- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

The Clipper (clip on <clap clap> clip off <clap clap>)
by poier＠sfu.ca 18 May '93

18 May '93

One question regarding the proposed Clipper chip: What exactly is the key escrow facility? From what I can tell, it seems to be the bit that allows the LEEF... Skye -- "Thppt bwach oop ack" - Bill the Cat | -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- PGP Public Key available on request | Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)

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No Subject
by Eric Hughes 17 May '93

17 May '93

Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:04:46 PDT From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) Subject: [ROBACK(a)ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV: Answers to Your Questions] FYI. NIST has responded to my questions. Feel free to distribute. -Jim Date: Mon, 17 May 1993 16:44:28 -0400 (EDT) From: ROBACK(a)ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV Subject: Answers to Your Questions To: jim(a)RSA.COM X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"jim(a)rsa.com" To: Mr. Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security, Inc. From: Ed Roback, NIST Mr. Ray Kammer asked me to forward to you our answers to the questions you raised in your e-mail of 4/27. We've inserted our answers in your original message. ------------------------------------------------------ From: SMTP%"jim(a)RSA.COM" 27-APR-1993 03:13:12.75 To: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov CC: Subj: Clipper questions

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NIST answers to RSADSI questions
by Eric Hughes 17 May '93

17 May '93

Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:04:46 PDT From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) Subject: [ROBACK(a)ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV: Answers to Your Questions] FYI. NIST has responded to my questions. Feel free to distribute. -Jim Date: Mon, 17 May 1993 16:44:28 -0400 (EDT) From: ROBACK(a)ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV Subject: Answers to Your Questions To: jim(a)RSA.COM X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"jim(a)rsa.com" To: Mr. Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security, Inc. From: Ed Roback, NIST Mr. Ray Kammer asked me to forward to you our answers to the questions you raised in your e-mail of 4/27. We've inserted our answers in your original message. ------------------------------------------------------ From: SMTP%"jim(a)RSA.COM" 27-APR-1993 03:13:12.75 To: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov CC: Subj: Clipper questions

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May Modern Times event
by Eric S Theise 17 May '93

17 May '93

Thought some of you might be interested in Wednesday's Jacking In/Cyberspace Literacy event ... Jacking In: A Series on Cyberspace Literacy presents ONLINE COMMUNITIES AROUND THE BAY: THE INNS AND THEIR KEEPERS Every computer-based conferencing system lets its subscribers access relevant community information and discuss topics ranging from Apple Computers to zymurgy. While these systems are all based on the same conceptual model, each one evolves its own personality and community standards based on underlying software, management policies, and, ultimately, the subscribers it attracts. This installment of Jacking In will feature a talk about building and nourishment of online community, followed by community-conscious demonstrations of several San Francisco-based conferencing systems. In cyberspace, community is not geography. John Coate, "Building Online Community" Wayne Gregori, SF Net Alex Liberman, 101 Online Gail Ann Williams, The WELL Wednesday, May 19, 7:30 p.m. $3-$5 sliding scale Modern Times Bookstore 888 Valencia (19th/20th) San Francisco, CA 94110 (415) 282-9246

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re: Double encryption
by Not MY universe! 17-May-1993 0927 17 May '93

