In article <9309031826.AA09137@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>, Carl Ellison wrote: : If you want reliability, you can take a page from the fault tolerance : business. Replicate the remailers. If you're going to do that, why not go for extra security at the same time? Instead of transmitting the same message to all of the remailers, transmit different pieces to each and then reconstruct the original from whatever pieces you get. Done right, this could also be used to make traffic analysis harder.

Samuel Pigg wrote:

go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow the header construction software already being worked on by ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks like this to defend against attacks.

?? Header construction software for unix and pc's has existed for months and is available at soda.berkeley.edu Granted, I'm waiting to validate three of the remailers so the scripts are a bit out of date, especially the dos batch files... -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

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On Sun, 5 Sep 1993 11:14:48 -0500 (CDT), Karl Lui Barrus said:

Karl> Samuel Pigg wrote:

go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow the header construction software already being worked on by ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks like this to defend against attacks.

Karl> ?? Karl> Header construction software for unix and pc's has Karl> existed for months and is available at soda.berkeley.edu Karl> Granted, I'm waiting to validate three of the remailers Karl> so the scripts are a bit out of date, especially the dos Karl> batch files... Ok.. I'll rewrite it:

go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow the header construction software already around to use tricks like this to defend against attacks.

The point is that header contruction software would be able to use the remailer command language in the header contruction to custom tailer some of the defense against statistical and traffic based remailer attacks. Sam Pigg dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu samp@renoir.cftnet.com <or> b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C