December 2019 - cypherpunks@lists.ogf.org

Ring camera lawsuit.
by jim bell 27 Dec '19

27 Dec '19

Ring and Amazon are sued by customers over hacking https://mol.im/a/7830499 via http://dailym.ai/android

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ChernobylDice, OnlyKey, PrivateUpRealFam
by grarpamp 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

https://github.com/nategri/chernobyl_dice https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21862728 https://onlykey.io/ https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21884184 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/1209500062163832832 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21881014

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us - public system
by other.arkitech 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

I post all answers to raised questions so far. I'd like to receive more feedback about my new crypto platform, it is helpful to me, as they help me to write english rather than C++ , : ) http://otheravu4v6pitvw.onion/misc/downloads/answers_to_questions.txt Thanks for the help All invited to evaluate it. Other Arkitech

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Intel Interrogation FM 34-52
by grarpamp 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/intel_interrrogation_sept-1992.…

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Cryptocurrency: Spooks vs Decentralization
by grarpamp 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

https://www.yours.org/content/leaked-emails-of-peter-todd-and-john-dillon--… https://news.bitcoin.com/why-is-blockstream-working-with-national-spies-sig… Be wary tech and money, do as needed.

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Please keep feeding the trolls - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

Why can't we stop feeding the trolls? Latest frenzy over 'it's OK to be white' proves society desperately wants to be offended https://www.rt.com/op-ed/476520-white-supremacy-pranks-4chan-offense/ A plague of “it’s OK to be white” stickers has struck Perth, Scotland, “sickening” local authorities. The slogan’s origins in an internet prank are known, yet it’s still taken seriously – nor is it the sole case of self-trolling. The stickers’ arrival in Perth catapulted the town into a state of shock, to hear the BBC tell it on Tuesday. “It’s sickening and disgusting to know that people think like this,” an anonymous resident told the outlet, while local group Perth Against Racism claimed to have been contacted by multiple people who “felt unsafe” upon seeing the stickers. You are NOT OK. They want you dead and gone.BBC News - Perth city centre 'It's okay to be white' stickers condemned https://t.co/Zp7ljyppZz ... Hunters unmercifully troll PETA’s ‘Shoot Selfies, Not Animals’ campaign https://www.rt.com/viral/400970-hunters-troll-peta-campaign/ A PETA campaign urging people not to hunt has backfired in spectacular fashion after being hijacked by hunters. ... However, predictably enough, hunters seized upon the idea and started posting it on photos of themselves with dead animals. ... Europe's politically correct 'selective compassion' losing steam https://www.rt.com/op-ed/330787-europe-politically-correct-selective-compas… ... That which men capable of independent thought understood http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-sp… intellectually decades ago, men less so well endowed, finally, understand viscerally. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3390168/Migrant-rape-fears-spread-E… They have woken up and smelled the agenda: the ship has an iceberg embedded in the hull; and it was Political Correctness – or Cultural Marxism – which put it there. Read more 1 1 Invasion of Europe: The ship is going down And this shift has made the job of self-appointed social gatekeepers – from well-heeled, well-lunched, first-tier think tanks all the way down to third-rate, bottom-feeding trolls sniping anonymously from behind fictitious names and pretend honors for minimum wage – more difficult. Whereas previously, Europeans could be kept on-message with the project of their own demise with nothing sterner than a set of Thaler and Sunstein nudges and a palette of meaningless and generally incorrect epithets, the populations of Europe are beginning to get it: either we put grown-ups back in charge of the ship, or it is going down. ...

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MERRY CHRISTMAS
by rooty 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

MERRY CHRISTMAS everyone including Ryan carbini

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Saying 2 + 2 = 5 to own the libs
by Ryan Carboni 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

Saying 2 + 2 = 5 to own the libs

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Re: Fwd: Climate Scientist Caught Lying To Australian Public
by Ryan Carboni 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/groundwater… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocean_acidification Anyway, I'm probably lying, even about the things I'm telling the truth about, so I guess you're right. If no one listens to the facts, if the whole political system is corrupt, if Epstein could get away with whatever he wanted by virtue of being a member of the elite... Everything is justified. Everything. Especially when the political system desires to essentially genocide the global population. I emailed the EFF once speculating about an iOS zero day.

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The unbelievable tale of a fake hitman, a kill list, a darknet vigilante... and a murder
by coderman 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

https://www.wired.co.uk/article/kill-list-dark-web-hitmen The unbelievable tale of a fake hitman, a kill list, a darknet vigilante... and a murder Hitman-for-hire darknet sites are all scams. But some people turn up dead nonetheless --------------------------------------------------------------- Tuesday 4 December 2018 I did not know Bryan Njoroge. I had never met him, talked to him, or encountered him online. In ordinary circumstances, I would have never heard of his death, more than 6,500 kilometres away. Yet in late June 2018, a message arrived in my inbox. Its subject read: “Suicide (or Murder)?” The email contained a link to a webpage showing unequivocally that someone wanted Bryan dead. On May 29, a person calling themselves Toonbib had exchanged messages with someone they thought was a Mafia capo renting hitmen on the [dark web](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-the-dark-web-how-to-access). Toonbib had sent a picture of Njoroge in a suit, lifted from a school yearbook, and an address in Indiana where Njoroge – a soldier, who usually resided at a military base in Kentucky – would stay for a few days. “He will only be in location from june 01 2018- june 11,” Toonbib wrote. They [paid](https://www.blockchain.com/en/btc/address/18Kt92cKiVU2DsHFoPFqQF5dAEi… about $5,500 in bitcoin for the hit. The day after, Toonbib started chasing the presumed capo for an answer, which took some more time to arrive. “I will assign an operative to your job and it will be done in about a week, is this ok? I will get back to you shortly with an estimated date,” the capo wrote on June 1. Toonbib never answered. On June 9, Bryan Njoroge was found with a fatal gunshot wound to the head, near a baseball field in Clarksville, Indiana. His death was recorded as a suicide. There are no hitmen in this story. There are no sharply dressed assassins screwing silencers on to their Glocks, no operatives assigned, nor capos directing them. There is a website, though – a succession of websites, to be precise – where all those things are made out to be true. Some people fall for it. Looking for a hitman, they download Tor, a browser that uses encryption and a complex relaying system to ensure anonymity, and allows them to access the dark web, where the website exists. Under false names, the website’s users complete a form to request a murder. They throw hundreds of bitcoins into the website’s digital purse. Read next - [Global insect populations are collapsing, and we don't know why](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/insect-populations-biodar-weather-radar) Global insect populations are collapsing, and we don't know why --------------------------------------------------------------- By Amit Katwala The website’s admin is scamming them: no assassination is ever executed. The admin would dole out a hail of lies for why hits had been delayed, and keep the bitcoins. But, elsewhere, someone called Chris Monteiro has been disrupting the website’s operations for years, triggering its admin’s wrath. In 2016, two years before sending me the email about Njoroge, Monteiro was just a guy writing wikis. A tall man in his thirties with thick sable hair, a short beard and deep-set, dark eyes, Monteiro is a man of weird pastimes. By day, he worked as a computer system administrator for a London-based firm; by night, he turned on a six-screen desktop computer in his South London flat and spent hours plumbing the depth of the internet. He called himself a “cybercrime and niche topic internet researcher”. He was into transhumanism, the internet-based movement advocating for human enhancement and immortality. He gave talks about the politics of sci-fi, using a slightly slurred patter. He knew a great deal about credit card fraud. But his passion was the dark web. This was the perfect environment for scammers – impenetrable to search engines and rife with illegality. Online forums crawled with references to sentient AIs lurking in the dark web, live-streaming websites showing people being slaughtered in “red rooms”, or dark web pages revealing the secret of the Illuminati. “This weird fringe of the internet, it's one of the toughest areas to seek truth,” Monteiro says. In 2015, Monteiro started running the r/deepweb subreddit, a front row on the day-to-day happenings of the online netherworld. He documented his findings on his blog – pirate.london – and on online encyclopedias, such as Wikipedia and anti-pseudoscience website RationalWiki. He made it his mission to kill urban legends – he contributed to Wikipedia’s articles on the dark web and darknet market, and created RationalWiki’s pages about [red rooms](https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Red_room) and [runaway AIs](https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/CAIMEO). Read next - [Hidden for centuries, Rembrandt's secrets are finally being revealed](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/the-night-watch-painting-rembrandt) Hidden for centuries, Rembrandt's secrets are finally being revealed --------------------------------------------------------------- By Victoria Turk He also wrote RationalWiki’s [article](https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Internet_assassination) about internet assassination. The rumour that you could hire a contract killer on the dark web in exchange for bitcoin had been around since the early 2010s. That was because, unlike snuff movies and evil AIs, hitman-for-hire services were ubiquitous on the dark web. Some were structured as “prediction markets”, with users crowdfunding the assassination of VIPs and politicians; or they could be catering to the private grudge-bearer wanting to book a hit via private chat. Monteiro’s research suggested all such websites to be either harmless trolling or scams designed to rob people of their bitcoins. He could find no evidence of anybody ever being killed by a hitman hired online, nor of any hitman working online. He wrote this all on RationalWiki. With footnotes. Then, on February 20, 2016, an anonymous user made an edit to the internet assassination article. The edit, Monteiro says, added something to the effect of “all assassination sites are scams, except for Besa Mafia, which is real”, appending a link to a dark web site. (The edit was permanently deleted by RationalWiki’s admins at Monteiro’s urging; but a subsequent [modification](https://rationalwiki.org/w/index.php?title=Internet_assassina… by the same user remains in the edit history. “An other site is Besa Mafia, a marketplace where hitmen can sign up to provide their services and where customer can order, [sic]” the edit read. “The site protects the customers with an escrow service that stores the bitcoin until the job is completed. They also accept external escrows.”) Monteiro understood this to be shameless self-promotion. The people running Besa Mafia, whatever that was, had seemingly vandalised his finely crafted piece of wiki-scholarship in order to shill for their assassination website. “I went, ‘What the fuck is this shit?,’” he says. “This is not only nonsense, it's someone promoting a scam on my article.” He fired up Tor and went to the Besa Mafia website. Ostensibly run by Albanian gangsters (“besa” is Albanian for “honour”), it was littered with poor English, stock pictures of armed beefcakes, and a payment system that – far from protecting customers’ bitcoin – allowed whoever ran the website to easily snatch the funds. He wrote a scathing [review](https://pirate.london/assassination-scams-the-next-generation-16faccef578e?gi=fd05c8e983a2) of Besa Mafia on his blog, calling it a scam. Read next - [The climate crisis has sparked a Siberian mammoth tusk gold rush](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/mammoth-tusk-hunters-russia-china) The climate crisis has sparked a Siberian mammoth tusk gold rush --------------------------------------------------------------- By Sabrina Weiss A few days later, someone from Besa Mafia got in touch. “Helo, I am one of the admins of the Besa Mafia website on deep web [sic],” the email read. “Would it be possible for us to pay for a true and honest positive review? Let me know if we can prove to you that we are legit.” It was signed “Yura”. A back-and-forth exchange ensued. Monteiro gleefully bombarded Yura with questions, punching holes in the site’s business model, security and technical makeup. For Monteiro, it was obviously a scam. But, while Yura acknowledged the website’s shortcomings, he maintained it was legitimate. He asked Monteiro to give Besa Mafia the benefit of the doubt. “We are open to suggestions, we will do our best to make it the best marketplace focusing on body harm revenge and property destruction,” Yura wrote. As evidence, Yura offered to have someone of Monteiro’s choice beaten up. He then proposed to pay a $50 monthly retainer to feature Besa Mafia banners on Monteiro’s blog. When Monteiro declined both offers, Yura’s tone became menacing. “Be neutral to our website,” he wrote. “Unless you do that, we will pay some cheap freelancers to fill articles and submit posts and comments claiming you are undercover cop.” Monteiro published the [exchange](https://pirate.london/reputable-assassination-service-outs-pirate-london-as-law-enforcement-operation-faaaef50c2ee?gi=70f549591245) in full on his blog, mocking Yura and Besa Mafia. Weeks later, someone left a comment: a link to a [video](https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/dark-web-hitmen-hire-service-7988693). It started by showing an A4 sheet. ““[G]ang members for besa mafia on deep web,” the sheet read. “[D]edication to pirate london, 10 April 2016.” There followed some 30 seconds of darkness, rustling and metallic sounds. Finally, the camera turned towards a white car, engulfed in orange flames. The sheet was shown again, metres away from the blazing car. The video appeared to be a threat to whoever was running pirate.london. Monteiro was horrified: he thought this was not the behaviour of a scammer. Online con artists ignore people who call them out, he thought; they don’t set cars on fire to defend their reputation. “I started questioning myself: had I pissed off a criminal organisation?” he says. “What the fuck had I got myself into?” Read next - [Inside the startling, chaotic rise of Alibaba’s Singles’ Day bonanza](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/alibaba-singles-day-china-ecommerce) Inside the startling, chaotic rise of Alibaba’s Singles’ Day bonanza --------------------------------------------------------------- By Barclay Bram Monteiro works out of his living room in London WIRED The video prompted Monteiro to contact law enforcement. At London’s Charing Cross Police Station, he told the officer behind the desk that he was a cybercrime researcher – specialising in drugs, fraud and murder – and he wanted to report a darknet assassin threatening him with videos of flaming cars. “I just wanted to get this on the record,” Monteiro recalls. The officer was perplexed. Weeks later, the case was passed on to the Metropolitan Police’s cybersecurity unit, Falcon Team. Monteiro maintains that nothing came out of it: he says that the officer said that the car did not seem to have been destroyed in the UK and was therefore out of the Met’s jurisdiction. Monteiro also attempted to contact the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) – but, he would later realise, he mistyped the email address and the message was not delivered. (The NCA doesn’t send bounce-back notifications.) Monteiro resolved to explore the Besa Mafia website himself. He created a customer account, calling himself Boaty McBoatFace and requested a hit on a fictional person he called Bob the Builder. In doing so, he spotted a way to gather intelligence on the website: each message sent on the platform was assigned a unique numeric ID. By combining message IDs with the website’s url, Monteiro discovered that he could read every other user’s messages. Exploiting this vulnerability, he downloaded Besa Mafia’s entire message database and examined its archive. Read next - [The return of the night train](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/return-night-trains-europe) The return of the night train --------------------------------------------------------------- By Nicole Kobie Sure enough, Besa Mafia was a scam. Every conversation followed an identical template. Customers submitted the details of the person they wanted killed and the method they preferred – for instance, a hit that looked like an accident would be more expensive. To prove they had the wherewithal to pay, they were required to make an advance bitcoin transfer to a digital wallet – from which, the website assured, its clients would be able to withdraw their funds any time. Yura would claim to take swift action, before a period of prevarication: the hitman had been stopped for a traffic violation, or for illegal possession of a gun. A more professional assassin could be hired, but that would cost more bitcoin. Some customers kept paying, as Yura led them on for months. Others requested a refund, which never came. Yura kept all the bitcoin. But Besa Mafia was more than just any run-of-the-mill scam: Monteiro realised that it was a fully fledged fake news operation. Yura devoted a lot of energy to defending the website’s credibility. A California-based person going by name Thcjohn2 had written to the website offering his services as an assassin. “[I] am broke (of course), and am looking for quick cash,” Thcjohn2 wrote. “I have military training (US Navy).” Instead of taking him up on his offer, Yura had asked Thcjohn2 to make videos of burning cars to intimidate Monteiro and other critics. He then asked him to enact and video a fake murder, with the help of a friend and a replica gun. In the following months, several videos of balaclava-clad thugs firing guns and talking up Yura’s assassination websites would pop up online. Yura had also set up a galaxy of micro-websites on the regular web, which spread the word about Besa Mafia under the pretence of denunciating it. Yura had hired freelance SEO experts, who had optimised the sites to ensure that they appeared first in search results for “hitman for hire” and similar word combinations. One such freelancer, a Kolkata-based consultant called Santosh Sharma, told me in July 2018 that Yura – who had used the name of Andreeab when dealing with him – had paid him in bitcoin. “He was based in Romania,” he said. Sharma says that he is no longer working for Yura. Read next - [Jochen Zeitz saved Puma. Now he's trying to fix global business](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/jochen-zeitz) Jochen Zeitz saved Puma. Now he's trying to fix global business --------------------------------------------------------------- By Richard Benson The marketing strategy seemed to have paid off. After working his way through Besa Mafia’s messages, Monteiro had proof he was right about the site being a scam – but that was little consolation. “It was a fully functioning operation,” he says. “People had been buying it.” And there was a flipside to the scam: the message archive was essentially a kill list – of targets, of conflicts, and instigators. Of people who other people wanted to kill. Yura had no hitmen to deploy, Monteiro thought, but what if some of the website’s customers decided to take matters into their own hands, and kill their target themselves? Could this archive be evidence – or even be used to pre-empt murders? “Most scams aren't dangerous or don't feature dangerous people,” Monteiro says. “If you get ripped off by a ‘Nigerian prince’, you're not dangerous – just stupid. This scam was different, fundamentally different, from any scam I had seen before. The people who are using it are the dangerous people, more than the scammer himself. The clients are the bad guys.” The website attracted customers from every corner of the world. There were some trolls who put in joke requests, but most users were serious. Someone wanted his wife’s lover killed, his organs sold to get a discount on the hit, and the woman herself smuggled into Saudi Arabia; a Dutch user paid 20 bitcoin to have someone flattened in a fake cycling accident; a person in Minnesota had spent four months chatting with Yura about how to get a mother-of-one murdered. Monteiro turned for help to a friend of his – a scammer-baiter who adopted the nom de guerre Judge Judy – and together they created a program to systematically scrape messages from Besa Mafia. Judge Judy was solely interested in disrupting Yura’s business. Monteiro, instead, started compiling a list of the most dangerous users, ranked by how much they paid and how determined to see the murder through they appeared. Sometimes, he used information in the correspondence to find out the website users’ identities; but he decided against getting in touch with the targets mentioned in the messages, or leaking the archive online. “I was hoping to work with the police, and what I didn't want to be was a hacker who destroys evidence,” he says. “What if [the users] realised they were exposed, and had hidden?” Read next - [The curious tale of Julian, the last King of Brussels](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/the-last-king-of-brussels) The curious tale of Julian, the last King of Brussels --------------------------------------------------------------- By Gian Volpicelli He says he tried to get the police involved – again, with little success. He claims that the Met referred him to the NCA, which didn’t answer his calls or messages; the National Counter Terrorism Security Office said that the matter was out of its jurisdiction; the FBI suggested that he talk with the NCA. Besa Mafia's website as it appeared after "Operation Vegetable" Besa Mafia On July 3, 2016, Monteiro and Judge Judy launched “Operation Vegetable”. It was the third hack Besa Mafia had suffered in four months. It would also be the final – and decisive – one. In late April 2016, a hacker known as bRspd had infected the website by uploading a malicious file instead of the picture of a target. In that way, the hacker seized the website’s message archive, its user IDs, passwords, server passwords and admin emails; then dumped the whole lot on the internet. The hack – together with a second, nearly identical attack bRspd carried out in June – set several events in motion. Yura reassured his customers that the leak was not a big deal. “We are not a scam. There are no bitcoin lost. Our website got hacked, but hackers only got information about some users,” Yura wrote in a message to a customer. “[T]hey did not stoled any bitcoin.” Meanwhile, he set about launching a new, rebranded website. Read next - [A mysterious death, a genetic clue and the lifelong quest for answers](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/disease-detectives) A mysterious death, a genetic clue and the lifelong quest for answers --------------------------------------------------------------- By Tom Ward Some media outlets covered the leak and Monteiro gave [interviews](https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/dark-web-hitmen-hire-service-7988693) on the matter – something that, in hindsight, put his name on Yura’s radar. Together with Judge Judy, Monteiro planned to build on bRspd’s work to bring Yura down for good. Using information from bRspd’s dump, the two managed to hack into the website; Monteiro even obtained access to Yura’s Gmail. There, he snooped through the admin’s correspondence. He found emails in which Yura talked about buying a much-needed English course, messages to freelancers about advertising and shill sites, and data on bitcoin payments. Combining this information with the content of the two bRspd leaks, the duo obtained the cryptographic keys controlling access to Besa Mafia’s website domain. “Me and my mate said, ‘Well, we appear to have access,’” Monteiro explains. “Let's take the website down.” There was no long-term plan or complex rationale behind the decision. “I just wanted to disrupt the operation,” Monteiro says. “It was also a personal revenge. I can talk about the greater good... but it's personal. It's many things – my individual focus shifts day to day.” Monteiro describes “Operation Vegetable”, as a carefully planned “Ocean's Eleven-style” mission. They copied all of Besa Mafia’s content – and saved it, Monteiro says, with a view to giving it to the police – and shut the website down, redirecting users to a site they had built. The new [page](http://besa.infodealer.org/) showed the picture of a closed, rusty door. Under the Besa Mafia logo, they left a message: “Besa Mafia has closed for business Read next - [Inside the Brexit Party's general election war machine](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/brexit-party-social-media-machine-nigel-farage-brexbox) Inside the Brexit Party's general election war machine --------------------------------------------------------------- By Darren Loucaides After 6 months of scamming criminals for their bitcoins and stealing over 100 BTC ($65.000) the site has closed No one was ever beaten up or killed ” In the background, the website played that tune from The Sound of Music, “So long, farewell, auf Wiedersehen, goodbye.” At Monteiro’s place, he and Judge Judy uncorked a bottle of champagne. [As fake news flourishes, the UK's fact-checkers are turning to automation to compete](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/fake-news-full-fact-fact-checking-news) Long Reads As fake news flourishes, the UK's fact-checkers are turning to automation to compete Read next - [The impossible fight to save Jakarta, the sinking megacity](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/jakarta-sinking) The impossible fight to save Jakarta, the sinking megacity --------------------------------------------------------------- By Peter Guest Evidence of the first murder linked to Besa Mafia emerged shortly after Monteiro met up with two police officers and seven months after Besa Mafia’s takedown. In January 2017, Monteiro managed to establish contact with the NCA through a friend who knew someone in the organisation’s intelligence unit. After some email exchanges with an operative – who did not use his real name – Monteiro was invited for a confidential meeting in central London. For more than an hour, Monteiro told the officers about the material he had come across after penetrating the website’s messaging system – wannabe organ harvesters, mutilation requests, people aspiring to commit matricide. He suggested that the targets should be told what was going on and flagged up that Yura, undeterred by the Besa fiasco, was now operating a new assassination market, called Crime Bay. It used the same source code as Besa Mafia, which conveniently allowed Monteiro to continue to read the site’s correspondence. Monteiro claims that the officers said they would be in touch again for an information handover, but did not ask him to show them the data he had brought to the meeting, which was on his laptop. The only document they consulted was an A3 printout on which Monteiro had summarised the intricacies of Besa Mafia’s operation. Part timeline, part list, part flow chart, the document included a breakdown of the various hacks and dumps the website had suffered, and even a top 10 of the website’s most dangerous users – in a fully wikified format. Always the wikipedian, Monteiro had begun to structure his trove of Besa Mafia-related information in a password-protected BesaWiki. One of the “most wanted” users on Monteiro’s A3 was someone who went by the name of Dogdaygod. Read next - [This economist has a plan to fix capitalism. It's time we all listened](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/mariana-mazzucato) This economist has a plan to fix capitalism. It's time we all listened --------------------------------------------------------------- By João Medeiros Dogdaygod first messaged Yura in February 2016. He was eager to kill a woman living in Cottage Grove, Minnesota. He was open-minded about the method – initially pushing for a hit-and-run, or a deliberate traffic collision, but later suggesting rasher systems, such as shooting the target and burning her house down. Dogdaygod displayed a virulent animosity towards his target. “I need this bitch dead, so please help me,” he wrote. Yura had egged him on: “Yes she is really a bitch and she deserve to die.” The conversation went on for months, coming to an abrupt conclusion when Dogdaygod – tired of Yura’s increasingly implausible pretexts for why the hit had not been carried out – requested a refund. “Unfortunately, this site has been hacked,” the admin had responded. He pretended to be the hacker, hoping to stop Dogdaygod from badgering him, and make some money on the side. “We got all customer and target information and we will send it to law enforcement unless you send 10 bitcoin,” he wrote. That happened on May 20, 2016. On May 31, 2016, about a month after the bRspd leak, the FBI contacted Amy Allwine, a woman living at the Minnesota address Dogdaygod had submitted to Besa Mafia. Amy and her husband Stephen Allwine – an IT specialist and a deacon at a local church – met with officers who informed them that someone had paid at least $6,000 on the dark web to murder Amy. The Allwines said they had no idea of who could be hiding behind the Dogdaygod persona. Six months later, Amy Allwine was dead. On November 13, her husband called 911 and said he had found her body in her bedroom. “I think my wife shot herself,” he told the operator. However, the police found evidence that linked Stephen Allwine to the murder: traces of bitcoin transactions on his devices, cookies for dark web-related websites, the fact that Dogdaygod had tried to buy the anaesthetic scopolamine on the darknet – and that high doses of the substance had been [found](http://www.startribune.com/allwine-murder-case-goes-to-jury-in-still… in Amy’s system. In January 2017 Allwine – aka Dogdaygod – was charged with his wife’s murder. In court, prosecutors pointed to a series of affairs – and the fact that Stephen was the only [beneficiary](http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1701/24/ptab.01.html) of Amy’s $700,000 life insurance policy – as probable motives. Allwine was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison in February 2018. Monteiro says that he was devastated when Allwine was arrested. Up to that point, the idea that he could have saved lives – that the kill list he had been frantically trying to hand to law enforcement had a portentous power – had essentially been a thought experiment. “I had been thinking: ‘Well, these are horrible, terrible people, who, if you don't arrest them, maybe will take the matters into their own hands,’” he says. “I thought that was hypothetical. But then it really happened.” He texted his NCA contact about the development; the officer reassured him that they would look into the matter urgently. Weeks went by. One Friday night in early February, Monteiro was at home sipping pumpkin soup in front of his computer’s six glowing screens. His desk was strewn with tokens of geekery: a self-destruction-style red button; a stuffed Bulbasaur; a parody “Maybot user’s guide”. Monteiro walked across his beige-carpeted living room, towards the front door: he had heard a strange noise. Seconds later, a red battering ram smashed through the white door and armed police officers rushed in. They pushed Monteiro against the wall and handcuffed him. Seizing his computer, they took pictures of the room and asked him for his devices’ passwords. After about 15 minutes, they put Monteiro into the back of a van and drove him to the nearest police station. At the station, an NCA officer told him he had been arrested for incitement to murder, in connection with Besa Mafia. In early 2018 Stephen Allwine, who had tried to hire a killer under the false name "Dogdaygod", was sentenced to life for murdering his wife FOX9 It appeared that Monteiro had been arrested on the basis of a misinformation campaign. There had been warning signs for a while, at least since the point at which Yura had threatened to expose him as a cop. In June 2016, when Monteiro hacked into Yura’s Gmail account, he had noticed that the scammer had created email addresses under the name of Chris Monteiro and Eileen Ormsby, an Australian journalist who had also written about Besa Mafia. Over the following months, Yura had instructed his detail of freelancers to create websites peddling fake news about Ormsby’s and Monteiro’s involvement in the assassination marketplace. They were WordPress blogs, not excessively sophisticated, but strong on SEO. Some had seemingly caught the NCA’s eye: the application for the warrant to search Monteiro’s flat referenced one of these blogs as evidence. “Open source reporting shows that Chris MONTEIRO and two other subjects created the Hit Man for Hire website ‘Besa Mafia’ on the Dark Web [https://hackeddatabaseofbesamafia.wordpress.com/](https://web.archive.org/w… the document read. It was imperative to search Monteiro’s place, the application for the warrant continued, because, as the presumed site’s admin, he might be in possession of more victim data and criminal evidence. Monteiro spent almost two days in a custody suite, working himself up, pacing the cell and paging through the only book he could get his hands on – a golfer’s autobiography. Over the course of several interviews with the officers who had arrested him, Monteiro understood that the NCA agents he had spoken with some weeks earlier had not told their colleagues that he was collaborating with them – and that, far from being Yura’s accomplice, he claimed to be his self-appointed nemesis. Monteiro says that, as he didn’t know his NCA contact’s full name and he didn’t have access to his devices while in custody, he could not immediately prove his dealings with the agency. For Monteiro, the interrogations were a mix of blundering and black comedy. He had to explain the story of Boaty McBoatFace’s taking a hit on Bob the Builder. At some point, the person questioning him asked Monteiro about a copy of stealth videogame Hitman found in his flat, implying that it could have been an inspiration for Besa Mafia. Eventually, Monteiro succeeded in explaining to the agents that they should look at the BesaWiki on his computer. There, they would find everything they needed: target names, messages, data on bitcoin payments, server IPs and information on how to backdoor the Crime Bay website. At midnight, on Sunday February 5, Monteiro was released on bail. He went back to his flat and guessed he’d have to change the door’s frame. Monteiro stayed at Judge Judy’s place that night. They played N.W.A’s song “Fuck tha Police”. In June 2017, the police informed Monteiro’s lawyer that no further action would be taken. [You used to build a wall to keep them out, but now hackers are destroying you from the inside](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darktrace-insider-threats-hackers-security) Long Reads You used to build a wall to keep them out, but now hackers are destroying you from the inside Shortly after, the NCA launched an international operation. They tracked down several Besa Mafia users and charged them with conspiracy to commit a crime. In March 2017, they [arrested](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-dorset-44955451) David Crichton, a British doctor who had ordered a hit on his former financial advisor. Crichton did not pay the website, though, and later said he had put in the order just out of frustration; Crichton was cleared of any wrongdoing in July 2018. Another Crime Bay user in Denmark, an Italian-born woman called Emanuela Consortini, was [arrested](https://www.deepdotweb.com/2018/01/04/woman-sentenced-six-years-h… thanks to an NCA tip-off and then sentenced to six years in jail for commissioning the murder of an ex-boyfriend. The Crime Bay website was eventually shut down by the NCA and the Bulgarian police in May 2017 and Monteiro assumed that Yura had been found and jailed. Monteiro stopped researching the matter. Then, in December 2017, he received an email from Yura. The scammer accused Monteiro of being immoral: his exposing of Besa Mafia as a scam could have caused users to stop wasting time and resources on the website and kill their targets themselves. He called Monteiro Amy Allwine’s real killer. “How is Yura sending me emails?,” Monteiro thought. “How is he not in jail?” The full extent of the situation emerged in early 2018 when CBS’s 48 Hours approached Monteiro regarding the Allwine case. They wanted to interview him about his run-in with Yura. While preparing for the interview, Monteiro discovered that Yura had launched a new website, Cosa Nostra, and adopted a new persona – Italian capo “Barbosa”. Monteiro’s exploit still worked and he could read all the messages between Yura/Barbosa and his customers, just as he did back in 2016. For some time, Monteiro entertained the hypothesis that the new website may be a police decoy. But it seemed unlikely: when Monteiro started providing CBS with details about conversations from Cosa Nostra, it would always be CBS’s subsequent tip to the local police force that triggered investigations and arrests. “I started realising that people were getting arrested directly as a result of the information I supplied,” he says. CBS’s tips [led](https://www.cbsnews.com/video/click-for-a-killer-part-2/) to arrests in [Singapore](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/48-hours-disrupts-alleged-dark-web-…, Illinois and Texas. When Monteiro passed me some documents about customers in the UK, I forwarded the details to police stations in Edinburgh and Oxfordshire. Monteiro tried again to pass the matter to the police. He had his lawyer email the NCA, telling them about murderous plots hatched on Yura’s website, which was continuously rebranded – Cosa Nostra, Sicilian Hitmen, Camorra Hitmen, Ndrangheta Hitmen, Yakuza Mafia, Bratva Mafia. Through his lawyer, the NCA advised Monteiro to call their hotline to report possible offences; they warned him about using illicit means to access the assassination markets’ correspondence. “The threat posed by so-called assassination markets is going to be pretty small in comparison to other things we deal with,” an NCA spokesperson told me. “We aren’t monitoring the website [and] there have been no arrests. However, we work closely with our international law enforcement partners to share information and intelligence,” a second spokesperson later added. That leaves Monteiro stuck with the list and an apparent strong urge to act, by sending the most plausible cases to the media. “I want to create a bit of a splash about this thing,” Monteiro says. “Selfishly, I want to give talks [about assassination markets], and use it as a platform to put further pressure on the police.” But he also feels that he has a duty to try and act on the information he retrieves. “I can't stop because there are people's lives at risk. Imagine you'd looked into a box and the act of looking into that box changed you. You can choose not to look into that box. But you knew that something would still be going on: the box is full of horrors. Should you look? Should you not look?” Monteiro keeps looking. He set up Google alerts for every target’s name – in case something happens to them, even if the authorities have been alerted. That’s how he spotted the news about Bryan Njoroge in a local Indiana outlet, the News and Tribune. According to Clarksville PD’s case reports, on June 8, Njoroge, a 21-year-old Texan on leave from the Fort Knox base, stole a gun from a shooting range, American Shooters, in the town’s north-west. Njoroge was found dead in the early hours of June 9, face down under the stairs of an announcer’s box on a baseball field. The coroner quickly established that he had died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The case was closed within days. Whoever ordered the hit on Yura’s scam website knew that Bryan would be in Indiana on those days; more specifically, they knew he would stay at a specific Airbnb, the address of which was included in the order instructions. Njoroge’s father, Samwel, confirmed to me that his son had booked that Airbnb. “We’re done with the case,” the officer in charge of the investigation at Clarksville PD, detective Ray Hall, told me in August. He said that he had already received a tip about the Toonbib conversation and that nevertheless had found “no factual evidence” of anything other than a suicide taking place. Samwel Njoroge told me that the police had never mentioned the assassination market when talking with him about the case. He was not happy with how his son death’s had been investigated, pointing to what he thought were inconsistencies between the case report detailing the discovery of the body and the autopsy, and underlining that the fatal bullet has never been found. (A forensic pathologist told me that bullets often go unretrieved in suicide cases.) Samwel added that Bryan’s computer, camera and two phones had vanished, which is strange, as Bryan – a small-time Instagram and YouTube celebrity – was inseparable from his devices. He also mentioned that his son had a $400,000 life insurance policy; Njoroge had changed the beneficiary – designating a female friend instead of his parents – just a month before dying. Samwel said he did not know whether someone else could have been travelling with Bryan, or known about his trip to Indiana. Bratva Mafia is the latest iteration of the Besa Mafia killer-for-hire scam Bratva Mafia We know little about Yura: he (everyone I spoke to who had interacted with Yura believed him to be a man) boasts to have made a lot of money – which is possible, especially in light of last year’s spike in bitcoin price; he claims to be Albanian, but Santosh Sharma’s recollection and Monteiro's IP analysis of Yura’s comments on wikis link him to Romania; Eileen Ormsby, who has had multiple email conversations with him, believes that Yura is likely to be in his twenties. Maybe the most interesting question, though, is whether Yura, aka Barbosa, is a police informer. He certainly tries to style himself as one of the good guys. When we exchanged emails he implored me not to say that his website was a scam. “If you intend to report hitmen scams, you are basically siding up with those would be murderers, helping them to avoid scams and traps and helping them to find other means to do their kill,” Yura/Barbosa wrote. “[It] is a moral right to scam criminals and would be murderers if this helps saving victims.” He signed off his messages “Barbosa, Lifesaver”. His defence is that he is a hindrance to potential murderers’ plans, robbing them of precious time and money. More significantly, he said that he was giving all target information to the police, and maintained that he has been working with the FBI. “After Besa Mafia was hacked, FBI agent talked with me on chat on site. He told me they don't want to arrest me, they are not after me, they want to arrest the murderers,” Yura/Barbosa, wrote. “They don't care about a scammer. They care about murderers.” Yura refused to provide evidence of his communications with the FBI, as that would prove that his website is a scam. Pleading with me not to report that, he offered to hand over the names of all the targets. He finally said he would deny ever speaking to me if I wrote that his business was a scam. What Yura said was a blend of facts, factoids and lies. It is true that Yura has passed information to journalists who approach him in order to establish his credentials as a good-hearted scammer: he handed two cases to CBS, which then turned them over to the police, triggering investigations and arrests. And some conversations in the bRspd dump do show that Yura had contacts with someone claiming to work for the FBI’s Dallas office as early as 2016. The FBI declined to confirm or deny whether it had ever worked with Yura. Other things Yura says are untrue. He maintains to have never condoned violence, but there is evidence of his trying to pressgang Thcjohn2, the wannabe hitman, into committing an assault – which apparently never materialised. His overall narrative of being a killer-baiter in shining armour doesn’t hold water. bRspd, the hacker who in 2016 twice broke into Besa Mafia’s website, told me over private chat that he had approached Yura about turning Besa Mafia into an actual honeypot for criminals. “I was trying to work with him by making the website better and more secured [sic] and instead of scamming we could really help people to identify these criminals and etc by collecting more data & NOT stealing people money,” bRspd wrote in September. According to bRspd, Yura refused. “He was just thirsty for money,” bRspd told me. “He's a big liar, he doesn't care about anything but money. Almost all the conversations I had with him included the word ‘money’ or [bitcoin].” According to Monteiro’s analysis of Besa Mafia’s bitcoin wallets, Yura might have [amassed](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/hire-a-hitman-website-is-a-scam-and-its-owner-has-made-a-killing-mt0shr3zn) nearly £5m. bRspd added that the notion that Yura was working with the police was – at least as of 2016 – “totally false”. In general, though, does Yura have a point? Without his scamming, some lives would have been at risk and some people plotting murders would still be around. Without Yura, neither Monteiro nor law enforcement nor journalists would have ever heard of Stephen “Dogdaydog” Allwine in Minnesota, the man in Singapore, or the woman in Denmark. Yura’s greed, tenacity and SEO strategy had unwittingly created a tool to perceive the intentions of would-be criminals. I posited the question to Monteiro over a beer in a London pub. Was Yura providing a service to the community? The matter, Monteiro argued, boiled down to a philosophical debate between virtue and consequentialism. Yura could make the case that his website was being used to jail criminals. But he was doing that by inciting murder, by egging criminals on and by spreading lies – about hitmen, about other people and about the dark web. The whole Besa Mafia sorry saga, Monteiro says, started because he wanted to cleanse the public sphere of lies. “I set out to bump off fake news. I wanted to explain the dark web, establish facts and fiction, explain what's real and what's not,” he says. “That’s my higher purpose – you know?” Updated 05.12.2018, 10.13 GMT: This article has been amended to correct a date in the Toonbib correspondence: Barbosa replied on June 1, not June 6.