17 May '93

Skye asks (upon brute-force attacks): >If so, how about double-encrypting a file with two completely different and >very complex programs? Then, even if it did get the first, it couldn't tell >because the resulting data would still be largely gobbledegook. Maybe. The question is the same as the mathematical question "does the encryption algorithm form a group?". "Groupness" refers to whether two applications of an encryption can be collapsed (by some arbitrary key) into a single application of the same encryption. [or, for two differing encryptions, a single application of some algorithm either less complex than the sum of the two original encryptions, or using a key shorter than the two original keys...] For example, consider Caesar rotations. Here, the key is just a number from 0 to 26 and rot13 (rotation by 13, a->n, being the USENET standard for encrypting dirty jokes). We can "collapse" any pair of Caesar rotations into a new single rotation; it's just rotate for the sum of the two keys. So, Caesar rotations form a group, and it does no good to encrypt twice, because brute force needs to solve only one problem, not two, as combinatorics would suggest. But what about something more... interesting? Say, a Caesar rotation followed by a N-skipped version of the alphabet (for N=1, this is the identity alphabet, for N=2, the alphabet is "a,c,e,g,i,k,m,o,q,s,u,w, y,b,d,f,h,j,l,n,p,r,t,v,x,z", for N=3, it's "a,d,g,...".) Now, there's no possibility of collapsing the two encryptions into one operation; no Caesar rotation can give any of the N-skip alphabets (except the trivial case of N=0), and most pairings of Caesar rotations followed by skipping alphabets cannot be faked by either a Caesar rotation or a skip-alphabet alone. Thus, we can say that Caesar followed by N-skip "does not form a group" and so is as hard to crack by brute force as combinatorics suggest. Back in the early days of DES, it was not known if DES encryption followed by another DES encryption formed a group. That's why triple DES encryption was designed to use an intermediate DEcryption (not encryption) stage, so that even if double-DES-encryption formed a group, encryption/decryption/encryption would not (since it's possible to DES-encrypt any possible message stream, therefore some set of cyphertext bits corresponds to some possible plaintext, and that plaintext can be reencoded) and so it would not be possible to collapse the first two operations into a single DES encode, collapse the <first+second> and the third into yet another single encode and thereby save much time for the brute force attack. However, it's now been proven that DES encode followed by DES encode does NOT form a group, and so it doesn't really matter any more. >Probably a stupid question, but I was curious. No, it's an *excellent* question. -Bill

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Double encryption
by poier＠sfu.ca 17 May '93

17 May '93

Hi. Being the security freak that I am, even with military grade encryption (for whatever THATS worth) I feel a little insecure, as most routines are, as far as I can tell, still succeptable to at the least brute force attacks. I was wondering: how to cracking programs determine that they have successfully decrypted a file? Does it simply look for english text (or file headers etc)? If so, how about double-encrypting a file with two completely different and very complex programs? Then, even if it did get the first, it couldn't tell because the resulting data would still be largely gobbledegook. Probably a stupid question, but I was curious. Skye -- "Thppt bwach oop ack" - Bill the Cat | -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- PGP Public Key available on request | Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality) !!!!!!! FIGHT CLIPPER / LEEF !!!!!!! | email: poier(a)sfu.ca

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Washington Post story
by Mike Godwin 17 May '93

17 May '93

Look for a major story in the Washington Post about Clipper, Digital Telephony, and related matters. It will be coming any day now and should get major play. The reporters are John Schwartz and John Mintz. -Mike

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Diffie Statement to Boucher's Committee
by whitfield.diffie＠Eng.Sun.COM 16 May '93

