- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

AT&T
by meyer 26 May '93

26 May '93

I recently switched my long distance carrier from AT&T to another, since they bribed me to do so with an offer of $35. Tonight a lady from AT&T called to ask why I switched. "They bribed me," I said. I said that I also had a problem with AT&T's support of the Clipper (or Wiretap) Chip. She had never heard of this, but I said to write this down on her report so that some higher-up in AT&T would get the message. She then offered to pay me $50 to switch back to AT&T. I thought, if I keep switching, and they keep upping the amount, eventually I can pay my rent this way. But no. I said: As long as AT&T supports the Clipper Chip I'll never return to AT&T! Ah, the pleasure of occupying the moral high ground. (Now, if they'd offered $500 ...)

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Re: Steganography
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 26 May '93

26 May '93

> Here is a pitfall to be avoided in Steganography using > low bits of AD converter output. Such converters may be biased > in their low bit. [...] Falling too close to 50% would be a clue that the data That's not too risky for graphics, since many scanned pictures aren't based on raw A/D converter output; they've been processed and squashed down to some smaller number of bits. A more serious concern is compressibility - a real image file is probably more compressible than a file with the low-order bit replaced by a crypto-bit, since the real data has moderate correlation and the crypto-bits are random. I doubt the Feds will immediately start looking to see if you're shipping GIF files that have significantly worse compression than average, but they'd probably find something if they did it. Bill Stewart

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No Subject
by Anonymous 26 May '93

26 May '93

On Tue, 25 May 93 21:26:20 EDT, Bill_Stewart <uunet!anchor.ho.att.com!wcs> wrote - [ ... referring to earlier discussions on TEMPEST, ELINT and COMINT topics] > I'm not arguing about whether the stuff works, I believe that :-) It does, and I can expand further in subsequent paragraphs. > VT100s and Brother electronic typewriters are two other classic > emitters; I hadn't heard that the IBM was loud, but it's > certainly a good target. He used a very simplistic example, one which is electro-mechanical, as another list participant already pointed out. The same ELINT potential eavesdropping techniques exist, which range from keyboard monitoring (passive and active) to synchronic monitoring of "visual displays," which by all rights, parallels the electronic equivalent of monitoring your "visual" data; what is written to your visual display. > The wording *is* relevant when you're discussing whether a proposed > acronym is real or made-up-to-fit, and as I said, > > I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the > > documents I read. > and the proposed expansions are really stretching credibility, > as were the quoted article's contentions that using TEMPEST protection > was illegal. TEMPEST was/is a specification that was written/developed to safeguard classified communications which were transmitted electronically, and rightly so. Digital Cryptanalysis is easy to record, measure and study; emissions are emissions. Its a well known fact that INT agencies were/are active in monitoring secure communications _recording_ for years, simply on the basis that the keys would be eventually compromised. The technical specifications of TEMPEST implementations on _SECURE_ systems are classified, likewise, the tempest requirements on confidential and FOUO (For Official Use Only) communications are less classified, at least to the level of their traffic. This was/is done in anticipation of secure, captured traffic analysis being eventually compromised. I have reason to believe that this exactly the tactics being mined now by the FBI/NIST/NSA. (whoops, slap my wrist) Traffic analysis is a dangerous concept when used in the wrong context, especially in a big brother capacity. Additionally (no classified information divulged here!), both the US INT agencies and the KGB sponsored intelligence agencies, recorded _all_ intercepted communications regardless of cryptographic tolerance, eventually under the guise that they would be compromised. This idealism alluded to the fact that compromised keys could be used to analyze past communications and provide information on future strategies. > *Clipper is a trademark of Intergraph. Oh, don't be silly. Uncle Sugar has already "officially" re-dubbed the chip the "Key Escrow" Chip. Silly, isn't it? Our Government is cheating us. Something needs to be done. Who's going to do it? Personally, I'm going to take fergp's suggestion and "question the powers that be." If any of you have a conscious, I'd suggest doing the same. To Eric Raymond: Include info on anon remailers and why they are important. Tell 'em "nobody" sent you. ;-) Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

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PGP-RSAREF rumors
by L. Detweiler 26 May '93

