- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
by tcmay＠netcom.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

(Sorry, Cypherpunks, for the ">" in this message--I made the classic mistake of sending this message only to Fen, hence this forwarded form. I'll try to watch this in the future!) >Fen Labalme believes Eric's "penny a hop" is still too expensive, especially >for "the poor": > >>Geeez, Eric! I'd think a penny a hop would be a pretty high price... And >>given that most messages go through two hops, then you'd really be giving >>your 2 cents worth! >> >>Note that there can be about 50 cypherpunks messages a day -- if each went >>through 2 hops at $0.10 / hop, as you proposed, that would be $10 / day in >>revenues for the remailers. Seems like a lot to me. >> >>I would support the idea if I felt that the system would quiet the flame >>wars, but I think rather it would simply quiet the poor... >> >>Fen > >You don't have to support the idea, Fen, you just have to open your own >remailing node! If you think you can do it more cheaply--perhaps subsidizing >the costs from your other income, or perhaps just doing it as charity--you are >completely free to do so. > >The "liquidity" of remailer hops (with the "Mark V" software that handles the >grunge automatically) will be quite interesting to see. Some will go for >minimum cost (one cheap hop), others will route messages through dozens of >hops. > >Services will arise which "rate" the quality of remailers, in terms of >pricing, security, latency, message sizes accepted, past experiences, etc. > >Bandwidths are increasing so rapidly and computer hardware is getting so >cheap, that I doubt even the poorest of the poor, in the U.S. at least, will >be unable to send these kinds of messages. The costs of transmission are just >so trivial compared to other costs that even poor people routinely pay. > >(Whether the poor and downtrodden will _want_ to participate in this Brave New >World is another matter. My guess is they will.) > >-Tim

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REPS: Filters Against Unwanted Messages
by tcmay＠netcom.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

Attached below is a message wherein the author advertises in his .sig this item: "(anon. postings not read)" Simple, but it gets the point across. Expect to see more such declarations. In my off-line newsreader, Eudora, (which ironically is also the subject of the message attached below--must be a plot), it's easy enough to mark all the stuff from some anonymous site for deletion. Such "filters" are a basic kind of positive reputation system and are in use in many places. Some on this list have asked for this kind of filtering to be incorporated (somehow) into NetNews readers. Maybe this will come someday, but for now the best approach is to simply not read anonymous postings, if that's important to you. I want to also describe an important use of filters: Publishers almost never accept unsolicited material. Manuscripts "thrown over the transom," as the saying goes, are returned _unopened_ or sometimes just thrown away. And the publishers are careful to publicize this fact. Why? Mainly to head off charges that they or one of their writers "stole" an idea. Merely by opening the manuscript's envelope, they are exposing themselves, potentially, to lawsuits from would-be authors who claim to see elements of their ideas in someone else's "Movie of the Week" or Great American Novel. So publishers and editors scrupulously refuse to look at unsolicited manuscripts. (I have heard, anecdotally, that the onset of electronic submissions is causing them great distress. Without the option of "returned unopened," what are they to do? Various cryptographic solutions suggest themselves...this could be a small niche market for some cypherentrepreneur to fill, and could also be a way to get some P-K and reputation-filtering software out in the world.) Some forms of crypto-extortion can be handled the same way. (I described this approach to Dean Tribble a while back.) Simply advertise widely--like in your .sig--that you do not read messages unless they come from known sources. Would-be extortionists ("Deposit 10 kilocrypts in this account or I will do X") come to realize that they cannot easily contact their victim. To be sure, other channels exist (anonymous postal mail, phone calls, routing through other sources, etc.), but the lack of a direct channel makes the initial threat harder to issue. It's a kind of crypto speed bump. This approach, "I don't listen to extortion threats," is akin to "We don't negotiate with hostage takers." Far from perfect, but still a "damping" force. -Tim Here's the posting I cited earlier: >Newsgroups: netcom.general >Path: netcom.com!pfeiffer >From: pfeiffer(a)netcom.com (Kevin Pfeiffer) >Subject: Re: EUDORA for DOS? >Message-ID: <1993Mar3.171249.26738(a)netcom.com> >Organization: Pfeiffer Design Assoc. >X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8] >References: <1993Mar3.062411.9712(a)netcom.com> >Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1993 17:12:49 GMT > > You might look into pceudora... Can't speak for it, but Eudora (Mac) >seems well-designed. No matter what seems to break my connections (me, the >phone company, etc.) Eudora (and unix) leaves my mail intact at Netcom. >Knock on wood. >-- > * Kevin Pfeiffer <pfeiffer(a)netcom.com> (anon. postings not read) * >--

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Re: Let's look at this ....
by fen＠genmagic.genmagic.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

fergp(a)sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) writes: > The one topic that _does_ interest me is the nonsensical fodder > stemming from a post regarding the (actual?) governmental > consideration to license keys. That just drops my carrier. > This is probably the one reason why I tolerate the wasted bandwidth > here -- there are many powerful souls amongst you (us) who can keep this > bullshit from happening. Me too. It's not the only topic of interest to me, but one that I feel strongly about. Is there any suggested action that we can take? Fen