16 May '93

The Impact of a Secret Cryptographic Standard on Encryption, Privacy, Law Enforcement and Technology Whitfield Diffie Sun Microsystems 11 May 1993 I'd like to begin by expressing my thanks to Congressman Boucher, the other members of the committee, and the committee staff for giving us the opportunity to appear before the committee and express our views. On Friday, the 16th of April, a sweeping new proposal for both the promotion and control of cryptography was made public on the front page of the New York Times and in press releases from the White House and other organizations. This proposal was to adopt a new cryptographic system as a federal standard, but at the same time to keep the system's functioning secret. The standard would call for the use of a tamper resistant chip, called Clipper, and embody a `back door' that will allow the government to decrypt the traffic for law enforcement and national security purposes. So far, available information about the chip is minimal and to some extent contradictory, but the essence appears to be this: When a Clipper chip prepares to encrypt a message, it generates a short preliminary signal rather candidly entitled the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field. Before another Clipper chip will decrypt the message, this signal must be fed into it. The Law Enforcement Exploitation Field or LEEF is tied to the key in use and the two must match for decryption to be successful. The LEEF in turn, when decrypted by a government held key that is unique to the chip, will reveal the key used to encrypt the message. The effect is very much like that of the little keyhole in the back of the combination locks used on the lockers of school children. The children open the locks with the combinations, which is supposed to keep the other children out, but the teachers can always look in the lockers by using the key. In the month that has elapsed since the announcement, we have studied the Clipper chip proposal as carefully as the available information permits. We conclude that such a proposal is at best premature and at worst will have a damaging effect on both business security and civil rights without making any improvement in law enforcement. To give you some idea of the importance of the issues this raises, I'd like to suggest that you think about what are the most essential security mechanisms in your daily life and work. I believe you will realize that the most important things any of you ever do by way of security have nothing to do with guards, fences, badges, or safes. Far and away the most important element of your security is that you recognize your family, your friends, and your colleagues. Probably second to that is that you sign your signature, which provides the people to whom you give letters, checks, or documents, with a way of proving to third parties that you have said or promised something. Finally you engage in private conversations, saying things to your loved ones, your friends, or your staff that you do not wish to be overheard by anyone else. These three mechanisms lean heavily on the physical: face to face contact between people or the exchange of written messages. At this moment in history, however, we are transferring our medium of social interaction from the physical to the electronic at a pace limited only by the development of our technology. Many of us spend half the day on the telephone talking to people we may visit in person at most a few times a year and the other half exchanging electronic mail with people we never meet in person. Communication security has traditionally been seen as an arcane security technology of real concern only to the military and perhaps the banks and oil companies. Viewed in light of the observations above, however, it is revealed as nothing less than the transplantation of fundamental social mechanisms from the world of face to face meetings and pen and ink communication into a world of electronic mail, video conferences, electronic funds transfers, electronic data interchange, and, in the not too distant future, digital money and electronic voting. No right of private conversation was enumerated in the constitution. I don't suppose it occurred to anyone at the time that it could be prevented. Now, however, we are on the verge of a world in which electronic communication is both so good and so inexpensive that intimate business and personal relationships will flourish between parties who can at most occasionally afford the luxury of traveling to visit each other. If we do not accept the right of these people to protect the privacy of their communication, we take a long step in the direction of a world in which privacy will belong only to the rich. The import of this is clear: The decisions we make about communication security today will determine the kind of society we live in tomorrow. The objective of the administration's proposal can be simply stated: They want to provide a high level of security to their friends, while being sure that the equipment cannot be used to prevent them from spying on their enemies. Within a command society like the military, a mechanism of this sort that allows soldiers' communications to be protected from the enemy, but not necessarily from the Inspector General, is an entirely natural objective. Its imposition on a free society, however, is quite another matter. Let us begin by examining the monitoring requirement and ask both whether it is essential to future law enforcement and what measures would be required to make it work as planned. Eavesdropping, as its name reminds us, is not a new phenomenon. But in spite of the fact that police