- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Re: drugs and simulation games.
by efrem＠spitha.informix.com 13 Oct '92

13 Oct '92

Unfortunately the first two things which come to mind are: coffee (a drug - actually an excuse for gathering) papers on public key cryptography (primary information) radios - illegel in Russia and I believe elsewhere during WWII East German typewriters - I had one Also a slight deviation: many medicines (and soon herbal contraptions) which are doctor monoply items here, but over the counter in most other countries. Religious artifacts of any number of banned religions. Divorce (opps, not a physical object). Really on thinking about it, I believe that the trade of ideas is always far more repressed than the trade in any kind of stuff. --Efrem Re: > We want to develop a list of game items, physical objects, which will > be the goods of transaction. I would like to pick objects that have > been illegal in the past, but which are not anymore. They should not > be primarily information, such as copies of _Ulysses_. They should > not now be restricted. Nor should they be weapons

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The subject of Saturday's game
by ravi＠xanadu.com 13 Oct '92

13 Oct '92

I just joined the list; I've read such archives as are locally available, but I apologize if this subject has already come up. Talking to a couple of people who had been to Saturday's meeting, I was deeply disturbed by the choice of subject for the simulated privacy game - trying to purchase illegal drugs. This is a subject on which rational public discussion is essentially non-existent in this country. Let me first state that I do favor the legalization of drugs, and I am a committed libertarian (as I suspect are many of the people in this group). However, I think it is unwise to tie cryptography in with this issue. Communications privacy is *too important* to take the risk that it will get caught up in the current hysteria of the New Prohibition. There have already been enough government attacks on cryptography that we do not want to give them any more ammunition. I think that if we are committed to getting cryptographic technology in wide use, and spreading true privacy and information security throughout the world, then we need to take careful account of the political and social factors, as well as the technical. In order to be successful, this needs to be not just a development project, but also a marketing campaign. When an MIS manager at some large corporation is deciding whether to upgrade her network to privacy-enhanced mail, we want her to associate it with security and liberty, not the street corner punks who are trying to sell her kids crack. In this vein, let me suggest some subjects for future simulations: - organizing the Boston Tea Party in the face of British spies and informers - purchasing condoms or Lady Chatterley's Lover back when they were banned (these bans seem so absurd now, that trying to get around them seems sensible and ordinary, and may start people thinking about the absurdity of current interdictions) - Yeltsin/Gorbachev vs the coup leaders Furthermore, given the erosiion of constitutional protections in the Drug War, I think the participants in Saturday's game were taking a non-trivial risk to their persons and property. If the risk were necessary to help spread cryptographic privacy, I think none would begrudge it; however, I think it was not only unnecessary, but counterproductive. 'Nuff said. To life and liberty, --ravi

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Next meeting: Nov. 21
by Eric Hughes 12 Oct '92

12 Oct '92

The next physical cypherpunks meeting was decided on Saturday at that meeting. It will be Saturday, November 21, starting at noon at the Cygnus Support offices in Mountain View. I am announcing the date now so that you can put it on your calendar. Eric

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More on packet radio encryption
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 12 Oct '92

12 Oct '92

This article was forwarded to you by whitaker(a)demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker): --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!pipex!unipalm!uknet!doc.ic.ac.uk!agate!spool.mu.edu!sgiblab!public!grady From: grady(a)public.BTR.COM ( ) Newsgroups: alt.privacy Subject: packet radio encryption Message-ID: <8113(a)public.BTR.COM> Date: 11 Oct 92 19:41:12 GMT Organization: BTR Public Access UNIX, MtnView CA. For info contact: info(a)BTR.COM Lines: 52 Bill Stewart (wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com) writes, in part: [...Unlike the AX.25 link protocol specified by FCC rules, the higher level protocols are not required to be plain-text...] Do you have a reference for this? And does this apply to the contents, the protocols, or both? (E.g. can you use a crypto-based presentation layer protocol and plain-text payload, or vice versa?) ---- The definitive reference is Part 97 of the FCC rules (available from the US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Phone orders: 202 783 3238. Ask for "Code of Federal Regulations" 47 CFR 80 to End.) To summarize the rules, except for certain remote control operation as space or repeater machines, nothing can be transmitted with the intent that the meaning be obscured. Conversely, text compression, for example, is legal because, although the plaintext is certainly obscured, it wasn't the _intent_ of the LZ or Huffman or whatever coding to conceal the meaning. Likewise with UUencoding and a host of other compression/ error detection and correction schemes that incidentally involutes the plaintext to some more efficient transmitted form. Spread spectrum is treated somewhat more restrictively since for that mode you may be required to produced the logs and the content of the messages. But not so for narrow- band FM packet. To sum up, using cryptography in general is prohibited. (However, digital signatures are OK, even though based on MD5 or SHA as long as the intent is not to _obscure the meaning_ of part of the transmitted message.) Clearly, though, the burden of proof is upon the FCC to show that a particular message _was_ encrypted, since there is _no_ theoretical, a priori way that an encrypted data stream can be distinguished from one merely well compressed or, just for that matter, random. Of course you should verify this with an attorney if you are troubled with fears of prosecution. Grady Ward KD6ETH/AA -- Grady Ward grady(a)btr.com Moby Lexicons --------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

