- cypherpunks@lists.ogf.org

"To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
by griffin＠cryptolab.net 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

This talk is divided into two parts. Morgan Marquis-Boire and Claudio Guarnieri talking about the militarization of the internet in part one, including both targeted and dragnet surveillance in deep-packet inspection. (See also Citizen Labs' work on BlueCoat). In part two, Jake Appelbaum talks about some of the most hardcore and cutting-edge NSA surveillance tactics and equipment. (See also yesterday's Der Spiegel articles). Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZYo9TPyNko Part 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA best, Griffin -- As always, opinions are mine and kittens are cuddly :3 Seriously, go take a kitten break: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=fluffy+kittens

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peertech.org cert [was: DEF CON cell network attacks]
by coderman 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 more details here soon... only 443 should be considered valid - that is, try https://peertech.org first, plain-text must die. and remember lkaglbgpvvcmc6xc.onion in case it becomes necessary Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2b:50:49:6a:55:85:55 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/, CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 Validity Not Before: Dec 3 00:18:04 2013 GMT Not After : Dec 3 00:18:04 2014 GMT Subject: OU=Domain Control Validated, CN=peertech.org Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (4096 bit) Modulus (4096 bit): 00:b7:64:54:f1:2e:3a:ec:11:29:5a:93:1f:ad:f0: 16:8c:9c:eb:d9:0f:49:d2:9d:16:9a:53:a4:60:b6: 23:5b:4f:f3:17:90:77:0a:b3:25:27:f2:27:dd:65: 83:b6:e4:d5:13:b1:3b:97:5d:b5:b9:a9:62:32:4a: 7e:fb:67:73:20:5f:d7:44:52:c8:fc:ca:f8:fb:f1: 4f:d1:9d:94:39:72:12:2b:67:22:4c:0b:dc:7f:31: 34:cf:63:42:f1:c8:3d:ed:7c:de:2f:e2:63:e1:a2: 0a:c9:e6:86:dd:3f:39:73:af:01:58:d7:6d:59:7a: 51:d0:b7:bb:4c:8d:5f:1e:43:10:da:96:09:67:56: 2f:38:f6:a8:44:a7:96:9a:5c:bc:3e:6c:d6:d1:b6: 96:80:34:c8:88:84:4e:2e:06:14:0f:c5:f2:11:ff: f6:15:06:f2:25:e7:d2:1a:8d:62:ef:5c:0e:fb:44: 8e:73:da:96:23:26:03:62:5c:2b:e6:70:5c:87:76: d3:21:59:83:57:ac:56:15:bd:4f:25:fb:df:10:ec: 0e:56:fa:44:c8:8b:a4:97:ea:b1:98:71:3b:51:78: 79:ee:33:cf:b5:a5:68:15:86:9f:31:70:ee:8f:2f: f4:53:32:b7:99:4f:67:21:db:1e:5d:4f:dc:5b:5d: 59:fd:30:3e:a2:04:22:13:76:05:4c:44:d6:08:fe: b5:42:5f:b5:4a:38:4f:3d:eb:ea:59:63:ab:27:87: 7e:c4:46:3b:96:75:41:be:85:7e:e8:b5:8a:d4:11: aa:cc:6a:28:b9:50:a3:f4:45:e2:50:d5:1f:6c:bf: b8:ba:07:10:20:f8:7f:94:ec:15:d7:39:a6:fe:df: 65:78:1d:60:2c:b0:b1:76:40:82:b5:0f:d6:c8:e3: 8b:bb:f3:04:ff:80:e3:de:fc:2c:32:0e:21:13:d5: bd:38:94:a1:c8:53:da:c7:3b:a9:a5:c1:70:ea:89: ef:a7:f8:04:35:41:7e:38:05:73:ff:76:8a:c1:92: 7f:03:b8:76:48:b9:f6:61:b1:c5:22:be:b9:36:73: de:0e:b8:36:4a:9c:c5:66:3b:63:2c:be:4f:20:75: 94:03:d8:05:d0:78:12:df:77:d8:17:51:7e:3c:24: 7f:cc:c6:8e:2a:f7:bc:f8:5c:29:64:bb:10:42:4d: c0:83:64:6f:da:78:14:52:2e:97:49:e8:5d:7f:38: 36:3d:5a:5d:7c:44:71:28:21:04:6e:24:f5:f8:59: 