Hello:
This are all fine issues. However, they are secondary to the basic design
of the architecture. Consider this in the context of designing a house.
You first have to determine what type of house should/could be designed.
Then you can address the security issues related to it. Also, other
dynamic provisioning projects already have effective, working code
addressing these issues. They should not be discussed as new
considerations.
Thanks.
At 11:34 AM 4/15/2010, John Vollbrecht wrote:
Hi Joe -
I agree that the way trust is implemented is out of scope. The
intent of this is to start a discussion on what the trust requirements
for NSI is. In particular, this is meant to identify three main
issues which I summarize here in case the PPT doesn't make this overview
clear.
1) Trust between either end of the NSI is required. Identification
of NSAs at each end is also necessary. The protocol might support
both as a single operation, or might treat them independently.
2) Attributes of the original requestor of a circuit may need to be down
a chain of NSAs so the bottom NSA can use the attribute to evaluate its
policy to decide whether to grant the request for resources it
controls. Passing these attributes must be done in a way that
allows the bottom NSA to trust the attributes it gets. This seems
doable, but probably requires some special handling of these attributes
as they go from NSA to NSA. I describe a way that I think will work
to show that it seems possible, but this is not meant to define the way
that it will work.
3) Trust between the reservation/ scheduler and the control plane is
needed so that when a provisioning request is made the control plane is
sure the resource is reserved for the owner of this request. This
might be done in a number of ways, and I describe two approaches to doing
this.
In order for the standard to support interoperable implementations it is
necessary for it to define how trust will be supported between
implementations. This does not mean inventing the trust mechanisms
(in fact this is clearly out of scope), but it seems to me it does mean
defining which can or should or must be used.
Does this make sense?
John
On Apr 13, 2010, at 4:56 PM, Joe Mambretti wrote:
Hello:
All of these are important issues and should be addressed as part of
using an NSI. However, in my opinion, all of these issues are out of
scope for the basic definition of the NSI. All IT resources must be
surrounded by various trust domains. However, there are thousand of
activities developing these types of techniques. The basic architecture
should be agnostic about trust techniques used.
Thanks.
At 02:55 PM 4/13/2010, John Vollbrecht wrote:
Attached is a ppt that describes
4 trust areas in NSI. It is meant as
a way to help discussion. I think some trust discussion should be
in
the eventual document.
John
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Joe Mambretti,
Director
tel 312.503.0735
International Center for Advanced Internet Research fax
312.503.0745
750 North Lake Shore Drive, Suite
600
www.icair.org
Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois 60611