- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

RE: Digital warfare
by ferguson＠fiber.sprintlink.net 11 Sep '93

11 Sep '93

On Fri, 10 Sep 93 20:57:16 EDT, <cme(a)ellisun.sw.stratus.com> Carl Ellison wrote - >> That's an interesting point (images of "Wild Palms" conjured). >> This _is_ the wave of the future, as Tim implies, and it's >> unfortunate that instances such as this (segway) tarnishes what >> it is that I think many of us are trying to espouse in the >> cypherpunk movement. >> > >> ferguson(a)icp.net | Privacy -- Use it or lose it. > > I have heard cypherpunks described as two groups under one label: > > 1. those of us who advocate privacy in private hands > > 2. those who advocate anarchy I find myself straddling the line most of the time, but I have to come down solidly on the side of privacy-advocate, if push came to shove. However, push isn't shoving, so we (cypher-punk-advocates) should all be able to heterogeneously work our goals -- soild, secure and unmolested crypto for the masses. Let's be realistic -- and effective. > It's important not to give the government any excuse which would > make the populace side with them against us. This is a political > battle and we need the people on our side. Anyone who thinks that this battle can be won purely on the grounds of technology is dead wrong. Political leverage is a factor which we must, absolutely be striving for. We're getting there, slowly (very slowly) through education, but digital realization is something that is not going to happen overnight. The impact has yet to hit home in the public sector. - -- On Fri, 10 Sep 1993 21:27:37 -0400, Perry E. Metzger <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> wrote - > Feel free to check my credentials. I assure you I earn more than > enough money at my job that it wouldn't be worth the FBI's money to > make the bribe big enough -- it would also have to cover the risk to > me that being an anarchist presents vis a vis my job -- someday I > might lose it for having strange political ideas, and salaries like > mine are hard to come by in other professions. Oh, come now, Perry. Let's be practical. I (on just one side of this multi-faceted topic), on the other hand, maintain more conventional idealisms; much more geared towards maintaining privacy (at all costs) and fighting the big brother machinations of a government out of control. In my own hairy opinion, anarchy is a losing strategy, but that is merely a matter of semantics, not something we should hash out on this list. I believe in the growth of the world-wide matrix; the growth of the internet -- access for the masses. In fact, that's just what I do to earn my pay. Filter this, Filter that, BGP this, EGP that, OSPF (oh, no!). I believe in strong cryptography. I believe in your power (and mine) to actually endorse and shape the world of digital communications. Let's just agree that we hold the same views on the matter of cryptography: it's a powerful tool. In the hands of the masses, it allows privacy unhindered. Compromised or crippled by the oppressive forces of a government, it is a weapon against privacy. > I'll fully agree that arguing for anarchy with the general public > won't work at the current time -- and I agree that our image is > important. However, at this point the battle is being fought by folks > like EFF and CPSR. I for one don't see any reason to hide my politics, > although I try not to make an issue of it. A wise summation. I would like to think that others are as aware of the political battlefields that must be crossed. I despise the political machine, but I understand the importance in influencing it in order to achieve the ideal "space." Government has no damned business in networking. We do. Paul Ferguson | privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies; Mindbank Consulting Group | 1: the quality or state of being apart Fairfax, Virginia USA | from others 2: secrecy fergp(a)sytex.com | ferguson(a)icp.net | Privacy -- Use it or lose it.

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Digital warfare
by ferguson＠fiber.sprintlink.net 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

On Fri, 10 Sep 93 14:35:02 PDT, <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> Timothy C. May wrote - > An investigator called this type of crime the wave of the > future, and said something to the effect that "chips will > be the coke of the 90s." Also talk of black markets and > how computer networks are being used to coordinate things. > So, if you see folks using BlackNet for advertising Intel > chips.... That's an interesting point (images of "Wild Palms" conjured). This _is_ the wave of the future, as Tim implies, and it's unfortunate that instances such as this (segway) tarnishes what it is that I think many of us are trying to espouse in the cypherpunk movement. Paul Ferguson | privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies; Mindbank Consulting Group | 1: the quality or state of being apart Fairfax, Virginia USA | from others 2: secrecy fergp(a)sytex.com | ferguson(a)icp.net | Privacy -- Use it or lose it.

