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SO... APPARENTLY THEY DECIDED TO TAKE THE INTERNET
by Cari Machet 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

https://www.ourinternet.org/#commission -- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet(a)gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited.

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Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Any plans for drafts or discussions on here? (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

Interesting thread going on at dsfjdssdfsd(a)ietf.org. Forwarded for our collective interest and amusement. //Alif -- Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable. An American Spring is coming: one way or another. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 23:38:07 +0100 From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr(a)gmail.com> To: Michael Hammer <michael.hammer(a)yaanatech.com> Cc: "dsfjdssdfsd(a)ietf.org" <dsfjdssdfsd(a)ietf.org>, "ietf(a)hosed.org" <ietf(a)hosed.org> Subject: Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] Any plans for drafts or discussions on here? Michael Hammer (at Thursday, January 23, 2014, 9:49:32 PM): > This may get off-topic, but are there good software tools for testing > entropy, > that could help applications determine if the underlying system is giving > them good input? disclaimer: i'm no expert, it is just what i gathered. (i'm pretty much interested in randomness.) short answer: no long answer: in some situations yes. if you are handed a bunch of data, all you can do is to try different techniques to put an upper limit on the entropy. for example you can calculate the shannon entropy assuming independent bits. then you can hypothesize some interdependence, and see if you can compress the data. you can apply different lossless compression methods. the better compression you find puts an upper limit on the entropy. but never a lower limit. you can only do better if you have an idea about the process that created the data. for example you might assume that it is mostly thermal noise. you can assume that thermal noise has some frequency distribution, or energy or whatever, etc. within this assumption, you can determine the entropy content by measurements. but at this point, you are pretty much prone to two errors: 1, what if your assumption is wrong and 2, what if your physical model overestimates the unpredictability of the given system. example for the former: the signal might be largely controllable by an external EM interference, and then you measure not noise, but attacker controlled data. example for the latter: a smartass scientist might come up with a better physical model for thermal noise. it is also important to note that entropy is observer dependent. we actually talk about the entropy as seen by the attacker. but it is not straightforward to assess what is actually visible to an attacker and what is not. observation methods improve with time. _______________________________________________ dsfjdssdfsd mailing list dsfjdssdfsd(a)ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dsfjdssdfsd

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Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] software tools for testing entropy (was: Any plans for drafts or discussions on here?) (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

