August 2006 - caops-wg - lists.ogf.org

Certificate Profile document, update v0.5
by David Groep 12 Sep '06

12 Sep '06

Dear all, The last version of the certificate profile draft document is now almost two months old, so its high time for a new version that we can discuss in Washington (GGF18). The new version can be found at: http://www.eugridpma.org/temporary/eugridpma-certprofile-20060717-0-5.pdf (and I'll try to upload to GridForge once that works again; there is also an associated MS Word .doc version on the web site). I've completely restructured the document, taking Kaspar's comments into account. So it now has - two separate parts: one for CA certs and one for EE certs - the wording is RFC2119 - reference is to RFC3280 (and no longer 2459) - many extensions added, and more guidance text Please have a look through the document, and send your comments, suggestions, and text on additional extensions. Cheers, DavidG. -- David Groep ** National Institute for Nuclear and High Energy Physics, PDP/Grid group ** ** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam NL **

4 5

IGTF, CAOps, other activities at GGF 18
by Alan Sill 29 Aug '06

29 Aug '06

It would be nice to compile a list of topics and sessions of interest for CA operations and related topics at GGF 18. Does anyone have such a list started? Alan Alan Sill TIGRE Senior Scientist High Performance Computing Center TTU ==================================================================== : Alan Sill, Texas Tech University Office: Admin 233, MS 4-1167 : : e-mail: Alan.Sill(a)ttu.edu ph. 806-742-4350 fax 806-742-4358 : ====================================================================

6 10

Re: AW: [igtf-general] Re: [caops-wg] Certificate Profile document, update v0.5
by David Groep 16 Aug '06