93:1f:e9:d1:3e:6d:6d:db:93:57:8f:44:74:d6:64: e9:2b:b6:33:fd:16:81:92:29:a5:80:6a:1f:2b:78: 66:d3:ed Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:http://crl.godaddy.com/gdig2s1-6.crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1 CPS: http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/ Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.godaddy.com/ CA Issuers - URI:http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:40:C2:BD:27:8E:CC:34:83:30:A2:33:D7:FB:6C:B3:F0:B4:2C:80:CE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:peertech.org, DNS:www.peertech.org X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: C6:5E:C0:43:56:84:2E:11:A3:35:C8:AC:A9:70:96:7B:A5:2E:5B:77 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption b1:ea:a9:16:b6:9c:56:f4:59:99:df:36:69:92:a5:57:48:df: 70:55:a6:1f:5b:51:74:b4:d1:d7:5a:f6:71:e6:92:f2:56:14: 07:f4:2c:14:06:50:4a:e6:f8:32:8c:a1:ed:4b:25:50:fa:05: 99:01:74:db:45:ae:c2:ca:dc:f3:e7:ad:50:1b:12:c2:1e:ea: c8:19:41:db:b0:eb:f1:0c:c7:ba:af:c2:08:9e:7d:3c:c9:de: 5d:7f:ff:9e:c3:cc:54:bd:ac:1f:24:47:17:ae:ba:75:b7:0b: b7:ee:3b:3a:ba:2a:f7:19:19:1a:98:56:35:34:16:8a:ec:ac: 50:f0:45:7c:06:5a:fe:b1:d8:8b:13:94:5b:2c:1c:3d:b6:df: f9:79:69:b0:75:68:b3:e5:01:8e:90:85:bc:bf:92:47:ba:d0: 9c:8c:5d:28:d6:d3:17:58:96:76:ed:bf:65:75:7c:25:58:57: 2f:52:ae:9f:a9:a1:35:92:ca:28:13:b6:ae:a8:89:cf:ce:a6: cd:31:28:42:f7:66:9d:de:38:0d:4c:d5:ae:49:6c:db:92:28: a2:7c:4a:18:8e:7b:b6:0a:c9:d4:8d:0a:82:d4:04:a6:d0:3d: 8c:a6:37:ac:16:98:bd:79:49:83:60:7f:b5:dc:d7:80:aa:5d: ae:f7:11:eb - 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Fwd: [liberationtech] Commotion Wireless source code & downloads
by coderman 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Griffin Boyce <griffin(a)cryptolab.net> Date: Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 8:54 PM Subject: Commotion Wireless source code & downloads Hi all, Just wanted to shoot a couple of links to the source code for Commotion, since there seemed to be some confusion. The project is kind of huge ^_^;; Source for all packages on github: https://github.com/opentechinstitute Pre-built router images: https://commotionwireless.net/download/routers NOTE: signing key for images is: 0x55A525F8EFE57820BA2A40F7D3F54B1ED01D01F1 Base repo for routers: https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-router (as part of the build process, it pulls in numerous other repos, so be sure to check the make files if you want to hack on it) Android apk: https://commotionwireless.net/download/android Commotion Linux (developer release): https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-linux-py Documentation: https://commotionwireless.net/docs/cck (It's also on github and we accept patches!) https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-docs/ This project is really important to all of us, so if there's a dead link or you find a bug, or you think usability could be improved in some way, or the documentation doesn't cover you -- LET US KNOW! We're all really friendly and are always happy to accept patches or rewrite instructions if that's what's needed. best, Griffin Boyce (Happy New Year!)

