- cypherpunks@lists.ogf.org

on anarchy [was: propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"]
by coderman 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 12:57 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Anarchists are interesting... because they have an affinity towards > nothing, they're resistant towards everything, and proposing anything. > Perhaps that is worthy of certain degree of respects. authentic anarchists are not about "nothing"; that would be the nihilists. anarchism is about autonomy, personal responsibility, utmost liberty. delegating what should not be delegated to corrupt(ing) centralized powers is the source of great harm and suffering across humanity. the heart of anarchism is opposing centralized control and power, whether unitary or hierarchical, in all domains of life. anarchism has the potential to be most robust and most just, in the same way that well built fully decentralized systems are robust against classes of faults endemic in centralized structures. rational anarchy, however, does appear to require a higher class of human animal than currently populates the planet... best regards,

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Ukraine's Security Service asking for blocking separatists websites
by Anton Nesterov 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

Security Service of Ukraine send a letter to Ukrainian Internet Association asking for blocking websites which "promotes war, ethnic hatred, violent changing the constitutional order or territorial integrity of Ukraine". List include many Russian-language websites related to separatist movement of Eastern Ukraine, two videos on YouTube, polish website wolna-polska.pl and Russian game steaming community goodgame.ru (?). Ukrainian Internet Association is a trade association of Internet-related companies founded in 2000. Original letter http://www.inau.org.ua/download.php?9034a12e0033c3a5fbfbb5395b35ad9e (in Ukrainian)

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Encrypt iPhone calls app
by Henry Rivera 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

Can someone please give me your appraisal of Signal. I'm not noticing the red flags that we see all too often in such sales pitches. https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal/?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjE5NjEwLGVtYWlsaWQ9O…

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private windows YosemiteBeta
by Digitalfolklore 04 Aug '14

04 Aug '14

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Re: [tor-talk] carml: tasty treats from your Tor
by coderman 03 Aug '14

03 Aug '14

thank you meejah! this is awesome useful :) best regards, ---fwd--- On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 10:32 AM, meejah <meejah(a)meejah.ca> wrote: > > I've got a first super-alpha release of this thing that's been sitting > around for a while. Turns out "sanitize a bit" turns into "refactor some > things" and so forth... > > Anyway, carml does various command-line things with Tor and I thought it > might be useful to others (plays nicely with grep, pipes, etc). > > I would really love feedback on whether the "downloadbundle" command is > doing the right thing with certificate-checks. > > https://github.com/meejah/carml > https://carml.readthedocs.org/en/latest/ > > You can "pip install carml" to try it out. Recommend doing this in a > virtualenv: > > virtualenv trycarml > ./trycarml/bin/pip install carml > ./trycarml/bin/carml help > > To check signatures first, instead download the WHL file and associated > signature from PyPI, gpg --verify it and then replace "install carml" > with "install path/to/.whl" above. > > Some other things to try: > > carml downloadbundle --extract --system-keyring > echo "hello darkweb" | carml pastebin > > wait for a new consensus to be published, dump it and exit: > > carml events --once NEWCONSENSUS > > Currently, the defaults work with a system Tor (i.e. localhost port > 9051). Probably I'll change this to be TBB defaults. To connect to a Tor > Browser Bundle instance, do this: > > carml --connect tcp:localhost:9151 monitor > > It is written using Twisted and txtorcon. > > Thanks, > meejah

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Feds’ Silk Road Investigation Broke Privacy Laws, Defendant Tells Court
by coderman 03 Aug '14

