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unsubscribe
by Timothy E. Buchanan 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

Please unsubscribe.

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remove me from the list
by parish＠cactus.org 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

Overload ... please remove me from the list. Thanks, Tom

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Re: Anonymous flooding
by tcmay＠netcom.com 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

Marc Ringuette worries about anonymous messages flooding the nets: >I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable? >I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally >flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees. >Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess >traffic to its source and stop it from being generated. This will no >longer be possible when true anonymity is available. The simple solution: paid transmissions. Remailers pass on messages only if they receive the payment they've announced is their fee. While _some_ remailers may pass on messages for free (charity, policy, etc.), _their_ recipients are under no obligation (obviously) to continue to forward them if no postage is attached. This means the nets may indeed be filled with junk, but at least somebody has to pay for it--and the remailers are making nice profits. Economics thus provides a damping effect against runaway situations (as it does in so many areas that at first seem unstable). (The analogy with junk mail in the current postal system is apt: you may not like getting 10 pieces of junk mail a day, but at least you never have to pay for it directly...and the Postal System _likes_ "direct mail" (junk mail), as it pays the bills.) >This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward >an incoming message to more than one destination. In that case, by sending a >single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount >of net traffic. This would be bad. Again, a remailer "willing to forward" to multiple destinations must pay for the transmission--and the recipients will of course look to see that _their_ remailing fees are paid. It is thus extremely expensive to "flood" the nets, as each message costs some amount to transmit to remailers, to remail, etc. And don't forget that most folks will likely have various forms of reputation filters running. The may scan incoming messages for interesting content, for messages from senders known to them, etc. As with our ordinary mail, the junk can be thrown away very quickly. > >Two basic precautions for a remailer to take are > 1. To require a 1-1 correspondence between input and output messages. > 2. To require that the address portion of the message shrink at each step > (preventing infinite loops). >If this is done, then the saboteur's original message can be at most >n-fold replicated, where n is the maximum number of remailer hops >allowed. Fine, some remailers may insist on a 1-1 correspondence, others may remail to as many sites as postage is provided for. The market can then decide which remailer to use. Businesses who take all paying customers generally outcompete those with arbitrarily set policies or their own ideas of rationing services (e.g., "But, sir, we can't let you buy five tubes of toothpaste--what if _everyone_ tried to buy five tubes?"). >However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based >system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys, >including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such >systems. This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition. > >I'm discouraged. Any thoughts? Little need to be discouraged. There are a great many "covers" for anonymous mail, including legal consultations (attorney-client privilege), psychiatric consultations (ditto), religions ("Digital Confessionals--the Latest in Catholic Computing"), games (role-playing), and "personals" ads (as in newspaper ads that match partners, dates, etc., except mediated electronically in this case). Stopping any one of these will be tough, stopping them all would be very hard indeed. -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer (fwd)
by kelly＠netcom.com 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

Forwarded message: > From cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Wed Feb 24 08:24:42 1993 > Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1993 11:08:17 -0500 > From: ghabrech(a)ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni) > Message-Id: <9302241608.AA09746(a)ultrix.ramapo.edu> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, rubin(a)citi.umich.edu > Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer > > I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account. I don't think you have > any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it. The > idea for this is privacy. The best way to keep someone from reading your > files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em. > > George > it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA) credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered unless one started taking their precautions before the information age... now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can insure it with technology cheers kelly --