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Jim Bell comes to Cypherpunks?
by Jim Bell 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

Since the issue was just raised about me needing a PGP key (presumably, for now, just for signing purposes), it occurred to me that the best way to get that key signed would be for me to attend a meeting of Cypherpunks. Since many such meetings occur in the Bay Area (San Francisco and environs) I could come from Vancouver Washington (Just across the Columbia river from Portland) and attend an upcoming Cypherpunks meeting. What I'd appreciate would be a local who could provide transportation (I don't do 'credit card' and they probably wouldn't rent a car to me if I did!), and possibly a place to stay for 2-3 days. Does this sound like a plan? I could bring my BOP (Bureau of Prisons) ID, smuggled out when I was released, and auction it off for bitcoins, to pay for my expenses. (It's sure to be a collector's item someday!) Jim Bell

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Fw: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
by Jim Bell 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

From: James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 2:54 PM Subject: Re: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany "James A. Donald" >> As to Swartz he didn't commit any real crime so he never was, or pretended >> to be, 'above the law'. >Accessing someone else's computers without permission to obtain the >information therein is trespass. The powerful trespass against the less >powerful. He had mistaken ideas about how powerful he was. My understanding (from reading the Wikipedia article on Swartz an hour ago) was that he accessed "PACER" information. ( http://www.pacer.gov/ ) The information in PACER (which I have used a few times before, for example to access the docket for fake, forged, fraudulent "appeal" case 99-30210) is simply Federal court case files. (Dockets; filings). This material is legally in the public domain: It is not even copyrighted. I don't know if Swartz did anything 'illegal' to get into the computer that had the information, but I doubt that. Incidentally, the charge for PACER documents is now $0.10 per page, but if you run up a charge of less than $15.00 in a calendar quarter, there is no charge. (In other words, less than 150 pages downloaded are free) Jim Bell

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To Protect and Infect Slides
by John Young 31 Dec '13

31 Dec '13

30c3 slides from Jacob Appelbaum: http://cryptome.org/2013/12/appelbaum-30c3.pdf (3.8MB)

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trojan hardware (keyboard black bag implant) circa 2003
by coderman 30 Dec '13

30 Dec '13

out of time, barest gist til next year: back when doing wifi security research and other interests [trunc.] received an FBI black bag job; presumably physical focus due to non standard OSes and FDE. IBM keyboard internal chip replaced with identical logging variant; note that this is not as sophisticated as the more recent TAO toys with covert RF channels and active, on-demand capabilities... the keyboard tampering: https://peertech.org/dist/baghw04.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw05.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw06.jpg which is for all intents and purposes otherwise visually undetectable using this trojan chip technique, tailored for every common manufacturer. while that was not bad, aside from leaking tamper event, the FDE was so sad/funny. a screw amuck, replacement drive significantly different (when compared to identical lot mate purchased with original that got yanked for offline attack) https://peertech.org/dist/baghw01.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw02.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw03.jpg --- in a round about manner this was all instigated in part by wifi research done at the time which put various powerful entities into a tiff. here's what the pacNW sample looked like back in early 2003: https://peertech.org/archives/wifi-scan/ "Cleartext Nodes: 8755 (62.59%) , WEP Nodes: 5232 (37.40%)" ... ah, memories :) --- one last fun learning by example: consider that you thwart direct physical access black bag type attempts, and are not running a vulnerable router/CPE, and present a sufficiently compelling target, you may encounter a clever "just outside the property line" isolation and active attack on DOCSIS uplink. (a broadcast medium is hard to mess with in a covert manner, unless you're able to isolate target from the local broadcast loop itself.) https://peertech.org/dist/docsis-mitm.jpg (circa 2007 - make note of image comments and also single "Comcast tech" shielding self behind door...)

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30c3: To Protect And Infect, Part 2
by coderman 30 Dec '13

30 Dec '13

so much asking for names, details, conspirators. so many months and months of nearly zero satisfaction. ... until: kudos Jake for delivering; specifically. :) "[QI vector] 30c3: To Protect And Infect, Part 2" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA --- you can argue some subset of these attacks are exercised in a targeted manner, however, this does nothing to prevent collateral damage to domestic and global individuals, indiscriminately. fuck these guys![0] best regards, 0. fuck you, at least in so far as your offensive efforts to undermine privacy and liberty in the name of route tasking without restraint. to those who go privacy tech repurpose, i will sing your praises and support your efforts!