and spies have been doing it for a long time, it has acquired a whole new dimension since the invention of the telegraph. Prior to electronic communication, it was a hit or miss affair. Postal services as we know them today are a fairly new phenomenon and messages were carried by a variety of couriers, travelers, and merchants. Sensitive messages in particular, did not necessarily go by standardized channels. Paul Revere, who is generally remembered for only one short ride, was the American Revolution's courier, traveling routinely from Boston to Philadelphia with his saddle bags full of political broadsides. Even when a letter was intercepted, opened, and read, there was no guarantee, despite some people's great skill with flaps and seals, that the victim would not notice the intrusion. The development of the telephone, telegraph, and radio have given the spies a systematic way of intercepting messages. The telephone provides a means of communication so effective and convenient that even people who are aware of the danger routinely put aside their caution and use it to convey sensitive information. Digital switching has helped eavesdroppers immensely in automating their activities and made it possible for them to do their listening a long way from the target with negligible chance of detection. Police work was not born with the invention of wiretapping and at present the significance of wiretaps as an investigative tool is quite limited. Even if their phone calls were perfectly secure, criminals would still be vulnerable to bugs in their offices, body wires on agents, betrayal by co-conspirators who saw a brighter future in cooperating with the police, and ordinary forensic inquiry. Moreover, cryptography, even without intentional back doors, will no more guarantee that a criminal's communications are secure than the Enigma guaranteed that German communications were secure in World War II. Traditionally, the richest source of success in communications intelligence is the ubiquity of busts: failures to use the equipment correctly. Even if the best cryptographic equipment we know how to build is available to them, criminal communications will only be secure to the degree that the criminals energetically pursue that goal. The question thus becomes, ``If criminals energetically pursue secure communications, will a government standard with a built in inspection port, stop them. It goes without saying that unless unapproved cryptography is outlawed, and probably even if it is, users bent on not having their communications read by the state will implement their own encryption. If this requires them to forgo a broad variety of approved products, it will be an expensive route taken only by the dedicated, but this sacrifice does not appear to be necessary. The law enforcement function of the Clipper system, as it has been described, is not difficult to bypass. Users who have faith in the secret Skipjack algorithm and merely want to protect themselves from compromise via the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field, need only encrypt that one item at the start of transmission. In many systems, this would require very small changes to supporting programs already present. This makes it likely that if Clipper chips become as freely available as has been suggested, many products will employ them in ways that defeat a major objective of the plan. What then is the alternative? In order to guarantee that the government can always read Clipper traffic when it feels the need, the construction of equipment will have to be carefully controlled to prevent non-conforming implementations. A major incentive that has been cited for industry to implement products using the new standard is that these will be required for communication with the government. If this strategy is successful, it is a club that few manufacturers will be able to resist. The program therefore threatens to bring communications manufacturers under an all encompassing regulatory regime. It is noteworthy that such a regime already exists to govern the manufacture of equipment designed to protect `unclassified but sensitive' government information, the application for which Clipper is to be mandated. The program, called the Type II Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program, requires facility clearances, memoranda of agreement with NSA, and access to secret `Functional Security Requirements Specifications.' Under this program member companies submit designs to NSA and refine them in an iterative process before they are approved for manufacture. The rationale for this onerous procedure has always been, and with much justification, that even though these manufacturers build equipment around approved tamper resistant modules analogous to the Clipper chip, the equipment must be carefully vetted to assure that it provides adequate security. One requirement that would likely be imposed on conforming Clipper applications is that they offer no alternative or additional encryption mechanisms. Beyond the damaging effects that such regulation would have on innovation in the communications and computer industries, we must also consider the fact that the public cryptographic community has been the principal source of innovation in cryptography. Despite NSA's undocumented claim to have discovered public key cryptography, evidence suggests that, although they may have been aware of the mathematics, they entirely failed to understand the significance. The fact that public key is now widely used in government as well as commercial cryptographic equipment is a consequence of the public community being there to show the way. Farsightedness