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Fwd: Climate Scientist Caught Lying To Australian Public
by Zenaan Harkness 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

Legendary ~20 minutes vid - Alex Jones slams ABC Q&A lynching re climate change and sea level rise. Interview with an actual scientist, and plenty of facts and some humorous self immolatory irony. tl;dr - Anthropegenic (human caused) CO2 driven AGW (average global warming) and average global sea level rise, is total bollocks. Enjoy, ----- Forwarded message from Gil May <gilmay97(a)gmail.com> ----- From: Gil May <gilmay97(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 07:37:50 +1000 Subject: Fwd: Climate Scientist Caught Lying To Australian Public Climate Scientist Caught Lying To Australian Public > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oebulzcra0c

1 0

Assassination Politics AP (re: Harpers: Click Here to Kill)
by grarpamp 26 Dec '19

26 Dec '19

On 12/17/19, Zenaan Harkness <zen(a)freedbms.net> wrote: > and it's all true... People who study the darknet say the same. Sanjuro's list was a scam but had actual political figures... the "politics" part. And of course it will be political entities and corps and countries going after each other... they have the money after all... non-aggression people simply won't have anything to do with it. And as in the article and darknet... the rest is going to be people... trying to kill each other, their dogs, their cars, etc... over basically nothing, and even innocent are going to get hurt. This is what makes it hard for anyone to recommend. Yet like the advancement from fists to swords to nukes, the tool is present and not going away anytime soon. Perhaps one way deal with is to make available systems offering alternative outcomes... use the tech itself to steer some of those swords towards plowshares... Crowdfunding reformative measures that don't result in physical harm... surrounding them or their place in some protest or siege of love, massive advertising and spot campaigns targeting illdoers, constant street level interviews, etc... lots of possibilities, including mailing them mountains of manure.. that's already possible online today. Perhaps soon you will be able to have a steaming pile dropped via drone into your favorite politico's pool, streamed live on dTube :)

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There are no such things as bad actors
by Ryan Carboni 25 Dec '19

25 Dec '19

There are no such things as bad actors, there are only those who are elite and those who cause trouble for the elite. Hence no effort to investigate or even spend a hundred hours investigating various likely pedophiles in the government, they weren't grabbing the children of the elite. With social norms like those, what does it matter? Without a fair application of laws and rules, and a listless population, the actually important parts of democratic institutions do not exist. Besides, some of those in disagreement helped build your fortunes, they don't wish to compete, they only want outer space colonies and such. It is self evidently reasonable to allow the naysayers to leave. The difference in wealth is equal to the difference in interest from junk versus government bonds.

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The Surveillance State Quietly Lost a Major Court Case
by jim bell 25 Dec '19

25 Dec '19

https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-surveillance-state-quietly-lost-a-major-c… The Surveillance State Quietly Lost a Major Court Case The feds have a habit of rifling without a warrant through NSA data warehouses to find dirt on American citizens. An appeals court ruling may finally start to break the addiction.

2 4

Cryptocurrency: Music
by grarpamp 25 Dec '19

25 Dec '19

2 1

Cryptocurrency: Music Xmas Edition
by grarpamp 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CxnLaI0h58 vandal santa style https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCbwbPwP4Ag crypto xmas ep https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_cZDsY1ITU bitcoin xmas https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pqIFDI18ZY jingle buys https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=37Bc5ZmvX8Y saint nick rap https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5AoOA5j85A adoption all i want https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4o_uTQ8jT7E drunk on crypto https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h4MyfaO5oHg bags plan

1 0

Cryptocurrency: Atomic CCDEX vs FakeDEX
by grarpamp 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

https://anchor.fm/investnoir3/episodes/Episode-67---arlynculwick-e9npia Cryptos should understand what true atomic ccdex are. More content and tools on the subject now entering the space.

1 0

Cryptocurrency: Major Youtube Censorship Attacks Against Crypto
by grarpamp 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

https://beincrypto.com/youtube-allegedly-flagging-popular-cryptocurrency-re… https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6odnm_X0jI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tKc3eq3_lFI Agent shit getting real. Get the word out. Decentralize all the things. Be seen, upload your content to all services in parallel. "Literally @YouTube Took Down A Video of Me Asking Hot Babes If They Have Ever Heard of #Bitcoin." via @colintcrypto @crypt0snews Nuked... @chrisdunntv @boxmining @blockchainchick @chrisdunntv @ivanontech @chicocrypto @chrisconeyint @blockchainchick @BTCsessions etc Options... steemit uptrennd bitchute d.tube lbryio 3speak bittubers dlive bittorrent ipfs cjdns tor i2p etc

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Ho, ho, ho!!! Merry Christmas!!! <3
by Cecilia Tanaka 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

Merry Christmas From Your - cof, cof! - Favorite Lawyer!!! :D => https://imgur.com/gallery/r3PihDY Wish you all in the whole world an amazingly happy Christmas!!! :D Much love and serenity all the days of all the years, not only today, but in your current life and maybe also in eventual reincarnations. (I don't know, who knows? :P) I love you, guys, girls, and who isn't binary!!! <3 Always yours, Ceci, who is sending Mirimir, Steve, grarpamp, Razer, John (both of them), Juan, Jim, Greg, and a lot of friends more, several snugglehugs, snugglekisses, and soft Christmas tickles... Smile, you are still alive!!! :D ---------- Loving. Caring. Sharing. Being Excellent To Each Other And To Our Hackerspace. <3 ---------- "Don't let anyone rob you of your imagination, your creativity, or your curiosity. It's your place in the world; it's your life. Go on and do all you can with it, and make it the life you want to live." - Mae Jemison

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sanity - deputising citizens - 2nd Amendment Sanctuaries - Democ-rats threaten national guard - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

>From the "God doin' a little tap dance" dept., we finally have some sane Sheriffs "threatening" to deputise citizens! Now THERE's some creative thinking! Next it will be the Sheriffs training the citizens militia, and mandatory gun training, a la Switzerland and the most racist ethnostate in the world who shall remain forever bracketted. Fortunately, the Democ-rats continue to march forward their gun seizure flashing gif agenda :D Virginia Lawmakers Threaten 2nd Amendment Sanctuaries With National Guard https://www.zerohedge.com/political/virginia-lawmakers-threaten-2nd-amendme… https://www.theorganicprepper.com/virginia-lawmakers-threaten-2nd-amendment… Virginia is the new battleground of the Second Amendment. After the most recent election, the state’s House and Senate are both Democrat majorities and they haven’t wasted a moment in attempting to gut the gun laws in what has historically been a permissive state. What are these new gun laws? The so-called “assault weapon ban” is SB16 and has that perilously vague wording we all know to be incredibly dangerous. In some interpretations, this law, if it passes, could make illegal the ownership or transportation of any semi-automatic gun because extendable magazines are available for it – and you don’t even have to have the extendable mags. The Virginia Mercury reports: The new Democratic majorities are expected to pass a variety of gun restrictions, including universal background checks, red flag laws that would allow authorities to take guns from people deemed dangerous and reinstatement of a one-handgun-a-month law… …But the proposed ban on particular types of firearms — and the prospect of criminal charges for gun owners who didn’t give them up — seemed to stoke the strongest outrage in the 40-plus rural localities that have declared themselves Second Amendment sanctuaries within the past few weeks. Of the dozens of bills already filed for the session that begins in January, Saslaw’s assault weapon bill was the most-read, according to the state’s online legislative system. (source) Since the above article was written, it should be noted that 2nd Amendment Sanctuary Counties are at 80 and counting. One sheriff has even vowed to deputize citizens should these unconstitutional laws pass. https://www.whsv.com/content/news/Virginia-sheriff-vows-to-deputize-citizen… ... Oh yeah! Note well muh grits, dey's comin' fo yer guns! Dey is comin' fo yer rights! NOW is the time to live your rights, in the face of the opposition and madness. Join with others who are living our basic human rights - especially the first and second amendments. You got a sheriff who "threatens" to deputise all citizens who carry semi automatics? Damn, dude, get down to the range already, muffas! That there is a sheriff you wanna know! We shouldn't have to point out the obvious - look at history, and look at the typicaol state "legislated" confiscation of guns and what, sooner or later, follows! Get 'em while they're still available. Get yourself deputised. Move to a state or county with a strong rights-upholding citizenry/ sheriffry! There are great people in your world - go support them already. Spread the word. Create your world, muffas,

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The Invention of “Ethical AI”: How Big Tech Manipulates Academia to Avoid Regulation
by Razer 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

"Anarcho"-Capitalist" Libertards in action From the newsletter editor: "When Rodrigo Ochigame was an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, other students rushed to major in computer science and land high-paying tech jobs, but Ochigame designed his own course of study, focused on “algorithmic filtering” and the “computational regulation of social and political life” — fortuitously, years before the Facebook-assisted election of Donald Trump. After graduating, he contributed an article to the New Left Review on how social media filters hurt Indigenous activists in their land dispute with agribusiness in Ochigame’s native Brazil. That journal article would ultimately help Ochigame conduct an investigation, published in The Intercept, on how the field of artificial intelligence ethics has been twisted to serve the goals of big tech. The New Left piece caught the attention of staff at MIT’s Media Lab, and they recruited him. Prior to joining the lab, Ochigame says, “I had some theoretical objections to the mathematical formalisms of fairness in AI but didn’t realize the organized lobbying operation behind it.” Under the leadership of Joichi Ito (financially connected to Jeffery Epstein), his misgivings only grew, and Ochigame resigned in August." https://theintercept.com/2019/12/20/mit-ethical-ai-artificial-intelligence/

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California Penal Code 12355
by grarpamp 24 Dec '19

24 Dec '19

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booby_trap https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_property https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katko_v._Briney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McComb_v._Connaghan As before, it's not 12355 anymore... PEN - 16310. - DIVISION 2. DEFINITIONS BOOBYTRAP PEN - 20110. - DIVISION 3. BOOBYTRAP > So if, say, somebody steals $10, he has to return $10 And if he refuses... then what?