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automated crash reporting XKeyscore hooks
by coderman 29 Dec '13

29 Dec '13

seems automated processes are a great XKeyscore source: "in practical terms, the NSA's agents... enjoy it because it allows them [a "neat way" to gain "passive access" to a machine] ... In one internal graphic, they replaced the text of Microsoft's original error message with one of their own reading, "This information may be intercepted by a foreign sigint system to gather detailed information and better exploit your machine." --- http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-… Inside TAO Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit By SPIEGEL Staff The NSA's TAO hacking unit is considered to be the intelligence agency's top secret weapon. It maintains its own covert network, infiltrates computers around the world and even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant back doors in electronics ordered by those it is targeting. In January 2010, numerous homeowners in San Antonio, Texas, stood baffled in front of their closed garage doors. They wanted to drive to work or head off to do their grocery shopping, but their garage door openers had gone dead, leaving them stranded. No matter how many times they pressed the buttons, the doors didn't budge. The problem primarily affected residents in the western part of the city, around Military Drive and the interstate highway known as Loop 410. In the United States, a country of cars and commuters, the mysterious garage door problem quickly became an issue for local politicians. Ultimately, the municipal government solved the riddle. Fault for the error lay with the United States' foreign intelligence service, the National Security Agency, which has offices in San Antonio. Officials at the agency were forced to admit that one of the NSA's radio antennas was broadcasting at the same frequency as the garage door openers. Embarrassed officials at the intelligence agency promised to resolve the issue as quickly as possible, and soon the doors began opening again. It was thanks to the garage door opener episode that Texans learned just how far the NSA's work had encroached upon their daily lives. For quite some time now, the intelligence agency has maintained a branch with around 2,000 employees at Lackland Air Force Base, also in San Antonio. In 2005, the agency took over a former Sony computer chip plant in the western part of the city. A brisk pace of construction commenced inside this enormous compound. The acquisition of the former chip factory at Sony Place was part of a massive expansion the agency began after the events of Sept. 11, 2001. On-Call Digital Plumbers One of the two main buildings at the former plant has since housed a sophisticated NSA unit, one that has benefited the most from this expansion and has grown the fastest in recent years -- the Office of Tailored Access Operations, or TAO. This is the NSA's top operative unit -- something like a squad of plumbers that can be called in when normal access to a target is blocked. According to internal NSA documents viewed by SPIEGEL, these on-call digital plumbers are involved in many sensitive operations conducted by American intelligence agencies. TAO's area of operations ranges from counterterrorism to cyber attacks to traditional espionage. The documents reveal just how diversified the tools at TAO's disposal have become -- and also how it exploits the technical weaknesses of the IT industry, from Microsoft to Cisco and Huawei, to carry out its discreet and efficient attacks. The unit is "akin to the wunderkind of the US intelligence community," says Matthew Aid, a historian who specializes in the history of the NSA. "Getting the ungettable" is the NSA's own description of its duties. "It is not about the quantity produced but the quality of intelligence that is important," one former TAO chief wrote, describing her work in a document. The paper seen by SPIEGEL quotes the former unit head stating that TAO has contributed "some of the most significant intelligence our country has ever seen." The unit, it goes on, has "access to our very hardest targets." A Unit Born of the Internet Defining the future of her unit at the time, she wrote that TAO "needs to continue to grow and must lay the foundation for integrated Computer Network Operations," and that it must "support Computer Network Attacks as an integrated part of military operations." To succeed in this, she wrote, TAO would have to acquire "pervasive, persistent access on the global network." An internal description of TAO's responsibilities makes clear that aggressive attacks are an explicit part of the unit's tasks. In other words, the NSA's hackers have been given a government mandate for their work. During the middle part of the last decade, the special unit succeeded in gaining access to 258 targets in 89 countries -- nearly everywhere in the world. In 2010, it conducted 279 operations worldwide. Indeed, TAO specialists have directly accessed the protected networks of democratically elected leaders of countries. They infiltrated networks of European telecommunications companies and gained access to and read mails sent over Blackberry's BES email servers, which until then were believed to be securely encrypted. Achieving this last goal required a "sustained TAO operation," one document states. This TAO unit is born of the Internet -- created in 1997, a time when not even 2 percent of the world's population had Internet access and no one had yet thought of Facebook, YouTube or Twitter. From the time the first TAO employees moved into offices at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, the unit was housed in a separate wing, set apart from the rest of the agency. Their task was clear from the beginning -- to