Hi Tom I would like to make two points to your comments Firstly you are missing the point I made about the Shibboleth metadata. This is telling the SPs which IDPs it can trust. Without this necessary information user presence is not provable, since an untrusted IDP will lie to the SP that the user has just authenticated correctly, when there could be no user or the wrong user there. Consequently the meta data is providing the trust anchors in just the same way that Valerio is doing in his list of Grid SPs. Hence my analogy on the way of providing trust is correct. Secondly the inclusion of a "certificate" needs more elaboration. The inclusion for example of a user's public key certificate proves nothing more than the presence of a DN does, since it is publicly available and an untrustworth grid SP could send any PKC it wished, just as it can send any DN it wished. Therefore one needs to specify the properties of the certificate that are being transferred, which is, that the user is delegating to the grid SP to act on its behalf. A proxy certificate would do this, as would an attribute certificate. Finally, if you have followed a lot of the (old) discussions on the PKIX list about DN matching in certificates, you will see that a lot of PKI software vendors do plain string matching of DNs, rather than proper X.500/LDAP DN matching rules, so dont believe that passing certs instead of DNs will solve this problem. It wont. Only proper DN matching software will solve this, so it is irrelevant whether the DN is passed as a string or in a cert. regards David Tom Scavo wrote:
On Fri, Mar 21, 2008 at 6:15 PM, David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk> wrote:
I dont fully agree with your analysis since you have missed out the concept of trust. If an AA trusts an entity to act as a proxy on behalf of another entity (and this is actually the case we have here with the Grid SP acting as a proxy on behalf of the user) then the AA will be prepared to let the trusted proxy have the attributes of the entity it is acting on behalf of. There are many ways for the AA to know who it trusts. One way is for it to configure in the names of the trusted proxies (this is the easiest way but is not scalable), another is for it to configure in the name of a trusted entity that says who are trusted proxies (much more scalable since the trusted entity can authorise hundreds or thousands of trusted proxies) and for the trusted proxy to present this token to the AA.
What you say is true. If the AA trusts the requester, then we're fine of course. In the typical cross-domain scenario, however, I claim this is more trust than the AA can bear. No AA worth its salt will respond to a cold query from an SP wielding a DN, even if the SP is "trusted" in other respects.
Another way would be for the user to give a token to the proxy saying that it authorises the proxy to act on its behalf, and the proxy can present this to the AA.
Yes, this approach will work, in general. It is the approach I'm advocating, in fact.
However, this later model will require enhancements to the communications between the user and the Grid SP, which is probably a route you dont want to go down.
Having adopted a push model, our project is already far down this path (and making more progress than we ever did with a pull model, I might add). (In fact, sometimes I wonder if it's worth belaboring the pull model further.)
Note that this issue is not unique to grids. Shibboleth has a similar problem of determine who are trusted IDPs, and it has solved it in the unscalable easy way by passing the complete list of trusted IDPs in the meta data. Not the best choice, but a quick and easy one. So the solution that Valerio has currently chosen is no different to the one that Shibboleth has chosen
No, that's not the whole story, I'm afraid. In fact, metadata has nothing to do with user presence. The Shib SP queries the AA using a transient, encrypted name identifier that the *user* obtained from the IdP during the SSO step. By presenting this identifier to the AA, the SP proves user presence.
If you take away the SSO step and replace the Shib SP by a Grid SP, you have precisely the use case that our profile addresses. But by taking away the SSO step, you lose the transient name identifier, so the Grid SP is unable to prove user presence. No Shib AA will respond to such a query.
I doubt I've convinced you, but I've made my point the best I can, so I won't try to convince you further :-) Let me close by proposing the following "patch" to our profile:
Instead of *requiring* a DN, the name identifier in the query should be generalized to accommodate the entire certificate (without excluding the possibility of a naked DN in those situations where it is warranted). This can be done using <ds:KeyInfo>, something like this:
<saml:Subject> <saml:BaseID xsi:type="KeyIdentifierType"> <ds:KeyInfo>...</ds:KeyInfo> </saml:BaseID> </saml:Subject>
where KeyIdentifierType is defined as follows:
<complexType name="KeyIdentifierType"> <complexContent> <extension base="saml:BaseIDAbstractType"> <sequence> <element ref="ds:KeyInfo"/> </sequence> </extension> </complexContent> </complexType>
This new name identifier type accommodates either a DN or a certificate. In addition to proving user presence at the Grid SP, using a certificate in this way has the extra added benefit that it avoids potential DN string matching at the AA, which in and of itself is almost sufficient reason to pass a certificate instead of a DN.
Tom
-- ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security The Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick Tel: +44 1227 82 3221 Fax +44 1227 762 811 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html Research Web site: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 *****************************************************************