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What is there to protect?
by Ryan Carboni 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

What is there left to protect? The idea that elites are immune to prosecution (complete with bribes to the prosecutors to appoint a jury favorable to the defence)? The image of men you had orgies with? It is not as if any of you elites actually care about anything other than those things. There is no need to accuse other portions of the elite of pedophilia, though I question the judgement of those who require satanic symbolism for greater orgasms. Certainly there are risks, the US didn't target enemy governments in WWII because there would no one to negotiate with, but right now there is no one to negotiate with. I also refuse to be manipulated using my emotions, whatever they may be. No one ever cared, I doubt any of you will start. You people aping the emotions of normal people is unconvincing, it is certainly not met by any real deeds.

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Re: California Penal Code 12355
by Ryan Carboni 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

Prohibiting the possibility of peaceful resolution invites revolution. To paraphrase JFK. Punk-Stasi 2.0 wrote >But now he apparently wants a system where every little crime is 'properly' dealt with I guess when you murder and rape a child (in that order), it is just a little murder? Not worth worrying about? Maybe it is a fun sized crime.

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Fw: The Cypherpunk's 1995 Archive has been forged, and what are we going to do about it? (was:Re: Could someone add news of Cypherpunks Archive...
by jim bell 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

To: Adam Back adam(a)cypherspace.org Nearly two months ago, I discovered that at least one of the archives for the Cypherpunks had been hacked, specifically the 1995 year. I accessed that year of archive, because I wanted to learn on what date the first part of my Assassination Politics essay had been posted to Cypherpunks. (Someone else copied it from the Digitaliberty list, run by Bill Frezza.)What I discovered was that nearly every message in 1995:That was from me, to me, about me, or contained the strings "Assassination Politics" or "AP' were missing. (and of about 15 instances of ' ap ' still present, most were meaning Associated Press: In other words, the tampering was apparently done by a human, not by a machine.) With a three exceptions, the archive run by Tom Busby contains no posting between February 14, 1995 and July 10, 1995. I, and I think the other current subscribers to the CP list, are looking for an untampered archive. Might you help? Do you know if other people may have some of this data from 1995? Jim Bell ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: jim bell <jdb10987(a)yahoo.com>To: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com>Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2019, 12:39:34 AM PSTSubject: Re: The Cypherpunk's 1995 Archive has been forged, and what are we going to do about it? (was:Re: Could someone add news of Cypherpunks Archive... Ooops, In the following, I substituted 2019 for the correct 1995: "That actually reflects the content of the Tom Busby archive, I believe. Problem is, it's wrong.One major problem which I, an others currently on the CP list discovered in early November 2019 is the virtually complete absence of postings from about February 14, 2019, through about July 10, 2019. That virtually-complete absence is a clue that there is something very wrong there. " Also: Notice that below, you said: >I have personal archives of the whole cypherpunks list, and your AP essay did not appear in the list in 1995. If you remember posting it, you must remember posting it elsewhere. Oddly enought, after you said that, you disproved yourself, saying: >Jim Bell's first message about "assasination politics" was from November 17, 1995. He said: So, you are confused. Let's find all those "ooh, what's this new idea called 'Assassination Politics'. If the CP archive hasn't been tampered with, it must appear somewhere.To shorten the problem a little, count the number of messages that appearl between February 14, 1995, and July 10, 1995. Is it more than, say, 20 or so? I could go back and check. Jim Bell On Monday, December 9, 2019, 04:50:00 PM PST, jim bell <jdb10987(a)yahoo.com> wrote: My comments inline: On Monday, December 9, 2019, 03:06:55 PM PST, John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> wrote: >Hi Jim. >> I discovered that the 1995 Archive for the CP list had been tampered with. >What you have is a conspiracy theory. Do you mean literally, as in I'm saying that two or more people acted together? Or a "highly-improbable theory". >I have personal archives of the whole cypherpunks list, and your AP essay did not appear in the list in 1995. If you remember posting it, you must remember posting it elsewhere. Huh? Even the existing archive, maintained by Tom Busby, has a very few emails mentioning me and AP. And if you do a Google search for "assassination politics", essentially every source says it is a 1995 essay. >I don't know if the public cypherpunks archive matches my own. But I looked in my own, a few months ago. Here's what I found. John To: grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> cc: gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Cypherpunks Archive Question In-reply-to: <CAD2Ti2-N=XErEE3iPJCbw5AkfBDh7OLDNZt5Un0XUaJnhbQ+jg(a)mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti2-N=XErEE3iPJCbw5AkfBDh7OLDNZt5Un0XUaJnhbQ+jg(a)mail.gmail.com> Comments: In-reply-to grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> message dated "Fri, 15 Nov 2019 19:53:43 -0500." Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 18:29:42 -0800 Message-ID: <21545.1574130582(a)hop.toad.com> From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> >I have archives of the old cypherpunks(a)toad.com mailing list from its inception (21 sept 1992) through its split into moderated and unmoderated lists and beyond. >These are in files in my own backups and filesystems, not in any public place. >I did a brief web search and see these archives: https://github.com/Famicoman/cypherpunks-mailing-list-archives >which have a cryptome version and a venona version. >In my own archives: >Tim May mentioned markets for assassination on 22 Nov 1992 in his message, "The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto". In the message itself, he says the manifesto was originated in mid-1988. Yes, I am NOW well aware of the pre-1995 discussion of the 'assassination market' concept, although I wasn't aware of it in, say, January 1995. >Jim Bell's first message about "assasination politics" was from November 17, 1995. He said: That actually reflects the content of the Tom Busby archive, I believe. Problem is, it's wrong.One major problem which I, an others currently on the CP list discovered in early November 2019 is the virtually complete absence of postings from about February 14, 2019, through about July 10, 2019. That virtually-complete absence is a clue that there is something very wrong there. > "If you've been following my idea, "assassination politics," you know that there is an excellent use for payee-anonymous digital cash." >He mentions it again on November 24, 1995, again without details: Yes, at this point I have no doubt that these are likely genuine emails, from me. But where are all the other emails from, to, about, etc, me?Where are there "Look at this new idea I found on Digitaliberty!!!" comments? > "It is for this kind of problem that I "invented" my concept of "Assassination Politics": If everybody pissed off at this situation was willing to donate $10 to a fund to reward the deaths of a few government officials responsible for ITAR, I can well imagine that this would shake them up a bit." >And again on December 3, 1995: > "Which is an excellent reason for implementing my idea, "Assassination Politics."" >On December 17, 1995, he said: > "Besides, I have already proposed what I consider to be a _better_ method of reforming government. It's called "Assassination Politics." Perhaps you've heard of it." >On December 29, 1995, he said: > "In my essay, "Assassination Politics," I pointed out that it would be relatively easy to deter such official-type actions if enough of us simply said, "NO!" and denominated it in terms of dollars and cents. After all, with four million Compuserve users, if they each were willing to donate a penny to see this latter-day Fuhrer dead, that would be $40,000. (Pardon me if I don't translate this into marks and other currencies.)" I guess you don't understand. All those are genuine emails FROM me. But saying that, doesn't say that these represent ALL the emails that were originally present on the list. And, if you look at 1996, you see THOUSANDS of references, not the tiny handful you've referred to. >On January 24, 1996, he says: > "Notice that I've added two areas to the list above, nwlibertarians(a)teleport.com and dnowch2(a)teleport.com ; the areas on which "Assassination Politics" is commonly discussed. I've also sent a copy to Cypherpunks(a)toad.com, for its obviously ob crypto (encryption, digital cash, etc) aspects." >On January 28, 1996, Rich Graves posted: > "I have saved Jim Bell's "Assassination Politics" essay, with his PGP signature, and soon to be a lot of other things, at > http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/Not_By_Me_Not_My_Views/ > "I plan to collect as many off-the-wall conspiracy theories in this directory as will fit in my disk quota. And when I run out of quota, I'll raise it for myself." >It's not there any more, and the Wayback machine doesn't have it. On January 28, 1996, Jim Bell posted: >I have saved Jim Bell's "Assassination Politics" essay, with his PGP >signature, and soon to be a lot of other things, at > > http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/Not_By_Me_Not_My_Views/ Thank you. I guess... BTW, I sent the file to you as A16.??? That isn't a really descriptive name. Please change it to something more mnemonic, like ASPOL.TXT or something." >Finally, on February 6, 1996, Jim Bell posted a message with subject line "Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I wrong?" and included the apparent full content of his essay. I'll append it below. I don't appear to have an earlier version than this one. > John Well, you keep citing messages. You don't address the question, "where was all the THOUSANDS of messages in 1995 that have gone missing? >From owner-cypherpunks Tue Feb 6 16:09:09 1996 Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks> Received: by toad.com id AA23336; Tue, 6 Feb 96 16:09:09 PST Received: from pacifier.com by toad.com id AA23320; Tue, 6 Feb 96 16:08:59 PST Received: from ip6.van1.pacifier.com by pacifier.com (Smail3.1.29.1 #6) with smtp for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> id m0tjx35-0008zlC; Tue, 6 Feb 96 15:43 PST Message-Id: <m0tjx35-0008zlC(a)pacifier.com> X-Sender: jimbell(a)pacifier.com X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Tue, 06 Feb 1996 15:43:12 -0800 To: lunaslide(a)loop.com From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Subject: Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I wrong? Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk >>1. Governments will no longer be "necessary," if they ever were. >2. Protection will no longer depend on having a "government." >>3. Anonymous networking technology will protect our rights, to the extent >>they can be protected. >>4. Your statement, "...anarchy is a massive step backward..." is absolutely >>incorrect. >That's fine that you believe the things, but for acceptance by others you >will have to provide support for your position. I, personally, would like >to see your premises so that I may evualuate your claims. You may indeed >be correct in your assessment. Well, here's my "Assassination Politics" essay. [Part 1] I've been following the concepts of digital cash and encryption, since I read the article in the August 1992 issue of Scientific American on "encrypted signatures." While I've only followed the Digitaliberty area for a few weeks, I can already see a number of points that do (and should!) strongly concern the average savvy individual: 1. How can we translate the freedom afforded by the Internet to ordinary life? 2. How can we keep the government from banning encryption, digital cash, and other systems that will improve our freedom? A few months ago, I had a truly and quite literally "revolutionary" idea, and I jokingly called it "Assassination Politics": I speculated on the question of whether an organization could be set up to _legally_ announce either that it would be awarding a cash prize to somebody who correctly "predicted" the death of one of a list of violators of rights, usually either government employees, officeholders, or appointees. It could ask for anonymous contributions from the public, and individuals would be able send those contributions using digital cash. I also speculated that using modern methods of public-key encryption and anonymous "digital cash," it would be possible to make such awards in such a way so that nobody knows who is getting awarded the money, only that the award is being given. Even the organization itself would have no information that could help the authorities find the person responsible for the prediction, let alone the one who caused the death. It was not my intention to provide such a "tough nut to crack" by arguing the general case, claiming that a person who hires a hitman is not guilty of murder under libertarian principles. Obviously, the problem with the general case is that the victim may be totally innocent under libertarian principles, which would make the killing a crime, leading to the question of whether the person offering the money was himself guilty. On the contrary; my speculation assumed that the "victim" is a government employee, presumably one who is not merely taking a paycheck of stolen tax dollars, but also is guilty of extra violations of rights beyond this. (Government agents responsible for the Ruby Ridge incident and Waco come to mind.) In receiving such money and in his various acts, he violates the "Non-aggression Principle" (NAP) and thus, presumably, any acts against him are not the initiation of force under libertarian principles. The organization set up to manage such a system could, presumably, make up a list of people who had seriously violated the NAP, but who would not see justice in our courts due to the fact that their actions were done at the behest of the government. Associated with each name would be a dollar figure, the total amount of money the organization has received as a contribution, which is the amount they would give for correctly "predicting" the person's death, presumably naming the exact date. "Guessers" would formulate their "guess" into a file, encrypt it with the organization's public key, then transmit it to the organization, possibly using methods as untraceable as putting a floppy disk in an envelope and tossing it into a mailbox, but more likely either a cascade of encrypted anonymous remailers, or possibly public-access Internet locations, such as terminals at a local library, etc. In order to prevent such a system from becoming simply a random unpaid lottery, in which people can randomly guess a name and date (hoping that lightning would strike, as it occasionally does), it would be necessary to deter such random guessing by requiring the "guessers" to include with their "guess" encrypted and untraceable "digital cash," in an amount sufficiently high to make random guessing impractical. For example, if the target was, say, 50 years old and had a life expectancy of 30 years, or about 10,000 days, the amount of money required to register a guess must be at least 1/10,000th of the amount of the award. In practice, the amount required should be far higher, perhaps as much as 1/1000 of the amount, since you can assume that anybody making a guess would feel sufficiently confident of that guess to risk 1/1000th of his potential reward. The digital cash would be placed inside the outer "encryption envelope," and could be decrypted using the organization's public key. The prediction itself (including name and date) would be itself in another encryption envelope inside the first one, but it would be encrypted using a key that is only known to the predictor himself. In this way, the organization could decrypt the outer envelope and find the digital cash, but they would have no idea what is being predicted in the innermost envelope, either the name or the date. If, later, the "prediction" came true, the predictor would presumably send yet another encrypted "envelope" to the organization, containing the decryption key for the previous "prediction" envelope, plus a public key (despite its name, to be used only once!) to be used for encryption of digital cash used as payment for the award. The organization would apply the decryption key to the prediction envelope, discover that it works, then notice that the prediction included was fulfilled on the date stated. The predictor would be, therefore, entitled to the award. Nevertheless, even then nobody would actually know WHO he is! It doesn't even know if the predictor had anything to do with the outcome of the prediction. If it received these files in the mail, in physical envelopes which had no return address, it would have burned the envelopes before it studied their contents. The result is that even the active cooperation of the organization could not possibly help anyone, including the police, to locate the predictor.) Also included within this "prediction-fulfilled" encryption envelope would be unsigned (not-yet-valid) "digital cash," which would then be blindly signed by the organization's bank and subsequently encrypted using the public key included. (The public key could also be publicized, to allow members of the public to securely send their comments and, possibly, further grateful remuneration to the predictor, securely.) The resulting encrypted file could be published openly on the Internet, and it could then be decrypted by only one entity: The person who had made that original, accurate prediction. The result is that the recipient would be absolutely untraceable. The digital cash is then processed by the recipient by "unblinding" it, a principle which is explained in far greater detail by an article in the August 1992 issue of Scientific American. The resulting digital cash is absolutely untraceable to its source. This overall system achieves a number of goals. First, it totally hides the identity of the predictor to the organization, which makes it unnecessary for any potential predictor to "trust" them to not reveal his name or location. Secondly, it allows the predictor to make his prediction without revealing the actual contents of that prediction until later, when he chooses to, assuring him that his "target" cannot possibly get early warning of his intent. (and "failed" predictions need never be revealed). In fact, he needs never reveal his prediction unless he wants the award. Third, it allows the predictor to anonymously grant his award to anyone else he chooses, since he may give this digital cash to anyone without fear that it will be traced. For the organization, this system also provides a number of advantages. By hiding the identity of the predictor from even it, the organization cannot be forced to reveal it, in either civil or criminal court. This should also shield the organization from liability, since it will not know the contents of any "prediction" until after it came true. (Even so, the organization would be deliberately kept "poor" so that it would be judgment-proof.) Since presumably most of the laws the organization might be accused of violating would require that the violator have specific or prior knowledge, keeping itself ignorant of as many facts as possible, for as long as possible, would presumably make it very difficult to prosecute. [end part 1] [part 2] "At the Village Pizza shop, as they were sitting down to consume a pepperoni, Dorothy asked Jim, 'So what other inventions are you working on?" Jim replied, 'I've got a new idea, but it's really revolutionary. Literally REVOLUTIONARY.' 'Okay, Jim, which government are you planning to overthrow?,' she asked, playing along. 'All of them,' answered Jim." Political Implications Imagine for a moment that as ordinary citizens were watching the evening news, they see an act by a government employee or officeholder that they feel violates their rights, abuses the public's trust, or misuses the powers that they feel should be limited. A person whose actions are so abusive or improper that the citizenry shouldn't have to tolerate it. What if they could go to their computers, type in the miscreant's name, and select a dollar amount: The amount they, themselves, would be willing to pay to anyone who "predicts" that officeholder's death. That donation would be sent, encrypted and anonymously, to a central registry organization, and be totaled, with the total amount available within seconds to any interested individual. If only 0.1% of the population, or one person in a thousand, was willing to pay $1 to see some government slimeball dead, that would be, in effect, a $250,000 bounty on his head. Further, imagine that anyone considering collecting that bounty could do so with the mathematical certainty that he can't possibly be identified, and could collect the reward without meeting, or even talking to, anybody who could later identify him. Perfect anonymity, perfect secrecy, and perfect security. And that, combined with the ease and security with which these contributions could be collected, would make being an abusive government employee an extremely risky proposition. Chances are good that nobody above the level of county commissioner would even risk staying in office. Just how would this change politics in America? It would take far less time to answer, "What would remain the same?" No longer would we be electing people who will turn around and tax us to death, regulate us to death, or for that matter sent hired thugs to kill us when we oppose their wishes. No military? One of the attractive potential implications of such a system would be that we might not even need a military to protect the country. Any threatening or abusive foreign leader would be subject to the same contribution/assassination/reward system, and it would operate just as effectively over borders as it does domestically. This country has learned, in numerous examples subsequent to many wars, that once the political disputes between leaders has ceased, we (ordinary citizens) are able to get along pretty well with the citizens of other countries. Classic examples are post-WWII Germany, Japan, and Italy, and post-Soviet Russia, the Eastern bloc, Albania, and many others. Contrary examples are those in which the political dispute remains, such as North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Cuba, Red China, and a few others. In all of these examples, the opposing leadership was NOT defeated, either in war or in an internal power struggle. Clearly, it is not the PEOPLE who maintain the dispute, but the leadership. Consider how history might have changed if we'd been able to "bump off" Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Moammar Khadafi, and various others, along with all of their replacements if necessary, all for a measly few million dollars, rather than the billions of dollars and millions of lives that subsequent wars cost. But that raises an interesting question, with an even more interesting answer. "If all this is so easy, why hasn't this been done before?" I mean, wars are destructive, costly, and dangerous, so why hasn't some smart politician figured out that instead of fighting the entire country, we could just 'zero' the few bad guys on the top? The answer is quite revealing, and strikingly "logical": If we can kill THEIR leaders, they can kill OUR leaders too. That would avoid the war, but the leadership on both sides would be dead, and guess who is making the decisions about what to do? That's right, the LEADERS! And the leaders (both theirs and ours!) would rather see 30,000,000 ordinary people die in WWII than lose their own lives, if they can get away with it. Same in Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, and numerous other disputes around the globe. You can see that as long as we continue to allow leaders, both "ours" and "theirs," to decide who should die, they will ALWAYS choose the ordinary people of each country. One reason the leaders have been able to avoid this solution is simple: While it's comparatively easy to "get away with murder," it's a lot harder to reward the person who does it, and that person is definitely taking a serious risk. (Most murders are solved based on some prior relationship between the murder and victim, or observations of witnesses who know either the murderer or the victim.) Historically, it has been essentially impossible to adequately motivate a assassin, ensuring his safety and anonymity as well, if only because it has been impossible to PAY him in a form that nobody can trace, and to ensure the silence of all potential witnesses. Even if a person was willing to die in the act, he would want to know that the people he chooses would get the reward, but if they themselves were identified they'd be targets of revenge. All that's changed with the advent of public-key encryption and digital cash. Now, it should be possible to announce a standing offer to all comers that a large sum of digital cash will be sent to him in an untraceable fashion should he meet certain "conditions," conditions which don't even have to include proving (or, for that matter, even claiming) that he was somehow responsible for a death. I believe that such a system has tremendous implications for the future of freedom. Libertarians in particular (and I'm a libertarian) should pay particular attention to the fact that this system "encourages" if not an anarchist outcome, at least a minarchist (minimal government) system, because no large governmental structure could even survive in its current form. In fact, I would argue that this system would solve a potential problem, occasionally postulated, with the adoption of libertarianism in one country, surrounded by non-libertarian states. It could have reasonably been suspected that in a gradual shift to a libertarian political and economic system, remnants of a non-libertarian system such as a military would have to survive, to protect society against the threats represented by foreign states. While certainly plausible, it would have been hard for an average naive person to imagine how the country would maintain a $250 billion military budget, based on voluntary contributions. The easy answer, of course, is that military budgets of that size would simply not happen in a libertarian society. More problematic is the question of how a country would defend itself, if it had to raise it defenses by voluntary contribution. An equally simplistic answer is that this country could probably be defended just fine on a budget 1/2 to 1/3 of the current budget. True, but that misses the point. The real answer is even simpler. Large armies are only necessary to fight the other large armies organized by the leadership of other, non-libertarian states, presumably against the will of their citizenry. Once the problem posed by _their_ leadership is solved (as well as ours; either by their own citizenry by similar anonymous contributions, or by ours), there will be no large armies to oppose. [end of part 2] [part 3] In the 1960's movie, "The Thomas Crown Affair," actor Steve McQueen plays a bored multi-millionaire who fights tedium by arranging well-planned high-yield bank robberies. He hires each of the robbers separately and anonymously, so that they can neither identify him or each other. They arrive at the bank on schedule, separately but simultaneously, complete the robbery, then separate forever. He pays each robber out of his own funds, so that the money cannot be traced, and he keeps the proceeds of each robbery. In my recent essay generally titled "Digitaliberty," or earlier "Assassination politics," I hypothesized that it should be possible to LEGALLY set up an organization which collects perfectly anonymous donations sent by members of the public, donations which instruct the organization to pay the amount to any person who correctly guesses the date of death of some named person, for example some un-favorite government employee or officeholder. The organization would totalize the amounts of the donations for each different named person, and publish that list (presumably on the Internet) on a daily or perhaps even an hourly basis, telling the public exactly how much a person would get for "predicting" the death of that particular target. Moreover, that organization would accept perfectly anonymous, untraceable, encrypted "predictions" by various means, such as the Internet (probably through chains of encrypted anonymous remailers), US mail, courier, or any number of other means. Those predictions would contain two parts: A small amount of untraceable "digital cash," inside the outer "digital envelope," to ensure that the "predictor" can't economically just randomly choose dates and names, and an inner encrypted data packet which is encrypted so that even the organization itself cannot decrypt it. That data packet would contain the name of the person whose death is predicted, and the date it is to happen. This encrypted packet could also be published, still encrypted, on the Internet, so as to be able to prove to the world, later, that SOMEBODY made that prediction before it happened, and was willing to "put money on it" by including it in outside the inner encrypted "envelope." The "predictor" would always lose the outer digital cash; he would only earn the reward if his (still-secret) prediction later became true. If, later on, that prediction came true, the "lucky" predictor would transmit the decrypt key to the organization, untraceably, which would apply it to the encrypted packet, and discover that it works, and read the prediction made hours, days, weeks, or even months earlier. Only then would the organization, or for that matter anyone else except the predictor, know the person or the date named. Also included in that inner encrypted digital "envelope" would be a public-key, generated by the predictor for only this particular purpose: It would not be his "normal" public key, obviously, because _that_ public key would be identifiable to him. Also present in this packet would be "blinded" (not yet certified as being good) "digital cash" codes, codes that would be presented to a certifying bank for their digital "stamp of approval," making them worth the dollars that the predictor has earned. (This presentation could be done indirectly, by an intermediary, to prevent a bank from being able to refuse to deal with the organization.) Those "digital cash" codes will then be encrypted using the public key included with the original prediction, and published in a number of locations, perhaps on the Internet in a number of areas, and available by FTP to anyone who's interested. (It is assumed that this data will somehow get to the original predictor. Since it will get to "everyone" on the Internet, it will presumably be impossible to know where the predictor is.) Note, however, that only the person who sent the prediction (or somebody he's given the secret key to in the interim) can decrypt that message, and in any case only he, the person who prepared the digital cash blanks, can fully "unblind" the digital cash to make it spendable, yet absolutely untraceable. (For a much more complete explanation of how so-called "digital cash" works, I refer you to the August 1992 issue of Scientific American.) This process sounds intricate, but it (and even some more detail I haven't described above) is all necessary to: 1. Keep the donors, as well as the predictors, absolutely anonymous, not only to the public and each other, but also to the organization itself, either before or after the prediction comes true. 2. Ensure that neither the organization, nor the donors, nor the public, is aware of the contents of the "prediction" unless and until it later becomes true. (This ensures that none of the other participants can be "guilty" of knowing this, before it happens.) 