03 Aug '14

http://www.wired.com/2014/08/feds-silk-road-investigation-violated-privacy-… ''' The Department of Justice sees its takedown of the billion-dollar Silk Road black market as a massive, victorious drug bust. Ross Ulbricht, the alleged creator of that anonymous contraband bazaar, now wants to cast the case in a different light: as a landmark example of the government trampling privacy rights in the digital world. In a pre-trial motion filed in the case late Friday night, Ulbricht’s lawyers laid out a series of arguments to dismiss all charges in the case based on Ulbricht’s fourth amendment protections against warrantless searches of his digital property. As early as the FBI’s initial discovery of servers in Iceland hosting the site on the Tor anonymity network—seemingly without obtaining a search warrant from a judge—Ulbricht argues that law enforcement violated his constitutional right to privacy, tainting all further evidence against him dug up in the investigation that followed. “The [electronically stored information] and other material seized and searched has been contaminated at its source, and at several later points along the way, rendering the direct and indirect product of those searches and seizures – in essence, the entire product of the investigation itself – inadmissible,” a 102-page memo accompanying the motion summarizes. “Thus, the Fourth Amendment and relevant statutes require suppression of the fruits of the searches and seizures, and any evidence or other information derived therefrom.” The motion refers to 14 distinct searches and seizures of Ulbricht’s computers, equipment, and online accounts. Beyond the initial tracing of his alleged servers in Iceland, investigators performed several of those surveillance operations with “trap and trace” or “pen register” orders that don’t require the “probable cause” standard necessary to convince a judge to sign off on a warrant; The warrantless surveillances ops included asking Comcast for information related to Ulbricht’s alleged IP address in San Francisco. And even in the cases when investigators did get a warrant before performing their searches—as in the case of a Samsung laptop believed to belong to Ulbricht as well as his Gmail and Facebook accounts—Ulbricht’s defense argues that those warrants were unconstitutional “general warrants” that allowed a wholesale dump of his private data rather than allowing the search for a specific piece of information. “Many of the warrants…constitute the general warrants abhorred by the Framers, and which led directly to the Fourth Amendment,” the memo reads. “The wholesale collection and study of Mr. Ulbricht’s entire digital history without limitation – expressly sought in the warrants and granted – represent the very type of indiscriminate rummaging that caused the American colonists so much consternation.” Ulbricht’s memo isn’t simply a demand to dismiss the charges against him, which include conspiracy to traffic in narcotics, money laundering, and a “kingpin” statute often used against mob bosses and drug cartel leaders. It’s also a request for more information from prosecutors. Despite the “discovery” process designed to give defendants a chance to review the evidence against them, the memo says that the government still hasn’t revealed to Ulbricht or the public many aspects of the investigation. The most crucial of those information gaps is just how the FBI located the Silk Road’s servers despite the anonymity protections provided by cryptographic software Tor. “All of the searches and seizures are predicated upon the government’s infiltration of the alleged ‘Silk Road Servers,’” reads the memo. “However, that event – location of the Silk Road Servers – is shrouded in mystery, as the means and manner in which that discovery was accomplished has not been disclosed.” If that initial pinpointing and penetration of Ulbricht’s alleged servers—whether by the FBI, the NSA, or investigators with the means of defeating Tor’s privacy safeguards—is determined to be unconstitutional, the defense argues it could contaminate virtually all of the prosecution’s other evidence. It points to what it calls the “fruit of a poisonous tree” doctrine, stating that an improper search can invalidate all subsequent searches based on evidence found in the initial step. And it notes that the requests to judges for warrants in other steps of the feds’ investigation didn’t explain or even mention that initial discovery of the Silk Road’s computers in Iceland. The memo backs up its argument by referring to several recent fourth amendment decisions, most notably the case of Riley vs. California, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a police can’t search a arrested suspect’s phone without a warrant due to the massive amount of private data that sort of digital device contains. It also points to another case in which Microsoft was ordered to respond to a search warrant for emails belonging to one of its users, even though the emails were stored on a foreign server. Ulbricht’s defense points to that second case as a demonstration that the government ought to seek a warrant even when the information it’s seeking is stored abroad, as in the case of the Silk Road’s Icelandic servers. “The government has not provided any reason why it could not have pursued, and why it was not obligated under its own theory of the scope of [the law], to pursue the same avenue – a warrant – for obtaining the [electronic stored information] on the Silk Road Server,” the memo reads. Aside from its Fourth Amendment arguments, the memo makes an unrelated request: That the prosecution stop calling Ulbricht a murderer. In its criminal complaint and pre-trial arguments, the prosecution has referred repeatedly to Ulbricht’s alleged attempts to pay for the murder of six people, including what the prosecutors describe as a potential informant against him and a blackmailer. But despite the fact that Ulbricht still faces a separate murder-for-hire case in Maryland, he hasn’t been charged with any such killings in the current Southern District of New York case. The defense argues that means the prosecution’s murder references are “unduly prejudicial” and violate Ulbricht’s right to a fair trial. Those murder charges have weighed heavily on Ulbricht’s reputation, draining support for a young defendant who might have otherwise been a cause celebre for privacy and personal freedoms–after all, the Silk Road’s creator who called himself the “Dread Pirate Roberts” preached a libertarian philosophy of “victimless” crime and civil disobedience. With his latest motion, that alleged “pirate” is taking another, well-timed shot at elevating his case beyond one of a cybercriminal drug kingpin–this time to a story of illegal government surveillance. '''

