Re: [SlightlyAboveMyPaygrade] The problems with encryption on Android

Nice article Rr +1 : ) On Tue, 15 Aug 2017, Razer wrote:

Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2017 19:54:27 -0700 From: Razer To: "cypherpunks@lists.cpunks.org" Subject: [SlightlyAboveMyPaygrade] The problems with encryption on Android

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The limitations of Android N Encryption

Over the past few years pixelphonewe’ve heard more about smartphone encryption than, quite frankly, most of us expected to hear in a lifetime. We learned that proper encryption can slow down even sophisticated decryption attempts if done correctly. We’ve also learned that incorrect implementations can undo most of that security.

In other words, phone encryption is an area where details matter. For the past few weeks I’ve been looking a bit at Android Nougat’s new file-based encryption to see how well they’ve addressed some of those details in their latest release. The answer, unfortunately, is that there’s still lots of work to do. In this post I’m going to talk about a bit of that.

(As an aside: the inspiration for this post comes from Grugq, who has been loudly and angrily trying to work through these kinks to develop a secure Android phone. So credit where credit is due.)

Background: file and disk encryption

Disk encryption is much older than smartphones. Indeed, early encrypting filesystems date back at least to the early 1990s and proprietary implementations may go back before that. Even in the relatively new area of PCs operating systems, disk encryption has been a built-in feature since the early 2000s.

The typical PC disk encryption system operates as follows. At boot time you enter a password. This is fed through a key derivation function to derive a cryptographic key. If a hardware co-processor is available (e.g., a TPM), your key is further strengthened by “tangling” it with some secrets stored in the hardware. This helps to lock encryption to a particular device.

The actual encryption can be done in one of two different ways:

Full Disk Encryption (FDE) systems (like Truecrypt, BitLocker and FileVault) encrypt disks at the level of disk sectors. This is an all-or-nothing approach, since the encryption drivers won’t necessarily have any idea what files those sectors represent. At the same time, FDE is popular — mainly because it’s extremely easy to implement. File-based Encryption (FBE) systems (like EncFS and eCryptFS) encrypt individual files. This approach requires changes to the filesystem itself, but has the benefit of allowing fine grained access controls where individual files are encrypted using different keys.

Most commercial PC disk encryption software has historically opted to use the full-disk encryption (FDE) approach. Mostly this is just a matter of expediency: FDE is just significantly easier to implement. But philosophically, it also reflects a particular view of what disk encryption was meant to accomplish.

In this view, encryption is an all-or-nothing proposition. Your machine is either on or off; accessible or inaccessible. As long as you make sure to have your laptop stolen only when it’s off, disk encryption will keep you perfectly safe.

So what does this have to do with Android?

Find out, with links: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/11/24/android-n-encryption/

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