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"Code Warriors" Article in "Metro" Newspaper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

Bay Area Cypherpunks and Extropians, Julian Dibbell's excellent article that appeared in the "Village Voice" (August 3rd, cover story) is the *cover story* as well in the latest "Metro" newspaper, the free San Jose area paper (but we get it down here in Santa Cruz as well). I have picked up a handful of these free papers, which I'll take to the Cypherpunks meeting this Saturday. But you all ought to do the same. And those not in the Bay Area may want to be on the lookout for versions of this appearing in your own community newspapers. If it was sold to "Metro," it'll probably be in other major markets as well. Plastered across the cover is this: "CODE WARRIORS New encryption software cripples the government's power to monitor our activities, eavesdrop on our conversations or read our e-mail. Soon the state may be unable to regulate business, collect taxes, spy on foreign enemies, or police criminal activity. It will be the end of government as we know it." And in the table of contents is this description of the article: "COVER STORY How will the Feds be able to control us when they won't know what the hell's going on? Simple encryption software now gives ordinary citizens the ability to keep their secrets secret--and conduct underground transactions safe from the prying eyes of government spooks and IRS agents." And the "Metro" version also differs from the "VV" version by having such paragraphs like this in 24-point type: "Untraceable digital cash transactions and a brisk commerce in trade secrets could spell doom for the corporation as we know it. Hopelessly untaxable, such crypto-markets could also sap the strength of governments." Wow! And "Gulp." I may have to get my European Community passport sooner than I had planned. Does Martinique have a Net connection? -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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Re: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000!
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

>From: gnu(a)toad.com (John Gilmore) >Message-Id: <9309100913.AA23487(a)toad.com> >Subject: Re: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000! >Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 02:13:32 -0700 It feels like you're jumping to conclusions, John. At 40 bits of key, I don't care how strong an algorithm is. I can have my network of SPARCstations try all keys. NSA chip technology doesn't enter into that analysis. Meanwhile, on the death of DES -- what we know is that there's a known plaintext attack, given the right hardware. What I've recently heard called a pre-whitening (XOR with PRNG before the DES) wipes out the known plaintext. The PRNG doesn't need to be that strong. It's protected by DES and vice versa -- Chinese-puzzle style. Of course, my personal favorite DES variant remains: compress|des|tran|des|tran|des but if you're really paranoid, you could change it to: compress|xor|tran|des|tran|des|tran|des since xor and tran are so cheap. [des in any mode you prefer -- eg., cbc or cfb -- IVs kept secret, of course.] [For those not reading sci.crypt, tran is an (up to) 8KB transposition with PRNG keyed from the histogram of the first block of bytes -- code posted to sci.crypt, mailed by me or avbl by ftp from scss3.cl.msu.edu.] - Carl

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Object Code Release
by Matthew J Miszewski 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

Just a qwik note on the release of ViaCrypt only in object code. Ill dig up the cite later but recent appelate decisions show two circuits leaning toward allowing fair use decompiling for academic purposes. Actually, they have gone as far to say that deprogramming an EEPROM and printing out the resultant Source (after decompiled) *might* be considered a fair use of sorts. So, release VC in object and have the folks that decompiled the KOH decompile this too and whallah! A more robust encryption scheme (not security thru obscurity). Matt (not --Matt) mjmiski(a)macc.wisc.edu (I hate .sig space)

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DES, key scheduler
by Timothy Newsham 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

Does anyone here have a list of the scheduled bits for each subkey in each round of DES? (ie. if input key is {0,1,...64} (or 56) then k1 = { 15, 2, 35, ... } etc.) Alternatively (next best thing) does anyone have a list of which key bits arent used in each round? Tim N.

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Further PGP Security Doubts
by Graham Toal 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

In article <199308261827.AA25477@xtropia> an31144(a)anon.penet.fi writes: > I have been seeing yet more criticisms of PGP, this time from some > character calling himself "Raymond Paquin." He claims to be a > professor of mathematics who has been working at an unnamed university > exclusively on cryptographics for the past twelve years. He implies > that he is working for some government in a classified capacity and is > thus unable to either publish or discuss the matter openly. I missed that one (had <pressing> matters to attend to ;-) ) - could someone repost it please? I'd quite like to see if my text style analysis skills are still working :) G -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

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Mailer hooks for PGP
by Graham Toal 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