The thread continues... //Alif -- Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable. An American Spring is coming: one way or another. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 16:32:25 -0800 From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges(a)KingsMountain.com> To: IETF Pseudorandom Number Generator PRNG discussion list <dsfjdssdfsd(a)ietf.org> Subject: Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] software tools for testing entropy (was: Any plans for drafts or discussions on here?) > are there good software tools for testing entropy, that could help > applications determine if the underlying system is giving them good > input? well, from.. [0] Akram, Raja Naeem, Konstantinos Markantonakis, and Keith Mayes. "Pseudorandom Number Generation in Smart Cards: An Implementation, Performance and Randomness Analysis." New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), 2012 5th International Conference on. IEEE, 2012. http://digirep.rhul.ac.uk/file/315c7a7e-4963-4a62-189f-4ad198a79f30/5/Paper… ..there's the sections reproduced at [1] below which may (or may not) be helpful. also, NIST has these resources.. NIST SP 800-22: A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Application. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-22-rev1a/SP800-22rev1a.pdf Random Number Generators (RNG) Testing Requirements: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html#04 RNG Test Vectors http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/rngtestvectors.zip One could also ask the authors of [0] if they might share their impl. hth, =JeffH [1] E. Experimental Proof To provide experimental proof, the NIST statistical test suite was applied. Each algorithm was provided with a common seed file, and generated sequences from it were saved in a binary file. This binary file was used as input to the statistical test. Point to note here is that seed files given to all algorithms were the same. The reason for doing so was to analyse differences in the quality of output while using the same entropy source. For statistical analysis, each algorithm was executed to generate 1,048,578 pseudorandom sequences of 128 bits. Concatenating the outputs into a binary file that was then used for NIST SP 800-22 statistical analysis. The results of each algorithm are listed in Appendix A. Taking into account the Common Criteria AIS 20 [18], our implementation fulfils the requirements for the K4 DRNG. Below is the discussion on how our implementation satisfies these requirements. 1) K1 DRNG: Its a simple requirement that states that if the generated values is of set C =f c1, c2, c3, .., cm g then all members of the set should be distinct regardless of the statistical properties. 2) K2 DRNG: Requires that the implementation should satisfy the statistical properties such as monobit test, poker test and tests on runs. Our implementations were subjected to the NIST SP 800-22 test suite. 3) K3 DRNG: This requires that the entropy of the PRNG is at least 80. All SHA based algorithms has 440 bits seed and block cipher based algorithms has 128 bits seed. All of the seed values were chosen from an external high entropy source that is carefully tested. 4) K4 DRNG: This level requires that the PRNG should be forward-secure. A PRNG is forward-secure if after n iteration of the PRNG, a malicious user is unable to guess the internal state of the generator. The implemented PRNG feed back to the internal seed that is changing in each of the iterations. Furthermore, block cipher based implementation of the PRNG use different key in each of the iterations. Even retrieving a cryptographic key would not help a malicious user to successfully know the entire state of the seed file. In our implementations we tested SHA and block cipher based algorithms for the PRNGs. In general block cipher based algorithms, only a single key is used for the entire lifetime of the generator. However, we have tested that a PRNG could be modified to use a new key on each execution of the generator. The internal key generation mechanism of the block cipher based PRNG implementations are light weight and they do not hamper the overall performance of the generator. Therefore, it could be argued that it provides a more secure block cipher based PRNG then an PRNG that only uses a single key for entire lifetime. Table IV details the percentage of passing sequences pro duced by individual algorithms. As it is evident from table III and IV, there is not a big difference between the implemented algorithms both in terms of performance and percentage of sequence passing the NIST statistical tests. Of particular note, if we take the accumulated average of the passing sequences percentage in the table IV an interesting result emerges. The SHA-1 performs comparative better than other algorithms and AES based PRNG has the least accumulated average of passing sequence as illustrated in figure 4. This measure represents the randomness of the generated sequences - not the security of the algorithm. If we also account for the performance, SHA based algorithms perform better than the encryption based algorithms (e.g. DES and AES). V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ... Our research into the possibility of using a test suite like NIST SP 800-SP to check pseudorandom number generators in smart cards has showed that it is a workable concept. The tests listed in the NIST SP 800-22 are substantially more then the one recommended for the smart card pseudorandom number generators in AIS20 [18] and AIS31 [13]. This research has demonstrated that even with limited resources and an entropy constrained environment like a smart card, good quality pseudorandom sequences can be generated that can satisfy all the requirements for a PRNG even the ones that are used for general purpose computers. ... --- end _______________________________________________ dsfjdssdfsd mailing list dsfjdssdfsd(a)ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dsfjdssdfsd

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Internet/cell phones blocked in Eastern Ukraine?
by rysiek 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

Hi there, I just got wind that Internet and cell phones are being blocked/disabled in Eastern Ukraine. Can anybody confirm this in any way? -- Pozdr rysiek

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[OT] Note to new-ish subscribers: you joined a mailing list, not a "group". (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 24 Jan '14