3. Prove to the donors (including potential future predictors), the organization, and the public that indeed, somebody predicted a particular death on a particular date, before it actually happened. 4. Prove to the donors and the public (including potential future predictors) that the amount of money promised was actually paid to whomever made the prediction that later came true. This is important, obviously, because you don't want any potential predictor to doubt whether he'll get the money if he makes a successful prediction, and you don't want any potential donor to doubt that his money is actually going to go to a successful predictor. 5. Prevent the organization and the donors and the public from knowing, for sure, whether the predictor actually had anything to do with the death predicted. This is true even if (hypothetically) somebody is later caught and convicted of a murder, which was the subject of a successful "prediction": Even after identifying the murderer through other means, it will be impossible for anyone to know if the murderer and the predictor were the same person. 6. Allow the predictor, if he so chooses, to "gift" the reward (possibly quite anonymously) to any other person, one perhaps totally unaware of the source of the money, without anyone else knowing of this. Even the named "target" (the "victim") is also assured of something: He is assured that literally anyone in the world, from his worst enemy to his best friend, could make the amount of the reward, absolutely anonymously, should they "predict" his death correctly. At that point, he will have no friends. This may represent the ultimate in compartmentalization of information: Nobody knows more than he needs to, to play his part in the whole arrangement. Nobody can turn anyone else in, or make a mistake that identifies the other participants. Yet everyone can verify that the "game" is played "fairly": The predictor gets his money, as the donors desire. Potential future predictors are satisfied (in a mathematically provable fashion) that all previous successful predictors were paid their full rewards, in a manner that can't possibly be traced. The members of the public are assured that, if they choose to make a donation, it will be used as promised. This leads me to a bold assertion: I claim that, aside from the practical difficulty and perhaps, theoretical impossibility of identifying either the donors or the predictor, it is very likely that none of the participants, with the (understandable) hypothetical exception of a "predictor" who happens to know that he is also a murderer, could actually be considered "guilty" of any violation of black-letter law. Furthermore, none of the participants including the central organization is aware, either before or after the "prediction" comes true, that any other participant was actually in violation of any law, or for that matter would even know (except by watching the news) that any crime had actually been committed. After all, the donors are merely offering gifts to a person who makes a successful prediction, not for any presumed responsibility in a killing, and the payment would occur even if no crime occurred. The organization is merely coordinating it all, but again isolating itself so that it cannot know from whom the money comes, or to whom the money eventually is given, or whether a crime was even committed. (Hypothetically, the "predictor" could actually be the "victim," who decides to kill himself and "predict" this, giving the proceeds of the reward to his chosen beneficiary, perhaps a relative or friend. Ironically, this might be the best revenge he can muster, "cheating the hangman," as it were.) In fact, the organization could further shield itself by adopting a stated policy that no convicted (or, for that matter, even SUSPECTED) killers could receive the payment of a reward. However, since the recipient of the reward is by definition unidentified and untraceable even in theory, this would be a rather hollow assurance since it has no way to prevent such a payment from being made to someone responsible. [end of part 3] [part 4] In part 3, I claimed that an organization could quite legally operate, assisted by encryption, international data networking, and untraceable digital cash, in a way that would (indirectly) hasten the death of named people, for instance hated government employees and officeholders. I won't attempt to "prove" this, for reasons that I think will be obvious. First, even if such operation were indeed "legal," that fact alone would not stop its opponents from wanting to shut it down. However, there is also another way of looking at it: If this system works as I expect it would, even its claimed "illegality" would be irrelevant, because it could operate over international borders and beyond the legal reach of any law-abiding government. Perhaps the most telling fact, however, is that if this system was as effective as it appears it would be, no prosecutor would dare file charges against any participant, and no judge would hear the case, because no matter how long the existing list of "targets," there would always be room for one or two more. Any potential user of this system would recognize that an assault on this system represents a threat to its future availability, and would act accordingly by donating money to target anyone trying to shut it down. Even so, I think I should address two charges which have been made, apparently quite simplistically, claiming that an implementation of this idea would violate the law. Specifically: "Conspiracy to commit murder" and "misprision of felony." As I understand it, in order to have a "conspiracy" from a criminal standpoint, it is necessary to have at least two people agree to commit a crime, and have some overt act in furtherance of that crime. Well, this charge already "strikes out" because in the plan I described, none of the participants _agrees_ with ANYONE to commit a crime. None of the participants even informs anyone else that he will be committing a crime, whether before or after the fact. In fact, the only crime appears (hypothetically; this assumes that a crime was actually committed) to be a murder committed by a single individual, a crime unknown to the other participants, with his identity similarly unknown. Remember, the "prediction" originally sent in by the predictor was fully encrypted, so that the organization (or anyone else, for that matter) would be unable to figure out the identity of the person whose death was predicted, or the date on which it was predicted to occur. Thus, the organization is incapable of "agreeing" with such a thing, and likewise the donors as well. Only if the prediction later came true would the decrypt key arrive, and only then would the organization (and the public) be made aware of the contents. Even then, it's only a "prediction," so even then, nobody is actually aware of any crime which can be associated with the predictor. "Misprision of Felony" This crime, sort of a diluted form of "accessory before and/or after the fact," was claimed to qualify by "Tim of Angle," who subsequent to my answer to him on this subject has totally failed to support his initial claim. (a recent curiosity is that this crime is one that has been charged against Michael Fortier, the person who claims he helped OKC bombing suspect Tim McVeigh "case the joint" at the Federal building.) I include it here, nevertheless, because his simplistic (and un-careful) reading of my idea led him to perhaps the "closest" law that one might allege that the participants would have broken. Tim claimed: TOA> No. That's called "misprision of felony" and makes you an accessory TOA> before the fact. Arguably, under the felony murder rule you could get TOA> capital punishment in a state that has such. However, I did a little library research, checking Black's Law Dictionary. Here is the entry for this item: "Misprision of felony. The offense of concealing a felony committed by another, but without such previous concert with or subsequent assistance to the felon as would make the party concealing an accessory before or after the fact. United State s v. Perlstein, C.C.A.N.J., 126 F.2d 789, 798. Elements of the crime are that the principal committed and completed the felony alleged, that the defendant had full knowledge of that fact, that the defendant failed to notify the authorities, and that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the crime. U.S. v. Ciambrone, C.A. Nev., 750 F.2d 1416, 1417. Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, is guilty of the federal crime of misprision of felony. 18 U.S.C.A 4." See also Obstructing Justice. ++++++++++end of Black's law Dictionary Entry The only "element" of this crime which is arguably satisfied is the first: Some person (_other_than_ the defendant for "misprision of felony") committed a crime. The second element fails miserably: "... that the defendant had full knowledge of that fact... " My previous commentary makes it clear that far from "full knowledge of that fact," other participants are carefully prevented from having ANY "knowledge of that fact." The third element, "..that the defendant failed to notify the authorities..." is also essentially non-existent: No other participants have any information as to the identity of a predictor, or his location, or for that matter whether he has had any involvement in any sort of crime. In fact, it would be possible for each of the other partiipants to deliver (anonymously, presumably) copies of all correspondence they have sent, to the police or other agency, and that correspondence would not help the authorities even slightly to identify a criminal or even necessarily a crime. In fact, normal operation of this organization would be to publicize "all" correspondence it receives, in order to provide feedback to the public to assure them that all participants are fulfilling their promises and receiving their rewards. This publication would presumably find its way to the police, or it could even be mailed to them on a regular basis to prevent any suggestion that the organization was "fail[ing] to notify authorities." Nevertheless, none of this material could help any authorities with their investigations, to their dismay. The fourth and last element of the crime of "misprision of felony", "...and that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the crime," would totally fail. The organization would not " conceal" the crime. In fact, it will have no ability to do anything to the contrary, if for no other reason that it _has_ no knowledge of the crime! And as described above, it would carefully avoid having access to any information that could help solve the crime, and thus it would escape any obligations along these lines. Summary: In hindsight, it is not surprising that such an organization could operate legally within the US, although at least initially not without political opposition. First, this is at least nominally supposed to be a "free country," which should mean that police and other authorities aren't able to punish behavior just because they don't like it. Secondly, it is obvious that most laws today were originally written during an era in which laws assumed that "conspirators" at least knew each other, had met each other, could identify each other, or had (at least!) talked to each other. On the contrary, in my scenario none of the participants even know on what continent any of the others reside, let alone their country, city, or street. They don't know what they look like, sound like, or for that matter even "type like": None of their prose, save a few sparse "predictions," ever get communicated to anyone else, so even text-comparison programs would fail to "target" anyone. Equally surprising (to those who originally wrote the laws against "conspiracy") would be "Person A's" ability to satisfy himself that "Person B" deserves the award, without knowing that "Person B" is (or is not) actually responsible for a particular death. [end of part 4] [part 5] In the previous four notes on the subject of Digitaliberty, I've suggested that this concept (collecting anonymous donations to, in effect, "purchase" the death of an un-favorite government employee) would force a dramatic reduction of the size of government at all levels, as well as achieving what will probably be a "minarchist" (minimal government) state at a very rapid rate. Furthermore, I pointed out that I thought that this effect would not merely affect a single country or continent, but might in fact spread through all countries essentially simultaneously. But in addition to such (apparently) grandiose claims, it occurs to me that there must be other changes to society that would simultaneously occur with the adoption of such a system. After all, a simplistic view of my idea might lead one to the conclusion that there would be almost no governmental structure left after society had been transformed. Since our current "criminal justice system" today is based totally on the concept of "big government," this would lead a naive person to wonder how concepts such as "justice," "fairness," "order," and for that matter protection of individual rights can be accomplished in such a society. Indeed, one common theme I've seen in criticisms of my idea is the fear that this system would lead to "anarchy." The funny thing about this objection is that, technically, this could easily be true. But "anarchy" in real life may not resemble anything like the "anarchy" these people claim to fear, which leads me to respond with a quote whose origin I don't quite remember: "Anarchy is not lack of order. Anarchy is lack of ORDERS." People presumably will continue to live their lives in a calm, ordered manner. Or, at least as calm and ordered as they WANT to. It won't be "wild in the streets," and they won't bring cannibalism back as a national sport, or anything like that. It occurs to me that probably one of the best ways to demonstrate that my idea, "assassination politics" (perhaps inaptly named, in view of the fact that its application is far greater than mere politics), would not result in "lack of order" is to show that most if not all of the DESIRABLE functions of the current so-called "criminal justice system" will be performed after its adoption. This is true even if they will be accomplished through wholly different methods and, conceivably, in entirely different ways than the current system does. I should probably first point out that it is not my intention to re-write the book of minarchist theory. I would imagine that over the years, there has been much written about how individuals and societies would function absent a strong central government, and much of that writing is probably far more detailed and well-thought-out than anything I'll describe here. One reason that ALMOST ANY "criminal justice system" would be better and more effective than the one we currently possess is that, contrary to the image that officialdom would try to push, anyone whose job depends on "crime" has a strong vested interest in _maintaining_ a high level of crime, not eliminating it. After all, a terrorized society is one that is willing to hire many cops and jailers and judges and lawyers, and to pay them high salaries. A safe, secure society is not willing to put up with that. The "ideal" situation, from the limited and self-interested standpoint of the police and jailers, is one that maximizes the number of people in prison, yet leaves most of the really dangerous criminals out in the streets, in order to maintain justification for the system. That seems to be exactly the situation we have today, which is not surprising when you consider that the police have had an unusually high level of input into the "system" for many decades. The first effect of my idea would be, I think, to generally eliminate prohibitions against acts which have no victims, or "victimless crimes." Classic examples are laws against drug sales and use, gambling, prostitution, pornography, etc. That's because the average (unpropagandized) individual will have very little concern or sympathy for punishing an act which does not have a clear victim. Without a large, central government to push the propaganda, the public will view these acts as certainly not "criminal," even if still generally undesirable by a substantial minority for a few years. Once you get rid of such laws, the price of currently-illegal drugs would drop dramatically, probably by a factor of 100. Crime caused by the need to get money to pay for these drugs would drop drastically, even if you assume that drug usage increased due to the lowering of the price. Despite this massive reduction in crime, perhaps as much as 90%, the average person is still going to want to know what "my system" would do about the residual, "real" crime rate. You know, murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and all that. Well, in the spirit of the idea, a simplistic interpretation would suggest that an individual could target the criminal who victimizes him, which would put an end to that criminal career. Some might object, pointing out that the criminal is only identified in a minority of crimes. That objection is technically correct, but it's also a bit misleading. The truth is that the vast majority of "victim"-type crime is committed by a relatively tiny fraction of the population who are repeat criminals. It isn't necessary to identify them in a vast majority of their crimes; statistically you'll eventually find out who they are. For example, even if the probability of a car thief getting caught, per theft, is only 5%, there is at least a 40% probability of getting caught after 10 thefts, and a 65% chance after 20 thefts. A smart car-theft victim would be happy to donate money targeting ANY discovered car-thief, not necessarily just the one who victimized him. The average car-owner would be wise to offer such donations occasionally, as "insurance" against the possibility of his being victimized some day: An average donation of 1 cent per day per car would constitute $10,000 per day for a typical city of 1 million cars. Assuming that amount is far more than enough to get a typical car thief's "friends" to "off" him, there is simply no way that a substantial car-theft subculture could possibly be maintained. Another alternative is that insurance companies would probably get into the act: Since they are going to be the financial victims of thefts of their insured's property, it is reasonable to suppose that they would be particularly inclined to deter such theft. It is conceivable that current-day insurance companies would transmogrify themselves into investigation/deterrence agencies, while maintaining their insurance role, in view of the fact that they have the most to lose. This is particularly true because if "assassination politics" (as applied to criminals and crime) comes about, they could then actually DO SOMETHING about the problem, rather than merely reporting on the statistics to their customers and stockholders. Such companies would also have a strong motivation to provide a workable system of rewards for solving crimes and identifying criminals, rewards that (naturally enough!) can be given out totally anonymously. While I would like to talk about the other advantage of this new kind of justice, the fact that politicians and other government employees would no longer have de-facto immunity in most cases, the reality is that since we would no longer HAVE "politicians and other government employees," to mention that advantage would be redundant. The principle is valid, however: In today's system, you can have people known to be guilty of crimes, but not prosecuted because they are part of "the system." Classic examples would be heroes of the right (Oliver North) and heroes of the left (Jim Wright) who either escape prosecution or conviction for "political" or "bureaucratic" reasons. With "assassination politics" that would simply never happen. [end part 5] Assassination Politics Part 6 A frequent initial belief among people who have recently heard of my "assassination politics" idea is the fear that this system will somehow be "out of control": It would end up causing the death of ordinary, "undeserving" people. This system, however, will not be without its own kind of "control." Not a centralized control, decideable by a single individual, but a decentralized system in which everyone gets an implicit "vote." A good analogy might be to consider a society in which everyone's house thermostat is controlled to operate at a temperature which is set for the entire country. Each person's control input is taken as a "vote," whether to get hotter, colder, or to stay the same temperature. The central control computer adjusts the national setpoint temperature in order to equalize the number of people who want the temperature colder and hotter. Each house is at the same, nationally-set temperature, however. Clearly, no one individual is in control of the setting. Nevertheless, I think it would be generally agreed that this system would never produce a REALLY "off the wall" temperature setting, simply because so many people's inputs are used to determine the output. Sure, if a group of 10,000 kids decided (assisted by the Internet) together to screw with the system, and they all set their houses' thermostat inputs to "hotter," they could SLIGHTLY increase the overall setting, but since there are probably about 100 million separate dwellings in the US, their fiddlings will be drowned out by the vast majority of the population's desires. Is this system "out of control"? True, it is out of the "control" of any single individual, but nevertheless it is well within the control of the population as a whole. It turns out that "assassination politics" actually has a rather similar control mechanism which, like the one I've described above. First, I've pointed out that if I were to operate a centralized system such as this, I'd only accept donations naming people who are in violation of the "Non-Initiation Of Force Principle" (NIOFP), well known to libertarians. By this standard, government employees (who have accepted paychecks paid for with funds stolen from citizenry by taxes) and criminals whose crimes actually had a victim would be included. Let's call this hypothetical organization "Organization A," or OrgA for short. True, somebody else might be a little less scrupulous, accepting donations for the termination of ANYBODY regardless of whether he "deserves" his fate. (Hypothetically, let's call them, "Organization B," or OrgB, for short.) However, I suggest that if it were explained to most potential donors (who, I suggest, would have "typical" levels of scruples) that if he patronizes OrgB, his interests wouldn't be protected. For example, OrgB (if it survives and thrives) might later come back to target HIM, because of some other donor. OrgA would not. Naturally, our "ethical" donor doesn't want this, so he would choose to give his donation to the most "ethical" organization who will accept it. This maximizes the benefit to him, and minimizes the potential harm. Since BOTH organizations will accept donations for "deserving" victims, while only OrgB will accept them for "just anybody," it is reasonable to conclude that (capitalism being what it is) OrgB's rates (the percentage of the price it keeps as profit) can be and will be higher for its donations. (that's because there is less competition in its area of specialization.) Thus, it would be more economical to target "deserving" people through OrgA , and thus donors will be drawn to it. In addition, OrgA will become larger, more credible, believeable and trustworthy, and more potential "guessors" (assassins?) will "work" its system, and for lower average potential payments. (all else being equal.) Even so, and ironically, the average donation level for people listed by OrgA would likely be higher, since (if we assume these are "deserving" people) more people will be contributing towards their demise. After all, if a potential donor wants to "hit" some government bigwig, there will be PLENTY of other donors to share the cost with. Millions of donations of $1 to $10 each would be common and quite economical. On the other hand, if you just selected a target out of the telephone directory, an "undeserving" target, you'll probably be the only person wanting to see him dead, which means that you'll probably have to foot the whole bill of perhaps $5K to $10K if you want to see any "action." Add to that OrgB 's "cut," which will probably be 50%, and you're talking $10K to $20K. I contend that the likelihood of this kind of thing actually happening will be quite low, for "undeserving victims." Now, the die-hards among you will probably object to the fact that even this tiny residual possibility is left. But consider: Even _today_ it would be quite "possible" for you to pick a name randomly out of a list, find him and kill him yourself. Does this frequently happen? Apparently not. For just one thing, there's no real motive. Unless you can show that the application of "assassination politics" would dramatically increase the likelihood of such incidents, I suggest that this "problem" will likely not be a problem after all. For a while, I thought that the "lack of a motive" protection was momentarily overturned by a hypothetical: I thought, suppose a person used this system as part of a sophisticated extortion scheme, in which he sends an anonymous message to some rich character, saying something like "pay me a zillion dollars anonymously, or I put out a digital contract on you." For a while, this one had me stumped. Then, I realized that an essential element in this whole play was missing: If this could be done ONCE, it could be done a dozen times . And the victim of such an extortion scheme has no assurance that it won't happen again, even if he pays off, so ironically he has no motivation to pay off the extortion. Think about it: The only reason to make the payment is to remove the threat. If making the payment can't guarantee to the target that the threat is removed, he has no reason to make the payment. And if the target has no reason to make the payment, the extortionist has no reason to make the threat! Another, related (and equally simplistic) fear is that political minorities will be preferentially targeted. For example, when I pointed out that "establishment" political leaders would probably "go" quite quickly, one wag suggested to me that "libertarian leaders" could likewise be targeted. Such a suggestion reflects a serious misunderstanding of political philosophy, and libertarians in particular: I consider it obvious (to me, at least) that libertarians NEED no leaders. (You don't need leaders if you don't want to control a population, or achieve political power. The only reason libertarians "need" leaders today is to take places in the government and (then) to shut it down.) And if my idea is implemented, "libertarian leaders" represent no more of a threat to anyone than the average libertarian citizen. Fully recognizing this, another (and far more credible) person thought a while, and in a proud revelation suggested that one way that the establishment would "fight back" is to convert to a government that is based on fully decentralized authority, as opposed to the leader-centric system we have today. Such a system could not be attacked by killing individual people, any more than you can kill a tree by pulling off a single leaf. His "solution" was, in effect, to totally disband the current government and turn it over to the public at large, where it would be safe from "attack." My smile reminded him that he had, in effect, totally re-invented my original idea: My goal is a highly de-centralized system that is not controlled by a tiny fraction of the population in a structure called a "government," essentially identical to his idea. So in effect, the only way the government can survive is to totally surrender. And once it surrenders, the people win. And in practice, it will have no alternative. Will this idea be "out of control"? To a great extent, that depends on what your definition of the word, "control," is. I have come to believe that "assassination politics" is a political Rorshach (ink-blot) test: What you think of it is strongly related to your political philosophy. [end part 6]

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Defeating Revelation of the Method
by Ryan Carboni 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

The method has been revealed many times in America. How does one defeat the method? I guess I should call it "Turning the Dimmer Switch to Full Brightness" The description behind it is immaterial however...

