- cypherpunks-legacy@lists.ogf.org

Forwarded article.
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

This article was forwarded to you by whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker): --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!news!uunet!usc!math.ohio-state.edu! magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!dbruedig From: dbruedig(a)magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Dena L Bruedigam) Newsgroups: alt.politics.libertarian Subject: Claustrophobia Date: 20 Jul 1993 00:56:45 GMT Organization: The Ohio State University Lines: 25 Message-ID: <22ffsd$adq(a)charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: top.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu The August issue of _Claustrophobia_ is hot off the press and has some great articles of interest to libertarians, such as: * NSA: The Eyes of Big Brother, an expose of the prying secret government organization * What You Should Know About Your Social Security Number * Violence on TV * The Right (?) to Health Care * And more! =========================================================================== For a free sample, just send your name and address and a 29-cent stamp to: Claustrophobia 400 N. High St. #137 Columbus, OH 43215 ============================================================================ ** The Claustrophobia staff has agreed not to sell, rent, trade, or give ** ** away our mailing list -- ever. --------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

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AP Story
by broitman＠bucrf4.bu.edu 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

> He should've used PGP! since they had his computer, they had his PUBKEY and SECKEY files... and more than likely his pass phrase in simple encryption somewhere in his files...(fairly easy to break simple encryptions...like CRYPT command on unix...) Don't you think? -JzB %#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#% Internet:broitman@koala.bu.edu J.Z.Broitman broitman(a)radon.bu.edu Dept. of Chemistry broitman(a)carbon.bu.edu Boston University broitman(a)xenon.bu.edu Snail:42 Maynard St. W.Newton MA. 02165 %#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%

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stegano codes.
by TO1SITTLER＠APSICC.APS.EDU 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

In reference to a message by Mike Johnson: I was thinking of steganography as being in two stages: first, you encrypt, (possibly with the identity transformation) then, you embed your encrypted message in your medium of transmission. My previous message was describing requirements for a strong encryption algorithm, quite apart from the actual embedding. I stand by my statements: the purpose of steganography is to make it difficult or impossible for an interloper to determine that enciphered data are being transferred. Thus, embedding a magic number in the file defeats the purpose completely. (As opposed to "slightly reducing security.") I accept your correction regarding availability of software. I think that designing a program to embed this apparently random bitstream in an innocent-looking file is a different and much harder problem. It is probable that I have misunderstood some part of your message, and I apologize if this is the case. Kragen (Bug my sysman for a newsreader that allows quoting with >'s-his username is jim.)

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Re: Crypto Patent Abstracts #1
by Stanton McCandlish 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

Well, I hereby relinquish my claim to having the most complete PGP site. Aql beats NitV hands down! But not for long... >;) Truly impressive though! PS someone requested that I UL my stuff (much of it hard-to-get Fido/PGP utils, and the like) to their site. Who was that? I've lost the msg. -- Stanton McCandlish * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. * anton(a)hydra.unm.edu * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION * FidoNet: 1:301/2 * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! * Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *

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PGP: "Stealth" mode
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- J. Michael Diehl wrote: Many encryption tools such as ripem, pgp, and dolphin can recognize their own output...which indicates that there is a footprint to that particular implimentation. There has been discussion among us PGP developers (I guess I am one now; see my recent posts to alt.security.pgp) of implementation of a "stealth" option, which would remove all the identifying footprints from encrypted output. RSA-Encrypted files would start with the (random) IDEA key followed by IDEA-encrypted data. Conventionally encrypted files (-c) would contain only encrypted data. Possibly the armor format wouldn't change, since PGP can be used to convert any binary file to armored form (-a). But it would probably be better to convert PGP binary output to e-mailable form using a common external utility like UUENCODE to make it look even more ordinary, especially if you change the UUENCODE BEGIN statement to specify, say, xxx.ZIP instead of XXX.PGP. Of course, the UUDECODED file wouldn't be recognized by PKUNZIP. "Oh, what a shame, the file must have got corrupted somewhere on the net". That's the easy part. The hard part is designing decryption procedures. PGP would have to prompt something like: "unrecognized input file. May be stealth mode. Select procedure 1. Assume RSA file with your default secret key 2. " " " Prompt for userid of secret key to try. 3. " " " try all your secret keys (may be impractical on slower CPU's) 4. Assume conventional file. prompt for pass phrase." Also note that for each secret key tried, PGP must prompt for its pass phrase. Of course, once decryption is successful, then the usual footprints can be there for signatures and compression. AFAIK, this idea is still just in the talking stage. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a.1/EWS iQCVAgUBLElab94nNf3ah8DHAQFIEwP/RR1+oUMpJL75smnHJCfP+8e8b4+P6uEm uFpyN1LOpVbuKwNG73tu2c/wvdmABDH39xDDs5C29rOj/RFjpGWj40wTXJcvJ878 dSI/Dmj1pAZXCay9qSOldxxrtXes/wsCuQtHL/PX9y+tcXGIaduP4TYlxMSCqXvr rwNTH1jeM5I= =t5A8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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OOPS!
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