16 Aug '06

Hi Ursula, all, Epting, Ursula wrote: > Dear Jens, David and all, the document is very well done, good work! I've > added some small comments and (possible) corrections of typos (using word > track changes on Jens' doc, after accepting all his changes) I've merged these in and produced version 0.8 - now on the web at http://www.eugridpma.org/temporary/ Most of the comments I've just merged, some are discussed below: * in section 2.1, on the serial number stuff: I've created a new subsection ("2.2 Serial Number") and put all this text there. * in section 3.1, "version number must be set to "2"": this is indeed the encoding of the version number in the first INTEGER of the certificate * section 3.2.1 "dNSName" and others funky capitalisation taken from the standards documents (where things never start with a capital letter) * On the Unicore need for "nsCertType: server, client" I've not seen this requirement before (of having a need for *both* server *and* client being asserted here). If you can dig up the email, I'll be very happy. Please do. * Section 4.2 "Key lengths and hashed" Since SHA-256 is not supported, we'll have to live with SHA-1 for the time being, despite it having only 80 bits effective. Thanks a lot, DavidG. > > Mit freundlichen Gruessen/ With kind regards > > Ursula Epting > > Ursula Epting Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe Institut fuer Wissenschaftliches > Rechnen (IWR) Grid Infrastruktur und Services (GIS) Tel. +049 (0)7247-82-6786 > Fax +049 (0)7247-82-7786 e-mail: ursula.epting(a)iwr.fzk.de > ----------------------------------------------- GridKa-Zertifikat > SHA1-Fingerprint: > 0B:DD:25:06:98:74:D6:81:DD:1E:AF:2F:AD:7A:EA:10:75:CE:7E:6E > ----------------------------------------------- > ************************************************************************** > The Institute for Scientific Computing of Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe will > again run its annual GridKa School from September 11-15, 2006. Please find > further information at http://www.fzk.de/gks06 . > ************************************************************************** > > > > > >> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Jensen, J (Jens) >> [mailto:J.Jensen@rl.ac.uk] Gesendet: Dienstag, 15. August 2006 09:31 An: >> David Groep; dg-eur-ca(a)services.cnrs.fr Cc: All IGTF Members >> (igtf-general); CAOPS-WG Betreff: RE: [igtf-general] Re: [caops-wg] >> Certificate Profile document, update v0.5 >> >> >> David, I have now finally had time to go through the document and made only >> a few changes. And fixed a few bugs, like commonName cannot use IA5String >> as encoding. I used Word's change tracker. >> >> http://www.grid-support.ac.uk/files/eugridpma-certprofile-2006 >> 0814-0-6-jens.doc >> >> What would be the consequences of saying in 4.1 "RDNs MUST be in the Right >> Order". Will we lose SWITCH and Purdue? >> >> Would it be worth expanding section 5 into a general annotated openssl.cnf? >> If new CAs feel this would be useful, I will be happy to provide something >> (if so, please reply to me). >> >> The document has also gradually started to describe how software deals with >> certificates - browsers, OpenLDAP, etc. This could be expanded. >> >> Thanks, --jens >> >> >> -----Original Message----- From: owner-caops-wg(a)ggf.org >> [mailto:owner-caops-wg@ggf.org]On Behalf Of David Groep Sent: 14 August >> 2006 13:08 To: dg-eur-ca(a)services.cnrs.fr Cc: All IGTF Members >> (igtf-general); CAOPS-WG Subject: Re: [igtf-general] Re: [caops-wg] >> Certificate Profile document, update v0.5 >> >> >> Hi Reimer, >> >> Thanks for the comments. Answers in-line, and a new document is on the web >> at >> >> >> http://www.eugridpma.org/temporary/eugridpma-certprofile-20060 814-0-6.pdf >> >> http://www.eugridpma.org/temporary/eugridpma-certprofile-20060 814-0-6.doc >> >> >> Reimer Karlsen-Masur, DFN-CERT wrote: >> >>> ... In section 2.2: >>> >>> Within the Issuer and Subject DNs, the following attributes >> >> *are known >> >>> to cause problems*: >> >> That was a piece of legacy text that I ought to have removed. As the >> document was restructure, this is now a plain list of attributeTypes. >> >> >>> 2.2.4 DomainComponent, country, organization, >> >> organizationalUnit, etc. >> >>> ... 2.2.5 commonName ... >>> >>> I am confused. Why are these causing problems, except maybe for multiple >>> RDNs of same name (except for DCs)? >> >> Multiple "O"'s are OK, and even multiple CNs are rumoured to be OK (the >> CERN-IS CA will find out :-) >> >> >>> In section 3.3.8 only some forms of the AKI block the in-place >>> replacement of CA certificates. If the AKI does only >> >> contain the hash >> >>> value I think it is working fine. IMO this hash only >> >> changes if the CA >> >>> key changes. And "in-place replacement" means extending the >> >> lifetime of >> >>> a CA certificate and maybe changing the serial number but >> >> nothing else, >> >>> right? >>> >>> If the AKI of an EE cert contains the dirname (i.e. the >> >> subject DN) of >> >>> the issuing CA issuing CA (note: this is the right number >> >> of repetitions >> >>> of "issuing CA" cause it is the *issuer* DN of the EE certs >> >> issuing CA >> >>> cert) plus the EE certs issuing CAs certificate serial number the >>> problems start when the replacement CA certificate gets a >> >> new serial >> >>> number (which it should as to sections above). >>> >>> When an in-place CA cert replacement is eventually planned >> >> for in the >> >>> future and this will come with a CA key change, above does >> >> not apply and >> >>> it is better to not use AKIs at all. >> >> This updated text should be better: The authorityKeyIdentifier is not >> usually interpreted by the software. It is not known to cause issues with >> grid software, as it is ignored. The extension MUST NOT be marked critical. >> >> >> If the AKI contains information that changes when the CA certificate is >> modified, it will block any "smooth" replacement of CA certificates (i.e. >> updating a CA certificate to modify the expiry date). Possible attributes >> in AKI include the directoryName of the authority that issued the issuer >> certificate (safe as it should not change) plus the serial number (which >> may or may not change), and/or the keyId of the end-entity issuing CA. If >> the keyIdentifier has been generated using one of the two recommended >> methods from RFC3280 (i.e. is purely derived from the public key value), it >> will not impair smooth replacement. >> >> >> >>> AKIs are also used in (Sub-)CA certificates, so similar apply there. >>> >>> In section 3.3.12 the AIA could additionally/alternatively hold the >>> issuing CAs certificate download URI. Can also be set in Sub-CA >>> certificates. This can be used to automatically retrieve CA >> >> certs for >> >>> validation path building and path validation. IMO at least >> >> Microsoft's >> >>> smart card Single-Sign-Logon is using these. >> >> Added to 3.3.12. >> >> Cheers, DavidG. >> >> >> >> -- David Groep >> >> ** National Institute for Nuclear and High Energy Physics, PDP/Grid group >> ** ** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam >> NL ** >> >> >> -- David Groep ** National Institute for Nuclear and High Energy Physics, PDP/Grid group ** ** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam NL **

1 0

Mailing list issues?
by David Groep 11 Aug '06

11 Aug '06

Dear all, (sorry, you don't need to reply to this message) I'm not sure that the caops-wg(a)ggf.org mailing list is still working correctly, and that everyone actually received the mail sent to it. This mail, sent on Friday, August 11, around 15.50 CEST, and exclusively to the caops-wg(a)ggf.org list. I've just sent the draft of the Cert Profile document half an hour ago, but I've not seen it yet through the caops-wg list, and the archive is dead since June 2006... But that mail I also sent to igtf-general, so many of you may have gotten it anyway. This mail is primarily to test the mailing list itself. Regards, DavidG. -- David Groep ** National Institute for Nuclear and High Energy Physics, PDP/Grid group ** ** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam NL **

1 0