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Chelsea Manning attempts to destroy 'grand jury' system using their actions as wrecking ball!
by Razer 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

💝 Love you Chelsea! See you at the Barricades 🏴‍☠️ "When Judge Anthony Trenga ordered Chelsea Manning back to jail for refusing to testify before the grand jury investigating WikiLeaks, he urged her to “reflect on the principles she says she’s embracing” as well as “whether those views are worth the price she’s paying for them.” Trenga maintained there was “no dishonor” in cooperating with a grand jury because the United States Constitution codified the grand jury. Manning took Trenga’s admonishment seriously and responded with a letter containing research she did with the help of her attorneys. It presented her position on the grand jury in a very clear and compelling manner. In doing so, Manning further demonstrated her resistance is about much more than defying an investigation into a dissident media organization. It is about publicly discrediting the institution and all its corruption once and for all. Manning, who is in jail at the William G. Truesdale Adult Detention Center in Alexandria, Virginia, was held in civil contempt of court on May 16. The federal court not only sent her back to jail but also imposed a fine of $500 per day after 30 days and a fine of $1000 per day after 60 days if she continues her resistance. If Manning “persists in her refusal” for the next 16 months, according to her legal team, she will face a total amount of fines that is over $440,000. Both jail and fines may violate her Eighth Amendment rights under the Constitution, especially since these sanctions are supposed to be coercive, not punitive. In her letter [PDF], Manning contended the modern grand jury barely resemble the grand jury, which the framers enshrined in the Constitution. She acknowledges much of her opposition comes from their use against activists but also makes it clear she believes the institution generally undermines due process for all citizens." https://medium.com/@kevin_33184/chelsea-mannings-resistance-brings-u-s-clos…

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Assassination Politics AP
by grarpamp 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

On 12/21/19, Razer <g2s(a)riseup.net> wrote: > My suggesting is > take Jim Bell ands his 'assinine-nation politricks' and move to the > island imagined in Lord of the Flies. May the most murderous child win. The murderous child seems almost like an internal problem among players... mobsters, rivals, enemies, Hatfield McCoy, etc. That always exists and is relatively self contained. Now an Assassination Politics instance operating in either autonomous mode, or in a "managed" mode for or devolving into sick bloodsport profit that raptures on humanity's tendencies therein, a distributively supported TV gameshow straight out of fiction memes "Let's bid $random human for $20k Alex"... these modes would have some real problems regarding innocent people getting originally harmed. That's different from say a distributed "fair" Hammurabi Code. And different from the original harm happening everyday news in essentially one on one unrelated and first events. Not much improvement happens there without lots of outreach, cultural education, hippie love, etc. The bloodsport and actions of Governments and even Corporations, their force against voluntary choices following no harm... would surely end as their workers quit them in droves. The question herein is which sport is worse, better, or more easily solveable or minimized, and by what means... Govt's or the Gameshow's. Does not the potential, and even propensity and or eventuality for sport (as history shows), make both Govt and AP very difficult to recommend, and essentially impossible to recommend as "pure" things.

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"Sonic attack" in China.
by jim bell 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

'Sonic attack' impacted 'at least 20 regions' of US diplomat's brain - but cause remains unknown, new study finds https://news.yahoo.com/sonic-attack-impacted-least-20-204353837.html Jim Bell's comment: Why not use a sound spectrum analyzer, running on a smartphone app, to identify this?

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The Fourth Phase of Water: Dr. Gerald Pollack at TEDx - [SCIENCE]
by Zenaan Harkness 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

About 50MiB (depending on format downloaded). The Fourth Phase of Water: Dr. Gerald Pollack at TEDx https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-T7tCMUDXU

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Re: [MERRY CHRISTMAS] - Revengeful wife - [PEACE]
by Ryan Carboni 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

"I am mad." - Robert Anton Wilson as Hagbard Celine as ...

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[MERRY CHRISTMAS] - Revengeful wife - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

Merry Christmas yo! May your new year be a healthy one with abundant opportunities to find that which yer Souls seek for ya mangey selves :D Me? I might be right on the edge o' perfection - just about to live for eternity in peace and divine serenity. Or something ;) Life's tough at the cutting edge of "perfectly humble" - which reminds me, gotta tee up anuddah of my humility workshops for the Dalai Llama to attend - I hear he's eager to really learn some true humility. Ya know, just as well there's someone as ego-less as me to run them... ----- Forwarded message from Gil May <gilmay97(a)gmail.com> ----- From: Gil May <gilmay97(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat, 21 Dec 2019 19:53:59 +1000 Subject: Fwd: A funny... A woman, cranky because her husband was late coming home again, decided to leave a note, saying "I've had enough and have left you...don't bother coming after me" Then she hid under the bed to see his reaction. After a short while the husband comes home and she could hear him in the kitchen before he comes into the bedroom. She could see him walk towards the dresser and pick up the note... After a few minutes he wrote something on it before picking up the phone and calling someone... "She's finally gone...yeah I know, about bloody time, I'm coming to see you, put on that sexy french nightie. I love you...can't wait to see you...we'll do all the naughty things you like." He hung up, grabbed his keys and left. She heard the car drive off as she came out from under the bed. Seething with rage and with tears in her eyes she grabbed the note to see what he wrote... "I can see your feet. We're outta bread: be back in five minutes."

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Chelsea Manning attempts to destroy 'grand jury' system using their actions as wrecking ball!
by Ryan Carboni 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

We have too many damn laws. Mandatory reporting laws are best written as extension to the old misprision laws. Banning terrorism already exists as treason against state governments, murder, and violence are already crimes. I don't see how all these laws serve to protect anyone.

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Re: California Penal Code 12355 - importance of reputation in fully decentralized networks
by coderman 23 Dec '19

23 Dec '19

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Saturday, December 21, 2019 9:29 PM, Punk-Stasi 2.0 <punks(a)tfwno.gf> wrote: > ... If you lend $10 to guy and he doesn't pay back then you don't lend him anymore. Furthermore, it only cost you $10 to learn that the guy isn't trustable. way back when, i wrote a decentralized resource discovery protocol. key to this design was the concept of reputation among peers, and peer discovery weighted by reputation. providing communication was a lightweight UDP protocol that could support tens of thousands of concurrent connections with minimal memory overhead and a single UDP socket. by building peer reputation directly among a very large peer group, you developed a deep basis for ranking peers useful to you in the past, and likely to be useful in the future. likewise, the useful peers of my useful peers are likely to be useful to me, and thus the recommendation engine proceeds... rich reputation in decentralized networks is still a poorly explored space. this should change! :) best regards,

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Re: NYT: Total Surveillance Is Not What America Signed Up For
by Ryan Carboni 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

The pinnacle of Jeffersonian democracy is when every man aspires to commit treason. His Empire of Liberty idea was not so great. https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Thomas_Jefferson What country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.

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NYT: Total Surveillance Is Not What America Signed Up For
by John Young 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/21/opinion/location-data-privac… Grim, omits NYT's and journalism's large benefits of smart devices spying by advertisers. And avoids spying corps generous support of NGOs and political office holders. Doesn't touch smart cities, kiosks, cryptographers, and fora like cypherpunks. Kinda down-dumbing blaming. So roll outs galore of improved privacy protection apps, gadgets, TED talks, carefully redacted/hobbled to appear trustworthy.

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John McAfee 2020 Presidential Campaign
by grarpamp 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

You can follow much of his ongoing dialogue at links below... https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=john+mcafee&sp=CAI%253D https://twitter.com/officialmcafee https://twitter.com/theemrsmcafee https://mcafee2020.com/ https://old.reddit.com/user/McAfee2020Official with Larry Sharpe https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmMAE9nx-EY Get your soul back https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=966SHabMJg4 Go John! Stay healthy and in the game, the world needs you and many others! Related links... DEX Privacy CryptoIntroDocs VoluntaryPodcast https://blocknet.co/block-dx/ https://z.cash/ https://bitcoin.com/ search: cryptocurrency documentary https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8ewiXhsWfnBENJQLCIxRIQ among more...

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GovUK Approves Itself for MI5 to Murder Torture Kidnap... Intel Dump
by grarpamp 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/licensed-to-kill-court-rules-mi5-can-m… https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/12/20/investigatory_powers_tribunal/ https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/12/20/mi5-spies-can-kill-without-fear… https://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Judgment-IPT-17-86.zip https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/us/politics/cia-torture-drawings.html https://www.africanexponent.com/post/10487-france-has-always-carried-evil-i… https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/news/judge-dismisses-wikimedia-case-agai… https://reason.com/2019/09/20/court-rules-fresno-police-accused-of-stealing… https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/18/jeffrey-epsteins-first-suicide-attempt-vide… https://sputniknews.com/military/201912211077704888-us-corps-marines-psycho… https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/ice-and-cbp-are-secretly-track… https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/31/aclu-sues-fbi-doj-over… https://www.wraltechwire.com/2019/09/18/report-75-countries-use-artificial-… https://thegrayzone.com/2019/06/24/new-york-times-media-us-government-appro… https://metro.co.uk/2019/03/28/mysterious-undocumented-technology-hidden-in…

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The Georgia Guidestones is a statement that should not go unquestioned
by Ryan Carboni 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

The Georgia Guidestones is a statement that should not go unquestioned. Unless of course they meant it ironically. You know, a few billionaires hear about a conspiracy theory and decide to make the conspiracy real with a monument, carefully crafted and proportioned. The world population stands at over seven billion. A reduction to half a billion cannot be by the consent of the governed. Bold statements regarding the futures of others cannot go unquestioned within a free society.

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People who refuse accountability are pushovers
by Ryan Carboni 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

People who refuse accountability are pushovers. I'm waiting for them to politely ask for the problem to go away. Maybe 99% of their wealth? I'm in a very bad mood at the moment. But that's not necessary.

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New Atlas: New ultrasound tech can make virtually any surface touch-sensitive
by jim bell 21 Dec '19

21 Dec '19

New Atlas: New ultrasound tech can make virtually any surface touch-sensitive. https://newatlas.com/mobile-technology/ultrasound-touch-sensitive-surfaces/ Programmable touch sensitivity.

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Quantum-proof encryption?
by jim bell 21 Dec '19

21 Dec '19

Scientists develop security system that can never be hacked https://mol.im/a/7816429 via http://dailym.ai/android

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Cryptocurrency: War on Cash, Privacy Coins to be Deployed
by grarpamp 21 Dec '19

21 Dec '19

Cash War going down In Australia and your own shitholes... https://old.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/edmf1y/cash_ban_hearings_politici… http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEESomYYTdU Note the beastbadges and lapel pins. https://old.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/edgmgz/when_coinjoin_day/ https://twitter.com/bittlecat/status/1207621591820951552 https://www.usdebtclock.org/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjodLvD23kI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6Obc_cJba4 Not really a true privacy coin though.

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On Linux's /dev/random, /dev/urandom, getrandom()
by coderman 21 Dec '19

