The ability for clients to create individualized miner blocklists could help diminish cartels and centralization The escheat could help prevent future "submarining" of coins thought lost or abandoned (and their economic impact) and re-cycle those coins. On Dec 30, 2017 4:01 PM, "Steven Schear" wrote:

I'm still hoping a new cryptocoin/fork implements a client-determined miner selection capability similar to what we suggested in that 2013 paper I've mentioned here. Heartening, Garzik & Company's decision their upcoming Bitcoin United fork appears to implement some form of our suggested block escheat.

On Dec 30, 2017 3:28 PM, "John Newman" wrote:

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Begin forwarded message:

*From:* byfield *Date:* December 29, 2017 at 12:05:02 PM EST *To:* "Florian Cramer" , "Morlock Elloi" < morlockelloi@gmail.com> *Cc:* nettime-l@mx.kein.org *Subject:* *Re: <nettime> Ten years in, nobody has come up with a use for blockchain*

On 29 Dec 2017, at 10:01, Florian Cramer wrote:

The *goal* of the Bitcoin proof of concept was 'an electronic payment

system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two

willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a

trusted third party.' So when the author of this avid-reader essay

complains 'but Visa... but FDIC... but NASDAQ,' one reasonable response is:

¯\_(ツ)_/¯. The point of Bitcoin wasn't to succeed to the degree that it

has, or in the way that it has.

Hi Ted,

If that had been Bitcoin's only goal, then it would have sufficed to create

a crypographic peer-to-peer payment system based on/supporting existing

currencies and their exchange rates.

Things got politically murky with the introduction of Bitcoin as its own

currency based on Hayek's and Mises' economic theory, i.e. with built-in

deflation and absence of political control except through owners.

Well, the difference is your addition of 'only,' as in it's 'only goal.' If I say I love you, Florian, that would be special, wouldn't it? But if I say I love *only* you, Florian, that's a different kettle of fish. 'Only' is one of those tricky words that serves as a mule for smuggling entire ideological apparatuses. 'Still' is another one: 'You *still* believe that?

As someone who's thought a lot about design, you probably understand better than many what a proof of concept is: an implementation — or we'd maybe we should think of it in more anthropological terms, as an *artifact* — that, more or less, tests a specific proposal. How that test is constructed, and the context in which it's conducted, involve a lot of artifice. Many of the assumptions that shape that artifice go unstated. The questions we're left with, in the case of Bitcoin, are what those assumptions were, and what they might mean.

If I'd said that goal was Bitcoin's *only* goal, then I'd agree with your objection, but I didn't: instead, I talked about the explicit ideological beliefs that dominated the cypherpunks milieu, including their implacable hostility to the state, their all but explicit aim of attacking models of trust anchored in ~public institutions, the ambiguity of their use of the idea of honesty, and — crucially — their interest in Vernor Vinge's novella _True Names_. It didn't seem worth the effort to say they were libertarian free-market extremists, because that's widely discussed. So your point is right on, but it seems like more of an elaboration ('and') than an objection ('but'). They didn't think talking about Hayek or Mises in the original Bitcoin paper, but as you say those ideas were baked into it from the beginning.

Whoever designed Bitcoin assumed that 'currency' and 'an electronic payment system' were interchangeable or even identical. They (and I'm pretty sure it was a group, not an individual) didn't set out to design better banknotes *or* to develop a better PayPal, they set out to create something entirely new that could function as either/both but wasn't *only* limited to meeting those specifications.

That brings us to Morlock's point about whether Bitcoin succeeded or failed. Two responses, one good, one bad. \_(ツ)_/¯.

This reminds me of discourses on theory and practice of communism. One good, the other bad.

Bitcoin failed for practical/mundane reason: it ceased to be distributed long time ago (today 4 Chinese mints control 50+% of hash power), while talking heads deceivingly ignored this, and continued to proselytize the initial but long extinct 'distributed' meme. It's more centralized than US dollar.

PoW concentration is mandated by its technological nature and there are no signs that anything will change any time soon. Every other 'proof' introduces either benevolent coordinating authority (which is utter bs), or switches CPU for something that has not been demonstrated as concentrate-able yet because no one bothered (such as proof of space - big disks are naturally distributed ... right.)

There is little more to say. Bitcoin is a big lie, for many too big to be acknowledged.

Possible futures and promises will continue to be built on the miserably failed premise, with non-working workarounds (But maybe the next workaround will work? ... Bitcoin is just the first try, the concept is good? ... It's such great idea and must be revisited? ... etc.)

Morlock, your point about its concentration nails it, and in that sense, yes, Bitcoin was a miserable failure. That structural tendency toward concentration was obvious in many of the experiments that contributed to Bitcoin, like the distributed cracks of RC5, which were dominated by actors with immense computing power at their disposal. Cypherpunk-types loved heartwarming talk about how Zapatistas and victims of sexual abuse would use PGP etc, but that was just playing to the crowd: they were much more concerned with systemic architectures and their baked-in biases because they knew cryptography was and would remain inevitably *politically* asymmetric.

But as you may remember (if you're the same Morlock Elloi who was kicking around in those circles), all that talk about crypto-anarchy was, at its heart, about class. Much of what normal people think about 'class' depends on the state: if there's no state, there are no classes, there are just arbitrary individuals and groups who are more or less adept at navigating and negotiating whatever resources are available to them. Whatever human potential gets lost in the fray is just the cost of doing business — and 'twas ever thus.

So...if Bitcoin has made some people fabulously wealthy, enabled new 'free markets' (including dark commerce, a growing parade of ICO cons, etc), and generally moved a bunch of Overton windows, do you really think some of them — Tim May, for example — would be upset that it was eventually dominated by a few Chinese mints rather than being equitably accessible for sheeple-to-sheeple use? If all of history a single catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage, what's a few more as long as they make you and yours rich?

What engineer ever objected if his/her/their proof of concept failed on a specified front but succeeded in creating a dozen new ones? It's as if the Wright Brothers' plane crashed — on the moon.

Cheers, Ted # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:

There is a killer app though. On 12/31/17, jamesd@echeque.com wrote:

On 12/31/2017 10:01 AM, Steven Schear wrote:

...

I'm still hoping a new cryptocoin/fork implements a client-determined miner selection capability similar to what we suggested in that 2013 paper I've mentioned here.

I cannot immediately find your link to your paper.

Obviously, at full scale we are always going to have immensely more clients than full peers, likely by a factor of hundreds of thousands, but we need to have enough peers, which means we need to reward peers for being peers, for providing the service of storing blockchain data, propagating transactions, verifying the blockchain, and making the data readily available, rather than for the current pointless bit crunching and waste of electricity employed by current mining.

The power over the blockchain, and the revenues coming from transaction and storage fees, have to go to this large number of peers, rather than, as at present, mostly to four miners located in China.

Also, at scale, we are going to have to shard, so that a peer is actually a pool of machines, each with a shard of the blockchain, perhaps with all the machines run by one person, perhaps run by a group of people who trust each other, each of whom runs one machine managing one shard of the blockchain.

Rewards, and the decision as to which chain is final, has to go to weight of stake, but also to proof of service - to peers, who store and check the blockchain and make it available.

All durable keys should live in client wallets, because they can be secured off the internet. So how do we implement weight of stake, since only peers are actually sufficiently well connected to actually participate in governance?

To solve this problem, stakes are held by client wallets. Stakes that are in the clear get registered with a peer, the registration gets recorded in the blockchain, and the peer is gets influence, and to some extent rewards, proportional to the stake registered with it, conditional on the part it is doing to supply data storage, verification, and bandwidth.