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a project for those who like it
by treason＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet and have up with some ideas. The concept is to runa server(a single server) to process the chat for up to say 50 users(more may lag you to death) using public key to secure the system. The server would be on an internet machine and the client would be on the users home pc. We use the home pc concept to avoid transporting raw data(unencrypted) over internet and phone lines. The basic gist (in a pseudo pseudocode) is this: CLIENT SIDE User runs client client asks for password (from pgp key) client checks for servers pgp public key user then connects to the network and such(dumb teminal, with hotkey to activate encryption/decryption) client connects to sever sending userid and hostname client asks for alias client sends server userid hostname start main function when message sent client encrypts with servers public key client sends message to server when message received client decrypts message with users public key (using password supplied at initiation) client displays it to users screen loop to start main function SERVER SIDE Admin starts server with server pgp password as a parameter server waits for connection server gets connection receives host and id server checks id table looking for legal user user is valid connect else boot user check and see if user is logged more than once if true boot both users alarm admin (* This is to make sure noone is lending out their account *) server matches user with pgp key start main function if message sent encrypt message with users pgp public key and sends it out if message received decrypt message sent by user using server secret key and password reencrypt it for each user on the server send message to each user loop to start main function The server would have a copy of each users public key, and a look up table with this format to tell which key is paired with which user: userid@host pgpkeyname When I say a user is logged in more than once in the above comment, I mean logged in on the server, not on his account. The id or hostname of the user is never displayed and cannot be retrieved. There is no similarity to irc, no channels, just one stream going to all users. The data will be encrypted in blocks, and sent out in blocks. There will need to be made some slight changes in pgp to get this to work. flaws: When entering a pgp password, and containing it in memory, this may be retreivable by the root or the server machine. Information will be temporarily stored in kmem, although disorderly, raw. People are stupid. Tell me what you think. People are already wrking on this project, but many more may be needed to bring it to its completion. Since I am not the IP programmer from hell, at this point I am doing the pc client. iI expect bitches about people saying people will use the server for illegal purposes, but because people can use a bathtub for illegal purposes if they wanted to, I will ignore them. Treason@gnu

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When's enough enough?
by Hal 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Paul Ferguson asks: > Now, I'd like to ask the cypherpunk readership to clarify the need (or > perhaps a better term may be "desire") for anonymous remailers? Maybe > I'm not getting the "big picture", but it would appear to me that > insurance of private communications is the area of intended interest > here. I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you > feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the > recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond > to? There are several different advantages provided by anonymous remailers. One of the simplest and least controversial would be to defeat traffic analysis on ordinary email. Two people who wish to communicate privately can use PGP or some other encryption system to hide the content of their messages. But the fact that they are communicating with each other is still visible to many people: sysops at their sites and possibly at intervening sites, as well as various net snoopers. It would be natural for them to desire an additional amount of privacy which would disguise who they were communicating with as well as what they were saying. Anonymous remailers make this possible. By forwarding mail between themselves through remailers, while still identifying themselves in the (encrypted) message contents, they have even more communications privacy than with simple encryption. (The Cypherpunk vision includes a world in which literally hundreds or thousands of such remailers operate. Mail could be bounced through dozens of these services, mixing in with tens of thousands of other messages, re-encrypted at each step of the way. This should make traffic analysis virtually impossible. By sending periodic dummy messages which just get swallowed up at some step, people can even disguise _when_ they are communicating.) The more controversial vision associated with anonymous remailers is expressed in such science fiction stories as "True Names", by Vernor Vinge, or "Ender's Game", by Orson Scott Card. These depict worlds in which computer networks are in widespread use, but in which many people choose to participate through pseudonyms. In this way they can make unpopular arguments or participate in frowned-upon transactions without their activities being linked to their true identities. It also allows people to develop reputations based on the quality of their ideas, rather than their job, wealth, age, or status. The idea here is that the ultimate solution to the low signal-to-noise ratio on the nets is not a matter of forcing people to "stand behind their words". People can stand behind all kinds of idiotic ideas. Rather, there will need to be developed better systems for filtering news and mail, for developing "digital reputations" which can be stamped on one's postings to pass through these smart filters, and even applying these reputations to pseudonyms. In such a system, the fact that someone is posting or mailing pseudonymously is not a problem, since nuisance posters won't be able to get through. Other advantages of this approach include its extension to electronic on-line transactions. Already today many records are kept of our financial dealings - each time we purchase an item over the phone using a credit card, this is recorded by the credit card company. In time, even more of this kind of information may be collected and possibly sold. One Cypherpunk vision includes the ability to engage in transactions anonymously, using "digital cash", which would not be traceable to the participants. Particularly for buying "soft" products, like music, video, and software (which all may be deliverable over the net eventually), it should be possible to engage in such transactions anonymously. So this is another area where anonymous mail is important. We anticipate that computer networks will play a more and more important role in many parts of our lives. But this increased computerization brings tremendous dangers for infringing privacy. Cypherpunks seek to put into place structures which will allow people to preserve their privacy if they choose. No one will be forced to use pseudonyms or post anonymously. But it should be a matter of choice how much information a person chooses to reveal about himself when he communicates. Right now, the nets don't give you that much choice. We are trying to give this power to people. Hal Finney -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQCVAgUBK4uRdKgTA69YIUw3AQGDRQP6AunUUIcsG99LdMDS9hKakJ4CcuMfPjjb SIDv/vLjAr+yWcHgu2+DtMaY1MD8+svJjfud/Q58ftupp6cm1Nvi8g/BfTUISMLj uNfOHWezx8vwPFBPiM3wJhQMLh+Cf2+O3fajEoIn8QLN+XRmJpBpbMmhYQ4l4rNt XCLX0Hi9BhE= =8/HS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a longer response to the warning posted by Xavier. > Beware of the message about the security bug in the > anon.penet.fi software! Indeed. > If you do as requested, and send your true email address to > an5877(a)anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email > address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you > don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that). Any > future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post > anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and > this person will know your true email address that goes with > it. You got me. I meant only slight malice here: I had intended to "expose" a few email/anon associations to highlight the problem. The problem became apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi, surely without his knowledge. > an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect > anonymous/real address pairs. Johan Helsingius should take > action against this trickster. Since he is learning other > people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his > own real address to be revealed. Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer (or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan Helsingius will reject this suggestion. > But, this does point out that these systems which automatically > assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws. Johan > has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it > more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a > particular email address through the server, thus revealing the > corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered. I think that merely masks the real problem. > an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in > news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to > someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the > return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous > address. So again you can pair up real and anonymous > addresses. I missed that discussion, or I wouldn't have wasted your (our) time. > These are serious problems. We need some discussion of how to > avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while > still having an easy-to-use system. Any ideas? For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi is badly broken. But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep our pseudonyms private. In the face of social pressure, such as Xavier's, that may be asking a lot. > ::Xavier:: DEADBEAT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQBFAgUBK4lr4/FZTpBW/B35AQGqeAF/UBefmNprQacueYazdvhAKMF4nA+2vl44 /+FMACnWjd7yaoG99VeyhO/S6vptT1UB =yZRb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update(a)anon.penet.fi for details.