26 May '93

Nothing has appeared on this list on this subject since the initial flurry sparked by PGP-RSAREF negotiations. I thought I would just post a few short comments based on inside sources and speculations for all the cypherpunks waiting on the edge of their consoles to hear some word. In no way should this be construed to be representative of positions on either side. I just hope to give members a little current insight and encouraging glimpse, but also show how the difficulties involved in the negotiations mean this is not as simple as Bidzos and Zimmerman shaking hands without snarling (although that's certainly part of it). A rather serious obstacle to RSAREF integration into PGP is that the RSAREF routines only `ostensibly' allow RSA encryption of DES session keys. For novices on the list, the background for this is that RSA is too slow to use to encode an entire message, so that one uses RSA to encode a randomly generated key for each session (hence the name) that is contained in the transmission. The remainder of the transmission includes the message encrypted under the private-key algorithm (e.g. DES) with the generated session key. Since the key is shorter than the message and the private-key algorithm faster than the public-key approach, this scheme results in a net gain of speed, but with security only `as strong' as the private key algorithm. Because of suspected weaknesses in DES, Zimmerman chose to use the Swiss IDEA algorithm for the session keys, and for obvious reasons prefers to continue to do so. However, the RSAREF routines have a `published interface' that only permits the system using a DES key. There are `low level' routines that do pure unadulterated RSA encryption of arbitrary data, crucial to PGP functions, but by the terms of the license the programmer is *not* allowed to call them! The reason for this restriction is presumably that a high-degree of backward-compatibility is required of the library, so that a strict adherence to use through `official' entry points must be preserved. However, this `hamstring connected' means that by no stretch of the imagination can RSAREF be considered a `general purpose RSA cryptography library' (in fact, it appears to be designed solely for meeting the PEM standard). It also means that the cryptographic security of RSAREF is quite curiously limited to that of DES. Rumor has it that Mark Riordan got permission to put in triple DES into RSAREF for RIPEM but so far it is unclear if Zimmerman and Bidzos can/will/have hammer(d) out something that allows the current PGP IDEA cipher. The backward compatibility of all previous PGP versions, and ultimately the integration of RSAREF into PGP, is at stake. Rumor has it that even Rivest (the R in RSA!) may be helping forge something favorable to everyone. Another complication of RSAREF that most on this list are probably familiar with is that it is not permitted to be used outside the U.S. Hence parallel versions of PGP must be maintained even if RSAREF would allow an IDEA implementation. One other complication is that Mr. Zimmerman, while apparently never directly profiting from PGP use, has before publicly `reserved the right' to attempt to gain some kind of compensation for his Herculean efforts on PGP, for which he has `a life sentence' and finds that it takes major amounts of his time and commitment, although he is also firm in his promise to keep it free. Of course, the position is not wholly compatible with RSA interests. Finally, I hear that negotiations are on pause while currently Mr. Zimmerman is in the middle of his May 19 - Jun 9 `PRZ EuroCrypt Tour' and is meeting PGP fanatics, groupies, and developers all over Europe! In fact, here's an excerpt from a message that made the rounds among some PGP contributors: >From 27 May until maybe 30 May, more or less, I'll be traveling >by train from Bergan, Norway, through Oslo, then on down to Copenhagen, >down to Hamburg, and over to Amsterdam. I'll be stopping along the way to >see some sights, having never been to Europe before. > >From 30(?) May til 6 June, I'll be hanging around Amsterdam and the >surrounding area, to see some things from something other than a train seat. > >From 6 June to 9 June, I'll be in Washington DC, giving a talk at the >7 June CPSR conference in DC. Then I'm going home. > >If any of you want to pass this on to the PGP fans in Europe, who are >fanatical enough to meet me over there in my travels, feel free. If I >play my cards right, I'll never have to buy lunch while I'm in Europe. Maybe with enough encouragement and hospitality he'll make it through the subsequent negotiations without strangling anyone or being strangled :) (You may be able to reach PRZ at prz(a)acm.org.)