continues to characterize public research in cryptography, with steady progress toward acceptable schemes for digital money, electronic voting, distributed contract negotiation, and other elements of the computer mediated infrastructure of the future. Even in the absence of a draconian regulatory framework, the effect of a secret standard, available only in a tamper resistant chip, will be a profound increase in the prices of many computing devices. Cryptography is often embodied in microcode, mingled on chips with other functions, or implemented in dedicated, but standard, microprocessors at a tiny fraction of the tens of dollars per chip that Clipper is predicted to cost. What will be the effect of giving one or a small number of companies a monopoly on tamper resistant parts? Will there come a time, as occurred with DES, when NSA wants the standard changed even though industry still finds it adequate for many applications? If that occurs will industry have any recourse but to do what it is told? And who will pay for the conversion? One of the little noticed aspects of this proposal is the arrival of tamper resistant chips in the commercial arena. Is this tamper resistant part merely the precursor to many? Will the open competition to improve semiconductor computing that has characterized the past twenty-years give way to an era of trade secrecy? Is it perhaps tamper resistance technology rather than cryptography that should be regulated? Recent years have seen a succession of technological developments that diminish the privacy available to the individual. Cameras watch us in the stores, x-ray machines search us at the airport, magnetometers look to see that we are not stealing from the merchants, and databases record our actions and transactions. Among the gems of this invasion is the British Rafter technology that enables observers to determine what station a radio or TV is receiving. Except for the continuing but ineffectual controversy surrounding databases, these technologies flourish without so much as talk of regulation. Cryptography is perhaps alone in its promise to give us more privacy rather than less, but here we are told that we should forgo this technical benefit and accept a solution in which the government will retain the power to intercept our ever more valuable and intimate communications and will allow that power to be limited only by policy. In discussion of the FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal --- which would have required communication providers, at great expense to themselves, to build eavesdropping into their switches --- it was continually emphasized that wiretaps were an exceptional investigative measure only authorized when other measures had failed. Absent was any sense that were the country to make the proposed quarter billion dollar inventment in intercept equipment, courts could hardly fail to accept the police argument that a wiretap would save the people thousands of dollars over other options. As Don Cotter, at one time director of Sandia National Laboratories, said in respect to military strategy: ``Hardware makes policy.'' Law, technology, and economics are three central elements of society that must all be kept in harmony if freedom is to be secure. An essential element of that freedom is the right to privacy, a right that cannot be expected to stand against unremitting technological attack. Where technology has the capacity to support individual rights, we must enlist that support rather than rejecting it on the grounds that rights can be abused by criminals. If we put the desires of the police ahead of the rights of the citizens often enough, we will shortly find that we are living in police state. We must instead assure that the rights recognized by law are supported rather than undermined by technology. At NSA they believe in something they call `security in depth.' Their most valuable secret may lie encrypted on a tamper resistant chip, inside a safe, within a locked office, in a guarded building, surrounded by barbed wire, on a military base. I submit to you that the most valuable secret in the world is the secret of democracy; that technology and policy should go hand in hand in guarding that secret; that it must be protected by security in depth. Recommendations There is a crying need for improved security in American communication and computing equipment and the Administration is largely correct when it blames the problem on a lack of standards. One essential standard that is missing is a more secure conventional algorithm to replace DES, an area of cryptography in which NSA's expertise is probably second to none. I urge the committee to take what is good in the Administration's proposal and reject what is bad. \begdis o The Skipjack algorithm and every other aspect of this proposal should be made public, not only to expose them to public scrutiny but to guarantee that once made available as standards they will not be prematurely withdrawn. Configuration control techniques pioneered by the public community can be used to verify that some pieces of equipment conform to government standards stricter than the commercial where that is appropriate. o I likewise urge the committee to recognize that the right to private conversation must not be sacrificed as we move into a telecommunicated world and reject the Law Enforcement Exploitation Function and the draconian regulation that would necessarily come with it. o I further urge the committee to press the Administration to accept the need for a sound international security technology appropriate to the increasingly international character of the world's economy.