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Fwd: Preferred Roaming List Zero Intercept Attack [was: DEF CON nostalgia [before that: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22]][still confusing]
by coderman 03 Aug '14

03 Aug '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 3:47 AM Subject: Re: Preferred Roaming List Zero Intercept Attack [was: DEF CON nostalgia [before that: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22]][still confusing] To: Full Disclosure <fulldisclosure(a)seclists.org> On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 4:06 AM, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Any carrier phones or specific builds known to not accept PRL updates > without authorization should be noted in response to this thread... anon from the wiki pointed out the verizon rigmaiden aircard incident.[0] while not a smart phone, this does illustrate how a properly privacy conscious device will refuse to accept insufficiently authenticated roaming list updates. UTStarcom PC5740 at that point in time resistant to surreptitious corruption of roaming list. also, more than twenty years for cell locator tech as written. how many years of PRL Zero tricks? still soliciting pointers, ... best regards, 0. "Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight" - http://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-aircard/all/ ''' Verizon reprogrammed the device so that when an incoming voice call arrived, the card would disconnect from any legitimate cell tower to which it was already connected, and send real-time cell-site location data to Verizon, which forwarded the data to the FBI. This allowed the FBI to position its stingray in the neighborhood where Rigmaiden resided. The stingray then “broadcast a very strong signal” to force the air card into connecting to it, instead of reconnecting to a legitimate cell tower, so that agents could then triangulate signals coming from the air card and zoom-in on Rigmaiden’s location. To make sure the air card connected to the FBI’s simulator, Rigmaiden says that Verizon altered his air card’s Preferred Roaming List so that it would accept the FBI’s stingray as a legitimate cell site and not a rogue site, and also changed a data table on the air card designating the priority of cell sites so that the FBI’s fake site was at the top of the list. ''' - the second "data table on the air card ... designating the priority of cell sites" not unambiguous. for example, System Determination Algorithms can utilize recent tower connection history foremost, along with the "Preferred Roaming List" as commonly used. a stated common method is listed in priority order: 1. MRU ROAMING History List (MRU) 2. Preferred Roaming List (PRL) ---fwd-ctxt-sw--- please direct questions to Mathew Solnik and Marc Blanchou, who are burning all sorts of vuln this week in Vegas. Cellular Exploitation on a Global Scale: The Rise and Fall of the Control Protocol - https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#Solnik "... In this presentation, we will discuss and disclose how Over-the-Air code execution can be obtained on the major cellular platforms and networks (GSM/CDMA/LTE). Including but not limited to Android, iOS, Blackberry, and Embedded M2M devices." such a setup suitable for silent PRL favor and middling as discussed.

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Fwd: [tor-talk] Tor-ramdisk 20140801 released
by coderman 01 Aug '14

