- cypherpunks@lists.ogf.org

DPL is closing
by David - 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

DPL has been mostly unsuccessful at raising money for the cause. I did receive some generous donations, but clearly insufficient. I guess this failure is not very surprising to anyone, since I could just be another scam. Hell, I probably wouldn't donate to such an unreputable identity. I hope that the DPL listed persons will meet their due treatment, to the benefit of the societies that they supposedly represent. Due to the (understandable) lack of funding this DPL will not play a role in this. I hope that other people with more resources will bankroll the first successful prediction, after which credibility should not be an issue anymore. The remaining funds will be tumbled and directed to a charity. David wasn't able to defeat goliath this time. Goodbye.

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Re: [cryptome] Re: German Television does first Edward Snowden Interview
by coderman 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

On Sun, Feb 2, 2014 at 10:47 AM, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > Interview on Cryptome since 27 January 2014. > > http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip > > A takedown demand is always welcome to stir hornets > of dissent. since cryptome abandoned twitter, can we get a cryptome-dmca-and-or-legal-takedown feed instead?

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Re: [cryptography] NIST asks for comment on its crypto standards processes
by coderman 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 2:09 AM, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> wrote: > ... > NIST is responsible for developing standards, guidelines, tools and > metrics to protect non-national security federal information systems... > > In November 2013, NIST announced it would review its cryptographic > standards development process after concerns were raised about > [anything NIST touched or looked at twice] in 2014 NIST transitioned into its proper role as crypto satirist and populist punching bag. by 2020 full irrelevance is expected, with the shame of engineering fraud firmly in the past. best regards, may you live in interesting times!

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Oh the humanity!! [was: MaidSafe: p2p encrypted anonymous drivesharing homedir network?]
by coderman 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 3:34 AM, rysiek <rysiek(a)hackerspace.pl> wrote: > ... > TALKS ABOUT DECENTRALISATION > CHOOSES A CENTRALISED SERVICE AS MAIN COMMUNICATION CHANNEL this shit makes me laugh every day of the week. thank you!

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Alleged NSA-GCHQ Attack on Jean-Jacques Quisquater
by John Young 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

Any further information on the alleged NSA-GCHQ attack on Jean-Jacques Quisquater than these two reports? http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf Apparently Quisquater would not have known about the attack if not told by an insider. Insider comsec disclosures may be finally getting legs, not yet long, but more than NDA-official secrecy paralysis. Any other cryptographer attacked (as if it would be known)?

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Jean-Jacques Quisquater on Alleged NSA-GCHQ Hack
by John Young 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

http://cryptome.org/2014/02/quisquater-comments.htm

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Taint Review Team
by Rich Jones 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

Docs via MuckRock show internal DEA training manuals instructing for parallel construction based on classified / illegally obtained information, combined with an internal review board to shield that information from the public courts. https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2014/feb/03/dea-parallel-constructio… "Americans don't like it!" R

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Re: [cryptography] Snowden Drop to Poitras and Greenwald Described
by coderman 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

On Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 11:27 PM, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> wrote: > ... So what > British Intelligence did was to switch gears and harass his operations > to make them as difficult as possible. Instead of trying to necessarily > stop the bombs, they pushed gear across that made bomb making risky, and > aggressively clamped down on 'safe' gear where they could. In effect, > making unstable explosives and detonators available, and controlling the > market for the quality stuff. > > So the bomb maker was forced into employing ever more risky techniques ... > > This tactic of harassing the enemy to make mistakes more likely is > rather well known. In war as in business. And it can and is applied to > the media. if you haven't observed this in the information security domain, you're not paying attention, of you're incompetent.

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A Surprisingly Easy Tool for Encrypting Email, Courtesy of an Ex-NSA Employee
by Gutem 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

Encrypting for the masses? http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/a-surprisingly-easy-tool-for-encrypting-em… Att, - Gutem ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Registered Linux User: 562142

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Gox dox'ed
by coderman 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

it seems the answer is here: http://blog.magicaltux.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MtGox2014Leak.zip http://89.248.171.30/MtGox2014Leak.zip https://mega.co.nz/#!0VliDQBA!4Ontdi2MsLD4J5dV1-sr7pAgEYTSMi8rNeEMBikEhAs http://burnbit.com/download/280433/MtGox2014Leak_zip let me know if you're still short a mirror... On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 10:16 PM, Juan Garofalo <juan.g71(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > --On Thursday, February 27, 2014 11:12 PM -0600 Troy Benjegerdes > <hozer(a)hozed.org> wrote: > >> >> I'd argue that centralized systems provide, on averge, a larger anonymity >> set and privacy in the majority of cases than decentralized ones. In >> particular exchanges that everyone believes are 'incompetent' are a >> wonderful place to get a lot of cheap plausible deniability by making >> everyone else that uses it pay for it when the house of cards falls down. > > > In the case of something like mtgox, how did it provide privacy? Or > plausible deniality? Users have to send IDs, bank account details, > everything is logged, etc etc. What am I missing? > > > >> >> >> >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' >> hozer(a)hozed.org 7 elements >> earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop >> >> Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel, >> nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash >> >> > >

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