .COM files > after compiling, so it would be of little use in that application (and > it is in .ASM), but writing another one at some point would be interesting... > haveta find someone with some _really_ technical docs on a good commercial > compiler..... > I hope I'm right about this, but when you do a reply to a message coming from the cypherpunks newsgroup (from my mailbox as I subscribed to it) doesn't the reply go through toad.com rather than just as a reply to the person to whom I'm responding? (If not, then I've been needlessly posting private messages!) Anyhow, you could always go for a compiler whose sources are readily available such as GCC. Commercial grade compilers will generally not provide a way to patch the back end. >HOWEVER< you can get around this by writing your own linker, and if the linker is smart enough to know where a function call is made, you can add in your own code to do the decryption to some free memory area off the disk, execute that area, and when the code returs back out, you free that memory area. It would be a somewhat disk intesive execution, but hey, it could be done from RAM as well. :-) There are several excellent third party linkers out there such as RTLINK and Blinker in the DOS world that do all sorts of nifty things such as overlays and dynamic memory management for compilers that don't give these features. Another possiblility is to write your own assembler as for instance Borland C will produce assembly output if told to do so rather than obj code. Then the assembler does the encryption handlink and I suppose a regular linker would work too. However, with most compilers, you should be able to write an engine in C code which will open up a datbase or some other file which is encrypted then grab portions of that file, decrypt them to memory, and do a call to them as if they were functions. Then when the call is done, you free that memory block, and continue to do the same.. This would deal with the ability to load up functions in overlays or just execute functions via a pointer than a direct call to a function. So the main code of your program is a decryption engine which loads up modules from an encrypted overlay file (or from the end of the EXE file,) decrypts them in RAM, calls them, and frees the memory they took up. (This may fail with STATIC variable declarations within functions!) It would work very nicely, but instead of doing direct function calls your program's source would need to be modifyied to do a whole song and dance before it can call a protected function. With a linker or compiler that does this automatically it makes it much easier to just recompile existing code, and much much easier to write such code from the programmer's point of view. Now an interesting situation is to be found on Macs which have individual code resources which can be compressed. There is no built in decompression/compression scheme in the system software. Rather it makes use of a special code resource labeled as DCMP for decompress which of course you could replace with a decrypt code resource, though the system would think the code resources are compressed. :-) This would not require any modifications to a compiler or linker. Just encrypting resources and adding in a decryption code resource which would pop up a dialog box asking for a key the first time it runs. (IF this winds up being private just to you, please post it as public for me by forwarding it to the cypherpunks newsgroup.)

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RE: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

That almost looks like a posting from "NewsGrazer" on the NeXT, but I can't confirm it. That app could post Ritch text, and it often appeared as garbage unless you use NewsGrazer to decode it, but it also had something in the header about NewsGrazer... who knows? -nate

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NIST contact information (further)
by bart＠netcom.com 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

Forwarded message: > From: fergp(a)sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) > Date: Sat, 07 Aug 93 16:52:31 EDT .... > > This file is on the NIST's publicly available system as > JUL93BLT.TXT. Other reports, announcements and bulletins are available In a forest of other information. The full recursive directory of /pub is itself 78346 bytes! The file referenced above is found in /pub/nistbul, but I downloaded several megabytes of interesting stuff.

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How does it really work, anyway?
by fergp＠sytex.com 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

As an aside, all this talk about anonymous remailers is intriguing. Does anyone know with certainty what happens at the remailer site, within the software process of stripping headers and the likes, where the original sender of the message could be tracked? SENDMAIL logs, etc.? What would be preferrable, in ideal scenario, would be that all traces of the incoming message was discarded altogether. In this fashion, the operator of the remailer would be less likely to be "persuaded" to divulge the originator(s) of messages, if found in such a precarious position. Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15 Paul Ferguson <fergp(a)sytex.com> Key fingerprint = EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05 AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58

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Anonymous remailer to USENET gateway testing continues
by Anonymous 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