21 Dec '19

Preface: """ This guy clearly thinks he's a lot brighter than everyone else... The people he's criticising aren't stupid, they just see just the job of the system RNG as to be extremely conservative, leading to decisions that are easy to criticise. You can alter this conservative behavior where appropriate. For example, his ridicule of not trusting the Intel RNG "because NSA". The decision was actually made not to replace the random source with it because the whitening stage of the Intel RNG makes it near-impossible to tell whether the random source is working properly. IIRC they instead xor it in to all inputs to the random pool, which allows them to gain from it if it's working without losing if it doesn't. """ - https://np.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/edaidy/on_linuxs_random_number_gene… The article: https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/12/19/on-linuxs-random-number-generation/ I have been asked about the usefulness of security monitoring of entropy levels in the Linux kernel. This calls for some explanation of how random generation works in Linux systems. So, randomness and the Linux kernel. This is an area where there is longstanding confusion, notably among some Linux kernel developers, including Linus Torvalds himself. A long time ago (20+ years), a random generator was designed along the theory of “entropy depletion”. It goes thus: at any point, the generator has an internal state (the “entropy pool”) which has contents unknown to attackers. The amount of unknown-ness is called “entropy” (initially by analogy with thermodynamics, but that’s just an analogy; it’s not real thermodynamic entropy) expressed with a logarithmic scale, in bits; roughly speaking, if the pool contains “n bits of entropy” then this means that its unknown contents can be any of 2n potential values. (That’s a simplified definition that assumes that all potential values are equiprobable, but it will do for this explanation.) Whenever some bits are obtained from the pool, they conceptually leak information about the pool: if you extract k random bits, then the remaining unknown-ness may be reduced down to 2n-k potential values, i.e. the entropy pool has been depleted by k bits. Now, here, the important word is “conceptually”. The RNG will not give away its raw pool bits just like that; instead, it will use the pool as a seed in a cryptographically strong RNG, whose output is what is sent back to applications. The whole idea of a RNG being cryptographically strong is that it is computationally infeasible to actually obtain information about the seed by just observing the output. The RNG, effectively, plugs the leak, and no depletion occurs in any practical sense. However, the person who designed that RNG was not very clear about that notion of “cryptographically strong”. In fact, out of some paranoid zeal, that person felt that some secret values required extra strong entropy, so that they may defeat adversaries that are powerful enough to break through the cryptographically strong RNG (it was in the 1990s, with the US rules on export of cryptography and the PGP craze, so these powerful adversaries were the usual fantasy of god-like NSA). If the CSRNG is assumed to be transparent, then depletion is back. Hence, the kernel was equipped with code that maintains a count of the current pool entropy contents, and /dev/random blocks when there is not enough to return the requested amount of pure NSA-proof randomness. This is flawed reasoning, in several ways: - The whole premise of entropy depletion is that cryptography does not work (the CSRNG does not prevent the leak), and yet the one and only example of values that require absolute randomness is “cryptographic keys”, i.e. the things that make sense only if cryptography, in fact, works. This is self-contradictory. - The current amount of entropy in the pool is not known. It is estimated. Entropy is extracted from physical events (in particular exact timing of IRQs, as measured with the cycle counter), and this relies on that information being unpredictable by attackers. In other words, the god-like entities that can munch through cryptographic algorithms at breakfast are supposed not to be able to measure and accurately simulate physical systems. So much for divine abilities. In a sense, whether a given mechanism provides entropy is a matter of “this or that expert said that it does”; impossibility of accurate simulation comes from physics, specifically quantum mechanics, so the entropy pool estimator is based on a fair amount of trust in physicists such as Feynman or Bohr (but not Einstein, for that matter). But the entropy depletion is an assertion that cryptographers such as Shamir cannot be equally trusted. - The measures from physical events are not uniform sequences of bits; they have biases, and successive measures can be correlated. Thus, the pool relies on some mixing which uses… a cryptographic hash function. So cryptography still has to be trusted to do something properly. Notwithstanding its flaws, the entropy depletion theory got its followers early on, and was adamantly maintained by some big names in Linux kernel development, mostly because it is quite hard to admit to other people, and to oneself, that one might have got something wrong. That theory is harmful in that /dev/random may block, possibly at inopportune moments. Typically, an OS or application installation may stall for long periods (possibly hours, I have seen it) because it tries to generate a cryptographic key (for SSH, PGP…) and the kernel does not believe it still has sufficient entropy. Note that, for all practical purposes, it really has more than enough entropy; the pool contents are not guessable by outsiders, since all previously extracted random elements were obtained through the CSRNG, and attackers do not have, in fact, the help of demoniac entities with unlimited computing abilities (or when they do, you usually have bigger problems). To work around the blocking issues of /dev/random, an alternate API was added, called /dev/urandom. It’s the same as /dev/random, except that it does not block. Never. This is better, but not actually good: there are times when the entropy pool is really empty, namely during the early stages of the boot. At that point, the kernel did not obtain many physical events to work on, and it is conceivable that /dev/urandom output could be predicted. Note that this is not really about /dev/urandom, the special file: the early boot moments we are talking about are before there is any notion of a file; this is really about a single case, which is booting a diskless machine over the network, and mounting the root filesystem from a remote server. The relevant network protocol can need some randomness (e.g. TCP sequence numbers). Since at least the early 2000s, Linux distributions have applied workarounds to ensure proper entropy at boot time, namely that a boot script injects the contents of a saved file upon boot, and immediately proceeds to regenerate the said file with /dev/urandom. In effect, this transports the entropy across reboots, so that even if the boot sequence was not enough, by itself, to generate enough entropy, the file contents would ensure that everything is all right. Later on, a system call was added, to get randomness without having to open a file and use a file descriptor; it is named getrandom(). That system call finally implements the proper behavior, i.e. blocking until a sufficient amount of initial entropy has been gathered since last boot, but never blocking afterwards. Incidentally, this is what /dev/urandom does on sane systems (e.g. FreeBSD or macOS). Applications should simply use getrandom(), and be happy. (Or not. Linux 5.3 will turn back getrandom() into /dev/urandom with its never-blocking behavior, because, quite frankly, Linus’s opinions on his own mastery of RNG theory exceed his actual abilities. The reasoning seems to be that if there is “not enough entropy”, then the application should make an interpretative dance of some kind to promote the appearance of new hardware events from which the entropy can be gathered. How the application does that, or why the kernel should not do it despite being much closer to the hardware, is not said.) All of the above is the classical description, up to the early/mid-2010s. There are now a few extra relevant points to make: - Virtual machines are a challenge to entropy gathering, in at least three ways: - They provided access to virtual, emulated hardware only. The nice physical events from which entropy is supposed to come (thermal noise, mostly) are then just a simulation, and that which is simulated can, indeed, be simulated. - The hypervisor can prevent access to the cycle counter (rdtsc opcode), which will further hinder attempts by the kernel to get entropy from the (not so) physical events. - VM snapshots can be taken and replayed at will; each restart from the same snapshot will use the recorded pool contents. - A contrario, sufficiently recent CPU have an embedded hardware generator which is totally available from VM (it’s the rdrand opcode on x86 CPU). The Linux kernel uses rdrand. It does not trust rdrand, because NSA (I’m not exaggerating! The kernel source code [explicitly calls out the NSA](https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/37d4e84f765bb3038ddfeebdc5d1cfd…) so it will not count the rdrand output as worth any entropy. But it will still use it. In all edge cases described above (network boot, VM snapshots…), rdrand will by itself ensure that there is enough entropy for all practical purposes. Given all the above mess, there are people who try to use extra hardware RNG, usually by injecting the random bytes obtained from these devices into the kernel (by writing into /dev/random). Surprise! It does not actually work; or, at least, not as well as is usually believed. It so happens that in 2017, a smart guy called Jason Donenfeld had a window of opportunity, to try to improve the RNG (he is the creator of Wireguard, and apparently Linus likes him). So, he changed the CSRNG for something decent and fast (the ChaCha20 stream cipher). As a byproduct of his changes, the CSRNG reseeds from the entropy pool only if the last reseeding occurred more than [five minutes](https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/37d4e84f765bb3038ddfeebdc5d… earlier (this is a part of the performance improvements). It still uses rdrand for each call, so it is very fine. But that means that any extra entropy, obtained from a dedicated hardware RNG (possibly a very costly one) and injected into the kernel, may be wholly ignored for up to five minutes. This incarnates a new high on the scale of uselessness. The entropy depletion cult is not very happy about that. Over time, it has spun off some extra sects, including [haveged](https://www.issihosts.com/haveged/). This particular piece of software is not only operating on the flawed notion of entropy depletion, but also on the belief that where the kernel, which has access to the hardware, fails, a userland software, without access to the hardware, can succeed. In practice, it’s another moving part in a complicated but ultimately meaningless ritual. Some words on statistical tests. The NIST has come up with a bunch of statistical tests meant to measure the quality of a random source. This is a semi-flawed idea. Any good CSRNG will pass these tests successfully. Many atrocious CSRNG will pass them, too. A bias that can be detected through statistics is the sign of an extremely bad design. The whole point of cryptography is to defeat intelligent attackers who have computers and know exactly what kind of software we run; this gives them a lot more power than statistics. Consider for instance the following RNG: from a seed s, it generates output in 32-byte chunks by doing the following: - Replace s with SHA-256(s) - Output s - Goto 1 (until all requested output as been produced) This will pass the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests with flying colours; none of the statistical tests will see anything wrong with that. But, of course, the first 32 bytes that this RNG outputs are its current internal seed; any attacker observing a 32-byte output chunk can compute all subsequent output with 100% reliability. To be brief, a CSRNG should be unbreakable by smart attackers with lots of resources. If a CSRNG does not pass statistical tests, then this means that it can be broken by a chimpanzee. But if it passes the tests, this does in no way prove that it is cryptographically strong; it just means that the chimpanzee will be stumped. Now, statistical tests are randomized in nature. Each such test is really a measure of implausibility: the test gets an output, then tries to compute how improbable such an outcome can be, assuming that the source is perfectly random. For instance, if there was less than 1 chance in 1000 to have such a bias, then the test reports a “significant bias” (this is the way all experimental science works, the probability being called “p-value” and the significance threshold being traditionally 0.05, i.e. that which could happen with probability 1/20 or less is considered significant). 1 in 1000 is a low probability. But if you run 10000 tests, each with a 1 in 1000 threshold, then there will be some “failures”: things that happen with probability 1 in 1000, do happen fairly reliably if you try 10000 times. Thus, the fact that some FIPS tests occasionally report a “failure” is here meaningless. Summary. Monitoring entropy levels on Linux systems is not very useful. From a security point of view, the entropy estimates by the kernel are quite off. It may happen that some applications insist on reading from /dev/random instead of /dev/urandom (or from getrandom()), and block unduly for the sake of that specific brand of fetishism. This should not happen often. OpenSSL uses /dev/urandom, for instance. So does Java by default. The occasional blocking is so irksome that there has been great pressure to make all apps use the non-blocking /dev/urandom; only the very few apps that nobody really uses (e.g. PGP) still insist on /dev/random. To fully ensure that no blocking ever happens, a simple solution might be to simply make /dev/random a link to /dev/urandom. (In recent Linux distributions, /dev is a virtual filesystem, so such renaming must be done at each boot, which may or may not be easy.) --- A better lay of the land: https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom Myths about /dev/urandom There are a few things about /dev/urandom and /dev/random that are repeated again and again. Still they are false. I'm mostly talking about reasonably recent Linux systems, not other UNIX-like systems. /dev/urandom is insecure. Always use /dev/random for cryptographic purposes. Fact: /dev/urandom is the preferred source of cryptographic randomness on UNIX-like systems. /dev/urandom is a pseudo random number generator, a PRNG, while /dev/random is a “true” random number generator. [Fact:](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#structure-of-linux-s-random-number-generator) Both /dev/urandom and /dev/random are using the exact same CSPRNG (a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator). They only differ in very few ways that have nothing to do with “true” randomness. /dev/random is unambiguously the better choice for cryptography. Even if /dev/urandom were comparably secure, there's no reason to choose the latter. [Fact:](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#what-s-wrong-with-blocking) /dev/random has a very nasty problem: it blocks. But that's good! /dev/random gives out exactly as much randomness as it has entropy in its pool. /dev/urandom will give you insecure random numbers, even though it has long run out of entropy. [Fact:](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#what-about-entropy-running-low) No. Even disregarding issues like availability and subsequent manipulation by users, the issue of entropy “running low” is a straw man. About 256 bits of entropy are enough to get computationally secure numbers for a long, long time. And the fun only starts here: how does /dev/random know [how much entropy](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#estimate) there is available to give out? Stay tuned! But cryptographers always talk about constant re-seeding. Doesn't that contradict your last point? [Fact:](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#re-seeding) You got me! Kind of. It is true, the random number generator is constantly re-seeded using whatever entropy the system can lay its hands on. But that has (partly) other reasons. Look, I don't claim that injecting entropy is bad. It's good. I just claim that it's bad to block when the entropy estimate is low. That's all good and nice, but even the man page for /dev/(u)random contradicts you! Does anyone who knows about this stuff actually agree with you? [Fact:](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#the-random-and-urandom-man-page) No, it really doesn't. It seems to imply that /dev/urandom is insecure for cryptographic use, unless you really understand all that cryptographic jargon. The man page does recommend the use of /dev/random in some cases (it doesn't hurt, in my opinion, but is not strictly necessary), but it also recommends /dev/urandom as the device to use for “normal” cryptographic use. And while appeal to authority is usually nothing to be proud of, in cryptographic issues you're generally right to be careful and try to get the opinion of a domain expert. And yes, quite a few [experts](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#orthodoxy) share my view that /dev/urandom is the go-to solution for your random number needs in a cryptography context on UNIX-like systems. Obviously, their opinions influenced mine, not the other way around. --------------------------------------------------------------- Hard to believe, right? I must certainly be wrong! Well, read on and let me try to convince you. I tried to keep it out, but I fear there are two preliminaries to be taken care of, before we can really tackle all those points. Namely, [what is randomness](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#true-randomness), or better: what kind of randomness am I talking about here? And, even more important, I'm really [not being condescending.](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#you-re-saying-i-m-stupid) I have written this document to have a thing to point to, when this discussion comes up again. More than 140 characters. Without repeating myself again and again. Being able to hone the writing and the arguments itself, benefitting many discussions in many venues. And I'm certainly willing to hear differing opinions. I'm just saying that it won't be enough to state that /dev/urandom is bad. You need to identify the points you're disagreeing with and engage them. You're saying I'm stupid! Emphatically no! Actually, I used to believe that /dev/urandom was insecure myself, a few years ago. And it's something you and I almost had to believe, because all those highly respected people on Usenet, in web forums and today on Twitter told us. Even the [the random and urandom man page](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#the-random-and-urandom-man-page) seems to say so. Who were we to dismiss their convincing argument about “entropy running low”? This misconception isn't so rampant because people are stupid, it is because with a little knowledge about cryptography (namely some vague idea what entropy is) it's very easy to be convinced of it. Intuition almost forces us there. Unfortunately intuition is often wrong in cryptography. So it is here. True randomness What does it mean for random numbers to be “truly random”? I don't want to dive into that issue too deep, because it quickly gets philosophical. Discussions have been known to unravel quickly, because everyone can wax about their favorite model of randomness, without paying attention to anyone else. Or even making himself understood. I believe that the “gold standard” for “true randomness” are quantum effects. Observe a photon pass through a semi-transparent mirror. Or not. Observe some radioactive material emit alpha particles. It's the best idea we have when it comes to randomness in the world. Other people might reasonably believe that those effects aren't truly random. Or even that there is no randomness in the world at all. Let a million flowers bloom. Cryptographers often circumvent this philosophical debate by disregarding what it means for randomness to be “true”. They care about unpredictability. As long as nobody can get any information about the next random number, we're fine. And when you're talking about random numbers as a prerequisite in using cryptography, that's what you should aim for, in my opinion. Anyway, I don't care much about those “philosophically secure” random numbers, as I like to think of your “true” random numbers. Two kinds of security, one that matters But let's assume you've obtained those “true” random numbers. What are you going to do with them? You print them out, frame them and hang them on your living-room wall, to revel in the beauty of a quantum universe? That's great, and I certainly understand. Wait, what? You're using them? For cryptographic purposes? Well, that spoils everything, because now things get a bit ugly. You see, your truly-random, quantum effect blessed random numbers are put into some less respectable, real-world tarnished algorithms. Because almost all of the cryptographic algorithms we use do not hold up to information-theoretic security. They can “only” offer computational security. The two exceptions that come to my mind are Shamir's Secret Sharing and the One-time pad. And while the first one may be a valid counterpoint (if you actually intend to use it), the latter is utterly impractical. But all those algorithms you know about, AES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic curves, and all those crypto packages you're using, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, Keyczar, your operating system's crypto API, these are only computationally secure. What's the difference? While information-theoretically secure algorithms are secure, period, those other algorithms cannot guarantee security against an adversary with unlimited computational power who's trying all possibilities for keys. We still use them because it would take all the computers in the world taken together longer than the universe has existed, so far. That's the level of “insecurity” we're talking about here. Unless some clever guy breaks the algorithm itself, using much less computational power. Even computational power achievable today. That's the big prize every cryptanalyst dreams about: breaking AES itself, breaking RSA itself and so on. So now we're at the point where you don't trust the inner building blocks of the random number generator, insisting on “true randomness” instead of “pseudo randomness”. But then you're using those “true” random numbers in algorithms that you so despise that you didn't want them near your random number generator in the first place! Truth is, when state-of-the-art hash algorithms are broken, or when state-of-the-art block ciphers are broken, it doesn't matter that you get “philosophically insecure” random numbers because of them. You've got nothing left to securely use them for anyway. So just use those computationally-secure random numbers for your computationally-secure algorithms. In other words: use /dev/urandom. Structure of Linux's random number generator An incorrect view Chances are, your idea of the kernel's random number generator is something similar to this: [Wrong view] “True randomness”, albeit possibly skewed and biased, enters the system and its entropy is precisely counted and immediately added to an internal entropy counter. After de-biasing and whitening it's entering the kernel's entropy pool, where both /dev/random and /dev/urandom get their random numbers from. The “true” random number generator, /dev/random, takes those random numbers straight out of the pool, if the entropy count is sufficient for the number of requested numbers, decreasing the entropy counter, of course. If not, it blocks until new entropy has entered the system. The important thing in this narrative is that /dev/random basically yields the numbers that have been input by those randomness sources outside, after only the necessary whitening. Nothing more, just pure randomness. /dev/urandom, so the story goes, is doing the same thing. Except when there isn't sufficient entropy in the system. In contrast to /dev/random, it does not block, but gets “low quality random” numbers from a pseudorandom number generator (conceded, a cryptographically secure one) that is running alongside the rest of the random number machinery. This CSPRNG is just seeded once (or maybe every now and then, it doesn't matter) with “true randomness” from the randomness pool, but you can't really trust it. In this view, that seems to be in a lot of people's minds when they're talking about random numbers on Linux, avoiding /dev/urandom is plausible. Because either there is enough entropy left, then you get the same you'd have gotten from /dev/random. Or there isn't, then you get those low-quality random numbers from a CSPRNG that almost never saw high-entropy input. Devilish, right? Unfortunately, also utterly wrong. In reality, the internal structure of the random number generator looks like this. A better simplification Before Linux 4.8 [Before Linux 4.8] See the big difference? The CSPRNG is not running alongside the random number generator, filling in for those times when /dev/urandom wants to output something, but has nothing good to output. The CSPRNG is an integral part of the random number generation process. There is no /dev/random handing out “good and pure” random numbers straight from the whitener. Every randomness source's input is thoroughly mixed and hashed inside the CSPRNG, before it emerges as random numbers, either via /dev/urandom or /dev/random. This is a pretty rough simplification. In fact, there isn't just one, but three pools filled with entropy. One primary pool, and one for /dev/random and /dev/urandom each, feeding off the primary pool. Those three pools all have their own entropy counts, but the counts of the secondary pools (for /dev/random and /dev/urandom) are mostly close to zero, and “fresh” entropy flows from the primary pool when needed, decreasing its entropy count. Also there is a lot of mixing and re-injecting outputs back into the system going on. All of this is far more detail than is necessary for this document. Another important difference is that there is no entropy counting going on here, but estimation. The amount of entropy some source is giving you isn't something obvious that you just get, along with the data. It has to be estimated. Please note that when your estimate is too optimistic, the dearly held property of /dev/random, that it's only giving out as many random numbers as available entropy allows, is gone. Unfortunately, it's hard to estimate the amount of entropy. The Linux kernel uses only the arrival times of events to estimate their entropy. It does that by interpolating polynomials of those arrival times, to calculate “how surprising” the actual arrival time was, according to the model. Whether this polynomial interpolation model is the best way to estimate entropy is an interesting question. There is also the problem that internal hardware restrictions might influence those arrival times. The sampling rates of all kinds of hardware components may also play a role, because it directly influences the values and the granularity of those event arrival times. In the end, to the best of our knowledge, the kernel's entropy estimate is pretty good. Which means it's conservative. People argue about how good it really is, but that issue is far above my head. Still, if you insist on never handing out random numbers that are not “backed” by sufficient entropy, you might be nervous here. I'm sleeping sound because I don't care about the entropy estimate. So to make one thing crystal clear: both /dev/random and /dev/urandom are fed by the same CSPRNG. Only the behavior when their respective pool runs out of entropy, according to some estimate, differs: /dev/random blocks, while /dev/urandom does not. From Linux 4.8 onward [From Linux 4.8] In Linux 4.8 the equivalency between /dev/urandom and /dev/random was given up. Now /dev/urandom output does not come from an entropy pool, but directly from a CSPRNG. [We will see shortly](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#the-csprngs-are-alright) why that is not a security problem. What's wrong with blocking? Have you ever waited for /dev/random to give you more random numbers? Generating a PGP key inside a virtual machine maybe? Connecting to a web server that's waiting for more random numbers to create an ephemeral session key? That's the problem. It inherently runs counter to availability. So your system is not working. It's not doing what you built it to do. Obviously, that's bad. You wouldn't have built it if you didn't need it. I'm working on safety-related systems in factory automation. Can you guess what the main reason for failures of safety systems is? Manipulation. Simple as that. Something about the safety measure bugged the worker. It took too much time, was too inconvenient, whatever. People are very resourceful when it comes to finding “inofficial solutions”. But the problem runs even deeper: people don't like to be stopped in their ways. They will devise workarounds, concoct bizarre machinations to just get it running. People who don't know anything about cryptography. Normal people. I'm working on safety-related systems in factory automation. Can you guess what the main reason for failures of safety systems is? Manipulation. Simple as that. Something about the safety measure bugged the worker. It took too much time, was too inconvenient, whatever. People are very resourceful when it comes to finding “inofficial solutions”. Why not patching out the call to random()? Why not having some guy in a web forum tell you how to use some strange ioctl to increase the entropy counter? Why not switch off SSL altogether? In the end you just educate your users to do foolish things that compromise your system's security without you ever knowing about it. It's easy to disregard availability, usability or other nice properties. Security trumps everything, right? So better be inconvenient, unavailable or unusable than feign security. But that's a false dichotomy. Blocking is not necessary for security. As we [saw](https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom#a-better-simplification), /dev/urandom gives you the same kind of random numbers as /dev/random, straight out of a CSPRNG. Use it! The CSPRNGs are alright But now everything sounds really bleak. If even the high-quality random numbers from /dev/random are coming out of a CSPRNG, how can we use them for high-security purposes? It turns out, that “looking random” is the basic requirement for a lot of our cryptographic building blocks. If you take the output of a cryptographic hash, it has to be indistinguishable from a random string so that cryptographers will accept it. If you take a block cipher, its output (without knowing the key) must also be indistinguishable from random data. If anyone could gain an advantage over brute force breaking of cryptographic building blocks, using some perceived weakness of those CSPRNGs over “true” randomness, then it's the same old story: you don't have anything left. Block ciphers, hashes, everything is based on the same mathematical fundament as CSPRNGs. So don't be afraid. What about entropy running low? It doesn't matter. The underlying cryptographic building blocks are designed such that an attacker cannot predict the outcome, as long as there was enough randomness (a.k.a. entropy) in the beginning. A usual lower limit for “enough” may be 256 bits. No more. Considering that we were pretty hand-wavey about the term “entropy” in the first place, it feels right. As we saw, the kernel's random number generator cannot even precisely know the amount of entropy entering the system. Only an estimate. And whether the model that's the basis for the estimate is good enough is pretty unclear, too. Re-seeding But if entropy is so unimportant, why is fresh entropy constantly being injected into the random number generator? djb [remarked](http://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html) that more entropy actually can hurt. First, it cannot hurt. If you've got more randomness just lying around, by all means use it! There is another reason why re-seeding the random number generator every now and then is important: Imagine an attacker knows everything about your random number generator's internal state. That's the most severe security compromise you can imagine, the attacker has full access to the system. You've totally lost now, because the attacker can compute all future outputs from this point on. But over time, with more and more fresh entropy being mixed into it, the internal state gets more and more random again. So that such a random number generator's design is kind of self-healing. But this is injecting entropy into the generator's internal state, it has nothing to do with blocking its output. The random and urandom man page There has actually been an updated version of the Linux kernel man page for /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Unfortunately, a simple web search still turns up the old, deficient version I'm describing here in the top results. Furthermore, many Linux distributions still ship the old man pages. So unfortunately this section needs to stay a bit longer in the essay. I'm so looking forward to deleting it! The man page for /dev/random and /dev/urandom is pretty effective when it comes to instilling fear into the gullible programmer's mind: > A read from the /dev/urandom device will not block waiting for more entropy. As a result, if there is not sufficient entropy in the entropy pool, the returned values are theoretically vulnerable to a cryptographic attack on the algorithms used by the driver. Knowledge of how to do this is not available in the current unclassified literature, but it is theoretically possible that such an attack may exist. If this is a concern in your application, use /dev/random instead. Such an attack is not known in “unclassified literature”, but the NSA certainly has one in store, right? And if you're really concerned about this (you should!), please use /dev/random, and all your problems are solved. The truth is, while there may be such an attack available to secret services, evil hackers or the Bogeyman, it's just not rational to just take it as a given. And even if you need that peace of mind, let me tell you a secret: no practical attacks on AES, SHA-3 or other solid ciphers and hashes are known in the “unclassified” literature, either. Are you going to stop using those, as well? Of course not! Now the fun part: “use /dev/random instead”. While /dev/urandom does not block, its random number output comes from the very same CSPRNG as /dev/random's. If you really need information-theoretically secure random numbers (you don't!), and that's about the only reason why the entropy of the CSPRNGs input matters, you can't use /dev/random, either! The [current, updated version](http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/random.4.html) of the man page says in no uncertain terms: > The /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and /dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient in all use cases, with the exception of applications which require randomness during early boot time; for these applications, getrandom(2) must be used instead, because it will block until the entropy pool is initialized. The man page is silly, that's all. At least it tries to redeem itself with this: > If you are unsure about whether you should use /dev/random or /dev/urandom, then probably you want to use the latter. As a general rule, /dev/urandom should be used for everything except long-lived GPG/SSL/SSH keys. Fine. I think it's unnecessary, but if you want to use /dev/random for your “long-lived keys”, by all means, do so! You'll be waiting a few seconds typing stuff on your keyboard, that's no problem. But please don't make connections to a mail server hang forever, just because you “wanted to be safe”. Orthodoxy The view espoused here is certainly a tiny minority's opinions on the Internet. But ask a real cryptographer, you'll be hard pressed to find someone who sympathizes much with that blocking /dev/random. Let's take [Daniel Bernstein](http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@randombit.net/msg04763.…, better known as djb: > Cryptographers are certainly not responsible for this superstitious nonsense. Think about this for a moment: whoever wrote the /dev/random manual page seems to simultaneously believe that > > (1) we can't figure out how to deterministically expand one 256-bit /dev/random output into an endless stream of unpredictable keys (this is what we need from urandom), but > > (2) we _can_ figure out how to use a single key to safely encrypt many messages (this is what we need from SSL, PGP, etc.). > > For a cryptographer this doesn't even pass the laugh test. Or [Thomas Pornin](http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/3936/is-a-rand-from-dev…, who is probably one of the most helpful persons I've ever encountered on the Stackexchange sites: > The short answer is yes. The long answer is also yes. /dev/urandom yields data which is indistinguishable from true randomness, given existing technology. Getting “better” randomness than what /dev/urandom provides is meaningless, unless you are using one of the few “information theoretic” cryptographic algorithm, which is not your case (you would know it). > > The man page for urandom is somewhat misleading, arguably downright wrong, when it suggests that /dev/urandom may “run out of entropy” and /dev/random should be preferred; Or maybe [Thomas Ptacek](http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-random-number…, who is not a real cryptographer in the sense of designing cryptographic algorithms or building cryptographic systems, but still the founder of a well-reputed security consultancy that's doing a lot of penetration testing and breaking bad cryptography: > Use urandom. Use urandom. Use urandom. Use urandom. Use urandom. Use urandom. Not everything is perfect /dev/urandom isn't perfect. The problems are twofold: On Linux, unlike FreeBSD, /dev/urandom never blocks. Remember that the whole security rested on some starting randomness, a seed? Linux's /dev/urandom happily gives you not-so-random numbers before the kernel even had the chance to gather entropy. When is that? At system start, booting the computer. FreeBSD does the right thing: they don't have the distinction between /dev/random and /dev/urandom, both are the same device. At startup /dev/random blocks once until enough starting entropy has been gathered. Then it won't block ever again. In the meantime, Linux has implemented a new syscall, originally introduced by OpenBSD as getentropy(2): getrandom(2). This syscall does the right thing: blocking until it has gathered enough initial entropy, and never blocking after that point. Of course, it is a syscall, not a character device, so it isn't as easily accessible from shell or script languages. It is available from Linux 3.17 onward. On Linux it isn't too bad, because Linux distributions save some random numbers when booting up the system (but after they have gathered some entropy, since the startup script doesn't run immediately after switching on the machine) into a seed file that is read next time the machine is booting. So you carry over the randomness from the last running of the machine. In the meantime, Linux has implemented a new syscall, originally introduced by OpenBSD as getentropy(2): getrandom(2). This syscall does the right thing: blocking until it has gathered enough initial entropy, and never blocking after that point. Of course, it is a syscall, not a character device, so it isn't as easily accessible from shell or script languages. It is available from Linux 3.17 onward. Obviously that isn't as good as if you let the shutdown scripts write out the seed, because in that case there would have been much more time to gather entropy. The advantage is obviously that this does not depend on a proper shutdown with execution of the shutdown scripts (in case the computer crashes, for example). And it doesn't help you the very first time a machine is running, but the Linux distributions usually do the same saving into a seed file when running the installer. So that's mostly okay. Virtual machines are the other problem. Because people like to clone them, or rewind them to a previously saved check point, this seed file doesn't help you. But the solution still isn't using /dev/random everywhere, but properly seeding each and every virtual machine after cloning, restoring a checkpoint, whatever. tldr; Just use /dev/urandom!

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CNN: FISA court looking at all of warrant applications from FBI lawyer involved in Carter Page wiretap
by jim bell 21 Dec '19

21 Dec '19

CNN: FISA court looking at all of warrant applications from FBI lawyer involved in Carter Page wiretap. https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/20/politics/fisa-court-clinesmith-fbi-carter-pa…

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Anglin literally defends homosexuals - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

So the Amblin Memer is now literally defending MILO. This is a good thing. Free speech yo! :D This might also come as (to put it very mildly) somewhat of a surprise to those who ate the Jewish meme "Anglin is a neon-Nazi" hook, line and sinker. "Nom, nom, Nazi cookies :)" It is also a good thing that more folks realise that "oven jumpers" are the ultimate troll on the rest of the world. goyim = cattle According the sacred Jewish bible, there is to be exactly 3000 goyim to serve each Jew, and this state of worldly paradise and the reclamation of "greater Israel" can only occur after the loss of exactly 6 million Jews. (From the "in case you were wondering why 6 million was such a significant number to Jews" dept.) MILO Says That Lauren Southern Had Sex with Paul Joseph Watson and Bokram http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/milo-says-that-lauren-southern-had-sex-with-p… ... Was MILO Destroyed for Lying About Being Jewish? As the regular reader knows, I’ve never had a terrible opinion of MILO. Well, I did at first. But he grew on me, so I was happy to see him not looking as bad as he did on the show with Nick. As a rule, I have zero tolerance for homosexuals. But he’s the best of them. He is one of the only ones I’m even aware of who will say that homosexuality is most likely a result of child sexual abuse. I was legit offended when he said I’m a fed. And I believe that his crucifixion in the media over that pederasty hoax was one of the most extreme hitjobs ever. For those who don’t recall: MILO was scheduled to speak at CPAC in 2017, and a few days before the event, someone posted a clip of him saying that homosexual teenagers often get involved with older homosexual men in their thirties. This is simply a fact and everyone knows it. All he did was say it. And he wasn’t denounced for being anti-gay – he was denounced for allegedly “promoting pedophilia”! All he did was describe his own experiences as a teenage boy having “sex” with older men, and said that though such relationships should be illegal, they can be consensual. Milo Yiannopoulos gives thoughts on pedophilia. ~6MiB http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52czsIDNb9E And get this: the clip had been online, just right there sitting on YouTube, for over a year. And the group that “leaked” it claimed to have “discovered” it. MILO was dropped from CPAC and forced to resign from Breitbart, his book, “Dangerous,” which had just been released and was climbing the New York Times best-seller list, was literally pulled off of shelves, his college tours were canceled and basically his entire life was over. Moreover: the day before it happened, someone posted on /pol/ that it was going to happen, describing it all in detail. /pol/ screenshot http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/AL3I1Y2-e157679691… Obviously, this person was on a mailing list. That’s the only way he could have said exactly what happened before it happened. But the claims of the cause of the thing are his own insights. Basically, MILO wasn’t any different than any other Republican. There was no reason he couldn’t have just been given a show on Fox News. I mean, maybe they specifically didn’t like him because he was good at promoting Trump. But he was also normalizing homosexuality in the Republican Party, which you would think would be viewed as a net gain. I think they did it because they found out he was faking being part Jewish. Otherwise, there just really wasn’t any reason to go so hard and destroy this guy. He would have went along with the narrative. Even since he’s been completely destroyed, he’s gone along with the narrative. I just heard him the other day talking about “the six million.” You don’t ever hear anyone on the internet say that anymore. Even if they don’t openly deny it, they don’t bring it up. It’s too embarrassing. Because every goy under the age of 30 who isn’t completely out of the loop knows. (I heard Ashley Rae Goldenberg, a right-wing Jew, on The Ralph Retort this week and she said that she thinks the numbers are up for debate. She’s not even a self-hater, she’s a religious Chabad Jew. But it’s just that at this point, everyone who is at all in touch with internet culture is aware that saying “exactly six million” marks you as completely and totally out of touch.) MILO’s claim is that his Irish maternal grandfather married a German-Jewish woman, who then converted to Catholicism, and that his mother was raised Catholic. He’s never offered any evidence for the claim. And it seems rather unlikely. He’s 34, so his grandparents would have gotten together in the 1940s or 1950s. And an Irishman marrying a German Jew and converting her to Catholicism in that era, in Britain, would be quite a thing. I have no evidence for any of this, by the way, I am simply speculating. But what I think happened is this: MILO was involved in media in the UK, before he was famous. He is part Greek, and Greeks have a significant genetic overlap with the Jews, which results in some similar features: dark hair and big noses, primarily. (Nothing against my Greek bros here – I’m not saying they’re Jewish or Jew-like or anything else, just pointing out the genetic fact of the matter.) He was probably regularly asked if he was Jewish, because he’s a swarthy guy in the media. And he probably quickly realized that if you’re Jewish you have a lot of opportunities that you don’t have if you’re not Jewish. When he doesn’t dye his hair, he looks Greek. That is to say, he looks a bit Jewish. So he started claiming to have a Jewish maternal grandmother, which according to Jewish religious custom, would mean he is Jewish. Then, someone figured it out, and looked into his background, and found that he was lying. And that was why he was destroyed. That is how I believe this all went down. It is really the simplest explanation. ...