24 Jan '14

Resent to the new "cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org" address, as the old address is experiencing some kind of random delivery issue - my apologies if the copies sent to the old address show up [much] delayed, as seems to happen about half the time... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2014 02:25:27 -0600 (CST) From: J.A. Terranson <measl(a)mfn.org> To: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net Subject: [OT] Note to new-ish subscribers: you joined a mailing list, not a "group". In response to several off-list emails, I believe that the Millenials Amongst Us (tm) may have a slightly off-kilter view of "What are CP's"? "cypherpunks are "doctors, lawyers, mathematicians, felons, druggies, anti-druggies, anarchists, libertarians, right-wing fanatics, left-wing fanatics, teachers, housewives, househusbands, students, cops and criminals,"[1] What I was [unsuccessfully] trying to point out to this Idjit was that the CP mailing list is *just* a mailing list: you have not joined "A Group", a "Political Party", or any other kind of organized "thing". You simply subscribed to a mailing list - that's it. There is only *one* universal position, or philosophy if you will: CP is a bunch of otherwise unconnected and likely opposite people (cops/criminals. felons/druggies & right wingers/left wingers, etc), who share a central concern over privacy and privacy enabling tools. Privacy is the ONLY thing that everyone here shares [in theory anyway]. There is NO GROUP. There is NO LEADER. There is NO RIGHT or WRONG "WAY"! Except for flat out trolling, there is ONLY one thing that binds all CP subscribers together: concern over privacy (digital or analog). From that concern for privacy flows a desire to contribute: some people write code, some people host code (remailers, TOR exit nodes, etc), but we all *use* code created and/or nursed along here, whether you realize it or not, so contribute some brain cells ;-) Play nice with others. Or don't - doesn't really matter, right? Yes, that was rhetorical. Grr... Got a little sidetracked there with the contribute some brain cells crap... Back to the point I was poorly making in the middle of the night (on 2 days with no sleep, waaaay too much caffiene, and, and ...). The *instant* you start believing that you have "joined a group" or some such nonsense, you'll find yourself in shackles: no bullshit, do your homework. *************************************************************************** * * * This list has a long history (day 2 pretty much) of both covert and * * overt monitoring by the Real Deal in Federal "Service": from Attorney's * * General [federal and state], to FBI to IRS and all the way down the * * alphabet - they all watch this list. So be aware of what you say, and * * how you say it. More than one list subscriber has done *serious* * * prison time for things they posted to this list: * * * * Think BEFORE you post. * * [2] * *************************************************************************** Last, but not least: Trolls.... Consider carefully whether a troll might not be a provocateur: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_provocateur It would not be the first time an Agent of the Federal Oligarchy has posted something here hoping to get a reaction that could be [and was] prosecuted using whatever Law-Of-The-Day was available for stretching that day. Look at my .sig. Go ahead - I'll wait till you get back. ... ... Pretty tame, right? Not so. I got "An Interview [3]" for it. Seriously. Don't fuck around unless you're willing to let them come for you. And they will: with delight and vengeance turned up to maximum. They will break their own laws, if necessary, when they come for you ("Hi Dennis!"). They don't exactly get written up for bending a law into a shape that nobody - including your Jury - can recognize ("Hi Tom!"). If your jury can't recognize it they WILL do what's expected of them: Convict. You will NOT get a fair trial, and you will NOT get a fair appeal, and nobody will get hurt except *you*. So for fucks sake, be *careful*. If you just can't be careful ("Hi ***"!), at least phrase it in such a way as to have Plausible Deniability[4]. If you can't control that either, at least avoid phrasing things in any way that would point at anyone else as a possible "co-conspirator": if you want to be a fuck up, you alone should be the recipient of your own lazyness. Hrmmmm... I already claimed to have written the "last" paragraph, but I forgot something else: Don't write to people directly (I break this rule a lot for those of you getting ready to say "huh? He just said *what*? Fuck me - we all have our issues), unless they specifically ask you to, or unless you have something to say that is truly private. A lot of people will get *really* Bent Out Of Shape(tm) over this one: it will often break reply-chains, although some people get bent for no reason I can identify - they're just plain fucking crazy. The Crazy Train makes very regular stops to both pickup and deliver to CPs. Get used to it ;-) //Alif -- [1] http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2002/09/55114 [2] People using proportional fonts probably see garbage here: GIGO ;-) [3] They don't call it "Interrogation" anymore. Now you are "Interviewed" into submission. [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plausible_deniability Those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent revolution inevitable. An American Spring is coming: one way or another.