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a reaction to Mycotronx intelligence data
by L. Detweiler 26 May '93

26 May '93

I'm disappointed at the *nonexistent* serious response to the Mycotronx postings on the list (I guess we do have some new algebraic formulas, though.) Apparently, these are just to hot for anyone to handle. I think these should be getting our utmost scrutiny as a group for tactical rewards. Are we at war or aren't we? So once again I have to do some dangerous limbwalking because all the other cyphersheep are clutching mommy's apron :). Okay, here goes. I'm sure there will be many inaccuracies but I think it is better here to be loud and wrong than to be silent and let it die with a whimper and nary a peep. I'd like to hear other reactions surely much superior to my own unauthoritative wanderings. I'll put in many questions; if anyone has insights into them please forward them to me and I will summarize (writing about each point to the list will probably take up too much traffic). * Also, if anyone can independently *verify* *any* of these pieces of information, please say so. * If you have access to databases that record relevant info from accounts listed and that kind of thing, and aren't at risk in doing so, please query them. * What about the people listed? Ever encountered them? * Interpretations of codenames and numbers especially of interest. * The possibilities for a little creative and ingenious `social engineering' (esp. with all the phone numbers in part 1) are absolutely unlimited for some really nervy cypherpunks, but I'm not going to encourage it... * Have there been any `repercussions' to the posting on cypherpunks? We need to know how afraid people are of us. Tighter security? Disconnected phone numbers? New code names? In sending me mail, please tell me if I can quote you or your address in the summary or just attribute it anonymously. Also, do not assume that email is secure. If a PGP key of mine will make the difference between your sending me email and not, I'll send it to you. * * * First of all, as a very preliminary opinion, it all looks believable and plausible. Ironically, there is almost too *much* information! The first document was forwarded anonymously to the list by nobody(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu. Both documents contain some comments apparently inserted by the source, the first only at the beginning, the second at the beginning and in the middle. In the first a statement is quoted >the >government wants us to trust to keep the Clipper design >secret, don't know jack shit about security. this comment makes sense in the light of a later message that purportedly revealed the source of the data. The statement also refers to `general ledger' probably referring to the second posting. The second posting came forwarded anonymously from nobody(a)alumni.cco. The contributor talks of leaving out account numbers. Also made two comments on the employee bonuses. * * * In posting 1 we have a great deal of very critical information on people involved in the company, current projects, company contacts, amazingly detailed cost/finance records. We even know their bank and banker! NSA contacts listed! It's not clear that all these diverse records would be stored in one volume of information. They appear to be pasted together from various sources, with some continuity in places. A later posting also suggests the reason for this long-term `snapshot' of company activity at the highest level. The most critical `big-picture' elements of posting 1 are probably the companies mentioned. It paints a clear picture of Mycotronx as a sort of `middleman' in coordinating and contracting other companies to do chip fabrication and testing, apparently with the NSA as their sole customer. AT&T was paid $100K under `Capstone Financial Commitments.' The companies VLSI Tech (fabrication?) and Exatron (testing?) figure prominently. Technical documentation by ELITE. Most amazing is the list of employees and their occupations. If it is complete, then it is remarkable in the number of employees, 10. There is a wide range of occupations from engineer to secretary to president that suggests the list may be complete. Chips: posting 1 refers to MYK80 for testing. Many references to KG44B, with several hundred thousand dollars worth of deliveries to the NSA. KG-48B appears to still be in testing phases. Part of the `Outrunner' project. The `Outrunner' project figures very prominently, what is it? Maybe a specialized chip for Air Force security (appears to be cryptographic because of KG-46 `Tactical Decryptor'). Capstone shows up at the end under `Financial commitments'. It's not clear if Clipper is referenced anywhere. There