On Monday, October 21, 2019, 04:10:23 AM PDT, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:

On 10/17/19, jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> Okay, I'm not advocating (or opposing) this concept. It just seemed to me
>> that since we are talking TOR-related features, we should pay attention to
>> what TOR currently claims to provide.
>> I think a few months ago, I mentioned the idea (which I assume somebody else
>> thought of first, probably years ago) of splitting a file into two (or
>> more?) pieces, stored in two (or more?) separate systems), which when XOR'd
>> together, provide the (forbidden, banned, 'reallybad!!!' 'highly-illegal')
>> product file. Neither file, alone, would be 'forbidden'.
>> The purpose of this is not 'secrecy' of course, but merely deniability.
>> Without the other file(s), the one file _I_ possess will be
>> indistinguishable from a random number. In fact, it could be a random
>> number, which when XOR'd with a forbidden text, becomes what amounts to
>> another random number, and somebody else's system will hold the other
>> 'random number' . Think Vernam cipher, otherwise known as a "one-time
>> pad". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad

>See the related...
>OFFSystem

One application of using this XOR principle is to avoid the problem of a anonymization output node (TOR or otherwise) containing openly suspicious or incriminating information. If all data through the network splits, before it exits, converted to two (or more???) seemingly-random data steams, outputted by two (or more???) distinct nodes, it can be recombined to regenerate the desired source data.

An individual node's output is simply random data.

Jim Bell