On July 15, I posted here: If there is any interest, I will bring both soft and hard-copies to the next Physical Meeting, which I presume will take place on the 2nd Sat of August, 8/8, noon, at Cygnus in Mtn. View. ... Of course that should have read on the 2nd Sat of August, 8/14, noon, at Cygnus in Mtn. View. ... ^^^^^^ Sorry if this error caused any confusion. It's not my fault; All the blame falls on my computer calendar which just has "S" for both Saturday and Sunday. (:} -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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PGP tutorial
by wet!naga 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

>Date: 14 Jul 93 19:50:26 EDT >From: Michael Glazer <72440.2236(a)CompuServe.COM> >Subject: PGP > >Folks, > > I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general > and PGP and similar programs in particular. Any advice? @article{Nathan92, author = {Paco Xander Nathan}, journal = {Fringeware Review}, month = {July}, number = {1}, pages = {17--18}, title = {Tutorial: PGP}, volume = {1}, year = {1992} Fringeware Review is available for $3.50 from Fringeware Inc., P. O. Box 49921, Austin, TX 78765 (512-477-1366, fringeware(a)wixer.bga.com) This issue also has articles on inter-experiential snorkeling, cruzin' the internet, email lists, tom jennings, the abolition of work, mind control, cyborganics, melt-o-media and even cypherpunx.

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Crypto Patent Abstracts #1
by J. J. Larrea 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