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Wasted BAndwidth
by kelly＠netcom.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

Forwarded message: > You are right that because of the right free speach, it is > impossible to prohibit remailers. However, while I don't believe in > prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility. It is > certainly true that it is possible to construct a remailer service, > using cryptography, such that it would be impossible to trace it back to > the original sender. This class of remailer would generally not provide Well Ted I am not here to make ad-hominen attacks AND... there are a number of issues raised... Personal responsibility is a choice accepted by the person exercising THEIR right of free speech... it is important to remember that it is #1 and foremost a CHOICE... you CANT force an attitude of personal responsibility > So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility? Well, I > would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site. They are > the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally > performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the > chain of liability. So, let the liability rest with the remailer site! > Now, I'm not a lawyer, and as far as I know, this legal theory hasn't > been tested in a court. So only time will tell what happens when these > remailers hit the real world. > > As far as remailers like Julf's are concerned, I very much like the idea > which Tim Moors suggested --- which is to have some method which the > identity between the input and output address could be revealed. This > provides general anonymity, but one that can be breached when someone > has abused that anonymity, as convicted by a jury of their peers. > Perhaps the way this could be reflected into the "real world" legal > system is that remailers which do keep a mapping between input and > output addresses, and which are willing to reveal them under appropriate > circumstances, would be exempt from being held liable for what comes out > of their remailer. > > Perhaps these are not the right sets of tools to be used to provide some > sort of controls over remailers so that the negative effects of these > remailers can be controlled. But it is our responsibility to consider > them, and not just pretend they don't exist. I hope we don't have the > attitude of "Vonce the rockets go up, who cares vere they come down? > That's not my department....." > > - Ted > Ted , you seem more concerned with how you and the particular cabal who agrees with you are going to control how others use their machines and software to ensure THEIR right of choice... Sorry but the attitudes you personally espouse just dont wash in the real world...Liability law is civil LAW... in most cases there are NO treaties between countries for laws such as libel... Anonymity will flourish... and in the VERY near future... it wont be dependent on the good-will of a sysadm or a government... there simply WONT be the means to control spread of anonymity tools Your viewpoint brings to mind an OLD saying "Those who would trade a little freedom for security deserve neither" and I apologize if I have misquoted here...I am afraid the scam of social control and responsibilty that you and others such as government practice and espouse is about over... "may you have an Interesting life" cheers kelly p.s. Atlas is shrugging --

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REMAIL: Juries...
by Hal 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

Tim Moors offers an interesting suggestion that a jury should be used to decide when a remailer operator should pierce the anonymity of an especially egregious poster. But I could see a way this could fail. If a post really is terrible, one might expect the poster to have taken some extra precautions. What if Tim's jury starts up, deliberates, argues, goes back and forth, and finally decides that the real email address of the poster should be revealed. When this is done, it may well turn out that the original email address was forged, or was another remailer which doesn't keep logs! This would mean that no replies to the message would have worked, but if the posting was harmful enough the poster might have been willing to give up the capability to receive private replies (he can always read followup postings on the newsgroup). In a case like this, all the effort on the part of the jury would have been wasted. We should also realize that, in a sufficiently bad case, there may well have been law enforcement involvement, anyway. If the harm is "real world" (not just something net folk would object to) then the jury activity may be superfluous, as court orders could have been used to force the remailer to reveal his mappings. I wonder, though, if Tim's jury could be married with Marc Horowitz's idea to have remailer operators support anonymous posting only from "approved" pseudonyms. Marc's idea was that people would literally buy approval of given digital pseudonyms (e.g. public keys). This approval would be granted by the operator(s) themselves, or buy some other agencies, and would be shown by a public log of signed pseudonymous public keys. Each message through the remailer would have to be digitally signed by one of these approved keys. (The approval process would be _completely anonymous_, that is, there would be _no_ correspondence between real identities and approved pseudonyms.) Then, if someone posted abusive messages, their approval could be cancelled. Their digital pseudonym (e.g. public key) would be removed from the list of approved "nyms" (I like Eli's shorthand). This way they could not post any more, at least unless they were willing to spend more of their hard-earned money to buy approval of another nym. This way we get the parallels to the postal service. If the approval agencies donated their earnings then this would not represent commercialization so it could even be done today. (Another thought along these lines would be to use Karl Barrus' digital bank to buy approval. I'm not sure this would work, but it's worth considering.) One weakness of Marc's proposal was what criteria would be used to yank approval of nyms. A person might be reluctant to pay real money for an approval certificate if he knew that it could be removed just because some blowhard complained about one of his postings. And remailer operators would be constantly forced to make judgement calls (as I gather Julf is today). Perhaps Tim's juries could serve this purpose. People would get their approval certificate removed only upon a jury's recommendation. The jury could even be specified in advance, composed of respected but fair members of the net community. If people had this kind of assurance that their posting privileges would be lost only under a fair system like this, they would be more willing to pay for an anonymous posting certificate. Hal Finney