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[PEACE] - actual Jewish memes/trolling
by Zenaan Harkness 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

This is important. Counter-anti-semitic memes abound - identifying them is straightforward, but sometimes they might slip through your "fake meme" filter, so be sure, be sure, before forwarding: Daily Reminder: Jews Make Fake Memes to Make You Look Stupid http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/daily-reminder-jews-make-fake-memes-to-make-y… It’s time for your daily reminder that Jews make fake memes containing false information so that people who criticize them will spread false information and then discredit all of the true stuff they are saying. It also helps out with the whole “you can’t trust what you read online unless it’s from the Jewish media” agenda. I recently saw someone on a comments board post this in response to an article about the impeachment: The question is who’s behind this: Adam Schiff’s sister Melissa Robin Schiff is married to Robert Soros the son of… George Soros. If Soros is her father -in-law., it is clear who’s orchestrating all this. And it’s not all. Who is behind Soros ? The Rothschild family. Proven. This is false. Adam Schiff’s sister is not married to George Soros’ son. The claim originated from a meme on Facebook. Politifact, a horrible “fact-checker” site that often reports false information, was correct on this issue. https://www.politifact.com/facebook-fact-checks/statements/2019/oct/11/vira… ... Why would a person make that fake meme unless they were trying to maliciously confuse the discussion of Jews being behind the impeachment of Donald Trump? There were theories in the 1990s about anti-virus software companies making viruses. Though this has never been proven to have happened (as far as I’m aware), it made a lot of sense, because a lot of the computer viruses in the 1990s didn’t really even benefit whoever was spreading them. They just seemed pointless. I wonder the same thing about fact-checker sites and these fake memes. It’s a bit like Jews spray-painting swastikas on their own property. They do it constantly. [Image of many arrests, each with a link, to Jews exposed painting literal swastikas on their homes, gravestones, etc: http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Screen-Shot-2019-1… ] The fake claim that Schiff is related to Soros takes away from the real, hard fact that nearly every single person involved in this impeachment hoax is Jewish. http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/boomer-rumbling-activated-trunews-puts-on-arm… [Impeachment meme image showing all the players as blue faced http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/090-BD9-A9-2-A55-4… ] The recently deceased Jew, http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/anti-white-kike-and-stereotypical-badger-noel… Professor Noel Ignatiev, spent his entire career saying that “the white race should be abolished.” He is a very bad Jew. Noel Ignatiev Urging White Genocide ~3MiB -F18, ~2.5MiB -F43 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vOtZgOOUHA However, he did not tell white male students in his class that they should kill themselves, as was claimed in a fake news article in 2013 on a WordPress blog called “Diversity Chronicle.” I wrote about this in 2014, and to this day I still see people linking to it or spreading memes that use these fake quotes. https://dailystormer.name/return-of-the-fake-noel-ignatiev-whites-should-ki… A lot of this fake stuff ends up showing up on sites like The Gateway Pundit and other spammy boomer conservative sites. To this day, The Gateway Pundit has an article up about the Ignatiev fake news story, without any correction. The Diversity Chronicle has an “about” page saying that it is satire (as opposed to fake news), but whoever runs the site is certainly aware that this information is being spread around as if it is real. I wrote them an email back in 2013 asking them to put a note on the article saying that it was satire, and they did not return my email. In that case, the person could be doing it for clicks, I suppose. But it is difficult not to think it is malicious. If someone hears about the real things that Noel Ignatiev said and then finds out that some of what is attributed to him is fake, they will think everything he said was fake. But he is on video saying “abolish the white race.” He’s written entire books about it. https://www.amazon.com/Race-Traitor-Noel-Ignatiev/dp/0415913934 The hoax covers that up. These are simply two examples of this phenomenon, but there are many such cases. It is all over Facebook and various boomer conservative blogs. You must be vigilant and make sure to check information before you spread it around. I know it can be difficult to figure out what is real and what isn’t. But just don’t repeat something unless you’re sure of it. Particularly if something sounds outrageous, you need to be careful. I don’t want to toot my own horn, but along with being a comedy site, The Daily Stormer is one of the most accurate news sites online, simply in terms of the facts. [Careful, according to the eternally bracketted, facts can be hateful.]]

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Google goes offline after fibre cables cut - BBC News
by jim bell 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50851420

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SDR Intro with LuaRadio, Linux RNG, Cox $1B Filesharing Tort Jury Nullification
by grarpamp 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

https://luaradio.io/new-to-sdr.html https://github.com/vsergeev/luaradio Lightweight signal processing libraries are gaining traction, modern open source SDR applications are cropping up, and the developer communities surrounding SDR are growing. The rest of this guide covers the details of getting started with SDR receivers, including hardware, software, a tour of the frequency bands, next steps, and additional resources. Most of this introduction focuses on SDR receivers, but SDR transmitters are touched on briefly in the next steps section. https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/12/19/on-linuxs-random-number-generation/ https://torrentfreak.com/cox-is-liable-for-pirating-subscribers-hit-with-1-… https://yro.slashdot.org/story/19/12/20/1646223/cox-owes-1-billion-to-recor… http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civi… https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/legal-and-management/8546842/co… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tort "music and making a living through making music existed for many centuries before "recording" existed. The vast industry creating and selling physical recording media was a brief blip in history. It'll be interesting seeing how the next century shakes this out."

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Fwd: Re: Facebook scraping?
by Razer 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

jim bell wrote: > On Thursday, December 19, 2019, 07:36:59 PM PST, Razer > <g2s(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > jim bell wrote: > > Data of more than 267 million Facebook users has been exposed online > https://mol.im/a/7811595 <https://mol.im/a/7811595%20>via > http://dailym.ai/android > > > > Jim Bell's comment: > > Article refers to "an illegal process called scraping...". > > I am not aware that "scraping" is illegal, or even wrong. > > Jim Bell > > > >FCC says passing it on or using the information for personal gain is, > and there's no reason to scrape pages unless one of those two are > operational. > > > Document that. Somewhat to the contrary > is: https://blog.zwillgen.com/2019/09/11/ninth-circuit-rules-scraping-public-we… > > > [partial quote follows] > > It depends on what you DO with the information. Just scraping it may not a crime, USING IT constitutes the crime and always has and it's the same on Amateur Radio as well so lookitup. I'm not your research assistant. PS. Prelim Injunctions are pretty much summarily granted until a court hearing. Rr [Html and image redacted]

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Prostitution Sex Drugs Guns Onions Dating
by grarpamp 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

Stamping Out Online Sex Trafficking May Have Pushed It Underground https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/technology/fosta-sex-trafficking-law.html https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21830744 Pink: Combining Sex and the Sharing Economy https://old.reddit.com/r/icocrypto/comments/75k620/ico_ann_pink_escort_star… https://old.reddit.com/user/Sarah_PinkApp https://old.reddit.com/r/pinkdate/ https://old.reddit.com/r/pinkdate/comments/a3rvfr/all_operations_paused/ http://darknetq7skv7hgo.onion/ https://old.reddit.com/r/onions/

4 6

Sheer Stupidity
by Ryan Carboni 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

Elites are worried if they'll be next. Morons are curious if sticking a fork in a socket will yield the same results. The confusion from stupidity is going to get worse, not better.

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Fw: Using my isotope-modified silica single-mode optical fiber to communicate longer distances using quantum principles.
by jim bell 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

Dear Sirs: I am Jim Bell, the inventor and businessperson of daltonium.com. I have a Bachelor's degree in Chemistry. I was alerted to your recent article https://phys.org/news/2019-12-entanglement-long-distance-free-space-quantum… . DECEMBER 16, 2019 How to use entanglement for long-distance or free-space quantum communication by Austrian Academy of Sciences I have invented a very new kind of silica single-mode silica optical fiber (waveguide) that is isotope-modified. Specifically, the silicon-29 isotope is removed from the core and cladding, and the germanium-73 isotope is removed from the doped core. I explain the reason for this invention at: daltonium.com/optical-fiber/ My hypothesis is that the Si-29 and Ge-73 isotopes, as well as the O-17 isotope atoms (the ones that have electromagnetic 'spin'), react to the passage of the infrared photons, and convert some of their energy into phonons, and thus cause what appears to be optical loss. If I am correct, the loss can be reduced from the record held by Sumitomo Electric of about 0.141 dB/kilometers. https://global-sei.com/company/press/2017/03/prs029.html My understanding is that the maximum distance that can be exploited for purposes of quantum entanglement is inversely related to the value of optical loss. I believe that the current record is about 50 kilometers. https://phys.org/news/2019-08-entanglement-km-optical-fiber.html I expect that the eventual loss for my fiber, made with 99.99% Si-28, and perhaps 99.95% Ge (non-Ge-73) could be as low as 0.001 dB/kilometer. (Although, achievement of this value might require use of O-17-free oxygen, created by the multiplate cryogenic distillation of liquid oxygen.) This would be about 140 times lower than the best existing fiber. This might allow quantum entanglement to effectively occur over a distance of 50 km x 140, or about 7000 kilometers. (Perhaps, the distance between New York City and Eastern Europe.) My understanding is that a group of the Russian Academy of Sciences, headed by Andrey Bulanov, is proceeding with the prototyping of my fiber. Are you interested in this fiber? It should also allow optical fiber links over long distances with no or very few optical repeaters. Jim Bell I am in Vancouver, Washington USA, in the Pacific Time Zone. See below for some of my 'advertising'. A message that I have sent to a couple thousand participants in the fiber optics industry: I am looking for a company to make an optical preform and draw it into optical fibers. It's a patented innovation, a silica single-mode optical waveguide with a loss of 0.001 dB/kilometer. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/optical-waveguide-0001-dbkm-loss-even-10x-le…'s the US Patent for Daltonium.com's isotope-modified optical waveguide.http://www.freepatentsonline.com/9459401.html orIsotopically altered optical fiberForecast silica single-mode waveguide specifications:Optical loss 0.001 dB/kilometer at 1550 nmTransmission bandwidth: 400 nm-2000 nm (loss will be about 100x lower, at any given wavelength, than current single-mode silica fiber)Signal velocity: Optical signals will travel 5.6% faster than current silica optical waveguide.Chromatic Dispersion: If made to minimize loss, 'material dispersion' should disappear. What would be left would be 'waveguide dispersion.Can be made with EITHER a germania-doped silica core, OR a pure-silica core, fluorine-doped cladding.

1 0

Cryptocurrency: The Four Horsemen, Papers, Empire, Resistance, and other Stories
by grarpamp 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

Four Horsemen - Docu - Renegade Economist 2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fbvquHSPJU Princes of the Yen: Central Bank Truth - Docu - Independant POV 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5Ac7ap_MAY 97% Owned - Economic Truth How is Money Created - Independant POV 2012 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcGh1Dex4Yo Spider's Web: Britain's Second Empire - Independant POV 2018 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=np_ylvc8Zj8 Panic: The Untold Story of the 2008 Financial Crisis https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QozGSS7QY_U Panama Papers – The Shady World of Offshore Companies https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CtvaNIQN0DY How The Economic Machine Works by Ray Dalio https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHe0bXAIuk0 Generation OS13: The new culture of resistance - Independant POV 2011 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vY4VZr8Ox94 Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse - Biblical https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MH35yzmM2oU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lofMWbUmBVY Four Horseman - Hitchens, Dawkins, Dennet, Harris 2007 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7IHU28aR2E Metallica https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4nCy5CITc8

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PsyOps: The Man Who Knew Too Much - Colin Wallace (Documentary 2020)
by grarpamp 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

The Man Who Knew Too Much - Colin Wallace https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8sYFACY1E9s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_D2l7kDtVKY A psychological operations (psyops) operative refuses to engage in dirty tricks and is framed for a murder. The Man Who Knew Too Much is a documentary film about Colin Wallace a former Military Intelligence Officer involved in psychological operations in Northern Ireland. The film explores in depth what psychological operations involved. This was not just spreading propaganda, but also creating conflict between target groups and individuals, and influencing and manipulating politics and politicians, religious office holders and community groups of all shapes and sizes. Colin Wallace fell out with sections of the Intelligence community and was framed for the murder of a friend. POV accepts Bitcoin for its work.

1 0

censorship, sorry, I mean, 'moderation'
by Punk-Stasi 2.0 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 13 Oct 1997 00:36:21 +0800 Subject: repost: potted history of moderation experiment Dimitri's discussion of the moderation experiment prompted me to dig up this history of the event I wrote shortly after the distributed lists were setup. I did promise around this time to repost this later after the moderation experiment to ensure that it wouldn't be itself censored. If Attila and Dimitri's suspicions are correct, in addition to the below, cypherpunks-unedited may actually have been hand edited, and have had filters placed on it which rejected certain postsers articles out of hand, or auto-forwarding them to cypherpunks-flames. Other list members may be able to verify some the uncertainty surrounding these aspects of the censorship experiment. Enjoy, Adam ==============================8<============================== Date: Sun, 16 Feb 1997 23:49:09 GMT From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Moderation experiment and moderator liability There appears to be a bit of a hush up surrounding the circumstances of the pause in the moderation experiment and subsequent change of moderation policy. To clear the air, I think it would be kind of nice if the full story were told, so I'll gather here a history as I understand it. Information from my archives (those I have), and from asking around in email. I realise that some of the actions that I am claiming of participants in this sequence of events seem hard to believe given their high reputation capital. I was myself initially dubious on the strength of the reputation capital of those being critisized. However the below is the sequence of events as close as I can determine. I welcome being proven wrong on any points. Events: 1. Dimitri Vulis posted a lot of off topic posts over a period of time 2. Dimitri reposted a couple of 50k Serdar Argic revisionist articles 3. Dimitri challenged John Gilmore to shut him up 4. John unsubscribed Dimitri, and modified majordomo(a)toad.com to siltently ignore Dimitri's attempts to resubscribe. Dimitri could still post, and presumably read cypherpunks with a different email address or via an archive. It was a token unsubscription only. 5. When Dimitri figured out what John had done, he made many posts denigrating John as a censor 6. Much discussion ensued critisizing John for blocking Dimitri 7. Over Christmas some joker subscribed cypherpunks(a)toad.com to a load of sports mailing lists, Hugh Daniels and John cleaned up the mess 8. Followed a long thread on hardening lists against spam attacks 9. John made a post to the list announcing that the list would be moderated for one month from Jan 11 as an experiment, and included Sandy Sandfort's proposed moderatation policy and offer to act as moderator. It appeared that the moderation experiment was Sandy's suggestion, and that John had agreed to go along with it. 10. Some discussion both pro and con of moderation, and the technical , free speech, and legal aspects followed 11. Moderation started Jan 19, the main list became the moderated list 12. Lots of people complained about the moderation, some defended it Tim May quietly unsubscribed 13. Some people complained about inconsistency in moderation -- some articles which went to flames were not flamish, but made by posters with low reputation capital, or were following up to posts which were flamish. 14. After a while some people commented on Tim's absence, and sent him mail asking what happened. Tim posted an article explaining that he had left because of the imposed moderation without discussion. 15. John followed up with a post defending the moderation experiment, and arguing for it's popularity (he claimed as evidence the number of posters who had not taken the trouble to move to the unedited list). 16. Dimitri posted an article where he claimed that there was a security flaw in Stronghold. Stronghold is C2Nets commercial version of the freeware Apache SSL web server. Sandy is employed by C2Net. 17. Sandy dropped the posting entirely -- it went to neither cypherpunks (edited), nor cypherpunks-flames. He considered that forwarding the posting would have made him legally liable. Sandy is a lawyer by profession. He did not explain this situation on the list. 18. Tim May had by now subscribed to cypherpunks-flames, and posted several follow-ups to Dimitri's posting, discussing the issue of Dimitri's post being dropped, and stated that Dimitri's posting was not flamish, and should not have been dropped in his opinion. Tim's postings were also silently dropped, going to neither of cypherpunks (edited), and cypherpunks-flames. 19. Sandy made an announcement that he was ending his participation in the moderation experiment. Still no explanation of why posts were dropped, or even admission that they were. 20. The two moderated cypherpunks lists (cypherpunks and cypherpunks-flames) went dead for some time. 21. Tim received a warning from C2Net's lawyers that if he did not desist from mentioning that Dimitri had posted an article criticising a C2Net product that he would be sued! 22. John posted a statement where he explained Sandy's sudden announcement of ending his particpation. John explained that Sandy had "hit a pothole in the moderation experiment when Mr. Nemesis submitted a posting containing nothing but libelous statements about Sandy's employer". Sandy did not drop Johns posting even though it covered the same topics that had resulted in Tim's posts being dropped, and resulted in Tim receiving legal threats from C2Net. In the same post John said that he had come to the conclusion that he was no longer willing to host the cypherpunks list. In this post John announced that Sandy had been persuaded to continue to moderate for the remainder of the moderation period, and gave the new policy. The changes were that anything other than crypto discussion and discussion of forming a new cypherpunks list would go to flames, and anything that Sandy thought was libelous would be dropped silently. 23. Sandy posted a statement affirming that he would continue to moderate, and that if any cypherpunks wished to discuss his prior moderation policy and performance as a moderator that they do it on new lists which they create themselves. (If Sandy's current moderation criteria mean that he feels obliged to forward this post to cypherpunks-flames as off-topic, or even to silently drop it from both moderated lists, so be it. I will simply repost it later, when the moderation experiment is over on one of the new lists. In the event of myself receiving legal threats, I shall simply post it via a remailer, or rely on someone else to do so. C2 does not appear to be running any remailers at the moment, otherwise I would use a remailer hosted at c2.net as the exit node in the remailer chain.) The positive outcome of all this has been to make the cypherpunks list more resilient to legal attack. The new distributed list seems to be progressing well, and will be less liable to attack. Filtering services continue, as they should. And alt.cypherpunks has been created as a forum ultimately resistant to legal attack. Also I should say that I would hope that no one holds any long term animosity towards any of the players in this episode, many of the people have been very prolific in their work to further online privacy and freedom, and I hope that we can all put this chapter behind us. Now more fun things... Anyone checked out the DES breaking project? Over on http://fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk/des/ are details of mailing lists where people are organising breaking RSADSIs DES challenge. For the RC5/32/12/6 (48 bit RC5) break which took 13 days, it seems there were a peak of 5000 machines involved. At this rate it will take 8 months to break DES. Adam -- print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

1 0

Facebook scraping?
by jim bell 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

Data of more than 267 million Facebook users has been exposed online https://mol.im/a/7811595 via http://dailym.ai/android Jim Bell's comment:Article refers to "an illegal process called scraping...".I am not aware that "scraping" is illegal, or even wrong. Jim Bell

2 2

Re: It'll be decades before we'll have another Great American Novel (or Film)
by Ryan Carboni 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

This for instance will explain why the American secret police were investigating so many writers during the Cold War for apparently non-political reasons. This disinformation effort to equate homosexuality or hedonism with sadistic pedophilia seems to have gone on for a very long time, and no one made any effort to look into it or even assign people to various elite groups for protective reasons. It might make every foreign elite nervous if they read how the Stasi were investigating the gamer movement in Germany. One would want the best inductive reasoners if one's regime was at stake. Not one that thinks a video game (without dialogue) about contemporaneous moods is a danger. Of course FANG hires the best inductive reasoners so this is all a bit funny. https://www.zeit.de/digital/games/2018-11/computer-games-gdr-stasi-surveill… The player's job in "Raid Over Moscow" is to destroy the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons arsenal, necessarily making it a political issue for the East German authorities. If the Stasi had discovered that you owned a copy of the game as a teenager, Ullmann says, "that could have caused a lot of trouble." But, he adds, "the love for video games clearly trumped fears of being caught by the Stasi."

1 0

Mathematicians crack Newton's three-body problem
by jim bell 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

https://www.zmescience.com/science/news-science/mathematicians-crack-newton… --- SmartNews https://www.smartnews.com

2 1

Re: Spying: Massive Global Phone Location Databases Bought and Sold Cell/GPS/WiFi/LAN
by Ryan Carboni 20 Dec '19

20 Dec '19

After a certain amount of intelligence intake, saying you were surprised doesn't prove you have too much information to process, it just proves you are stupid.

1 0

Re: Govt Attaches Snowden Book Proceeds, Tosses Out Surveillance Lawsuit; SSH, PBS
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

>You should be able to write off taxes as theft, burglary, robbery, >file insurance claims, jail or recover or otherwise compensate, >seek pain and suffering, tort from reduced investment capital, >loss of business, unpaid bills, etc. Gee, you say it like you give a damn.

1 0

Jeremy Corbyn, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a tale of two approaches - the JQ - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

For any who missed the memo, this is very insightful - Corbyn (who really needs to take a lesson from Tulsi Gabbard) is the classic tale of cowardice; Mélenchon is like Tulsi - taking the fight head on. Take notice - you can no longer sit on the fence. Unbowed French Socialist Promises to Take the Fight to the Jews http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion/unbowed-french-socialist-promises-to-take-the… https://www.thejc.com/news/world/french-far-left-leader-jean-luc-m%C3%A9len…

1 0

Serious Punk yo! -- Fw: FINALLY - a valid use for trannies - DEFEATING SLUTS! - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

Folks the following is the epitomy of the zeitgeist - how can this even be happening, it's 2018 already I'm literally shaking. Thankfully, this be "Our Tranny", shredding the fields in women's sports, so go nationalism right? :D This be some medicine that the politically correct crowd are in desperate need for - if we gonna turn our world upside down, Australia better benefit from it. Yo :) Did I mention "yo"? ----- Forwarded message from Google(a)StealsDomains.com ----- From: 1488anon(a)GoogleAndGodaddyStealDomains.com Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 19:16:34 +1100 Subject: FINALLY - a valid use for trannies - DEFEATING SLUTS! Less than a year ago, I could never have imagined saying "Fella's, we've found a use for trannies." You might like this :D https://dailystormer.name/absolute-unit-tranny-dominates-sluts-at-handball-… God that's good! An Aussie bloke defeating sports-pretender sluts all across Asia, and hopefully the world! :D :D GO Australia! Enjoy <cheeky garfield smile> -- Swastika-clad Russian Neon-Nazi Minx hunter since AT LEAST 1488. Da Ministry of Da Triggering. ----- End forwarded message -----

1 1

It'll be decades before we'll have another Great American Novel (or Film)
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

There were books that captured the spirit of America so well that they are cherished by literate men for decades or centuries into the future. We don't have them anymore not because our writers are less capable, we don't have them anymore because the great evil that pervades these lands seeps into our culture, an expression of secret pain and hidden traumas that devastate America. These are smart capable people, how can they not notice? Why wouldn't they make a veiled commentary on our state of affairs (at least from time to time)? We have great fiction still, yes, but we wish to forget them. Or the fiction isn't about America. It is terrible. Everything is shameful now. America is a beautiful country of freedom, or maybe was, and hopefully will be. One day we will have art worthy of her name.

1 0

Spying: Massive Global Phone Location Databases Bought and Sold Cell/GPS/WiFi/LAN
by grarpamp 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-ce… https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21833718 In addition to former WiFi maps... Every minute of every day, everywhere on the planet, dozens of companies -- largely unregulated, little scrutinized -- are logging the movements of tens of millions of people with mobile phones and storing the information in gigantic data files. The Times Privacy Project obtained one such file, by far the largest and most sensitive ever to be reviewed by journalists. It holds more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million Americans as they moved through several major cities, including Washington, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles. The New York Times: Each piece of information in this file represents the precise location of a single smartphone over a period of several months in 2016 and 2017. The data was provided to Times Opinion by sources who asked to remain anonymous because they were not authorized to share it and could face severe penalties for doing so. The sources of the information said they had grown alarmed about how it might be abused and urgently wanted to inform the public and lawmakers. After spending months sifting through the data, tracking the movements of people across the country and speaking with dozens of data companies, technologists, lawyers and academics who study this field, we feel the same sense of alarm. In the cities that the data file covers, it tracks people from nearly every neighborhood and block, whether they live in mobile homes in Alexandria, Va., or luxury towers in Manhattan. One search turned up more than a dozen people visiting the Playboy Mansion, some overnight. Without much effort we spotted visitors to the estates of Johnny Depp, Tiger Woods and Arnold Schwarzenegger, connecting the devices' owners to the residences indefinitely. If you lived in one of the cities the dataset covers and use apps that share your location -- anything from weather apps to local news apps to coupon savers -- you could be in there, too. If you could see the full trove, you might never use your phone the same way again. Severed fibre cables disrupted internet access in eastern Europe, Iran, Turkey https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50851420 https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/tech-companies-slap-back-at-the… https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/12/01/suspected-internet-cable-s… https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/19/federal-reserve-bank-glitch-delayed-bank-ac…

1 0

Govt Attaches Snowden Book Proceeds, Tosses Out Surveillance Lawsuit; SSH, PBS
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/gift/gift.htm I am debating with myself whether to send a token donation to Radio Free Asia or to directly donate to the US treasury. Well, I could write off a donation to Radio Free Asia.