Cypherpunks, I finally got to the library to do some patent searches. Attached to this mail is summary information on 6 significant crypto patents. Note that some of the patent numbers which have appeared in prior postings on cypherpunks were incorrect, but I managed to track down the references via other means; someone should make sure they're correct in any relavent FAQs etc. Of the 6, I have full-text for 4 of them: Schnorr: 4,995,082 Gaffney: 4,562,305 Hellman-Pohlig: 4,424,414 Rivest-Shamir: 4,405,829 and partial text for one more: Hellman-Merkle: 4,218,582 I hope to be able to get a full version of Hellman-Merkle, as well as: Hellman-Diffie: 4,200,770 within a week. So, is there an FTP site I should place these on? Have fun, J.J. Larrea O / \/ /\ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CUT HERE ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ O \ US PAT NO: 4,995,082 [IMAGE AVAILABLE] L19: 1 of 5 DATE ISSUED: Feb. 19, 1991 TITLE: Method for identifying subscribers and for generating and verifying electronic signatures in a data exchange system INVENTOR: Claus P. Schnorr, Frankfurterstr. 81, 6350 Bad Nauheim, Federal Republic of Germany APPL-NO: 07/484,127 DATE FILED: Feb. 23, 1990 ART-UNIT: 222 PRIM-EXMR: Thomas H. Tarcza ASST-EXMR: David Cain LEGAL-REP: Hill, Van Santen, Steadman & Simpson ABSTRACT: In a data exchange system working with processor chip cards, a chip card transmits coded identification data I, v and, proceeding from a random, discrete logarithm r, an exponential value x=2.sup.r (mod p) to the subscriber who, in turn, generates and transmits a random bit sequence e to the chip card. By multiplication of a stored, private key s with the bit sequence e and by addition of the random number r, the chip card calculates a y value and transmits the y value to the subscriber who, in turn, calculates an x value from the information y, v.sub.j and e and checks whether the calculated x value coincides with the transmitted x value. For an electronic signature, a hash value e is first calculated from an x value and from the message m to be signed and a y value is subsequently calculated from the information r, s.sub.j and e. The numbers x and y then yield the electronic signature of the message m. US PAT NO: 4,405,829 [IMAGE AVAILABLE] L19: 3 of 5 DATE ISSUED: Sep. 20, 1983 TITLE: Cryptographic communications system and method INVENTOR: Ronald L. Rivest, Belmont, MA Adi Shamir, Cambridge, MA Leonard M. Adleman, Arlington, MA ASSIGNEE: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (U.S. corp.) APPL-NO: 05/860,586 DATE FILED: Dec. 14, 1977 ART-UNIT: 222 PRIM-EXMR: Sal Cangialosi LEGAL-REP: Arthur A. Smith, Jr., Robert J. Horn, Jr. ABSTRACT: A cryptographic communications system and method. The system includes a communications channel coupled to at least one terminal having an encoding device and to at least one terminal having a decoding device. A message-to-be-transferred is enciphered to ciphertext at the encoding terminal by first encoding the message as a number M in a predetermined set, and then raising that number to a first predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver) and finally computing the remainder, or residue, C, when the exponentiated number is divided by the product of two predetermined prime numbers (associated with the intended receiver). The residue C is the ciphertext. The ciphertext is deciphered to the original message at the decoding terminal in a similar manner by raising the ciphertext to a second predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver), and then computing the residue, M', when the exponentiated ciphertext is divided by the product of the two predetermined prime numbers associated with the intended receiver. The residue M' corresponds to the original encoded message M. US PAT NO: 4,200,770 [IMAGE AVAILABLE] L19: 5 of 5 DATE ISSUED: Apr. 29, 1980 TITLE: Cryptographic apparatus and method INVENTOR: Martin E. Hellman, Stanford, CA Bailey W. Diffie, Berkeley, CA Ralph C. Merkle, Palo Alto, CA ASSIGNEE: Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA (U.S. corp.) DATE ISSUED: Apr. 29, 1980 TITLE: Cryptographic apparatus and method APPL-NO: 05/830,754 DATE FILED: Sep. 6, 1977 ART-UNIT: 222 PRIM-EXMR: Howard A. Birmiel LEGAL-REP: Flehr, Hohbach, Test ABSTRACT: A cryptographic system transmits a computationally secure cryptogram over an insecure communication channel without prearrangement of a cipher key. A secure cipher key is generated by the conversers from transformations of exchanged transformed signals. The conversers each possess a secret signal and exchange an initial transformation of the secret signal with the other converser. The received transformation of the other converser's secret signal is again transformed with the receiving converser's secret signal to generate a secure cipher key. The transformations use non-secret operations that are easily performed but extremely difficult to invert. It is infeasible for an eavesdropper to invert the initial transformation to obtain either conversers' secret signal, or duplicate the latter transformation to obtain the secure cipher key. US PAT NO: 4,562,305 [IMAGE AVAILABLE] L22: 1 of 3 DATE ISSUED: Dec. 31, 1985 TITLE: Software cryptographic apparatus and method INVENTOR: John E. Gaffney, Jr., Bethesda, MD ASSIGNEE: International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk, NY (U.S. corp.) APPL-NO: 06/452,248 DATE FILED: Dec. 22, 1982 ART-UNIT: 222 DATE ISSUED: Dec. 31, 1985 TITLE: Software cryptographic apparatus and method PRIM-EXMR: Salvatore Cangialosi ASST-EXMR: Aaron J. Lewis LEGAL-REP: John E. Hoel ABSTRACT: An improved software cryptographic apparatus and method are disclosed. The apparatus and method enables the encryption of the object code of a program so as to enable relocatable code operations. The apparatus and method will adapt program execution for a mixture of encrypted and nonencrypted code. A particular advantage of the apparatus and method is its accommodation of interrupts and branches while carrying out the cryptographic function. US PAT NO: 4,424,414 [IMAGE AVAILABLE] L22: 2 of 3 DATE ISSUED: Jan. 3, 1984 TITLE: Exponentiation cryptographic apparatus and method INVENTOR: Martin E. Hellman, Stanford, CA Stephen C. Pohlig, Acton, MA ASSIGNEE: Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, Stanford, CA (U.S. corp.) APPL-NO: 05/901,770 DATE FILED: May 1, 1978 ART-UNIT: 222 PRIM-EXMR: Sal Cangialosi LEGAL-REP: Flehr, Hohbach, Test, Albritton & Herbert ABSTRACT: A cryptographic system transmits a computationally secure cryptogram that is generated from a secret transformation of the message sent by the authorized transmitter; the cryptogram is again transformed by the authorized receiver using a secret reciprocal transformation to reproduce the message sent. The secret transformations use secret cipher keys that are known only by the authorized transmitter and receiver. The transformations are performed with nonsecret operations, exponentiation, that are easily performed but extremely difficult to invert. It is computationally infeasible for an eavesdropper either to solve known plaintext-ciphertext pairs for the secret cipher keys, or to invert the nonsecret operations that are used to generate the cryptogram. US PAT NO: 4,218,582 [IMAGE AVAILABLE] L22: 3 of 3 DATE ISSUED: Aug. 19, 1980 TITLE: Public key cryptographic apparatus and method INVENTOR: Martin E. Hellman, Stanford, CA Ralph C. Merkle, Palo Alto, CA DATE ISSUED: Aug. 19, 1980 TITLE: Public key cryptographic apparatus and method ASSIGNEE: The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University , Stanford, CA (U.S. corp.) APPL-NO: 05/839,939 DATE FILED: Oct. 6, 1977 ART-UNIT: 222 PRIM-EXMR: Howard A. Birmiel ABSTRACT: A cryptographic system transmits a computationally secure cryptogram that is generated from a publicly known transformation of the message sent by the transmitter; the cryptogram is again transformed by the authorized receiver using a secret reciprocal transformation to reproduce the message sent. The authorized receiver's transformation is known only by the authorized receiver and is used to generate the transmitter's transformation that is made publicly known. The publicly known transformation uses operations that are easily performed but extremely difficult to invert. It is infeasible for an unauthorized receiver to invert the publicly known transformation or duplicate the authorized receiver's secret transformation to obtain the message sent. *** END ***