work around the clock to find ways to hack into global communications traffic. Recruiting the Geeks To do this, the NSA needed a new kind of employee. The TAO workers authorized to access the special, secure floor on which the unit is located are for the most part considerably younger than the average NSA staff. Their job is breaking into, manipulating and exploiting computer networks, making them hackers and civil servants in one. Many resemble geeks -- and act the part too. Indeed, it is from these very circles that the NSA recruits new hires for its Tailored Access Operations unit. In recent years, NSA Director Keith Alexander has made several appearances at major hacker conferences in the United States. Sometimes, Alexander wears his military uniform, but at others, he even dons jeans and a t-shirt in his effort to court trust and a new generation of employees. The recruitment strategy seems to have borne fruit. Certainly, few if any other divisions within the agency are growing as quickly as TAO. There are now TAO units in Wahiawa, Hawaii; Fort Gordon, Georgia; at the NSA's outpost at Buckley Air Force Base, near Denver, Colorado; at its headquarters in Fort Meade; and, of course, in San Antonio. One trail also leads to Germany. According to a document dating from 2010 that lists the "Lead TAO Liaisons" domestically and abroad as well as names, email addresses and the number for their "Secure Phone," a liaison office is located near Frankfurt -- the European Security Operations Center (ESOC) at the so-called "Dagger Complex" at a US military compound in the Griesheim suburb of Darmstadt. But it is the growth of the unit's Texas branch that has been uniquely impressive, the top secret documents reviewed by SPIEGEL show. These documents reveal that in 2008, the Texas Cryptologic Center employed fewer than 60 TAO specialists. By 2015, the number is projected to grow to 270 employees. In addition, there are another 85 specialists in the "Requirements & Targeting" division (up from 13 specialists in 2008). The number of software developers is expected to increase from the 2008 level of three to 38 in 2015. The San Antonio office handles attacks against targets in the Middle East, Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia, not to mention Mexico, just 200 kilometers (124 miles) away, where the government has fallen into the NSA's crosshairs. Targeting Mexico Mexico's Secretariat of Public Security, which was folded into the new National Security Commission at the beginning of 2013, was responsible at the time for the country's police, counterterrorism, prison system and border police. Most of the agency's nearly 20,000 employees worked at its headquarters on Avenida Constituyentes, an important traffic artery in Mexico City. A large share of the Mexican security authorities under the auspices of the Secretariat are supervised from the offices there, making Avenida Constituyentes a one-stop shop for anyone seeking to learn more about the country's security apparatus. Operation WHITETAMALE That considered, assigning the TAO unit responsible for tailored operations to target the Secretariat makes a lot of sense. After all, one document states, the US Department of Homeland Security and the United States' intelligence agencies have a need to know everything about the drug trade, human trafficking and security along the US-Mexico border. The Secretariat presents a potential "goldmine" for the NSA's spies, a document states. The TAO workers selected systems administrators and telecommunications engineers at the Mexican agency as their targets, thus marking the start of what the unit dubbed Operation WHITETAMALE. Workers at NSA's target selection office, which also had Angela Merkel in its sights in 2002 before she became chancellor, sent TAO a list of officials within the Mexican Secretariat they thought might make interesting targets. As a first step, TAO penetrated the target officials' email accounts, a relatively simple job. Next, they infiltrated the entire network and began capturing data. Soon the NSA spies had knowledge of the agency's servers, including IP addresses, computers used for email traffic and individual addresses of diverse employees. They also obtained diagrams of the security agencies' structures, including video surveillance. It appears the operation continued for years until SPIEGEL first reported on it in October. The technical term for this type of activity is "Computer Network Exploitation" (CNE). The goal here is to "subvert endpoint devices," according to an internal NSA presentation that SPIEGEL has viewed. The presentation goes on to list nearly all the types of devices that run our digital lives -- "servers, workstations, firewalls, routers, handsets, phone switches, SCADA systems, etc." SCADAs are industrial control systems used in factories, as well as in power plants. Anyone who can bring these systems under their control has the potential to knock out parts of a country's critical infrastructure. The most well-known and notorious use of this type of attack was the development of Stuxnet, the computer worm whose existence was discovered in June 2010. The virus was developed jointly by American and Israeli intelligence agencies to sabotage Iran's nuclear program, and successfully so. The country's nuclear program was set back by years after Stuxnet manipulated the SCADA control technology used at Iran's uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz, rendering up to 1,000 centrifuges unusable. The special NSA unit has its own development department in which new technologies are developed and tested. This division is where the real tinkerers can be found, and their inventiveness when it comes to finding ways to infiltrate other networks, computers and smartphones evokes a modern take on Q, the legendary