2 1

Govt Attaches Snowden Book Proceeds, Tosses Out Surveillance Lawsuit; SSH, PBS
by grarpamp 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/12/us-government-is-entitled-to-al… https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21832129 infohash:AF5F9B5D4657DD3EDD0C080C4086CA346D03DBBC infohash:14BC623E91FBC7C50AF8620A212EF2B413D23692 infohash: 3D2904E3CC704CF10BB86882DB2419F58DE22C83 audiobook https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/news/judge-dismisses-wikimedia-case-agai… https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21826567 https://xorhash.gitlab.io/xhblog/0010.html https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21826495 https://techcrunch.com/2019/12/17/over-100-pbs-local-stations-start-streami… https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21818518

1 0

Your Cypherpunks archive
by jim bell 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

I have just discovered a startling omission in your Cypherpunks archive. A HUGE number of postings on the subject of AP, my assassination politics essay, which I began posting maybe about April/May 1995 are simply not there. And, in fact, postings on the subject of AP at least until early November 1995 seem to be missing. And perhaps after November 1995. I don't know what other classes of emails may also be missing, but I think it will be very important to find out this information. I looked at the archive because I wanted to determine the earliest that the subject of "Assassination Politics" appeared on the Cypherpunks list. It might have been April 1995.Note: as weird as it may sound, there are reasons that this material might have been tampered with, but I don't know what time the tampering occurred. We are discussing this on the Cypherpunks list. I assume you will want to participate. Jim Bell

6 27

Someone forgot ten pounds of C-4 in New York
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/1327639 New York police discovered a trash bag containing around 4.5 kilograms (10 pounds) of what has been described as C-4 explosive in a Manhattan cemetery the morning of Oct. 11. The material did not present an immediate threat, as it was not primed with a blasting cap - a component required to successfully detonate the explosives - or a firing train for initiating a blasting cap. The New York Police Department's bomb squad has reportedly secured the material, but the area around Marble Cemetery in East Greenwich Village on 2nd Street between 1st and 2nd avenues remains closed to traffic. It is difficult to imagine an innocent explanation for how six to eight blocks of apparent plastic explosive (likely comprising about 3 to 4.5 kilograms) came to be abandoned in the cemetery. Since the material was not primed, it does not appear to have been in the final phase of deployment for an attack. While information is still preliminary, there are a number of potential reasons for the material's presence in the cemetery. It is possible that the explosives were left there as a dead drop, to be passed to someone with bombmaking experience to construct an explosive device. It is also possible that it was simply abandoned there by someone who wanted to dispose of it. Since C-4 is a military-grade explosive, it is likely that the material can be traced back to establish where it was made, who bought it and when, which would provide clues as to how it ended up Manhattan. A number of nations manufacture C-4 and military-grade plastic explosives similar to C-4, such as PE-4A. The New York Police Department and its U.S. federal law enforcement partners in the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives will certainly be working overtime to attempt to determine the provenance of these explosives in order to discover who placed them there and why, in addition to testing the material to verify that it is in fact explosive and not a hoax. If the recovered explosives were still in their wrappers with lot numbers affixed, the job of tracing them will be easier. However, if they were U.S.-manufactured explosives that had been stolen or captured in a war zone, the trail may be hard to trace. If the explosive blocks did not have wrappers with lot numbers, a chemical analysis of the explosives should help the authorities narrow down the possibilities. New York remains one of the highest-profile targets for terrorist attacks in the United States, and plots to detonate explosives there are regularly investigated and disrupted. The last such plot was the failed May 1 attempt to detonate a car packed with a poorly constructed explosive device in Times Square. Indeed, many of these failed plots, like those involving Najibullah Zazi and Faisal Shahzad, failed for want of real explosives. This amount of plastic explosive would be enough to construct a relatively small improvised explosive device if it wound up in the hands of someone who wanted to use it violently, possessed a detonator or two and had some basic explosives training, but it would not be enough to create any large-scale damage by itself.

4 3

Tor Stinks re Traffic Analysis and Sybil (as do other networks)
by grarpamp 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

> recommend utilizing Tor to combat government surveillance If users adversaries operate under whichever governments classification levels such as TOP SECRET FVEY, and especially if the users are doing something that such govts would take personal affront to, such users need to do some serious thinking. > low-latency This phrase is misused by many as if it were some kind of litmus test for determining TA resistance... it is not. It's likely possible to create a LL network that traffic analysis cannot penetrate even with every single link tapped. Latency, purely by itself, does not define whether or not a network is secure against traffic analysis. Latency (whatever level therein) really refers to the useability different categories of apps would have at such level... the user experience. > "All ... systems as currently designed and deployed are essentially > broken against The Man" Surely generally true by now. Tor's nearly 25 year old design since inception is nothing more than a bunch of free proxies that users chain through (same as VPN's). Perhaps a bit better than VPN by maybe weighting traffic towards busy, plus an assortment of other things, and some more worse than VPN due to obvious simplicity of infesting the network with a nasty case of Sybil to the tune of 100+ nodes a month in some months. Luckily the dumb ones are caught, but it's not those that users should worry about. Like VPN, Tor is good at giving users a different IP that the everyday world of civilian / commercial endpoints has a hard time tracing. But hardly so good at resisting what Govt's and GigaCorps can now analyze and attack. Even independant smalltime researchers are confirming TA and Sybil methods against Tor and many other overlay networks. As to the *PA's listed before, they've had the thought, vantage, access, coordination, tech, money, etc to TA, and certainly to Sybil, just about any overlay network since about the time such networks came into being. 1995 2000 2005 and if by 2010 and Snowden people weren't assessing that capability exists, even based only on opensource research, well pity the fool. TA, Sybil, *PA's, GT-1's etc are no longer just some sidebar caveats in highbrow whitepapers to be dismissed and buried. There needs to be new networks deployed that take those as their top design considerations over all others. > https://www.schneier.com/blog/ Schneier seems much more a friend of govcorp (ie Counterpane), and a generic blogwonk, than any sort of genuine users activist taking any sort of strongly voiced principled stand on anything that matters. As Chiefs on Tor Board one might look for Schneier and Blaze to be publicly saying and doing some project, Tor or other, regarding TA, Sybil, or even disproving them if they weren't real threats, or at least something... instead Tor and other nets are often crickets on that. (Old congressional testimonies are also oldsauce, stir up some new hot chili.) Note also that Tor doesn't need to actually care about its users security to play whatever legal test and game in the courts that it and it's lawyers are lined up waiting to play (remember Tor was tied with EFF for many years for various reasons). How are users to be indemnified by anyone, if not first by themselves using the security of a network itself, and if the network is not capable, then what. Regardless of whether Tor etc is good or bad or none of the above, holding a near monopoly in the space on cashflow, legal, steering tech, discourse, twatterverse populism, etc... for ~10-15 years... is not good situation. Competition is healthy. And while the design of today's networks is largely unchangeable by nature of being deployed, their adversaries are adapting to leverage clearly whitepapered weaknesses in those designs since years. New networks... from internet overlay, fiber, radio, carrier pigeon, dropgangs... need to be researched, coded, and deployed by new players. Anyway, have some traffic noise generators... http://trackmenot.io/ https://adnauseam.io/

12 44

Anti-Prude Feminism
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

Recently discovered Pando closed. Personally have no idea if I'll have a negative surface altitude of six feet, but before then I hope I'll be involved with people who agree that firing a person with cause would restrict their golden parachute to only compensation for legal fees relating to their employment. None of modern feminism has resulted in any real gains for women's rights. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/business/google-ceo-vows-to-do-better-af… Google's top executive said Thursday he is "committed to doing better" as his workforce staged a global protest over reports that Android co-founder Andy Rubin received a $90 million severance package after his termination following sexual misconduct claims by a coworker. https://pando.com/2019/10/23/we-sold-pando/ And of course I’m not the only one, and my experience was far from the worst: In the last few years I have been overwhelmed by stories of sexual assault and harassment told by so many incredibley women in the Valley, holding back so much talent and driving so much talent out of the industry.

1 0

Cryptocurrency: Music
by grarpamp 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

1 0

Horowitz Examining Past FISA Applications to Determine if FBI's 'Basic Errors' are Systemic | National Review
by jim bell 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/horowitz-examining-past-fisa-applicatio…

1 0

speaking of Americ_n_s - a citizen's duty of care - karma - prep Now - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

Those who hail democracy (fewer these days) yet e.g. voted for Hillary "Benghazi Butcher" Clinton, failed a fundamental spiritual test: You don't like pussy grabbin? OK, sure, some folks don't... Don't like a father dating anyone as old as his 16 year old daughter? Sure, you'll likely find others who agree with you... Really opposed to tax cuts for the rich? Well, you're entitled to your Socialist dogma... But voting for Hillary Clinton? THAT is unforgivable! Ms Clinton has a sordid, war mongering, murdering, and "rape hoax" hoaxing past. And millions of American's either failed to at least check out Clinton's actual basic facts/history, and/or overlooked all her evils, and, it appears, millions still would do so today. When your corporations (Google) and military continues to drone Arab weddings, helicopter gunship random reporters and children in vans "into their place", and fuels, funds and provides weapons to known jihadi suicide bombers and your MSM proclaims them "moderate jihadis", and you STILL vote for those calling for more of this evil... ...you are collectively, tacitly, and arguably actively, supporting the evil of your own government. In today's connected world we cannot claim "insufficient access to the needed information". On a collective view of the North American citizenry, y'all got a debt to pay. This debt gonna paid by the collapse of the USA empire. This is inevitable to those who do even a little research, yet is ignored by the majority. So, now is the time to stock up or start your guns and ammo collection, now is the time to establish any prepper plans you have left idling on your bucket list, no is the time to hoard a few handfuls of silver coins so you have at least -something- to trade with when the $$ crash and re$et arrives - even if this lasts only a few weeks, and not years as in the last great depression, those few weeks, or months, might just be a critical and Soul searching time for you and those whom you love. Get your "house" in order. Now is the time, muffas!

1 0

Cryptocurrency: Freedom Documentary 2011
by grarpamp 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

Amir Taaki - EPCA Conference 2011 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0m2UN3nT0c Amazing early talk, not just Taaki, look at the audience... totally riveted... freedom... a few thinking against it, but most of them... they want in!!! All these fakeass coins tokens and shills in todays cryptocurrency space claiming crypto was never about anarchism freedom humanity, shopping themselves around cozying up with with govts taxes corporations centralization... fuck that. Go back to school.

1 0

Someone forgot ten pounds of C-4 in New York
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

It is the same with any group of people. If they are told that it is insignificant, they will do nothing. If they are told it is significant, they will do what they are told to do. If they are told it is dangerous and there is nothing they can do about it, they will leave. If they are told it is dangerous, but there is an important task at hand, they will obey.

1 0

Moses may have been the first Mossad agent. Probably utilized some sort of cloaking device.
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/1959583 Moses may have been the first Mossad agent. Probably utilized some sort of cloaking device.

1 0

Brown huh. So this might be linked to the Black Panthers....
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/376802 Brown huh. So this might be linked to the Black Panthers....

1 0

Global Conciousness Project Dot now Dark Blue
by Se7en 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

4 3

Compare and Contrast Stratfor and Hezbollah Communications
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/91224 Just talked to my source. He addressed your queries to my satisfaction. Hizbullah's communication system for emergencies is simpler than I had initially thought. Query #1: This communication system uses mobile phones (Nokia) for e-mail communication with GPRS-backup. Essentially, Hizbullah members use something similar to Stratfor communication, except that they use google mail instead of hushmail.Communication is sent from the central command in the form of draft messages that are deleted immediately. Hizbullah members can send messages only if it is an utmost necessity. Messages sent are in Arabic using in Latin transliteration. This communication system was developed by Hizbullah students at the American University of Beirut. Query # 2This is a secondary communication system to be used in the event of war and to guide officials, commanders and partisans to their point of duty, which Hizbullah does not determine in advance. Query # 3 The intended use of this network is limited to communication. Query # 4: Hizbullah conventional communication networks are functioning well, but they may not be appropriate for emergency mobilization. Please let me know if you need additional explanation.

1 0

Black Market Arms Prices in Lebanon
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/89990 ... Source advises there is not that large of a black market for explosives in Lebanon because those that use them mainly get them from the foreign intel agencies in the country. ... Ak (Russian) $900 Ammo (by round) 70 cents; 55 cents for Syrian manufactured rounds. AK (Chinese) $300-$500 Ammo (by round) same as above. RPG-7 $200 RPG rounds $30 RPK NA Grenade $7 (there is little demand for grenades) Land mine NA M-16 $1000; price per round $1 M-4 $2500 Ammo (by round) $3 Basic Explosives NA C-4 (1/4 pound) NA TNT (1/4 pound) NA Mortars -88 NA -120 $1500 Dragunov machine gun $ 4000 Glock Pistol $2000 Sig Sauer Pistol $ 1800 Czech Pistol $ 300 Makarov Pistol $3000

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Los Zetas bought 1000 grenades
by Ryan Carboni 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/5463811 The Zs are busy there - don't know the exact character of their ops but the military in ES just stopped some corrupt non-coms stealing 800 hand grenades and 40mm rounds. The crooks told DEA the grenades were destined for Zetas in Guat and they have supplied as many as 1000 grenades (total - hand grenades and 40mm) to the Zs in three previous transactions since 2009. They were getting $40 per grenade split between 3 crooks.

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The New York Times: Court Orders F.B.I. to Fix National Security Wiretaps After Damning Report
by jim bell 19 Dec '19

19 Dec '19

The New York Times: Court Orders F.B.I. to Fix National Security Wiretaps After Damning Report. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/us/politics/fisa-court-order-fbi-surveil… The FISA court needs to issue MANY "contempt of court" orders to those who suckered them in 2016 and onwards. And then jail them all.

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200 Al Qaeda operatives chilling in Europe
by Ryan Carboni 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/66387 Al-Qaeda has recalled more than 200 of its operatives from European countries, mainly from France, Holland, Italy, Spain and Germany. My source thinks al-Qaeda may want them there to launch possible attacks in Europe.

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The New York Times: India Adopts the Tactic of Authoritarians: Shutting Down the Internet
by jim bell 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

The New York Times: India Adopts the Tactic of Authoritarians: Shutting Down the Internet. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/world/asia/india-internet-modi-protests.…

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Iran already has a nuclear weapon
by Ryan Carboni 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/76211 [alpha] Iran There is a rumor floating in some seriosus circles of an impending iranian nuclear test. Also that a test would trigger an israel strike. Dagan's attack on bibi derives from this. The sourcing is asian. I do not believe it to be true and I believe that regardless of the source it is just a wild rumor. Nevertheless, there it is. Watchoffoficers and analysts need to stay alert for any anomaly. The time frame is specific at three weeks. Sourcing is moderately high and credibility low but significance is massive. Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

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Guard of honour - Americans fly Russian flags and sail in formation with Russian spy ship - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

>From the Crack out yer champagne and welcome our greatest Russian liberators dept. "The United States Coast Guard has received reports indicating that the RFN VIKTOR LEONOV (AGI-175) has been operating in an unsafe manner off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia," with those pesky Russian sailors waving in an excessively friendly manner to local boaters as a few Floridian and South Carolinian sailors tried to say "Spacibo, spacibo" and grew huge shit eating grins as their Russian counterparts waved and said "Hallo" in typically thick Russian accents, as they lifted their 1 pint (250ml) "shot" glasses containing some oddly clear liquid, in the typical Russian salutation gesture. One of the Russian sailors was then seen turning towards and asked something of the captain as they stood on the aft deck welcoming their American floating guard of honour, and after a brief exchange, the captain shook his head apologetically and the sailor shouted out "Sorry, cannot invite onto ship, might look like party, but please, have great day!" The American coast guard literally drummed up a fear mongering announcement in the middle of what was a glorious sunny day (pic not attached) with just a few whispy white clouds and broad swaths of pale blue sky :D "This unsafe operation includes not energizing running lights while in reduced visibility conditions, not responding to hails by commercial vessels attempting to coordinate safe passage and other erratic movements." https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/16/politics/russian-ship-us-coast/index.html ... The Viktor Leonov has regularly patrolled in the Atlantic and Caribbean near the US coast since 2015. In 2017 Trump actually threatened to attack Russian ships that got too close, but no such incidents have materialized. “Hey, the greatest thing I could do is shoot that ship that's 30 miles offshore right out of the water," Trump said https://www.foxnews.com/us/russia-spy-ship-east-coast-guard in that provocative January 2017 statement. "Everyone in this country is going to say, 'Oh, it's so great.' That's not great. That's not great. I would love to be able to get along with Russia." Full article at zerowedgie: "Use Extreme Caution": Boaters Warned Of "Unsafe, Erratic" Russian Spy Ship Off Carolina Coast https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/coast-guard-issues-alert-over-russia… https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/16/politics/russian-ship-us-coast/index.html

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Cryptocurrency: Zero Knowledge Proofs ZKP
by grarpamp 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

Security and Privacy for Crypto with Zero-Knowledge Proofs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NL0ThdvWMU Zero Knowledge Proofs and Their Future Applications https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3jKROwTPCs Zero-knowledge proofs intro with Str4d (Zcash) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y9YgRDJAFEE Satoshi's Faith... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCT21kt5KME https://read.cash/@Cheshirecat/abc-dragging-feet-or-existential-choice-6c4f…

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Earth's Magnetic North Pole Keeps Moving Towards Siberia at a Mysteriously Fast Pace
by jim bell 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

Earth's Magnetic North Pole Keeps Moving Towards Siberia at a Mysteriously Fast Pace sciencealert.com "Our planet is restless, and its poles are wandering. Of course, the geographic north pole is in the same place it always was, but its magnetic counterpart – indicated by the N on any compass – is roaming towards Siberia at record-breaking speeds that scientists don't fully comprehend." Jim Bell's comment:Russia is slowly stealing magnetic north...and Trump isn't doing anything about it!!!

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Boo!
by Ryan Carboni 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

“Do I know you? I know you clear through. I was born and raised in the South, and I’ve lived in the North; so I know the average all around. The average man’s a coward. In the North he lets anybody walk over him that wants to, and goes home and prays for a humble spirit to bear it. In the South one man all by himself, has stopped a stage full of men in the daytime, and robbed the lot. Your newspapers call you a brave people so much that you think you are braver than any other people—whereas you’re just as brave, and no braver. Why don’t your juries hang murderers? Because they’re afraid the man’s friends will shoot them in the back, in the dark—and it’s just what they would do. “So they always acquit; and then a man goes in the night, with a hundred masked cowards at his back and lynches the rascal. Your mistake is, that you didn’t bring a man with you; that’s one mistake, and the other is that you didn’t come in the dark and fetch your masks. You brought part of a man—Buck Harkness, there—and if you hadn’t had him to start you, you’d a taken it out in blowing. “You didn’t want to come. The average man don’t like trouble and danger. You don’t like trouble and danger. But if only half a man—like Buck Harkness, there—shouts ’Lynch him! lynch him!’ you’re afraid to back down—afraid you’ll be found out to be what you are—cowards—and so you raise a yell, and hang yourselves on to that half-a-man’s coat-tail, and come raging up here, swearing what big things you’re going to do. The pitifulest thing out is a mob; that’s what an army is—a mob; they don’t fight with courage that’s born in them, but with courage that’s borrowed from their mass, and from their officers. But a mob without any man at the head of it is beneath pitifulness. Now the thing for you to do is to droop your tails and go home and crawl in a hole. If any real lynching’s going to be done it will be done in the dark, Southern fashion; and when they come they’ll bring their masks, and fetch a man along. Now leave—and take your half-a-man with you”—tossing his gun up across his left arm and cocking it when he says this.

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The actual constitutional grounds for impeaching Trump - FAQ - Zerowedgie - [PEACE]
by Zenaan Harkness 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

Apparantly the Russians have weaponized shit eating grins and neon-nazi smirks. So for your Christmas gratitude and for those who missed the memo and need a little Chist-mas cheer. here is Zerowedgie re-com- posting the Babylon Bee. with Everything You Wanted To Know About Impeachment (But Were Afraid To Ask On Twitter) https://www.zerohedge.com/political/everything-you-wanted-know-about-impeac… https://babylonbee.com/news/the-bee-explains-impeachment What is impeachment? ... Why is Trump being impeached? ... Why didn't Democrats include any criminal offenses in the articles of impeachment? ... May the spirit of Christ manifest. Just in case I forgot to mention "Christ": Christ and a very Russian Christmas to y'all,

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Re: FISA court issues public rebuke to FBI over misconduct in spy warrants.
by Ryan Carboni 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

Anyone who does not make any real effort to effect a personal or collective goal is not worth anyone's time.

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Re: FISA court issues public rebuke to FBI over misconduct in spy warrants.
by Ryan Carboni 18 Dec '19

18 Dec '19

Yeah, no kidding. I think the Russians replaced our entire reality with a simulcra. Thus all the evidence is fake. Even the physical evidence. Even the physical evidence that is linked to missing persons. The Russians must be operating death squads to systematically kill the weak and vulnerable (just like what the Neo-Nazis want) and plant it wherever they want. It is like they are operating unopposed and there is no organized opposition to stop them!

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Re: FISA court issues public rebuke to FBI over misconduct in spy warrants.
by Ryan Carboni 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

If I was a FISA judge, I'd hire a special master to more thoroughly examine a whole set of documents behind an application. If the appropriations don't allow for it, I'd urge my colleagues to pool together a portion of our wages to hire someone. That would never happen.

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Harpers: Click Here to Kill - The dark world of online murder markets
by Razer 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

I'd rather be slaughtering the rich, but you know how Merica works. Indoctrinated to victimize other victims. Rr https://harpers.org/archive/2020/01/click-here-to-kill-dark-web-hitman/

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FISA court issues public rebuke to FBI over misconduct in spy warrants.
by jim bell 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

FISA court issues public rebuke to FBI over misconduct in spy warrants https://mol.im/a/7803115 via http://dailym.ai/android

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the leader of scalable cryptocurrency
by Punk-Stasi 2.0 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=638_Jpp2Rq8 enjoy

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Mrs. Patrick Bateman
by Ryan Carboni 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernardine_Dohrn#Controversial_statements_abo… Dohrn said, "First they killed those pigs, then they ate dinner in the same room with them, then they even shoved a fork into the pig Tate's stomach! Wild!" I would not be surprised that Dohrn and Obama attended the same orgy.

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Phys.Org: How to use entanglement for long-distance or free-space quantum communication
by jim bell 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

Phys.Org: How to use entanglement for long-distance or free-space quantum communication. https://phys.org/news/2019-12-entanglement-long-distance-free-space-quantum…

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Cryptocurrency: Taking Risks
by grarpamp 17 Dec '19

17 Dec '19

> corporation problems https://twitter.com/rogerkver/status/1205852081271128065 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mRs8ZIxUlCE People are realizing that @Blockstream’s financial interests depended upon strangling Bitcoin. https://old.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/eb5s7k/abc_dragging_feet_or_existenti… Markets seek to discover and account for everything in real time, but they can't steer where things actually need to go, or make that determination, that's where you come in... Risk Takers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dexLKMtaVW4 https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=risk+takers https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELmc6omVUAAQR0h.jpg "It's not clever marketing or stolen momentum that makes a coin valuable. It's the actual usage of the coin. If nobody uses it it's nothing." https://www.newlibertarian.io/2019/08/the-economics-of-btc-maximalism.html Don’t think of compliance as a good thing, think of it as obedience to strangers. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKKTWWa4k8o

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