are many product codes that may refer to it. * * * In posting 2 we have an incredibly detailed, perhaps complete, financial ledger for the company listing everything from employee costs to office supplies. An accountant would probably find it much more readable than me. Because of the probable single source, the information is more focused (into financial categories) than that in posting 1. There are three columns in each series, beginning balance, debits, and credits, supposedly for first four months of 93. Series are probably some Federal or IRS categories for reporting. It is organized into `series' with 1000 recording various brokerage agencies. This may reflect that employees have stock options in the company. Other entries are customer and employee accounts receivable. 2000 series records employee benefits with `accued bonuses' of $341K for the period (given 10 employees, this could be astronomical for someone). Payroll is $343K for the period -- bonuses are as much as salaries. These are very high numbers for 10 employees. Probably the `upper echelon' of a few is making six figure salaries. 3000 series lists more stock. 4000 series lists sales of $2.5M for the 4 month period. 5000 lists consultant fees at $47K, subcontracts at $932K debited and $110K credited. Direct labor for Engineering came to 186K, Technician 93K, Administrative 37K. 6000 lists a lot of different categories (miscellaneous) mostly debits. 7000 series lists another `special bonus' $132K debit, $123. Net money debited and credited at the end of the statement is given as $12.5M for the four month period. Finally the source lists some `outstanding VLSI purchase orders'. It is not clear if these are owed to Mycotronx or Mycotronx owes someone else, but in the first posting the same figure $100K is mentioned for AT&T under `Capstone Financial Commitments', so these are probably payments by Mycotronx. In this document we see that `Compass' is software, a total of $160K. Motorola $76K, VLSI Tech (for the Capstone project) $212K. Myk78 (Clipper?) figures prominently with VLSI Tech: $66K, fix $68K, 78A prototype $11K, 78A production $220K. Also Myk 80 #1 and #2 $48K and $33K, and Myk82 and Myk 79 (80K and 79K). VLSI Tech `Expoteniator' (sic?) $163K. The exponentiator might be a general purpose digital exponentiator suitable for integration with many cryptographic techniques (Diffie Hellman, RSA, etc.) * * * Battle plan: *If* Mykotronx is to be harassed, the things that might be useful to focus on are the large bonuses. Where is all that cold cash going? If it ended up in the hands of a few (or even one) it would not be good PR, to say the least. Also, Mykotronx is clearly heavily dependent on VLSI Tech, and the company does not appear to sell to anyone other than the NSA currently. So those are the jugular veins, so to speak. I suppose if we were really extremists, like animal rights activists, we might individually harass members of the company. I don't encourage anyone to do this unless they do something to provoke it. However, a little friendly getting-to-know 'em type interaction might be interesting and help make sense of our current horde or glean other information. In particular, if anyone in the company feels (shall we say) undercompensated that could be another Achilles heel after they hear how much bonuses are coming out (bonus? I haven't heard about any bonuses! You heard of any bonuses?) Following is the mostly raw undistilled stuff. As noted, please comment on *anything* to me personally in email, and I'll try to organize, compile, and make sense of it all. Special thanks to the `anonymous' individual who was willing to risk potentially severe repercussions to bring the outrageous secrecy concerning the chip to glaring lighted public exposure and those who went out of their way to help `him'. Hey, even though this person could greatly benefit from Introductory Espionage 101 we love you anyway. You'll probably be the main character when Cypherpunks get their own sitcom or Monday Night Movie... posting 1 ======== * address, phone, FAQ of company * bank that holds company account(s)? Shearson Lehman Brothers. Acct #509 24261 12011. * Fed Ex Acct #1122-7492-8 * List of employees names and occupations. There are 10 employees listed. >Bob Gottfried, CEO >Leonard J. Baker, President >Ralph O' Connell, aka "The Father of COMSEC", NSA Lobbyist >Mike Furusawa, Space COMSEC Manager >Patti Linahan, Executive Secretary >Kikuo Ogawa, Buyer >R. Todd, W. Greenfield, KG-44B (Outrunner) Project >John C. Droge, Personnel >Bob Todd, Manufacturing Manager >Landy Riley, Engineering * Has anyone heard of an `NSA lobbyist'? This is very interesting. Later O'Connell is listed as `NSA Contact'. * Also, `COMSEC