In article <9308271722.AA11690(a)ah.com> hughes(a)ah.com writes: > >check your public ring and automatically sign/encode outgoing mail to > >eligible users > > As a general rule, mere presence of a key on a keyring should not > indicate that this person wishes to receive encrypted mail. There > should be a separate installation for that, either by an enhanced > alias file or similar. There are many for whom reading encrypted mail > is not always desirable, because the effort required to download it > and decrypt it is more time than the content is worth. I myself fall > into this category, unfortunately. This is very true. I hacked my mailer to encrypt when possible, and it drove Phil Zimmerman batty every time I mailed him and forgot to override it. G -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

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No Subject
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

>From: "David LANDGREN, PUB " <David.D.L.LANDGREN(a)pub.oecd.fr> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: ... long live DES (sic) >Importance: Normal >Status: R > >>>>This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries >>>>DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the >>>>given plaintext. > >It's all very well to be able to crack DES in 3.5 hours, but I don't know >of too many people who obligingly send out the plaintext and cyphertext of >a message together, or in some other way combinable. If U can get the >plaintext of a DES-encrypted msg then U don't need to dick around with DES >anyway. No-one ever said it was bulletproof; a direct consequence is that DES users change their keys awful frequently. The way to get plaintext is through what is known as revealed-plaintext, where you can with a high degree of accuracy 'guess' part of the plaintext of a message, such as "From: Col. Dimwitt" in a message format, or the title of a paper or document, which is usally unclassified and knowable from another source. Fearing such, our illustrious 3 letter governmental organization implemented with the advent of electronic crypto gear (set your way back machine, sherman) something called traffic flow security, where on a radio net or dedicated line a cryptographic stream continously runs. The idea is to make it hard to distinguish boundaries of messages, and thus revealed-plaintext. This also allows the use of the caveat - EFTO (Encrypted For Transmission Only) seen on unclassified messages, hey the line was otherwise idle, waiting for classified traffic, right? Modern communications are swinging toward the use of packets, which beside allowing traffic analysis unless the transmission medium is denied (Such as using link encryption as a super encryption, or dedicated lines, etc.). The way to offset to offset the vulnerability to revealed-plaintext attacks is to use filling where some random data followed by a sync or start of message symbol preceeds the the actual message. All message traffic should be encrypted in general, making it hard to separate the wheat from the chaff. Ideally the only unencrypted data should be that required for operating the communications protocol, including denial of packet ordering if possible. There's a paper found on the NIST anonymous ftp site entitled 'Security in ISDN' by William E. Burr that can be informative. Its available in PostScript and is around 70 pages long.

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Re: ... long live DES (sic)
by smb＠research.att.com 10 Sep '93

10 Sep '93

It's all very well to be able to crack DES in 3.5 hours, but I don't know of too many people who obligingly send out the plaintext and cyphertext of a message together, or in some other way combinable. If U can get the plaintext of a DES-encrypted msg then U don't need to dick around with DES anyway. No-one ever said it was bulletproof; a direct consequence is that DES users change their keys awful frequently. It's not that simple; Wiener's design is indeed a major breakthrough (for the open literature, of course). First of all, one can often guess probable plaintext for some of the message. Here's the first line of your note as it (apparently) left your machine: Date: 10 Sep 93 10:30:12 GMT If I've ever received mail from you, and hence know that format, I know at least the first 6 bytes, and the format of the next two. If I know the date of the intercept, I have even more. Poof -- a crib. I can do even better. Look at the $10,000,000 machine -- the one with a 21-minute solution. I can afford to try several guesses for where the string `Date: ' occurs. It doesn't take that much more complex a chip to look for obvious variants, such as that string occuring shifted over one or two bytes in either direction. You may get some false positives, but a second-order search machine can then apply more complex heuristics to possible keys returned by Wiener's design. And historically, enemies have been able to get probable plaintext -- or even some chosen plaintext -- for at least a few messages. Read ``The Codebreakers'' or ``Seizing the Enigma'' for many such examples. There's one more step here, described in detail in Garon and Outerbridge's ``DES Watch'' paper. If the DES session key is transmitted encrypted by DES using a 56-bit master key, you're dead meat. I can crunch for weeks to recover one session key, using many possibilities for the plaintext and its location in the ciphertext. But once I recover that long-gone session key, I can use it as the known plaintext to recover your master key. And after that, the jig is up. No, there should be no mistake about it. Single DES is *dead*, for any application where recovery of a single session key is bad. If you want to stick with single DES, you need to change session keys very often (every few seconds against an enemy who can build a $10M machine), and you need to distribute session keys by some other mechanism (i.e., RSA, Diffie-Hellman, triple DES). --Steve Bellovin

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