gadget inventor in James Bond movies. Having Fun at Microsoft's Expense One example of the sheer creativity with which the TAO spies approach their work can be seen in a hacking method they use that exploits the error-proneness of Microsoft's Windows. Every user of the operating system is familiar with the annoying window that occasionally pops up on screen when an internal problem is detected, an automatic message that prompts the user to report the bug to the manufacturer and to restart the program. These crash reports offer TAO specialists a welcome opportunity to spy on computers. When TAO selects a computer somewhere in the world as a target and enters its unique identifiers (an IP address, for example) into the corresponding database, intelligence agents are then automatically notified any time the operating system of that computer crashes and its user receives the prompt to report the problem to Microsoft. An internal presentation suggests it is NSA's powerful XKeyscore spying tool that is used to fish these crash reports out of the massive sea of Internet traffic. The automated crash reports are a "neat way" to gain "passive access" to a machine, the presentation continues. Passive access means that, initially, only data the computer sends out into the Internet is captured and saved, but the computer itself is not yet manipulated. Still, even this passive access to error messages provides valuable insights into problems with a targeted person's computer and, thus, information on security holes that might be exploitable for planting malware or spyware on the unwitting victim's computer. Although the method appears to have little importance in practical terms, the NSA's agents still seem to enjoy it because it allows them to have a bit of a laugh at the expense of the Seattle-based software giant. In one internal graphic, they replaced the text of Microsoft's original error message with one of their own reading, "This information may be intercepted by a foreign sigint system to gather detailed information and better exploit your machine." ("Sigint" stands for "signals intelligence.") One of the hackers' key tasks is the offensive infiltration of target computers with so-called implants or with large numbers of Trojans. They've bestowed their spying tools with illustrious monikers like "ANGRY NEIGHBOR," "HOWLERMONKEY" or "WATERWITCH." These names may sound cute, but the tools they describe are both aggressive and effective. According to details in Washington's current budget plan for the US intelligence services, around 85,000 computers worldwide are projected to be infiltrated by the NSA specialists by the end of this year. By far the majority of these "implants" are conducted by TAO teams via the Internet. Increasing Sophistication Until just a few years ago, NSA agents relied on the same methods employed by cyber criminals to conduct these implants on computers. They sent targeted attack emails disguised as spam containing links directing users to virus-infected websites. With sufficient knowledge of an Internet browser's security holes -- Microsoft's Internet Explorer, for example, is especially popular with the NSA hackers -- all that is needed to plant NSA malware on a person's computer is for that individual to open a website that has been specially crafted to compromise the user's computer. Spamming has one key drawback though: It doesn't work very often. Nevertheless, TAO has dramatically improved the tools at its disposal. It maintains a sophisticated toolbox known internally by the name "QUANTUMTHEORY." "Certain QUANTUM missions have a success rate of as high as 80%, where spam is less than 1%," one internal NSA presentation states. A comprehensive internal presentation titled "QUANTUM CAPABILITIES," which SPIEGEL has viewed, lists virtually every popular Internet service provider as a target, including Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter and YouTube. "NSA QUANTUM has the greatest success against Yahoo, Facebook and static IP addresses," it states. The presentation also notes that the NSA has been unable to employ this method to target users of Google services. Apparently, that can only be done by Britain's GCHQ intelligence service, which has acquired QUANTUM tools from the NSA. A favored tool of intelligence service hackers is "QUANTUMINSERT." GCHQ workers used this method to attack the computers of employees at partly government-held Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom, in order to use their computers to penetrate even further into the company's networks. The NSA, meanwhile, used the same technology to target high-ranking members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the organization's Vienna headquarters. In both cases, the trans-Atlantic spying consortium gained unhindered access to valuable economic data using these tools. The NSA's Shadow Network The insert method and other variants of QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow network operated by the NSA alongside the Internet, with its own, well-hidden infrastructure comprised of "covert" routers and servers. It appears the NSA also incorporates routers and servers from non-NSA networks into its covert network by infecting these networks with "implants" that then allow the government hackers to control the computers remotely. (Click here to read a related article on the NSA's "implants".) In this way, the intelligence service seeks to identify and track its targets based on their digital footprints. These identifiers could include certain email addresses or website cookies set on a person's computer. Of course, a cookie doesn't automatically identify a person, but it can if it includes additional information like an email address. In that case, a cookie becomes something like the web equivalent of a