manager'? * `Buyer' of what? All major parts? * What about the code KG-44B Outrunner project? Under `Principle NSA Technical Contact' we have the NSA address (`Maryland Procurement Office) and code >Attn: N244 (CEB) (MDA904-92-G-0354/J.O. 5001) * Code names: what are these? People involved are clues. We already know KG-48B is also `Outrunner' and 48B and 46 are related somehow. * 46 is a `Tactical decryptor unit' -- sounds like a military application. Involvement of Air Force agents confirms it. * What is `Computer Systems Command'? That would really nail it, probably. * Capstone is being built by Mycotronx, right? It's likely Clipper and Capstone are also named KG-?. I don't think KG-46 and 48B are Clipper and Capstone due to the `tactical' Air Force involvement. Also, Clipper is MYK78, right? >KG-46 Tactical Decryptor Unit and >KG-48B Outrunner Provisioning Conference participants: >Robert Todd, Mykotronx >Bill Greenfield, Mykotronx >G. Burgio, NSA >J. Gochnour, NSA >J. Wimpy, Air Force Computer Systems Command >S. Solis, Air Force Computer Systems Command >To Be Discussed at meeting May 18 & 19, 1993 * This is an amazing piece of intelligence. These meetings were scheduled *after* this posting appeared for us. I think there are a lot of NSA agents having nightmares right now. * It is not clear, but it may be that `Outrunner Project Milestone Payments' were the subject of the May 18,19 meetings. (What is a `milestone payment'? Is that an NSA term? Military?) The meeting was very likely on Outrunner given the rest of the information. * The dates for payments are 2/14/92 (Preliminary Studies) to 5/13/93 (Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA). What is a known project under those dates? * Most categories refer to chip design with terms like VLSI and `complete fab' and `complete tests', `crypto verif'. Also, is VLSI a company? * Entires 11a,11b,13-17 are deliveries to the NSA, batches of 44B. What is chip 44B? Very important. No deliveries of 48B to NSA listed. Since this is in the `outrunner' categories we now know that KG48B, 44B, 46 are all related. Also, the KG number appears to be some parameter on the device code. * What are these keywords: `Complete PDR' (preliminary design review?) `Complete CDR' (concluding design review?) `SFA review VLSI'? Next sounds like a `Invoice' for KG-44LSI. Mykotronx P/N M20/00301XXX KG44 VLSI Procurement to >United Technologies Microelectronics Center >Colorodo Springs, CO 80907 Can't spell! The part I like is ``Secret item handling''. The invoice is fairly small, refers to Group B and Group C testing (?). Also a statement `export of this product is controlled by U.S. Disclosure of related technical data to foreign nationals without the appropriate export license is prohibited by law.' Test plan for MYK-80: Work for Exatron. MYK-80. 176 pin TQFP might pinpoint the chip. IMS tester? Installation of PET (Positron Electron Tomography? Like a microscope?) `handlers' at Mykotronx. Training & Manuals (for MYK-80?) subcontracted to ELITE Technical Corp (Redondo Beach, CA). `Capstone financial commitments' * ``Basic VII Cap VLSI 10'' $212,000. Sun 1 yr maintenance warranty. `Compass' $160K? IKOS System. ELITE Tech. Corp. Plotter. SJ (1) and (2), $71k and $76k. * AT&T, $100K (?) What is Mycotronx *paying* AT&T 100K for Capstone? * Another `Compass' $110K. VLSI Tech $30K and $163K. VLSI Tech Capstone TQFP $10K. Hm, both VSLI Tech. and Exatron do TQFP. * VLSI Tech Exponeniator Tamper System $163K? * $225K for `Litronics'? posting 2 ======== >Acct Descr Beg Bal Debits Credits >Shearson Lehman 286,511 2,620,096 2,670,822 > >Paine Webber 95,602 868 0 > >Dean Whitter 55,391 484 0 > >Petty Cash 3,000 0 0 * Why is so much stock being traded? What is it for? Employee bonuses? Ownership of child companies? >Raw inventory 172,252 0 76,064 * not much, although what is it in? reconfirms picture as just an intermediate company, almost just a `reseller'. >Accrued payroll 25,637CR 343,682 318,045 >Accrued bonuses 214,040 341,240 127,200 * how does this break down among employees? >Common Stock 169,320 0 61,435 > >Capital disbursement 916,675 222,230 0 > >Retd Earnings, begng 2,385,020CR 0 0 * more stock. What does it mean? Retd? disbursement? >Subcontracts 0 932,210 110,419 * almost $1M debit for 4 months. Most of the action is here. >Materials/parts 0 186,252 22,423 * for what? >Direct labor-Engnrg 0 240,341 54,172 > >Direct labor-Technician 0 129,839 37,459 > >Direct labor-Adminst 0 47,542 10,081 * why are these in a different category than employee costs? What's the difference? >Special Bonus 0 132,200 123,200 * Comes out to $9K. What does it mean? >G&A Labor 0 103,4520 0 * G&A means? 100K is fairly large; more than consulting fees for example.