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No Subject
by bmullane＠ultrix.ramapo.edu 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, has pgp 2.2 really been released? does anyone know? Brian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQCVAgUBK4u8ZOrVZ1ozEurpAQHqHQQAuyNiSkIVW8WN0vh1mng6FGWMNTD0utgP STeeKX3zRyYKPHUQDLN+fCpQDqNdw5I0zn0iicw2DBMWfQSEYXPsmiGlhQLbz+A5 q5e2xxhZJdEj0D8G34GLE2L/uSE6ZlT4MMst7o/tdZi5WHp2pHx5M46QDYS2KzWJ aTEldUjbjNc= =Uje7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
by Aviel David Rubin 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

> it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme > to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay > in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA) > credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered > unless one started taking their precautions before the information age... > now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can > insure it with technology > cheers > kelly No here's another application for anonymous cash.

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Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
by mjr＠netcom.com 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

Concerning the discussions of privacy, and anonymity on various USENET groups, attacks on Johan Helsingus, etc. I'd like to add my two cents... If we are going to convince the USENET community as a whole of the value of anonymity it seems to me we must also recognize the propriety and value of what seems to be the dominant sentiment on the USENET now, that being that accountability and responsibility (for what you say) reflected in a real identification is also valuable, and under most ordinary circumstances is more desirable then not. Putting it another way, I think most of the USENET community would accept the argument that access to anonymity is something that we should all have. It is a desirable thing, but it becomes desirable only under certain circumstances (e.g. active persecution, or a real threat of same, by a government or corporation, etc). Most of the time, it is better that people "stand for what they say" and accept the accountability that goes with non-anonymized postings. If we approach it this way I think we could achieve consensus at least to the degree that the existence of alias servers are generally supported. matthew rapaport Philosopher/Programmer At Large KD6KVH mjr(a)netcom.com 70371.255(a)compuserve.com

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