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Let's look at this ....
by fergp＠sytex.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

Okay, cypherpunks - I've watched enough "unsubscribe me" requests drop in, now I figure (that's a Virginia word, BTW) that since I'm silently digesting most of this nonsense, I can at least crop a few pennies in the mill from time to time. I've managed to irk several of you with the virus encryption post (a bona fide topic, for those of you who snicker); then with the "Why Anon (especially when there are twelve step programs) ?", but the federal deficit is peanuts to popcorn compared to the bandwidth wasted here. <Soap_box_mode_off> Lest I begin to resemble some cypher-drop-out (never happen), let's re-examine what we are now discussing: o Problems (solved yet?) with penet.fi o Arguments and innuendo regarding: _ digital cash _ digital anarchy (Gee, thanks, Tim.) _ digital bad-mouthing The one topic that _does_ interest me is the nonsensical fodder stemming from a post regarding the (actual?) governmental consideration to license keys. That just drops my carrier. This is probably the one reason why I tolerate the wasted bandwidth here -- there are many powerful souls amongst you (us) who can keep this bullshit from happening. On a serious note, I have been a programmer-slash-analyst from the card-punch days of not_so_old. My assembly programming began in the bowels of a IBM 360; somehow that weeded it's way into the desktop arena. Damned odd. Now I just put networks together. Much like tinker toys. My (long-winded) question is this: What are cypherpunk priorities? (NO, no, please do not cite the norms. I've heard 'em.) Where are we going with anon mailers? Are they going to serve us or cause us unlimited problems? (From a political point of view?) I stand _strongly_ behind private communications, and behind the right to privately encrypt. Personally, I do not think that it can be taken away from us. Thoughts? Cheers. Paul Ferguson | Network Integration Consultant | "All of life's answers are Alexandria, Virginia USA | on TV." fergp(a)sytex.com (Internet) | -- Homer Simpson sytex.com!fergp (UUNet) | 1:109/229 (FidoNet) | PGP public encryption key available upon request.

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No Subject
by Ryan, Edmund J 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

Greetings, Please unsubscribe me. I'd appreciate it if cypherpunks had a digest. It would be easier to handle the mail volume. Virtually, Ed ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - Edmund J. Ryan Major: Computer Information Systems - - KL62@MARISTB Minor: Computer Science/Business - - Marist College --Cypherpunk--------Extropian------- - - Poughkeepsie, NY --Libertarian-------Voluntarist----- - - - - "Replace taxpayers with shareholders, - - regulators with customers: privatize!" - ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
by tcmay＠netcom.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

>In article <CypherPunksList.0606(a)arcticus.UUCP> tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. >May) writes: >> * To handle _abusive volumes_ through remailers, charge for remailing. >> Short term, this may be a problem, but this is the long term market >> solution. > > Quick but relevant question: Assuming a commercial anonymous remailer >were set up tomorrow, with (don't ask me how this would be done, it's >hypothetical...) provable anonymity -- what should it charge per message, >or per kilobyte of message? > >> -Tim May >> tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > >Chris - Xenon I don't know. That's for the market to decide. This is not a glib answer. There is no "real" price for any service or commodity, only a complicated emergent market price that typically evolves and changes. An anonymous remailer (the "Mom and Pop" remailer I like to cite) may initially charge some price and find it is being undercut by others, or others are not matching its price. Prices will change, evolve. It is, however, that remailing prices will be much below a few pennies per 1 KB message, nor much above $2.00. I often use the crude estimate of $0.50 per remailing, suggesting that a 5-hop mailing will then cost about $2.50. (But once the infrastructure for remailer hops is in place, then even a single hop is basically enough--this may sound paradoxical, but think about it.) -Tim -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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Unsubscribe
by ghabrech＠ultrix.ramapo.edu 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

Please unsubscribe me. I am involved in a few other email groups and my load is way too high. I may resubscribe again, but for now can't handle it. Thanx George ghabrech(a)ultrix.ramapo.edu

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implementing positive reputation systems
by tribble＠xanadu.com 03 Mar '93

03 Mar '93

The scheme I always think of when envisioning positive reputation systems is that I get the feed of everything I might be interested in, then sort and filter using whatever cleverness I desire. Occasionally (perhaps regularly) I exchange message with various people so that we can update our transitive reputation information. Eric Hughes and the recent discussion about volume problems got me thinking about how to implement positive reputations at server sites. I want a system in which the semantics are similar to the ideal scenario above, but lower overhead in bandwidth and in processing power for the receiver. I suspect that the mailing list server would provide filtering, and the receiver would provide sorting. This will let us create mailing lists with anonymous participants without letting them overwhelm the list. It controls volume, etc. Hmmmm.... Anyone with ideas, please send them to me (or the list) and I'll collect them and post them. dean

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