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[gg@well.sf.ca.us: Re: +-=*^]
by d9mj＠crux2.cit.cornell.edu 11 Oct '92

11 Oct '92

Look at what my mailer did to your header. Is this a result of your perl script or my screwed router? Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1992 05:06:40 -0400 Illegal-Object: Syntax error in From: address found on router.mail.cornell.edu: From: George A.Gleason <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> ^ ^-illegal period in phrase \-phrases containing '.' must be quoted X-Ph: V3.12(a)router.mail.cornell.edu >From: <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> To: Secret_Squirrel(a)treehouse.com, shipley(a)tfs.COM Subject: Re: +-=*^ Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com [message deleted]

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Re: +-=*^
by George A. Gleason 11 Oct '92

11 Oct '92

Eric, good point about public keys and trust by association. More on OTPs. You say the key distribution problem for OTPs is "much worse" than for PKS and even other conventional ciphers. "Much worse" in what ways? The need for F2F meetings with all possible correspondents is something which exists with conventional ciphers. The cost of key storage is trivial: a fraction of the cost of the yearly (or less frequent) travel to meet each correspondent in person. Consider replaceable hard drive cartridges (30 meg for about a buck a meg), digital cassette formats including applications involving videocassettes, and so on. Yes, as you say, you have to exchange keys each time you run out of key; but you can keep ten years' with of key (error: "worth" not "with") on hand if you like, taking up less physical space than a box of cookies. "Bandwidth required is much higher..." In what way? Certainly not in terms of transmission; a stream cipher is a stream cipher. Perhaps in that each plaintext character requires one key character? This is just another formulation of the "storage" issue: and again, if you have a stack of 30MB cartridges, who cares? Not like we're talking about punched paper tape. I do agree that PKS offer convenience and features not available with conventional ciphers. However, RSA is just one mathematical breakthrough away from being obsolete, and we have no way of knowing when that breakthrough occurs. It may also be that massively parallel processors can be built through VLSI technology, allowing the cost of brute force solutions to come down to a reasonable level. All of this is not by way of getting down on PKS. I would suggest that we need a number of different systems, and need to keep them all in fairly constant use. I think we're already all in agreement that one of those systems should be RSA-based. Now I'm just suggesting that a One-Time system should be another one among the many. BTW, sorry I couldn't make today's meeting; various local tasks demanding attention; plus physical travel distance. Be back next time... -gg

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random
by Eric Hollander 10 Oct '92

10 Oct '92

So when are we going to start alt.crypt, where we just post a lot of uuencode'ed random data? e

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re: Re: +-=*^
by Tom.Jennings＠f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 10 Oct '92

10 Oct '92

(to: gg(a)well.sf.ca.us) Thank you for clarifying my particular problem: what I was worried about was *authentication* not security. I had the two tangled up. Duh. With an informal email/introducer setup for the FidoNet, we'll have a fairly secure system with a reasonable level of authentification, practically speaking, with authentification to some high level doable on an individual basis. (Using PGP.) This probably as "good as it gets" in our (email) environment. * Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111) -- Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings INTERNET: Tom.Jennings(a)f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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re: Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon
by Tom.Jennings＠f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 10 Oct '92

10 Oct '92

Things are not good here. I have to stay and deal with my best friend Deke who seems to be going nuts. (It's not a new story, but it heated up last night.) Now, at 1pm, I've gotta stay here another hour or so, and be back by 630, so I guess I'm gonna have to miss another. I'll see you all elsewhen (to borrow a Hugh-ism). * Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111) -- Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings INTERNET: Tom.Jennings(a)f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Directions!
by Tom.Jennings＠f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 10 Oct '92

10 Oct '92

Umm, directions never came. I think it's last minute, huh?! Can anyone tell me where Cygnus' new site is? * Origin: World Power Systems / FidoNews / San Francisco CA (1:125/111) -- Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings INTERNET: Tom.Jennings(a)f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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