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List
by x62727g2＠usma8.USMA.EDU 16 May '93

16 May '93

I think I may have somehow gotten wiped off the mailing list. I haven't received in cypherpunk mail in 3 days. Anthony J. Gatlin |-------------------------------------| Cadet Private, Co. G-2 |PGP Public Key available on request. | United States Military Academy |-------------------------------------|

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No Subject
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 16 May '93

16 May '93

This is the second of two documents I received anonymously. Maybe they're real, maybe they're forgeries. Decide for yourself. >Here are exerpts of the .......... of Mykotronx, > >the Torrance Based Big-Brother outfit that is going > >to make the Clinton Clipper wiretap chip. I have > >left off their chart of accounts numbers, since you > >don't care about that. ......... > >Period: 01/01/93 to 04/30/93 (first 4 months of 1993) > > > >Acct Descr Beg Bal Debits Credits > > > >==1000 series== > >Shearson Lehman 286,511 2,620,096 2,670,822 > >Paine Webber 95,602 868 0 > >Dean Whitter 55,391 484 0 > >Petty Cash 3,000 0 0 > >Union bank payroll act 13,408 900,000 816,443 > >Accts rcvbl -customer 1,185,829 1,981,356 2,562,064 > >Accts rcvbl - eployees 7,125 48,450 55,575 > >Franchise tx rcvbl 2,165 0 0 > >Unbilled costs&fees 567,792 533,347 0 > >Raw inventory 172,252 0 76,064 > >Prepaid taxes 1,116 0 0 > >Prepaid sales tax 688 0 688 > >Equp/mach/furn 383,038 20,695 0 > >Accum depreciation 234,425 0 23,000 > >Deposits 9,272 0 0 > > > >==2000 series== > >Accts Payable 482,895CR 1,869,477 1,684,555 > >Sales tax payable 147CR 176 0 > >Sales tax paid 0 0 0 > >FIT withheld 0 10,854 135,741 > >FICA withheld 0 0 56,622 > >CA state IT withh 0 0 36,163 > >CA state disability 0 0 8,730 > >SUI pybl employer 0 0 5,788 > >FUTA payable 0 0 2,007 > >FICA employer 0 0 56,621 > >Pd Payroll txs withh 0 290,820 0 > >401K withheld 0 0 42,712 > >Accrued payroll 25,637CR 343,682 318,045 > >Dental withheld 0 0 674 > >Dental plan pd 0 674 0 > >Withh 401K pd 0 42,712 0 > >Accrued bonuses 214,040 341,240 127,200 > >(holy shit - I wish I worked for a place that paid bonuses like that!) > >Accrued Vacation 44,252 0 0 > >Excess billings 139,216 154,706 55,036 > >Gross payroll 0 751,859 0 > >Gross payroll distrd 0 2,552 754,412 > >Lease obligations 4,911CR 0 0 > > > >==3000 series== > >Common Stock 169,320 0 61,435 > >Capital disbursement 916,675 222,230 0 > >Retd Earnings, begng 2,385,020CR 0 0 > > > >==4000 series== > >Sales, returns&allowc 0 6,014 2,577,323 > >Interest income 0 0 1,353 > >Int income tax free 0 0 2,490 > > > > > >==5000 series== > >Consultants 0 47,395 47,395 > >Subcontracts 0 932,210 110,419 > >Other direct costs 0 62,265 5,454 > >Printing/repro costs 0 542 0 > >Equipment rental/leasg 0 1,537 1,537 > >Maint, repairs 0 1,761 0 > >Delivery 0 3,217 0 > >Postage 0 960 0 > >Materials/parts 0 186,252 22,423 > >Telephone 0 93 0 > >Travel 0 10,437 0 > >Inv Cost of Mfg Prod 0 76,064 0 > >Direct labor-Engnrg 0 240,341 54,172 > >Direct labor-Technician 0 129,839 37,459 > >Direct labor-Adminst 0 47,542 10,081 > > > > > >==6000 series== > >Indirect labor 0 60,319 0 > >Holidays 0 32,867 27,331 > >Sick leave 0 3,276 0 > >Vacation 0 38,096 25,976 > >Retroactive pay 0 4,400 0 > >Job advertisments 0 655 0 > >Grp Med Ins non sharhl 0 25,522 1,818 > >Mykotronx pd payrl txs 0 64,417 0 > >Workers comp 0 9,554 1,418 > >Interest pd 0 0 0 > >Consultants 0 2,013 0 > >ADP Acctg 0 1,493 0 > >Real World Acct Suppt 0 1,485 0 > >Bank charges 0 155 0 > >Blueprints/repro 0 390 0 > >Proposals 0 2,817 0 > >Copier expense 0 514 0 > >Depreciation - elec eq 0 23,000 0 > >Dues & memberships 0 749 0 > >Education & Training 0 2,850 0 > >Employee relations 0 4,531 0 > >Business expense 0 7,431 0 > >Equip rental/lsng 0 4,458 0 > >Computer software 0 2,114 0 > >Insurance 0 9,061 1,380 > >Janitorial 0 20 0 > >Licenses & Permits 0 175 0 > >Maint, repairs 0 2,096 0 > >Delivery 0 995 13 > >Postage 0 942 0 > >Amort organiz expense 0 0 0 > >Taxes - franchise 0 2,763 0 > >Real & Pers prop tax 0 0 0 > >Rent 0 54,080 0 > >Subscriptions/books 0 325 0 > >Office/lab supplies 0 14,183 446 > >Telephone 0 7,961 36 > >Travel 0 10,296 1,303 > >Utilities 0 5,833 0 > >LTD Ins, non sharehld 0 2,877 594 > >401K Mykotronx contrib 0 17,411 0 > > > > > >==7000 series== > >Special Bonus 0 132,200 123,200 > >(Double holy shit!) > >G&A Labor 0 103,4520 0 > >Legal Services 0 5,895 0 > >Board of Dir Expnse 0 1,078 0 > >Financial Svc 0 7,505 0 > > > >Totals 0 12,555,101 12,555,101 > > > > > > > >Other little items: > > > >Locks at Mykotronx installed and maintained by Torrance Lock and Key, > >2421 Torrance Bl. Torrance, CA 90501 (310) 320-8840 For some > >reason, Mykotronx is over 90 days late paying a lousy $50 invoice. > > > >Mykotronx has a Mossler safe. It cost $1,693 when they bought it > >11/27/90. They have never changed the combination. > > > >Outstanding VLSI purchase orders: > >VLSI Tech (Capstone) $212,000 > >AT&T (Myk-78) $71,200 > >Motorola (Myk-77) $76,200 > >AT&T (Misc) $100,000 > >Compass (Software) $159,400 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-78) $66,200 > >Litronics (PCMCIA Crypto) $225,000 > >VLSI Tech (Expoteniator) $163,000 > >VLSI Tech (Capstone TFQP) $10,000 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-78 fix) $68,500 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-78A proto) $11,000 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-78A prod.) $220,000 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #1) $48,000 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #2) $33,750 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-82) $80,000 > >VLSI Tech (Myk-79) $79,500 > > > > > > > >Their LAN was installed by Strategies, Inc for about $14,000. > > >--

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