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Re: SIGINT and TEMPEST follies
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 26 May '93

26 May '93

In cypherpunks, fergp(a)sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) replied to my article (elisions[...] added) > > [...] The precise standards are classified (some SECRET, some > > CONFIDENTIAL COMSEC), [...], but as long > > as you're not using classified information as your sources, you can > > do anything you want. [...] > I beg your pardon, but this is _not_ the case. TEMPEST requirements > are _not_ classified and are available for public scrutiny. (You > obviously do not know where to look.) Ok, there may be standards that aren't classified. (Good!) I was referring to NACSIM 5100, 5100A, 5203, and their friends; different generations of the documents are NACSEM rather than NACSIM. > > TEMPEST isn't particularly about transients or electromagnetic pulses, > > it's about overall electromagnetic emissions. > > You're trying to separate issues that are one and the same. With the > proper equipment, I can put you and an IBM Selectric (tm) typewriter > on a wooden raft in the middle of Lake Superior, monitor and realize > every keystroke that you make and you'd not be the wiser. This type > of monitoring is easily defeated by low yield TEMPEST requirements. > I've worked in this area, Bill, and have tested these _facts_. I > don't care how you care to word it, it _is_ transient > electromagnetic emissions. I'm not arguing about whether the stuff works, I believe that :-) VT100s and Brother electronic typewriters are two other classic emitters; I hadn't heard that the IBM was loud, but it's certainly a good target. The wording *is* relevant when you're discussing whether a proposed acronym is real or made-up-to-fit, and as I said, > > I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the > > documents I read. and the proposed expansions are really stretching credibility, as were the quoted article's contentions that using TEMPEST protection was illegal. > I know the technical specifics of TEMPEST (it is an acronym, BTW) If it really is, it sounds like they made up the name TEMPEST first and stretched the words *real* hard to fit, since it's not really about EMP. > > In the case of the Crippler Chip, however, you knew it had a built-in > > wiretap when you bought it, which changes some of the reasonable > > expectations about privacy a bit. > This issue is one where I must disagree with you emphatically. > The majority of the American public don't even know about Clipper. Sure, but if you're a pro-government court trying to rationalize the behavior of government officials, as the courts have been doing lately, the fact that most Americans haven't read the White House Press Releases or the New York Times won't be given much respect - they've found a presumed lack of privacy in the use of cordless phones, and I'll bet you a floppy disk they'll find some excuse to support unauthorized wiretapping of Crippler* phones if the things become widespread. > Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip. Yeah. Actually, I won't mind much if government officials use the system when for their internal communications; it's presumably fairly secure, and makes it possible to subpoena "secure" conversations by government officials if we need to, though it does risk giving the NSA more power over the rest of the government if they've stolen the keys. Bill Stewart * Clipper is a trademark of Intergraph.

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Re: Anonymity on the net
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 26 May '93

26 May '93

In case you missed it...Wall Street Journal of May 24, page B1 had an article by Wm. F. Buckley on Internet anonymous messages. The article was about some professor who wrote a program to erase anon messages automatically and how he got "shouted down" and withdrew his program (it only ran on his netnews site anyway). The analogy Buckley used was that of self-policing coffee houses where people doing anti-social things are shouted out by the crowd. I guess Buckley is into anon remailers (or at least their use as free speech devices) since he portrayed the guy wiping out anon messages as being anti-social. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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Steganography
by norm＠netcom.com 26 May '93

26 May '93

Here is a pitfall to be avoided in Steganography using low bits of AD converter output. Such converters may be biased in their low bit. If you hid 2,000,000 bits in a digitized image you would probably get from 998,000 to 1,002,000 one bits if you took no precautions. A real digitizer might well be expected to produce more than 1,100,000 one bits or less than 900,000. Falling too close to 50% would be a clue that the data was not the yield of a AD converter. Stuffing a few percent of extra one bits according to a random number generator known to the receiver makes the data look more typical. There may be statictical dependencies with the next more significant bit as well. Some elementary statistics can be done on the yield of a real image scanner to examine this issue.