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Re: ANON: AP story
by smb＠research.att.com 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

The federal wiretap law was expanded in 1986 to prohibit employers, including the government, from accessing employee work computer records. Under the law, the government is allowed to conduct clandestine searches if the employee is suspected of espionage or theft. Pederson was under no such suspicion. [I guess this is the ECPA?] I'd like someone to provide some statute citations or some case law to back this up. As I read the ECPA, nothing in it prevents an employer from looking at employee files. (Admittedly, the government may be different.) The following quote is from @article{hernandez, title = {{ECPA} and Online Computer Privacy}, author = {Ruel Torres Hernandez}, journal = {Federal Communications Law Journal}, volume = 41, number = 1, month = {November}, year = 1988, pages = {17--41} } ECPA protection in the employer-employee situation may indeed be non-existent. [Footnote: This legislative intent to exclude corporate monitoring of employees from ECPA was confirmed by those who followed the drafting of the legislation. According to Jerry Berman, counsel for the Americal Civil Liberties Union, a participant in the drafting of th elegislation, ``ECPA `goes right up to the water's edge [of employee privacy protection] but stops short' and to have included some employee privacy protection against employers in the corporate context `would have killed the bill.' '' Electronic message from Brock Meeks (Mar. 31, 1988)] While the corporate exception acknolwedges an employer's property rights in all parts of his business, it leaves the employee's privacy interests completely unprotected. I should note that the ECPA also explicitly permits monitoring ``as may be necessarily incident to ... the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service''. Again, if anyone has hard citations to the contrary, I'd really like to know. In the case that has drawn the most attention, the Epson email case, the claim was based on a state law that protects employee telephone calls. From what I've read, the judge rule against the plaintiff on the grounds that only voice calls were protected. That ruling was apparently not appealed, probably because there was little chance that that holding would be overturned. --Steve Bellovin

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Re: It could happen to anyone (fwd Washington Post commentary)
by allan＠elvis.tamu.edu 20 Jul '93

20 Jul '93

Is it just me? Or does CNN just not cover things like the Randy Weaver trial when the gov't loses? -- Allan Bailey, UNIX programmer, CSC | "Freedom is not free." Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | or: allan.bailey(a)tamu.edu 616c6c616e206261696c6579 | or: nefud-the-delirious(a)tamu.edu

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