fingerprint. A Race Between Servers Once TAO teams have gathered sufficient data on their targets' habits, they can shift into attack mode, programming the QUANTUM systems to perform this work in a largely automated way. If a data packet featuring the email address or cookie of a target passes through a cable or router monitored by the NSA, the system sounds the alarm. It determines what website the target person is trying to access and then activates one of the intelligence service's covert servers, known by the codename FOXACID. This NSA server coerces the user into connecting to NSA covert systems rather than the intended sites. In the case of Belgacom engineers, instead of reaching the LinkedIn page they were actually trying to visit, they were also directed to FOXACID servers housed on NSA networks. Undetected by the user, the manipulated page transferred malware already custom tailored to match security holes on the target person's computer. The technique can literally be a race between servers, one that is described in internal intelligence agency jargon with phrases like: "Wait for client to initiate new connection," "Shoot!" and "Hope to beat server-to-client response." Like any competition, at times the covert network's surveillance tools are "too slow to win the race." Often enough, though, they are effective. Implants with QUANTUMINSERT, especially when used in conjunction with LinkedIn, now have a success rate of over 50 percent, according to one internal document. Tapping Undersea Cables At the same time, it is in no way true to say that the NSA has its sights set exclusively on select individuals. Of even greater interest are entire networks and network providers, such as the fiber optic cables that direct a large share of global Internet traffic along the world's ocean floors. One document labeled "top secret" and "not for foreigners" describes the NSA's success in spying on the "SEA-ME-WE-4" cable system. This massive underwater cable bundle connects Europe with North Africa and the Gulf states and then continues on through Pakistan and India, all the way to Malaysia and Thailand. The cable system originates in southern France, near Marseille. Among the companies that hold ownership stakes in it are France Telecom, now known as Orange and still partly government-owned, and Telecom Italia Sparkle. The document proudly announces that, on Feb. 13, 2013, TAO "successfully collected network management information for the SEA-Me-We Undersea Cable Systems (SMW-4)." With the help of a "website masquerade operation," the agency was able to "gain access to the consortium's management website and collected Layer 2 network information that shows the circuit mapping for significant portions of the network." It appears the government hackers succeeded here once again using the QUANTUMINSERT method. The document states that the TAO team hacked an internal website of the operator consortium and copied documents stored there pertaining to technical infrastructure. But that was only the first step. "More operations are planned in the future to collect more information about this and other cable systems," it continues. But numerous internal announcements of successful attacks like the one against the undersea cable operator aren't the exclusive factors that make TAO stand out at the NSA. In contrast to most NSA operations, TAO's ventures often require physical access to their targets. After all, you might have to directly access a mobile network transmission station before you can begin tapping the digital information it provides. Spying Traditions Live On To conduct those types of operations, the NSA works together with other intelligence agencies such as the CIA and FBI, which in turn maintain informants on location who are available to help with sensitive missions. This enables TAO to attack even isolated networks that aren't connected to the Internet. If necessary, the FBI can even make an agency-owned jet available to ferry the high-tech plumbers to their target. This gets them to their destination at the right time and can help them to disappear again undetected after even as little as a half hour's work. Responding to a query from SPIEGEL, NSA officials issued a statement saying, "Tailored Access Operations is a unique national asset that is on the front lines of enabling NSA to defend the nation and its allies." The statement added that TAO's "work is centered on computer network exploitation in support of foreign intelligence collection." The officials said they would not discuss specific allegations regarding TAO's mission. Sometimes it appears that the world's most modern spies are just as reliant on conventional methods of reconnaissance as their predecessors. Take, for example, when they intercept shipping deliveries. If a target person, agency or company orders a new computer or related accessories, for example, TAO can divert the shipping delivery to its own secret workshops. The NSA calls this method interdiction. At these so-called "load stations," agents carefully open the package in order to load malware onto the electronics, or even install hardware components that can provide backdoor access for the intelligence agencies. All subsequent steps can then be conducted from the comfort of a remote computer. These minor disruptions in the parcel shipping business rank among the "most productive operations" conducted by the NSA hackers, one top secret document relates in enthusiastic terms. This method, the presentation continues, allows TAO to obtain access to networks "around the world." Even in the Internet Age, some traditional spying methods continue to live on. REPORTED BY JACOB APPELBAUM, LAURA POITRAS, MARCEL ROSENBACH, CHRISTIAN STÖCKER, JÖRG SCHINDLER AND HOLGER STARK URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-…