01 Aug '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Anthony G. Basile <basile(a)opensource.dyc.edu> Date: Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 8:25 AM Subject: [tor-talk] Tor-ramdisk 20140801 released Hi everyone I want to announce to the list that a new release of tor-ramdisk is out. Tor-ramdisk is an i686 or x86_64 uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose only purpose is to host a Tor server in an environment that maximizes security and privacy. Security is enhanced by hardening the kernel and binaries, and privacy is enhanced by forcing logging to be off at all levels so that even the Tor operator only has access to minimal information. Finally, since everything runs in ephemeral memory, no information survives a reboot, except for the Tor configuration file and the private RSA key, which may be exported/imported by FTP or SCP. Changelog: tor was updated to 0.2.4.23 which addresses CVE-2014-5117. The kernel was updated to 3.15.7+ Gentoo's hardened-patches-3.15.7-1.extras. All other packages are the same as the previous release. It is recommended that users upgrade immediately. For more information see https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2014-July/000094.html. i686: Homepage: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk Download: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk-downloads x86_64: Homepage: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-x86_64-ramdisk Download: http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-x86_64-ramdisk-downloads -- Anthony G. Basile, Ph. D. Chair of Information Technology D'Youville College Buffalo, NY 14201 (716) 829-8197

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Fwd: Preferred Roaming List Zero Intercept Attack [was: DEF CON nostalgia [before that: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22]][still confusing]
by coderman 01 Aug '14