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Fwd: Google Chrome Has a Bug That Lets Any Site Eavesdrop On You
by Gutem 23 Jan '14

23 Jan '14

A Bug? Really? http://gizmodo.com/google-chrome-has-a-bug-that-could-let-anyone-eavesdrop-… http://talater.com/chrome-is-listening/ Att, - Gutem ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Registered Linux User: 562142

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Kiev Protest: Cell/Net LibTech Law
by grarpamp 22 Jan '14

22 Jan '14

http://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/blog/maybe-the-most-orwellian-text-messag… https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPR http://craphound.com/images/dictatorship-en.jpg http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25838962

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Re: What more is there? [infil/exfil]
by Anonymous Remailer (austria) 22 Jan '14

22 Jan '14

On 01/20/2014 07:56 PM, grarpamp wrote:> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Anonymous Remailer (austria) > <mixmaster(a)remailer.privacy.at> wrote: >> > I too wish the leaks would come at a faster pace. But I don't think >> > The pace is ok, it keeps up the pressure. The real question is, > is what remains? More of this same stuff we all knew was happening > anyways? Or is there more deeper stuff we only questioned but > shrugged off due to the hardness/fantasy of it all? > > - decryption of aes? cracked rsa? Unlikely, unless it's buried deep within files that Snowden took. Remember, during his very first few interviews, he encouraged us to continue to use encryption and made the statement "encryption works". He also trusted RSA enough to use it to encrypt communications with Greenwald and Poitris (sp?). > - automatic and global translation to stored text of all voice calls? Very real possibility. Commercial tech is almost there. Assuming government is 3-5 years ahead, they might well have that. But I really don't see that as much of a threat. It just saves analysts time. > - gratuitous unwarranted passing of crimetips to LEA? Likely already being done. In fact, there seems to be some evidence that this has happened in several instances. > - fundamental metadata knowledge of all persons/associations? Probably possible but not really feasible. Too difficult to filter even using selectors. But I'm sure they're close. Still, there are ways to communicate without generating useful metadata so it might not matter. > - political puppetstringing? I'd say this is nearly guaranteed. In fact, I suspect this is why Congress has been so slow to do anything about it. The NSA has them by the balls. If you were running a large, illegal, operation, wouldn't you first gather as much dirt on the people who could shut it down as possible? > I suggest the answer lies in budget analysis... the possibilities > within a well spent budget. Or a seriously conscientious leaker at > the top who is yet to come... since so far Snowden seems limited > to confirming lower level obviousness. Good point. You know what I'd like to see? I'd like to see code. I'd like someone to drop the code to one of these massive systems online for us to analyze. But I suppose documents and program details would be just as useful.

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independently assisting oversight of highly classified programs
by coderman 22 Jan '14

22 Jan '14

per the Schneier brief with congress[0]: """ ... Lofgren asked me to brief her and a few Representatives on the NSA. She said that the NSA wasn't forthcoming about their activities, and they wanted me -- as someone with access to the Snowden documents -- to explain to them what the NSA was doing... I suggested that we hold this meeting in a SCIF, because [...] top secret documents [...] The problem is that I, as someone without a clearance, would not be allowed into the SCIF. So we had to have the meeting in a regular room. EDITED TO ADD: This really was an extraordinary thing. """ Wyden has an aide whose primary efforts and expertise revolve around the classification of national security programs, funding, and information.[1] however this person is dedicated to keeping Wyden within bounds as far as what he publicly discusses. consider the opposite end of the spectrum: anonymous supporters and sources who are able to analyze and disseminate specifics of these programs deemed priorities by hamstrung and handbound public servants. how would you prioritize the efforts of such an ad-hoc group? (presumably the intent would be legislative and monetary impact, rather than advertising revenue via popularity, which may vary scope and focus a little or a lot...) would the ability to extensively and widely reverse engineer intelligence agency efforts significantly alter the position of various legislators with regards to these programs? (or are the details insufficient to alter already concrete and lucrative positions?) this is particularly relevant given the Obama pass to congress with respect to intelligence agency oversight and program limits[2]. best regards, 0. "Today I Briefed Congress on the NSA" https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/today_i_briefed.html 1. sorry, i can't find this off hand; there was a rolling stone or other profile done which discussed this person from beaverton/tigard areaoutside Portland, OR metro. 2. "Remarks of President Barack Obama: Results of our Signals Intelligence Review" http://cryptome.org/2014/01/obama-nsa-13-0117.htm

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Guccifer Arrested and Archive
by John Young 22 Jan '14

22 Jan '14

http://cryptome.org/2014/01/guccifer-arrested.htm Guccifer Archive (~7GB) http://pastebin.com/ph02cfxw

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