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30c3: The Year in Crypto default engines loaded in openssl-1.x through openssl-1.0.1e]
by coderman 29 Dec '13

29 Dec '13

in 30c3: The Year in Crypto with djb, Nadia Heninger, Tanja Lange http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fty107Us7oc at ~28min discussion of RDRAND, Intel's pass the buck to NIST no-comment, (after initial "just trust us, we looked at a lab sample close" didn't fly far enough...) alt slides: hyperelliptic.org/tanja/vortraege/talk-30C3.pdf also, Tor 0.2.4.20 (Mon Dec 23 07:21:35 UTC 2013) updates to avoid direct RDRAND use in specific circumstances: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-December/031483.html per previous discussion on OpenSSL use of RDRAND directly when engines on.[0] TL; DR - very rare case you may want to re-gen relay and hidden service keys now,, you may wonder if IETF could apply resistance to NSA seducing of NIST, but you'd be stepping into a quagmire :P http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/critics-nsa-agent-co-chairing-key-c… http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03554.html [specifically, all of Dan Harkins "appeals for legitimacy" bear striking resemblance to other demonstratively failed approaches to failure by default designs. Dragonfly is not sufficiently justified. insert pleas to appeal to decency and step away from CFRG and IETF authority roles for propriety sake, regardless of any reasonable claims or other implications best exemplified by RSA[1]] also,, SIMON and SPECK is lulz; no really: fuck those guys! and remember that AES GCM is a choice between: - user-land side channels galore /or/ - hardware instruction back-door . . 2013 was indeed a year for crypto let's not do this again soon? best regards, 0. "BADRAND and testing OpenSSL engines enabled behavior with direct RDRAND engine" https://peertech.org/goodrand BADRAND lets you link a test version of your application or library against OpenSSL 1.0.1e that uses a specific sequence of deterministic "random numbers" in OpenSSL. e.g. standard C lib function rand() seeded at zero replacing RDRAND. the debug logging to stderr can identify bad fork() assumptions. 1. Dual-EC-DRBG is bad and RSA should feel bad. No excuses. https://gist.github.com/0xabad1dea/8101758 IETF standards not a good reference for "formal proof" level thoroughness, and highly deployed does not mean highly used nor scrutinized (WEP, LEAP, OpenSSL's Dual_EC_DRBG implementation, [the set is large]) X. "see that one top post ..." [was: RDRAND used directly when... On Sat, Dec 14, 2013 at 4:33 AM, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > as per the FreeBSD announcement[0] and others[1][2] direct use of > RDRAND as sole entropy source is not recommended...

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