Hi Tom thanks for your detailed comments. I am now updating the document to reflect them. Questions/comments that I want to make are: i) why did you delete Identity Provider from being synonymous with Attribute Authority? If you think they are not technically equivalent can you say why. ii) I suggest changing Credential to Authorisation Credential, because as you point out, Credentials are a superset of signed attribute assertions. iii) concerning the word valid, in 'valid (authorisation) credential', it is not overloaded, since this definition is saying precisely what it means. It is in fact the equivalent in authorisation terms to that of a valid PKC in authentication terms. iv) you ask how the CIS is different from an AA. They are clearly related. An AA is the authority behind the attribute assertions that are released, and it does not have to sign the attribute assertions that are issued. A CIS is a service of an AA, and it does have to sign the assertions. In the grid we are only interested with digitally signed tokens (not symmetrically encrypted ones, MACed ones, or unsigned ones). So we introduce the CIS to show that it is signed attribute assertions that we are concerned with, and the CIS is the service of the AA that does this. We also need to have the converse validation service to the issuing service, hence the CVS. If we replace CIS by AA, then we should also replace CVS, perhaps by AVS. v) I think its useful to keep the MS STS terminology in the document since some readers may already be familiar with this concept, and it gives them a handle on our terminology. Its also good to relate different terms together when they are talking about the same conceptual entities. This helps people figure out how all these disparate terms fit together. (which is related to point i) above) vi) you asked "You’ve used the terms “application independent component”, “application independent service”, and “application independent policy engine.” Can this new terminology be consolidated?" Clearly the policy engine is a subset of the possible services so I dont see any consolidation here. But we could replace component by service, so I have done this. vii) You say about the text 'A user is issued with authorisation credentials by the Credential Issuing Service' "This model description assumes that the presenter of the credentials is the subject". It wasnt meant to. It was meant to imply "Credentials are issued in which the user is the holder/subject" but not say anything about who the requestor or recipient of the credentials were. I have updated the text appropriately. I will issue a new version soon regards David Tom Scavo wrote:
Attached is a modified version of the document "Functional Components of Grid Service Provider Authorisation Service Middleware." I corrected a few things, mostly minor, but the bulk of my comments have to do with terminology.
Tom Scavo NCSA
On 10/31/07, David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk> wrote:
Dear All
I have just uploaded the updated the XACML and WS-Trust specs as described at the OGF21 meeting to source forge. I have also updated the architecture document to reflect the latest changes. Pointers to the latest 4 docs are in my other email to Tom. The next task is to homogenise the terminology so that they use consistent terminology throughout the entire set.
regards
David
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***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security The Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick Tel: +44 1227 82 3221 Fax +44 1227 762 811 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html Research Web site: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5
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-- ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security The Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick Tel: +44 1227 82 3221 Fax +44 1227 762 811 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html Research Web site: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 *****************************************************************