01 Aug '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 4:06 AM Subject: Preferred Roaming List Zero Intercept Attack [was: DEF CON nostalgia [before that: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22]][still confusing] To: Full Disclosure <fulldisclosure(a)seclists.org> Cc: Georgi Guninski <guninski(a)guninski.com> ### The Preferred Roaming List Zero Intercept Attack # SUMMARY # Attackers in position to carry out Monkey-in-the-Middle against CDMA2000 links between customer stations and their carrier BTS equipment can leverage silent push PRL updates to apply a routing list preferring paths through malicious "tower(s)" carrying the subscriber voice and data traffic under threat. The use of a specific PRL version Zero (0), aka Preferred Roaming List Zero Intercept Attack, implements the rogue tower associations with least potential interference to legit carrier bands and devices present in broadcast domain of attack. The presence of PRL version zero (0) on a device indicates malfunction at best and potential maliciousness when supported by other confirming factors. Note that malicious changes to the PRL may happen out of band (at baseband / control plane) regardless of disabled update facilities on the Android, iOS, or other device operating system. Polling must be used to detect silent forced PRL updates at the version level. # IMPACT # All common smart phones deployed on Verizon, Sprint, MetroPCS, US Cellular, and Telus carrier networks appear to support silent force push PRL with insufficient authorization. Any carrier phones or specific builds known to not accept PRL updates without authorization should be noted in response to this thread and the author with specific radio and carrier details. Software defined CDMA2000 implementations observed to date unaffected as manual tower associations are usually required in these systems. # RECOMMENDED MITIGATIONS # 1. Smart phone platforms and OEM distributions should refuse to silently downgrade or set to version zero (0) any PRL updates. Versions always increment, an offset sequence is a signal of something amiss and must require user confirmation to execute overrides. 2. Manufacturers should pressure baseband vendors for strong controls around PRL updates similar to controls around signed firmware updates and defense in depth like TrustZone enforced PRL management. In addition, preferred only bit set (use only preferred systems) should be the default, not the exception. 3. Privacy conscious consumers should communicate via software defined radio stacks rather than proprietary baseband black boxes. Full control over all channels, forward, reverse, supplementary and the content within them compelling transparency for radio comms. 4. Hackers at DEF CON should create apps to monitor for PRL zero status and securely report the results to a hidden site. Unauthorized PRL changes should then force radios off (airplane mode or cell radios down) and trigger counter measures. # BACKGROUND # On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Georgi Guninski <guninski(a)guninski.com> wrote: > ... > Fyodor's Full Disclosure is heavily moderated. > He stops me at SMTP level. > Quite likely he will sell the list the > way aleph1 did with Bugtraq. > (I am not posting on FFD). asking for disclosure or utility seems not unreasonable. [0][1] far from a free for all these days, for sure, ... the rest of the rant after this regularly scheduled programming: [2] # VULNERABILITY ASPECTS # - Vulnerability Classes: Improper Access Control - Remotely Exploitable: Yes - Locally Exploitable: Yes; most devices - Authentication Required: No; only middle position # TECHNICAL DETAIL # Working knowledge of CDMA2000 network principles and protocols is assumed. Explicit PRL updates as may be invoked via dialing ##873283# on Sprint, *228 for Verizon - then opt. 2, or *228 on many other networks are user initiated and properly authorized. Over-the-Air system update facilities on carrier networks may also silently force push PRL updates to customers for better service, as intended, with incrementing versions. When used maliciously, OTA PRL updates with a version of zero (0) function well as in-scope target enabling, having the property that once a target leaves the broadcast area under attack the legitimate carrier update, no matter which real carrier or intervening time period, will always be great than zero, and thus replace the transient malicious roaming list with a legitimate copy of whatever is current. It is this specific aspect: silent force PRL downgrade to version zero (0) which is condemened. Any other aspects of securely communicating provider preferences to customer devices is left as a problem for the reader; CDMA designed to protect carrier base stations and networks, not subscribers from a rogue "carrier". Consider the following original roaming configuration for a device subject to this attack: | PRL Version: 1205 | Primary CDMA Channel: 500 | Secondary CDMA Channel: 425 | 0(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x000A+0xFF+1+OFF | 1(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x0012+0xFF+7+ON | 2(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x0015+0xFF+33+ON | n<=28(...): NULL The attacker desires least interruption to carrier SIDs ...0A, 12, 15, and associated frequencies. Attacker assumes operations on channels 650 and 725 with SID 0x00A1 to co-exist with incidental communications inside the broadcast domain under attack. With the new rogue station operating, a Preferred Roaming List Zero attack can now be mounted, routing targets over the malicious base stations as long as they remain in range of attacker. Such a roaming configuration may look like: | PRL Version: 0 | Primary CDMA Channel: 650 | Secondary CDMA Channel: 725 | 0(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x00A1+0xFF+1+OFF ** attacker SID | 1(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x000A+0xFF+2+OFF | 2(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x0012+0xFF+7+ON | 3(SID+NID+AcqIdx+RoamInd): 0x0015+0xFF+33+ON | n<=28(...): NULL One last note: It is useful to be alerting on scenarios where channel drops, and strong neighbor appears just outside SRCH_WIN_N with a hard hand-off. Investigation of the exchange in detail warranted, in addition to any control messages that followed. # DISCLOSURE PERSPECTIVE # - "State Level" attackers using since before 2008? [how long before?] - Observed "in the wild" 2011. - Paying Fyodor's FD Tithe to public at Fri Aug 1 10:58:20 UTC 2014, plus moderation delay. # ADDITIONAL INFORMATION # Will not be coming from this channel. This includes no press; sorry. Third parties encouraged to continue and disseminate additional