As a first relatively easy step towards a generic browser supporting
multiple mixnets this might not be a bad start.

It wrestles control of TBB from TorCorp and with additional protocols
would remove the dependancy on the compromised Tor exit nodes, possibly
even use some sort of 'least cost routing' style of algorithm to spread
traffic across the fastest or most secure network depending on user
preference and based on destination.

Maybe add an element of randomness to mixnet choice as well to make
traffic analysis more difficult :)

Longer term goals should be development of a secure browser from the
ground up, not basing it on any Mozilla/Apple/Google code - and having
it audited.

On 20/08/16 07:40, Mirimir wrote:
> On 08/20/2016 12:04 AM, Александр wrote:
>> Great news.
>>
>> For those who have suggested it there's already plans and a roadmap for the
>>> fork of Tor. Two concurrent networks which are compatible with a singular
>>> browser would greatly diversify the ecosystem and give users more choice.
>>> At this point this is the only way forward imo. More info:
>>> https://rotorbrowser.com
> I don't see the point. As Juan so likes to remind us, Tor design is
> fundamentally flawed, in that it's vulnerable to global adversaries.
> Which, in practice, means US military. So how would a fork not be
> vulnerable as well? Instead, why not develop something better?
>