This a summary of the anonymous e-mail to USENET gateway posts that I sent earlier today (8/7/93) - All messages included: :: Request-Remailing-To: <group.name or group-name>@<gateway>.<domain> Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor Organization: Shadows 'R Us in the remail header (per suggestions of Chael Hall, thanks). ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu alt-privacy-clipper(a)cs.utexas.edu ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu alt-privacy(a)demon.co.uk elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu sci.crypt.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu misc.legal.computing(a)news.cs.indiana.edu Based upon the following e-mail to USENET gateway templates: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu group-name(a)pws.bull.com group-name(a)demon.co.uk group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu And also based upon the following list of anonymous remailers: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu The message sent consisted of the following message: :: Request-remailing-To: <host>@<gateway>.<domain> Subject: Key_Escrow (black) Humor Organization: Shadows 'R Us Thanks to <ld231782(a)LANCE.ColoState.Edu> - Q. How many endangered bureacrats does it take to screw in a light bulb? A1. We're not sure, they prefer to hide in the shadows. A2. We don't know, we can't find any. Have you seen any? A3. You only need one, but each only works once because they invariably manage to electrocute themselves in the process. A4. You must fill out form KT-398930-0-3893-1z(321.31x*) in sextuplicate, "Requisition for Light Amplification and Enhancement Device Facilities and Staff Resources and Efficacy Data Measures Projections and Speculations." Invisible ink only. Reply will be shipped on punch cards by carrier pigeon after brief administrative period. Offer void where prohibited. Prohibited in this universe. Q. How many FBI agents does it take to wiretap? A1. All of them. One to hold the alligator clips and the rest to convince the Congress and American public "he's just doing his job." A2. FBI doesn't actually `wiretap,' a groundless popular myth. They only participate in wholesome law-enforcement activities at all times. A3. Two. One to do the job and one to botch it. Public relations is automatically handled by a new AI program that endlessly constructs almost-coherent sentences from keywords like `dead bodies', `airplane explosion', `innocent children', `drug dealers', `terrorists', `criminals', `law-abiding public,' `American businesses'. A4. B.C. (Before cryptography), several. After, none. (See also `endangered bureacrats.') Q. How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens? A. Sorry, that's classified information. Q. Why does D. Sternlight favor Clipper technology? A1. It's the kind of idea he could have come up with himself. A2. Doesn't like to be bothered by details. That's what the NSA is for. A3. No unsound idea has ever emanated from the U.S. Government. A4. Having been to many subversive foreign countries, he recognizes the necessity of spying on them. Q. Why is D. Denning promoting Clipper? A1. Peer pressure (all her friends are doing it). A2. Wanted to beat the rush. A3. Looks good on her resume. A4. Everyone needs a hobby. A5. Coincidentally got an NSA employee after signing up for the Adopt an Endangered Bureacrat program. Q. Why is D. Denning's cryptography book so successful? A1. It's cornered the lucrative NSA textbook market. A2. The NSA bureacrats love to shred their reading material, and order new copies each time they need to look something up (which is frequent). A3. People marvel at the writing by an expert endorsed by the NSA. A4. NSA afraid someone will read it so they buy all the copies. Q. Why is the Clinton administration wholeheartedly promoting Clipper? A1. The neato secret decoder rings handed out at the briefing won everyone over immediately. A2. Opportunity for another authoritative and stunning nose-tweaking at `the previous administration'. A3. First installment of the fabulous new and comprehensive `Orwell Plan'. A4. Anything to get those creepy NSA guys to go away. Q. Why did the NSA come up with the Clipper chip? A1. Job security. A2. Entertainment. A3. Scared silly of `economic espionage' monsters hiding in the closet. A4. Got bored that day. A5. Great joke on those Mykotronx bozos. These resulting messages have been posted thus far: Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor Date: 7 Aug 1993 12:48:57 -0500 Organization: Shadows 'R Us Lines: 91 NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu Newsgroups: misc.legal.computing Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor X-Sender: phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu Organization: Computer Science, Indiana University Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 10:49:08 -0700 Remailed-By: Anon Remail <phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu> Lines: 92 Further results will be posted as I receive them. Ye olde Spooge Meister spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code <spooge(a)dev.null.net> or random and probably incorrect output from a computer program.

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