* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS
Uu> 1) Chop off anything that even looks signature-like, whether the
Uu> user intended it or not -- I consider this ugly, evil, and
Uu> unreliable, and likely to chop stuff I want kept and leave stuff I'd
Uu> like chopped.
Yes, this seems fraught with problems.
Uu> A "Dont-Mess-With-Trailers:" header line would help a bit.
I agree.
Uu> I don't know how much of
Uu> M.
Uu> ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
Uu> --
Uu> M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
Uu> INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG
Uu> was added by the author, how much by the Blue Wave and/or
Uu> 8:914/201, or even for certain whether M. Stirner is the author or
Uu> merely a machine owner; I'm guessing the author, and I'm guessing
Uu> everything but the initial "M." was added automagically under the
Uu> machine-owner's control.
The BlueWave blurb was added by the program & can be stripped by
re-editing the message before upload. Everything else is out of my
control completely & added automagically by the host or the UUCP
gateway. The sucker stays, no matter what I do. Some anonymity!
Uu> 2) Cut-Here: lines of various sorts, either following a pre-specified
Uu> syntax or a MIME-like flexible syntax. I like this approach, since
Uu> it gives the user a reasonable level of control and very seldom
Uu> guesses wrong, but there are so many standards to choose from, and a
Uu> proper implementation would have to leave in the line (or add an
Uu> equivalent) at each hop to avoid accretion of path-traces, and make
Uu> sure it gets the correct syntax for each following remailer. And
Uu> the user does have to explicitly request it, which some people
Uu> view as a problem, especially if they don't know the characteristics
Uu> of the later mail-handlers in the chain.
I, personally, could live with it just to get the remailers to be truly
anonymous. The rest of the user input is not especially easy anyway,
particularly if accessing internet via a gateway. Another line wouldn't
kill me.
Uu> 3) Encryption-based systems, which only retain the encrypted portion;
Uu> this means the user has to know more about the remailers being
Uu> used, and there has to be a standard for expressing which remailers
Uu> to forward to if more than one will be used (which it probably will
Uu> be, for anybody security-aware enough to really want an encrypting
Uu> remailer.)
As an interrim measure I guess this is what I'll have to do, but as an
early PGP partisan, I've had enough PGP experience not to be turned off
by the extra trouble. Most casual users would be. In any case, I think
that this is undoubtedly the most user-labor-intensive solution.
Uu> Solving the problem for message headers is tougher than solving it
Uu> for trailers.
In that case, let's have this solved by Monday. 8-)
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