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Anonymity on the net
by poier＠sfu.ca 26 May '93

26 May '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I know of several anonymous remailers: would it not be a good idea to "link up" several of these hosts so that one mails the first remailer, which mails another and so on and so on.... This would be a real pain in the butt to retrace, as surely the owner info wont be rubber hosed out of all of the host bosses.... Skye - -- - -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality) |||| |||| email: poier(a)sfu.ca p-OO <--> OO-q THINK PGP Public Key available on finger \== ==/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLAKpgS0bkpXW3omvAQFwgAQAzXstBcts8h5U3chnu7SQe67DFgsj4dG1 Jz3BrK2QFHMspkVtxShAC+xBfIYwvR3eCIInKFFjxdzBxbprEJk+pwaNibFvtqDS IkMM86gr6dsu0UtY0jh73I63M1aZukWVUOzO2TpPL++fibKFBYQDJFD7xeOJWHx7 OeTEAL3gedk= =rKKD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Anonymity on the net
by tcmay＠netcom.com 26 May '93

26 May '93

Skye Merlin Poier writes: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I know of several anonymous remailers: would it not be a good idea to "link up" >several of these hosts so that one mails the first remailer, which mails >another >and so on and so on.... This would be a real pain in the butt to retrace, as >surely the owner info wont be rubber hosed out of all of the host bosses.... Chaining remailers is of course the basic idea of using remailers. "Linking up" the remailers would sort of defeat the purpose of the remailers, wouldn't it? The idea is for only the sender to really know the sequence of remailers. (Of course, some of us aren't always using encrypted remailers--though we really should be--and hence the first remailer node theoretically knows who sent the message and where it's going. (Later remailers won't know, as all header info gets stripped out, so most of the benefits are retained.) Longterm, this will have to fixed, by more and easier encryption. For now, just using remailers as I show below is a good exercise.) Using remailers is easily done, and in fact I do this for nearly all of the "remailed" messages I send (no, I won't say which of the "anonymous" or "nobody" messages I sent...if more people used remailers, we'd all be better off). I encourage everyone out there who has not yet played with remailers to give them a quick try. You can see for yourself in the next 10 minutes what this all means, just by sending yourself an "anonymous" message! Here's an example script I use. Note that I favor the "double colon" (sounds like a medical condition, doesn't it?) format, as my mailer doesn't have a convenient way of messing with the headers. (You are of course free to try the other remailer format, described in the documentation for the remailers.) To use the double colon method, simply place a "::" on a blank line in the _body_ of your message (not the header) followed by a line with "Request-Remailing-To: next address" in it. And then another blank line, and then your message. The forms below should make this clearer. Then _another_ such remailer form can be included, and another, and another, and so forth. Very easy to use. (Whoever came up with the double colon format, please keep it in future versions!) Karl Barrus occasionally publishes a list of operating remailers. I occasionally test these remailers by sending messages to myself, to assure myself they're still up and running and are sending stuff through promptly. I keep a small database of "functional remailers," with their speeds (most remail within seconds) and such. Once I've "pinged" these remailers, I feel more confidant about chaining several of them together. Example of Several Hops: To: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: final address This is a test message. Several hops. Even more remailer addresses could of course be included here. {this went through in just a few minutes} To use this yourself, replace the "final address" with your own address. You should get an "anonymous" or "nobody" message in just a few minutes. Naturally, you can vary the order of the remailers, use others, etc. Check out the list of remailers Karl Barrus publishes (and maybe it's even in the soda archives?) and "roll your own." Even use PGP with the sites that support it (and at least one of the sites *requires* PGP, last time I checked). If the last address is one of the mail-to-NetNews sites, you've just posted anonymously. Happy anonymous remailing! -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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