inquiry, however! # SOLICITED INFORMATION FOR BENEFIT OF OTHERS # - Are R-UIM based devices affected by force PRL zero? - Can knob frobbing mitigate successfully on carrier devices without root'ing or jailbreak'ing? [PCS, WCDMA, other radio opts] - If you force closed loop power control with constrained codings, can you thwart the effectiveness of attackers using mobile or non-tower emitters? - Will Metasploit deploy GNU CDMA blocks for this and other attacks along with requisite faraday tents? # FOR WANT OF CITES # 0. <citation needed> - i remember Fyodor asking that inflamatory off-topics at least be combined with a disclosure of some technical merit, too. as a way to atone for wasting precious minutes squandered and never to return; alas i can't find the message on a cursory search. i don't have a problem with this policy (Vuln for Voice) but it does seem to raise a high bar! *grin* 1. "Meta: List moderation", "Request to mailing list Fulldisclosure rejected", etc. - http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/56 2. # RESUME RANT # - this is in reference to [3] which is actually the gist of my angst. public and named individuals, organizations, institutions overly risk averse. prosecutorial zeal into the absurd squelching independent research while proprietary malcode monopolies from intelligence community to private sector weaponizers fleece talent into un-disclosure prisons with mental inhibitors decades to the future. we're in a strange new future now, and i have no idea what role full disclosure has in it, if any. so, "Vuln for Voice": why not? .. it certainly keeps the signal higher and the n3td3v lower! # END RANT # 3. "DEF CON nostalgia [was: going double cryptome at DEF CON 22]" - https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-July/005269.html ''' a hollow, decrepit shell of its former self.. ... oh the 0ld days, ;) "We'd appreciate some more ethics." - GOBBLES - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAJSxOzrD1g [ GOBBLES Security - still disappointed in 2014 ... ] ---- regarding the current line up: https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-speakers.html "Detecting Bluetooth Surveillance Systems" - what about RFID? "Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught" - see also, EPICFAIL "How to Disclose an Exploit Without Getting in Trouble" - if you thought ice cream had many flavors, welcome to the brave new world of 'responsible disclosure'! "NSA Playset: PCIe" - the lack of any VT-d mention makes for mediocre. TAO tools better include a VM breakout and uCode errata exploitation. (spoiler alert - i don't think this is actually dropping NSA exploits) "The Monkey in the Middle: A pentesters guide to playing in traffic" - this middle perspective, however, is absolutely a tailored favorite. a gift that keeps on giving... "Investigating PowerShell Attacks" - this is now pointless, what with pass the hash dead. IT'S ALL OVER, JUST GO HOME. *sobbing* [c.f. http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/penetesting/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-pas… ] "Screw Becoming A Pentester - When I Grow Up I Want To Be A Bug Bounty Hunter!" - one step further to enlightenment. the industry that should not exist; better yet to become build engineer or test automationer or devops devotee and build security in at unsexy day jobs for not fame and not riches. #hashtagInfosuckprotipyolo "In the forest of knowledge with 1o57" - nothing to say here other than i'm selling 1o57's uber badge for bitcoin to highest bidder. come find me :P~ "RF Penetration Testing, Your Air Stinks" - my discriminator for a delicious sw defined deployment: a) new grc blocks or custom sdr pipeline? b) wideband and full duplex? c) opportunistic and ad-hoc capabilities? - if you answered no to any of the following please try again, with more harder! [c.f. http://www.pervices.com/buy-crimson/ dual 10GigE, 100kHz – 6GHz, <= 800MHz bandwidth, 4 x (16 bit, 370 MSPS ADCs), 2 x (quad channel, 16 bit, 2500 MSPS DAC), 10MHz, 10ppb, reference OCXO] P.P.S. if you want do your own training on "WB Quad System" without travel to FVEY facilities this is how ;) "Panel - Diversity in Information Security" - i was not invited to this panel. credibility lost. "Android Hacker Protection Level 0" - because more fingers in the dike is more fingers. "Blinding The Surveillance State" - i am soliciting donations for premium consulting expertise. i don't think Soghoian's free advice will be instrumental, but Cowboy Alexander has some sweet new shit (you get what you pay for? :) [ c.f. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/29/the_crypto_king_of_the_NSA… "Summary of Attacks Against BIOS and Secure Boot" - aka, why to coreboot and kill AMT with fire. ok Intel chipsec peeps i got bones to pick SEE YOU IN VEGAS --- how about the talks you want so much but will never see? those billions for your discretion clearly benefiting profitability over pervasive security. best regards, '''

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Re: [Cryptography] You can't trust any of your hardware
by grarpamp 31 Jul '14

31 Jul '14

On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)lrw.com> wrote: > http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-bad… > The full talk/paper don't seem to be available yet, but they (a) figured out > how to write malware that attacks a system via something plugged into its > USB port (no, it doesn't depend on AUTORUN); (b) flipped that around and > figured out how to replace the firmware on a USB device from the host. I > wouldn't have thought (b) was possible - after all, how many firmware > updates for USB devices have you ever seen? - but I guess it's handy at the > end of manufacturing, and gets left open because ... who would ever think of > attacking it? > > On further reflection, though, I realized that the only thing new here is > that they actually went and built a full-cycle virus. All the rest was done > a couple of years ago: Apple published an update for its (USB) keyboards - > http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4010 - and someone reverse-engineered it and > figured out how to upload any code they liked - > https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/CHEN/BHUSA09-Chen-RevApple… > > The fun never ends.... Just like BIOS/HDD firmware APT's, the updateability of firmware on USB controllers is nothing new... even thumbdrives come with firmware 'deleted' or fast formatted off their media, dd(1)... it just took a while to make it fun for the entire family. flashboot.ru phison.com usb mass production tool BadUSB BadBIOS spritesmods.com hddhack

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