(Times of Israel) Stuxnet, gone rogue, hit Russian nuke plant, space station (fwd)
Hi,
I guess this is news? They say it happened few years ago, but I see it
being reported right now.
Regards,
Tomasz Rola
--
** A C programmer asked whether computer had Buddha's nature. **
** As the answer, master did "rm -rif" on the programmer's home **
** directory. And then the C programmer became enlightened... **
** **
** Tomasz Rola mailto:tomasz_rola@bigfoot.com **
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 20:30:11 +0100 (CET)
From: Tomasz Rola
The software was highly specific and messed with the controller of centrifuges. Speeding it up and slowing it down faster than they should, messing with the bearings (or something like that). I didn't know the ISS had that sort of centrifuges there. Regardless, the protip is: don't windows for critical systems.
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 10:57:43PM +0100, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote:
The software was highly specific and messed with the controller of centrifuges. Speeding it up and slowing it down faster than they should, messing with the bearings (or something like that). I didn't know the ISS had that sort of centrifuges there.
Regardless, the protip is: don't windows for critical systems.
The final payload was specific to the Natanz turbine controllers. The Windows malware delivery mechanism, though, could in theory infect any Windows host it came in contact with (that didn't have the 0days fixed). The intermediate stage attacked the Siemens Step7 software, which runs on Windows and which could potentially be used in space applications (although it seems somewhat unlikely that it would have been used *on* the ISS). The intermediate stage was designed to be inactive unless the specific configuration of hardware found at Natanz was detected, so in theory it should be "safe" even if Step7 were found on an ISS system, but that theory seems risky to depend on. Reading the reports charitably, I would suspect that the Windows malware delivery mechanism might have been transported to the ISS, but would have been inactive there in the absence of a Step7 installation for the intermediate stage to infect. -andy
2013/11/13 Andy Isaacson
Reading the reports charitably, I would suspect that the Windows malware delivery mechanism might have been transported to the ISS, but would have been inactive there in the absence of a Step7 installation for the intermediate stage to infect.
I hadn't thought they'd write it that way. In this way it makes sense. Thank you for your response.
On Tue, 12 Nov 2013, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote:
Regardless, the protip is: don't windows for critical systems.
Wrong lesson. Windows was used, but was not necessary. The lesson here is to reinforce the airgap with restrictions on who and how software and hardware is connected to critical systems. No critical system should be connected to anything other than it's own closed system unless there is an absolutely unavoidable reason (such as code repair). Where the system must be disturbed, nothing that connects to the protected system should be unexamined prior to connection, and the examination should be meticulously performed, by qualified personnel (and there should always be a lab-duplicate upon which all such events are dry-runned). //Alif -- Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable. An American Spring is coming: one way or another.
But what if they use BadBIOS to beam into space on a microwave carrier by modulating the PSU of all infected laptops at once?!
"J.A. Terranson"
On Tue, 12 Nov 2013, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote:
Regardless, the protip is: don't windows for critical systems.
Wrong lesson. Windows was used, but was not necessary. The lesson here is to reinforce the airgap with restrictions on who and how software and hardware is connected to critical systems. No critical system should be connected to anything other than it's own closed system unless there is an absolutely unavoidable reason (such as code repair). Where the system must be disturbed, nothing that connects to the protected system should be unexamined prior to connection, and the examination should be meticulously performed, by qualified personnel (and there should always be a lab-duplicate upon which all such events are dry-runned).
//Alif
-- Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable.
An American Spring is coming: one way or another.
-- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
On Thu, 14 Nov 2013, Cathal Garvey (Phone) wrote:
But what if they use BadBIOS to beam into space on a microwave carrier by modulating the PSU of all infected laptops at once?!
I understand your point, however, we aren't talking about just any old system, we are discussing the most critical parts of electronic infrastructure here. When you've got a computer controlling fission, or power distribution {$your critical infrastructure of choice}, this is simply a Best Practice. Hell, if we can do this for crap like public Internet carriers[1], why is it unreasonable to do this for actual critical systems? //Alif [1] I have worked for or with several internet carriers who enforced this kind of security around their core systems: the smallest was a very small regional carrier, while the largest was a multinational NSP. The only potential losses were dollars - painful but not necessarily fatal, or with any national security interest. If a dipshit regional carrier can do this, a power company failing to do so is simply negligent. And yes, I know that power companies are notoriously casual with their SCADA systems: it makes me crazy to think about it. -- Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable. An American Spring is coming: one way or another.
Also, I was kidding. :)
On Thu, 14 Nov 2013 06:38:10 -0600 (CST)
"J.A. Terranson"
On Thu, 14 Nov 2013, Cathal Garvey (Phone) wrote:
But what if they use BadBIOS to beam into space on a microwave carrier by modulating the PSU of all infected laptops at once?!
I understand your point, however, we aren't talking about just any old system, we are discussing the most critical parts of electronic infrastructure here. When you've got a computer controlling fission, or power distribution {$your critical infrastructure of choice}, this is simply a Best Practice. Hell, if we can do this for crap like public Internet carriers[1], why is it unreasonable to do this for actual critical systems?
//Alif
[1] I have worked for or with several internet carriers who enforced this kind of security around their core systems: the smallest was a very small regional carrier, while the largest was a multinational NSP. The only potential losses were dollars - painful but not necessarily fatal, or with any national security interest. If a dipshit regional carrier can do this, a power company failing to do so is simply negligent.
And yes, I know that power companies are notoriously casual with their SCADA systems: it makes me crazy to think about it.
On Thu, 14 Nov 2013, Cathal Garvey wrote:
Also, I was kidding. :)
It's pretty hard to tell the difference between kidding and sarcasm making an argument I have heard more times than I like to believe: still, I'm glad it was the former and not the latter! //Alif -- Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable. An American Spring is coming: one way or another.
On Thu, 14 Nov 2013 06:38:10 -0600 (CST) "J.A. Terranson"
wrote: On Thu, 14 Nov 2013, Cathal Garvey (Phone) wrote:
But what if they use BadBIOS to beam into space on a microwave carrier by modulating the PSU of all infected laptops at once?!
I understand your point, however, we aren't talking about just any old system, we are discussing the most critical parts of electronic infrastructure here. When you've got a computer controlling fission, or power distribution {$your critical infrastructure of choice}, this is simply a Best Practice. Hell, if we can do this for crap like public Internet carriers[1], why is it unreasonable to do this for actual critical systems?
//Alif
participants (6)
-
Andy Isaacson
-
Cathal Garvey
-
Cathal Garvey (Phone)
-
J.A. Terranson
-
Lodewijk andré de la porte
-
Tomasz Rola